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To Doug, a guide, a challenger, and a trustworthy friend
“Th e operation of the mind—conscious and unconscious, free and 
unfree, in perception, action, and thought, in feeling, emotion, refl ection, 
and memory, and in all its other features—is not so much an aspect of our 




Writing a book is comparable to a long journey. An adventure made of twists 
and turns, of travels down narrow country routes where the road signs oft en 
disappear. Th is challenging and exciting journey is impossible without sup-
port and guidance. We have been extremely lucky to benefi t from intellectual 
and friendly guides along the way. Without them, the expedition would have 
been more sinuous, perilous, and far less engaging! 
Th e philosophy of the mind was our fi rst guiding star. Turning our minds 
upside down to apprehend activist’s understandings of the social and po-
litical world—and we admit having been initially lost facing the many pos-
sible intellectual roads—we encountered John Searle’s book Mind, A Brief 
Introduction. Th is work accompanied us along the steep paths that led us 
to rethink the concepts of mind and intentionality. Colleagues have asked 
us why we opt for the term mind, rather than values, attitudes, perceptions, 
or cognitions. But Searle’s work makes us aware that those terminologies 
only bring the tip of the iceberg into sight. Simply put, he made us aware that 
the mind is central to our lives. We think, feel, imagine, remember, and act 
thanks to it. It is central to our lives, as Searle’s quote emphasizes. Th e phi-
losophy of the mind was hence essential as we set out to apprehend activists’ 
subjective and qualitative comprehension of the social and political world.
A second guide, who accompanied us since our very fi rst steps in social 
science research, was Charles Tilly, whose work broadened our perspective 
by helping us conceptualize social movements as contention. Politics and 
confl ict are central to understand protest dynamics. Tilly’s work also helped 
us to understand contention in a relational perspective and his contribution 
was key in grasping how talks and ties shape the activist’s mind and enables 
action. We have always been aware of the privilege it has been to have crossed 
Chuck’s path, both as a social scientist and as a person. Chuck was a generous 
man with exceptional human qualities and we will always remember how 
his eyes lit up when he said: “Let’s go to the seminar”. Chuck was a man who 
gave you the taste for social science research, and did so with passion and 
generosity. 
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The true revolution is the one of the mind.
Aung San Suu Kyi
Margot is a seventy- year- old with a lifelong commitment to political ac-
tivism. As a university student in the early seventies, she helped migrants 
coming from southern Europe settle in Switzerland, notably by delivering 
classes in French. She has pursued her social commitments since:  joining 
labor unions, social workers organizations, migrants’ right contention, and 
various new left groups. Twenty years ago she joined Greenpeace, which 
now constitutes her sole political commitment. At Greenpeace, she dedicates 
her time to sensitizing students at public schools to ecological problems, 
participates in the organization’s national council, is involved in the ongoing 
construction of strategies and selection of thematic priorities, and engages 
in what Greenpeace calls “activists” groups— small intervention groups that 
undertake illegal actions to protect our environment. Her life has been one 
de dicated to the improvement of society.
Why has Margot been this committed? A number of explanations come 
to mind. She possesses the necessary resources: Margot is a highly educated 
member of the new middle class, typically overrepresented in post- industrial 
movements (Kriesi 1993). Another key factor is: the social networks. Having 
begun her activist career during her student days, she forged particular 
formal ties that bound her to contentious groups at an early stage. She is also 
embedded in an extensive network of friends— including her husband— who 
are committed socially and politically. Now retired, she is able to devote most 
of her time to ecological advocacy. These are the most probable explanations 
that we, social movement scholars, would think of. However, the focus of this 
book is on Margot’s mind, and that of other activists. We aim to show that 
the manner in which Margot perceives her social and political environment 
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helps explain how she is able to participate and sustain her commitment to 
environmental protection.
Margot conceives of her commitment as an action that objectively 
improves people’s lives. In her view, pollution, excessive consumption, the 
exhaustion of natural resources, and global warming starkly impact human 
living conditions. Environmental destruction threatens the livelihood of 
those who will follow in our wake, and Margot perceives this as a major in-
justice: “We inherited the earth, a place full of life. We use portions of those 
elements, and destroy others. But the earth is a common good and we are 
diminishing both our inheritance and our legacy.” The main object of her 
commitment— environmental protection— is to preserve a common good 
that affects everyone. In this respect, Margot understands society as a highly 
interconnected and interdependent ensemble: “Society exists thanks to so-
cial ties and human relations. Without such ties, societies can develop only 
in an imbalanced fashion. . . . We exist, as persons, because of those ties; we 
are merely fractions in a whole.” Margot’s action is construed as an action 
for fellow citizens; her commitment goes beyond her own interests. Her pic-
ture of society is one that relies on a universalist dimension. For Margot, we 
all belong to the same world, and for society, this space is devoid of bound-
aries or lines between groups of people. As she asserts:  “We should work 
toward a more open world: A world without social, faith- based, or cultural 
distinctions. This is an imperative for me.” Crystallized here is Margot’s per-
ception of her social environment, or as we label it, her understanding of 
common good.
Margot further relies on a specific understanding of politics, including 
key actors in the domain. While economic actors are perceived as respon-
sible for the destruction of our environment, state actors are viewed as chiefly 
accountable when it comes to regulating society as well as protecting and 
bringing about common good. Regarding environmental protection, Margot 
delegitimizes state actors on grounds of a lack of accountability: “I entertain a 
difficult relationship with state actors. They don’t go far enough because they 
are profit oriented. What we need are measures that seriously reduce futile 
consumption, but I doubt they will act in this direction.” Civil society actors 
are hence crucial in influencing political decision making and challenging 
state actors when they fail to protect the common good. For Margot, it is only 
through protest action that people can voice their concerns and place pres-
sure on state actors: “I think civil society actors are absolutely necessary if 
one considers the political decision- making process. . . . Civil society actors 
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create a world carried by ideas and therefore have a crucial role in forming 
opinion and troubling political authorities.” To sensitize and inform the pop-
ulation appears a necessity, in addition to contesting state action. For Margot, 
this twin strategy is relevant for environmental protection and the protection 
of other types of common good. Margot thus understands politics as a field 
in which political intervention is required to increase state accountability.
Margot sees common good and politics with specific cognitive lenses. This 
brings a central question to the fore. Are these understandings strictly per-
sonal to Margot or are they synchronized with the understandings of other 
activists committed to Greenpeace? After all, Margot’s lifelong commitment 
could have given her a unique view. However, it could also be plausible that 
she shares these meanings with active and passive members of Greenpeace 
and even with activists from the same commitment community, namely, 
those committed to the defense of migrants’ rights and to the improvement 
of collective rights of minorities. And what about activists in other commu-
nities dedicated to providing social care to the deprived and who labor for 
better rights for workers? If all rely on similar specific worldviews regarding 
the common good and politics, we can consequently expect activists to be 
concerned about these issues, and this concern should translate to a par-
ticular conception of their role as political citizens within a democratic re-
gime. What notions of democratic cultures— which circulate through society 
as a consequence of their action— do activists hold? We will seek to answer 
this core question by comparing activists engaged in contentious politics,1 
volunteering, and unionism through survey and interview data.
A wider theoretical question follows from this discussion: What role does 
the mind play in enabling activist action? As we will see, social science is 
not silent on this issue. Yet more knowledge is required to grasp it in de-
tail. Activists are embedded in commitment communities and are therefore 
exposed to interactional opportunities that enable them to put into practice 
the cultural scripts2 available in these sites. Those interactions shape their 
 1 For Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 4), “contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make 
claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests 
or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. 
Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective 
action, and politics.”
 2 Cultural scripts capture values, norms, templates, guidelines, or models for ways of thinking, 
feeling, speaking, and acting in a particular cultural context. As Goddard and Wierzbicka (2004, 
153) underline: “Cultural scripts refers to a powerful . . . technique for articulating cultural norms, 
values, and practices in terms which are clear, precise, and accessible to cultural insiders and to 
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minds and enable them to participate and maintain their commitment. 
Questioning the influence of the activist’s mind on the participation and sus-
tainment of commitment lies at the heart of this book.
Synchronized Minds
The central aim of this book is to demonstrate that activists rely on synchro-
nized minds to perform joint action. During action, a process of synchroni-
zation occurs, one that enables activists to develop shared meanings about 
the aim and means of activism. This process leads them to perceive common 
good (aim) and politics (means) through similar cognitive lenses. We show 
the extent to which activists’ minds are synchronized within a commitment 
community and the depth of variation between activists’ worldviews across 
distinct commitment communities. To assess synchronization within, and 
the variation between, communities constitutes the first important ele-
ment related to the central aim of this book. The second is to explain how 
this process unfolds. How do activists synchronize their understandings of 
common good and politics? What are the relational mechanisms that enable 
their minds to be synchronized, and what are the cognitive mechanisms that 
ensue and allow them to participate in and sustain activism?
The perceptions of common good and politics held by activists is crucial 
to the empirical consideration of understandings of political citizenship. The 
second aim of this book is to assess whether activists construct community- 
specific democratic cultures. Through a close examination of activists’ 
understandings of political citizenship, both within and between communi-
ties, we show that different democratic (and undemocratic) cultures are imag-
ined and enacted in our societies, thereby entering the public sphere through 
collective action.
Our two aims matter for four main reasons. First, we need to provide 
more knowledge about the activist’s mind in order to explain why the mind 
matters for action. Compared to other factors of influence, the role of the 
activist’s mind in the mobilization process has been understudied. Piven and 
Cloward stressed “the necessity of cognitions” to participate in contentious 
activities and stated that “the emergence of protest entails a transformation 
cultural outsiders alike.” Individuals involved in a specific community (and whatever the community 
is; e.g., family, work, activism, sport, etc.) use those cultural scripts to interact with each other. They 
actually practice cultural scripts
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of both consciousness and behavior” (1977, 3). For McAdam (1982) too, 
the emergence of the civil rights movement would not have been possible 
without a process of “cognitive liberation.” Their claims echo San Suu Kyi, 
who declared: “The true revolution is the one of the mind.” Activists’ minds 
should therefore play a pivotal role in the activists’ participation in conten-
tious politics. While pioneering work has rightfully put effort into under-
standing the importance of collective meanings— such as frames, identity, 
or narratives— it unfortunately undermines the importance of the activist’s 
mind and fails to recognize how perceptions, among other factors, operate 
in commitment.
Furthermore, existing studies on activists’ minds yield controversial results 
about the causal link between mind and action. Jasper (1997, 10) stresses: “We 
often protest because our systems of meanings are at stake.” He thereby shows 
that specific views and understandings are essential for one to protest and 
enter into contentious politics. Worldviews are one of the key elements be-
hind people’s impulse to join activism. Gamson (1982, 1992, 1995)  and 
Klandermans (1997) found similar evidence: The mental world of activists 
intervenes in their joining protest actions. Studies that stress the importance 
of activists’ values also indicate as much (e.g., Abramowitz and Nassi 1981; 
Dunham and Bengtson 1992; Marwell, Aiken, and Demerath 1987; McAdam 
1989, 1999; Sherkat and Blocker 1997; Whalen and Flacks 1989). Meanwhile, 
Munson’s study (2009) reverses the causality others have established. In a 
comparative study of pro- life activists and non- activists, Munson showed that 
activists hold ambivalent or even pro- choice positions once they join pro- life 
groups. It is only over time that their views on abortion change as initial am-
bivalence and pro- choice beliefs turn into pro- life sentiments. Thus, most of 
the activists Munson studied developed specific worldviews about the aim 
and means of their protest action only once they had committed.
These controversial results show that the role of activists’ worldviews in 
the process of commitment in contentious politics is far more complex than 
we initially thought: More research on what occurs in the activist’s mind is 
required.
In this book, we do not seek to untangle the problem of causality. Nor do 
we ask whether specific worldviews are key to a person’s becoming an ac-
tivist, or whether these views develop once individuals engage in contentious 
action. Empirical evidence suggests that both causal links are present: Some 
people join activism because their systems of meanings are at stake while 
others develop specific understandings during action (Monsch and Passy 
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2018). Our focus here falls on what occurs during action. First, we show 
that once activists are involved in commitment communities, they rely on 
shared understandings that enable them to perform joint action and to sus-
tain their commitment. Second, we highlight how those shared meanings are 
constructed in activists’ minds by underscoring how various cognitions are 
interrelated and enable activists to perform action. Our contribution stems 
from the knowledge we provide on the role and importance of activists’ 
minds during commitment.
We rely on one- shot data in this study. As a result, we cannot empirically 
identify the synchronization process of activists’ minds that occurs during 
action. Our data show that once activists are involved in commitment com-
munities, they rely onsynchronized minds. This result suggests that a syn-
chronized mind is needed to perform joint action at a specific point in time. 
Our comparative research design also enables us to suggest that the activists’ 
mind is different from the mindset of the general population and varies from 
one commitment community to another. Those findings come from data col-
lected at one point in time— that is, when we interviewed and surveyed the 
activists.
We also show that activists who rely on synchronized minds are embedded 
in specific relational settings. Our data underscore that conversational 
interactions occur in activists’ formal and interpersonal networks. We also 
know from both interviews and survey data that embeddedness in those 
social networks precedes our data collection. We are therefore empirically 
aware that activists discuss and dispute ideas with their peers during their 
commitment and that this occurred prior to their being interviewed. This 
means that conversational interaction, a process that shapes the activist’s 
mind, occurred before our interviews. We thus have one empirical indi-
cation that conversational interaction occurs before we underscore that 
activists rely on synchronized minds to perform action. In addition, as we 
will discuss, knowledge from sociological theory clearly explains how and 
why interactions shape the human mind (e.g., Collins 2004; Emirbayer 1997; 
Mead 1934; White 1992; Zerubavel 1997). Therefore, both our data and social 
theory enable us to highlight how those shared meanings develop in activists’ 
minds by highlighting that a process of synchronization occurs during action.
We are nonetheless aware of the limits of our data. As tempting as it might 
be to use the life histories of activists collected in a longitudinal way to bring 
the development of activists’ understandings to light, they will always remain 
a reconstruction, influenced by the very moment and situation in which the 
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interview takes place. Consequently, we cannot identify when synchroniza-
tion occurs and whether synchronization takes place before or after an indi-
vidual joins a commitment community.
The second reason behind our interest in the activist’s mind is that we want 
to examine cognitions in the making, or during action. Social movement 
scholars have produced numerous studies that seek to explain the recruit-
ment process at work in protest politics (e.g., Chong 1991; Gould 1995; Jasper 
1997; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993; McAdam 
1988; Nepstad and Smith 1999; Opp 1989; Opp and Kittel 2010; Passy 1998a; 
Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland- Olson 1980). Initial engagement undoubtedly 
constitutes a pivotal first step in a citizen’s commitment. However, personal 
trajectories in activism go far beyond this. While scholars acknowledge that 
initial engagement is simply the initial phase in contentious participation— 
and some of them have conceptualized what comes after early recruitment 
(Klandermans 1997; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013)— we still 
know little about what happens afterward. Yet the sustainment of partic-
ipation is equally important when it comes to understanding contention. 
Contention is not a single event or performance. As Tilly demonstrated in 
his seminal work, contention is made of a series of performances sustained 
in time (Tilly 1978, 1998a, 2004). Contentious politics exists through the 
presence of sustained interactions between people with common purposes 
and solidarity with opponents and authorities (Tarrow 1994). Although 
broad processes and macro- dynamics are crucial to sustaining contentious 
episodes (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), processes that occur at the 
level of individual activists play a significant role too. Without sustained par-
ticipation, contention is improbable.
Sustaining commitment is not rare. In her study on patterns of protest, 
Corrigall- Brown (2012) showed that sustained participation can take various 
forms: persistence in the same group; commitment to other activist sites; or 
individual abeyance, whereby commitments are abandoned for a period of 
time and then resumed. Taking this variety of behaviors into consideration, 
Corrigall- Brown found that 56 percent of the citizens committed to activism 
in the United States sustained their participation over time. We found similar 
evidence in our study of mobilization in two organizations in Switzerland— 
the Bern Declaration and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)— where only 
10 percent of those activists declared themselves to be newcomers who had 
committed within the year or two years before. Half of the other activists 
had been committed for four to ten years, and another half had sustained 
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their commitment for over a decade (Passy 1994, 1998b). Another study 
conducted with a representative sample of the Swiss population showed 
that of people involved in activism about 50 percent sustained their collec-
tive effort over time (Monsch and Passy 2018). While sustaining commit-
ment is frequent, exactly what occurs once activists participate in collective 
endeavors remains obscure. We hope here to provide a unique insight into 
what goes on during action and how action impacts the activist’s mind.
A third reason for studying activists’ minds is that the interplay between 
commitment communities and activists is worth scrutinizing. Activism takes 
place in activists’ groups and is based on worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment (WUNC, Tilly 2005). These groups can be highly organized 
and formalized (like those studied here) or informal and made up of low 
numbers. Even in the latter case, however, activists are not isolated but tied to 
fellow members (Blee 2002). Once a citizen joins in contentious action— as a 
formal member, sympathizer, active or passive member, or by any other form 
of action— he or she joins a commitment community, a network of collec-
tive actors and campaigns (Diani 1995, 2003, 2007). Although structures and 
shared interests organize a commitment community, it is also a world made 
of meanings, stories, and identities, and is therefore a space prone to the de-
velopment and circulation of cultural scripts (Diani 2015; Diani and Pilati 
2011; Tilly 2005). Activists who evolve in a commitment community prac-
tice the cultural scripts available in that community (Polletta 2008).
Many studies separately examine individuals who join and leave activism 
and groups (but see Mische 2007 and Auyero 2001 for exceptions). However, 
as the definition of commitment community already indicates, the individual 
and group levels are intimately bound to one another. We therefore cannot 
make sense of individual participation without taking into consideration the 
collective site where they evolve. Basically, we need a better grasp of the in-
terplay between the micro- and meso- levels of activism. Mische (2007) has 
gone some way in illustrating this, as she scrutinizes how cross- talks enable 
individuals to bridge different networks and communities, to travel from 
one network to the other, with the potential to transform or change existing 
networks. In this book, we do not focus on processes between communi-
ties but on what goes on within communities. We examine how interactions 
among individuals within a specific community shape its members’ minds. 
While the empirical emphasis is on interactive and cognitive processes at 
work during action, these processes also have a bearing on the commitment 
community itself. These processes nourish the network with worldviews that 
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enable action and allow networks to distinguish themselves from others. 
A neat separation between both sociological levels is therefore counterpro-
ductive if we want to make sense of contentious participation and activism 
at large. Individuals and communities are tied together and influence each 
other during commitment.
An empirical example of the interplay between commitment communi-
ties and the activists we describe is the fourth reason behind our study of 
activists’ minds. We will show how types of embedded comprehensions of de-
mocracy exist in commitment communities and how varied they can be. This 
empirical endeavor allows us to consider culture in another light: not only 
as a structure bearing on individuals’ worldviews but as a dynamic and mul-
tifaceted entity. Examining things in this way doesn’t come at the expense 
of considering how cultures shape minds, but it stresses how minds simul-
taneously shape cultures. Collective understandings evidently exist within 
commitment communities and bear on activists’ minds. Yet these same col-
lective perceptions are continuously challenged, adapted, and sometimes 
transformed through the interaction of activists who never cease to create 
meanings. By studying activists’ understandings of political citizenship, we 
want to bring a dynamic and changing idea of culture into social movement 
studies. It must be said that these understandings do not circulate only be-
tween activists’ minds and within commitment communities. Rather, they 
are concretely lived by activists and enter the public sphere through collective 
action. Activists thereby disseminate their idea of citizenship— their demo-
cratic cultures— within and across countries through their action. Hence, to 
assess activists’ comprehensions of democracy is to reveal one facet of how 
commitment communities contribute to ongoing processes of (de- )democ-
ratization through the creation of spaces where (non- )democratic cultures 
are constantly constructed and modified (Tilly 2007).
Mind, Action, and Interactions
As we have seen, Margot relies on a specific understanding of common good, 
articulated in universalist terms. For her, goods are meant to objectively im-
prove people’s lives and should be shared by the whole population regardless 
of social groups. No citizens should be excluded from benefiting from goods 
that can improve their lives. Margot also conceives of politics in specific 
terms. She understands politics as a field of political intervention in order to 
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increase state actors’ accountability toward the common good. According to 
her, political conflicts carried on by civil society actors are essential to chal-
lenging state actors to promote, secure, and strengthen the common good. 
But how do those meanings enable her to act? How do meanings allow ac-
tion to be maintained within a commitment community? To answer these 
questions, Chapter 2 will develop our theoretical proposal, which aims to 
show how the mind affects action and how (inter)actions shape the mind. We 
simply outline it briefly here.
The mind orients an individual’s action.3 The mind is an important element 
in human action. But what is the mind? Philosophers, sociologists, and social 
psychologists define the mind as a thinking and perceiving “inner box” com-
posed of complex cognitive processes. Beyond this very broad definition, 
however, perspectives on the human mind differ across disciplinary bound-
aries. Relying on the epistemology of interpretative sociology, we consider 
individuals as “voracious meaning makers” (Weber 1978). Meanings permit 
individuals to perceive social realities, to make sense of them, and to act 
in their social environment. Without meanings, we cannot order a chaotic 
world and we are unable to act. However, apprehending the links between the 
mind and action requires us to consider the work of cognitive psychologists. 
As several sociologists have underscored, contributions by psychologists are 
key to understanding the individual’s mind (e.g., Cerulo 2010; P. J. DiMaggio 
1997; P.  DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Zerubavel 1997). Sociologists who 
have investigated the influence of the mind on an individual’s action face one 
major shortcoming: They admit that a substantial bond exists between mind 
and action rather than investigating how meanings and action relate to one 
another.
Two main axes of contributions by social and cognitive psychologists are 
relevant to conceiving of the manner in which the mind is tied to action. First, 
emphasis is placed on the notion that cognitions are domain- specific, tied as 
they are to a specific field of experience. This means that we need to specify 
the cognitive dimensions at work to investigate a specific action like activism. 
As we show throughout this book, understandings of aims (common good) 
and means (politics) of activism constitute two essential pillars of knowledge 
for committed individuals. To subjectively construct a sense of the aim of ac-
tivism and to mentally elaborate on the means to act constitute two crucial 
 3 We use the terms “mind,” “meaning,” “understanding,” “perception,” and “worldview” 
inter changeably.
Contentious Minds in Action 11
dimensions of the process of joining in, maintaining, and disengaging from 
collective endeavors.
Second, psychologists urge us to specify the cognitive paths that bridge 
the mind to intentionality and which ultimately enable action. Perceptions 
and subjective constructions of our surroundings provide us with a moti-
vational component that orients human action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). 
The mind therefore sets intentionality and delineates the possible and pref-
erable from the impossible. As shown in Figure 1.1, we disentangle the cog-
nitive mechanisms that link the mind to action as follows: Broad perceptions 
of common good and politics enable individuals to elaborate specific cog-
nitive components that set their intentionality in a specific way, eventually 
orienting their action toward particular political and social issues and forms 
of activism. Cognitive components span from broad understandings to 
a concrete intentionality required to perform action. The content of those 
cognitive components, as well as the way in which they intervene between 
understandings and intentionality, will be inductively identified through 
activists’ narratives like that provided by Margot. This cognitive path can 
be envisioned as akin to a funnel, where broad understandings guide ac-
tion through more specific cognitive elements that set individuals’ inten-
tionality. In our case, the latter is constituted by concrete answers to these 
questions: For whom, for what, and in which field do activists intend to mo-
bilize, and what form of action do they choose?
Our theory not only suggests how the mind is tied to action but also 
elucidates how social interactions enable the construction of shared meanings. 
This is necessary because, with a few notable exceptions (Vygotsky 1978), 
most psychologists pay little attention to the cultural context in which 
cognitions are elaborated and transformed. As contributions from the field of 
interpretative sociology highlight, however, cognitions are always particular, 
contingent upon cultural contexts in which individuals evolve. Individuals 







Figure 1.1 Cognitive mechanisms at play in the specific domain of activism
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They rely on socially shared meanings fashioned in concert with others 
through conversational interactions (Mead 1934). Interactions shape 
people’s minds, and such constant fluxes enable them to develop shared 
meanings. As we will show in our study, these interactions allow activists to 
elaborate shared understandings regarding the aim and means of activism, 
that is to say, about common good and politics. Joint action is improbable 
without these shared views and the related cognitive components behind 
the orientation of an activist’s action. Building on White’s (1992) idea that 
networks are “islands of meanings” we will demonstrate how conversational 
interactions enable activists to develop shared understandings. Talks and 
disputes lead activists to synchronize their understandings regarding the 
aims and means of activism. Conversational processes are as complex as cog-
nitive ones: Not all types of conversational interactions have a part in shaping 
an activist’s mind. We will identify which relational mechanisms do help syn-
chronize minds, as well as those that do not. A majority of the interactions 
that have an impact on the activist’s mind take place within commitment 
communities, leading to their inclusion in this study. By contrast, we do not 
examine how this interplay continuously shapes the scripts that circulate in 
the commitment community, preferring instead to focus on one element of 
White’s theory.
Finally, not only does the mind orient an individual’s action, but action 
itself reinforces or modifies the human mind (Albarracín et al. 2001; Boster 
et al. 2014; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). We therefore are faced with a non- 
recursive link between the mind and action whereby influence between the 
two elements is reciprocal. Actually, performing action in commitment com-
munities tends to reinforce activists’ understandings about the commitment 
itself. Previous understandings are strengthened and legitimized, with the 
consequence that commitment is stabilized over time. However, when action 
does not resonate with activists’ understandings, a dissonance between their 
action and their worldviews is created, inviting them to modify their views 
through peer interactions and to harmonize their action and thought; if the 
gap between action and worldviews is too wide, activists will tend to leave the 
commitment community.
In this book, we argue that a cognitive- relational process occurs during ac-
tion, leading to a process of mind synchronization among activists. The in-
terplay between the mind, action, and interaction takes place during action 
and we will show that this cognitive- relational process is essential to the per-
formance of joint action: in our case, activism. This process is also central 
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when it comes to sustaining commitment, thanks to the reinforcement of 
shared meanings that ensure commitment is stabilized over time. The proba-
bility of leaving the commitment community thereby increases whenever the 
synchronization of minds does not occur.
Figure 1.2 highlights the process of mind synchronization. Once 
activists join activism, they actually integrate a commitment community. 
Participation in activism, regardless of its form, above all entails evolving 
in a community and entering in a process of conversational interaction. 
Through talks and disputes, activists practice cultural scripts available in 
the community that allow their minds to undergo a process of synchroniza-
tion. Their meanings about common good and politics— about the aims and 
means of activism— synchronize with those of their peers. Yet this process 
of synchronization involves specific relational and cognitive mechanisms, 
which we explain in the next chapter. This synchronization process allows 
participants to construct shared meanings that, in turn, enable them to per-
form joint action and to continue the process of integration into a commit-
ment community.
Common Good and Politics
Having briefly outlined our theoretical model, we now turn to the operation-
alization of our key concepts:  common good and politics. As cognitions 
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Figure 1.2 Mind synchronization during activism
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dimensions that partake in the performance of activism, which is the aim of 
this section.
Specific meanings linked to the aims and means of activism are behind 
an individual’s motivation to voice dissent, to care about others, or to fight 
social and political injustices. Activism is the sustained intervention of a 
group of individuals with the aim of achieving social, cultural, or political 
change (e.g., to improve citizens’ rights, to enlarge democracy, to advocate 
better working conditions, but also to restrict the right of minorities or to 
reinforce authoritarian regimes), to avoid the deterioration of a specific 
situation (e.g., the environment, rights withdrawal), or to provide specific 
populations with social care (e.g., deprived or sick people, migrants, or na-
tive people). Each case of activism is therefore about a particular aim within 
a particular domain.
We assume that activists construct a specific meaning about the aim of 
their commitment, which we call their relation to common good. For ex-
ample, activists who mobilize against radioactive material stored in the 
English Channel may have two specific conceptions of common good 
in mind. Either they perceive mass pollution as a threat to the survival of 
human beings and our planet, and mass pollution is viewed as a universal 
threat which concerns everyone. Or they perceive mass pollution as a 
threat to the health of the population living on contaminated coastlines, 
meaning that mass pollution is a collective good but one restricted to a spe-
cific group of people. Hence, while the activists’ relation to common good 
is intimately tied to activism, the way activists perceive a common good can 
vary. Actually, common good constitutes the primary aim of activism, and 
activists develop a particular notion of common good either before joining 
an action or during it.
In addition to constructing specific meanings about the aim of activism, 
these groups also think about the particular means suitable to their action. 
Intervention can happen either through the enrollment of activists in politics 
in which state holders are challenged through a variety of tactics, or through 
the avoidance of politics all together. In both cases, however, activists con-
struct a specific meaning regarding the means of their commitment, which 
we call their relation to politics. For example, activists mobilized against ra-
dioactive material stored in the English Channel may have two specific 
conceptions of politics in mind. Either they conceive the issue in terms of a 
political conflict and confront governmental passivity as a consequence, or 
they conceive the issue as one they can take care of, thus deciding to provide 
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social and health care to the contaminated population themselves. Whatever 
activists decide to do, they must think about the means through which they 
intervene in society and construct what we call a specific relation to politics 
accordingly.
To grasp activists’ understandings of common good and politics requires 
conceptual work. And the concept of common good is not an easy one to 
define. First, common good has undergone important reformulations from 
ancient Greek times to the present day (Geuss 2001; Miller 2004). Second, it 
overlaps with other related concepts, notably “the commons,” “public good” 
also labeled “public interest,” and “collective good.” As a historian of ideas, 
Geuss (2001) emphasizes history as “a continuing series of transformations 
in which the old is not simply obliterated and utterly deleted, but is taken 
up and preserved in a modified form” (p. xii). Said otherwise, the concept 
of common good, the commons, and public good overlap to a certain ex-
tent, as all possess semantic, material, and evaluative traces due to their ge-
nealogical roots. Nonetheless, Geuss highlights a major divide in the way 
social science and philosophy have understood common good. The concept’s 
revision by liberal theorists turned it into a “public good” (e.g., Hobbes 
[1668] 1994; Locke [1660] 1959; Rawls 1971). Nowadays, we face two dis-
tinct understandings of common good: a pre- liberal definition that draws 
on Aristotelian thought, to which the notion of the commons is associated, 
and a liberal definition that draws on the concept of “public good” (Douglass 
1980; Smith 1999).
The pre- liberal definition of common good relies on the idea that goods 
should be accessible to all members of society. Those goods can be nat-
ural (e.g., land, water, air), cultural (e.g., mathematics, laws, art), or social 
(e.g., peace, education, rights). And the specificity of such goods is two-
fold:  First, they are goods that objectively improve people’s well- being. 
Second, all social members should be able to share them: They are indi-
visible. For Aristotle, common good is “a good proper to, and attainable 
only by the community, yet individually shared by its members” (Dupré 
1993, 687). It consists “in a number of specific objectives designed to pro-
mote general human well- being— such as peace, order, prosperity, justice, 
and community” (Douglass 1980, 104). In Aristotelian thought, common 
goods are conceived as objective goods that enhance people’s lives and ben-
efit all members of society.
This Aristotelian conception clearly departs from the liberal definition of 
common good. And the conceptual move from “common good” to “public 
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good” can again be said to be twofold: First, the term “public” refers to an 
aggregation of private interests and in the liberal tradition, the aggregation 
of individuals’ interests is thought of in terms of a majority (Barry 1964; 
Douglass 1980; Hobbes [1668] 1994; MacIntyre 1990). The “majority” 
is not an all- inclusive category and departs from the pre- liberal notion of 
commonness: Only a majority of people benefit from the common good. 
Second, the notion of “good” relates to personal preferences that are sub-
jectively defined (Douglass 1980; Murphy 2005). Public good depends on 
the mood and preferences of individuals; therefore, in the writings of liberal 
theorists, common good is a good that is subjectively defined and shared by 
the majority.
We rely on the pre- liberal definition of common good based on Aristotle’s 
thought in our study and follow in the wake of contemporary thinkers who 
urge social scientists and philosophers to depart from utilitarian notions of 
common good, with the aim of restoring it as an all- inclusive category and 
heralding its objective definition (Barry 1964; Douglass 1980; Geuss 2001; 
MacIntyre 1990; Smith 1999). Relying on Aristotle’s definition of common 
good helps us grasp what a common good truly is: a good that effectively 
and objectively enhances people’s lives and that all individuals can equally 
access. Each individual benefits, or can potentially benefit (as in the case of 
public schools), such indivisible goods. Yet, relying on Aristotle’s definition 
of common good does not imply that all activists perceive common good in 
this pre- liberal sense.
NIMBY groups (“Not in my backyard” groups who protest against nu-
clear plants in their region, for example) are a typical example of a group 
that defends a collective good. The individuals involved in the group do not 
care if this good, which is objectively dangerous for inhabitants of any region, 
could be implemented in another part of the country. They simply say: “Not 
in My Backyard.” The principle of equality toward the good— in this instance, 
the protection of health conditions and the viability of a given territory— 
is not taken into account. Activists in these groups therefore do not de-
fend a common good but their own interests. Similarly, groups mobilized 
for personal interests— like the construction of a public park only for one 
neighborhood’s children— are not committed to a common but to a collec-
tive good where only a happy few can enjoy the green space. Again, the prin-
ciple of equality is neglected. By opposition, we can imagine similar groups 
as committed to the development of a common good when they aim to build 
a green space in the neighborhood that is open to everyone.
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The dimensions of common good must be distinguished before we 
can grasp the activist’s understanding of common good empirically. The 
Aristotelian definition of common good relies on two analytical parts: com-
monness and goodness (Murphy 2005, 134). Drawing on this distinction, we 
will explore how activists perceive common good. First, we examine how 
they apprehend “commonness.” We ask whether activists consider all so-
ciety members as the beneficiaries of common good, or if they see the benefit 
as restricted to specific groups. Second, we examine how they understand 
“goodness.” We consider how goods are apprehended in general and how this 
relates to the specific good they are committed to.
Three sub- dimensions are required to grasp the tricky notion of common-
ness. Commonness refers to the possibility that an entire community shares 
a good. The concept helps us understand how individuals relate to society, 
how they conceive of fellow human beings, and whether they erect bound-
aries outside their social spheres. The first sub- dimension, labeled intercon-
nectedness, enables us to see how activists relate to society and refers to the 
social ties that bind people together. We therefore examine whether activists 
perceive individuals in society as linked and dependent on one another. With 
the second sub- dimension, humanness, we focus on the manner in which 
activists perceive how individuals evolve in society. Do activists make sense 
of others in universalist terms, ontologically, or as socially constructed 
(e.g., class, religion, nation)? The last sub- dimension, inclusiveness, delves 
into cognitive boundaries that individuals create between their own social 
circles and others. We can therefore evaluate whether divisions between so-
cial spheres are perceived or whether a shared humanity is imagined. These 
sub- dimensions allow us to question whether individuals rely on a commu-
nitarian or universalist conception of society (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994; 
Walzer 1997; I. M. Young 1990).
The second dimension— goodness— pertains to the perception and as-
sessment of the good that objectively improves people’s living conditions. 
For Aristotle, common good strengthens collective well- being. He points 
out that common good has various facets, one of them pertaining to justice 
(Smith 1999). Aristotle viewed injustice as a persistent feature of our soci-
eties, depriving people of their rights. Closer to our time, Gilligan (1982) 
argues that social problems can be seen in two different ways: through an 
ethics of justice or an ethics of care. The problem of poverty illustrates this 
distinction aptly. It can be seen as a social problem, through the lens of so-
cial justice, which considers that living under the social minima violates a 
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fundamental human right, or as a question of social care, whereby the poor 
require protection to survive. We accordingly examine whether activists per-
ceive social problems in terms of axes of social justice or care.
Combining the perceptions of “commonness” and “goodness” pries open 
a conceptual space where four possible understandings of common good can 
be articulated, as shown in Figure 1.3. First, activists can rely on a percep-
tion of common good in terms of social justice for all. Common good is then 
perceived as a matter of rights and those rights pertain to all social members 
without restriction, leading to a universal social justice understanding. 
Second, activists can see common good as a social justice for a specific group. 
As with the former, common good is above all construed as a question of 
rights. However, those rights are restricted to a specific social group. Those 
activists possess a communitarian social justice understanding. A third pos-
sible understanding of common good is that of social care for all. Activists 
who view common good with this mental lens rely on a universalist percep-
tion of the beneficiaries of common good, nonetheless understood as a ques-
tion of care, which we call a universal social care understanding. The fourth 
and final possible view of common good entails that an indivisible good is 
seen in terms of social care for a specific group, and this view can be called a 
communitarian understanding of social care.
Besides common good, the second central cognitive dimension we at-
tend to is an activist’s relation to politics. In the political space, the central 
actor is the state. According to Tilly (1992, 1), states are “coercion- wielding 
organizations” implying that they are usually the most important and 
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Figure 1.3 Distinct understandings of common good
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powerful actors within a given political space. However, in a democracy, 
multiple actors are present and try to voice their interests within a given 
political field by defending their position as incumbents or by contesting 
incumbents as challengers (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Multiple actors 
with diverse interests and different hierarchical positions hence interact in 
a political space, the locus where ongoing conflicts are regulated and in-
terest negotiation takes place. Consequently, an understanding of politics 
is about the way activists perceive the actors who manage political interests 
and ongoing conflicts in any given political field. Two major actors are cen-
tral in the field of activism: the state and civil society. We therefore examine 
an activist’s understanding of politics with the aid of two dimensions: the 
person’s perception of state actors and his or her understanding of civil so-
ciety actors.
In the assessment of an activist’s perception of state actors we differ-
entiate between two sub- dimensions. On the one hand, we consider how 
activists judge state actors’ accountability for common goods, and on the 
other, whether this judgment lends legitimacy to state actors. The distinc-
tion is therefore one made between state actors’ role and its evaluation by 
activists. In terms of the state actors’ role with regard to the accountability 
for common good, one can roughly establish a continuum that comprises 
two extremes: accountable states that are responsible for common good, 
and, by contrast, containing states that are not accountable. Activists who 
judge state actors to be accountable for common good desire a state that 
intervenes and assumes responsibility for the production and mainte-
nance of common good, as opposed to activists who favor state actors’ 
containment and who wish for a state that promotes economic freedom 
and personal responsibility. In the latter view, state intervention must ob-
viously be limited.
The second sub- dimension relates to how activists evaluate state ac-
tors. Social movement scholars have stressed the relevance of the concept 
of (de- )legitimization in this regard. Piven and Cloward (1977) have noted 
that protestors undergo a process of cognitive transformation. More pre-
cisely, activists do not accept the authority of rulers anymore and accord-
ingly delegitimize state actors. Similarly, Gamson et al. (1982) have described 
how legitimacy is undermined when authorities act unjustly. More recently, 
Klandermans (2010) has found that activists who demonstrated against the 
war in Iraq also delegitimized state actors by displaying feelings of opposi-
tion against the general mechanisms of democracy, emitting doubts about 
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political efficacy, and expressing low levels of trust in their national social 
and political institutions. Contentious activists here delegitimize state ac-
tors. But is this the case for all activists? Moreover, do activists delegitimize 
state actors solely regarding the issue they are concerned with, or do they de-
velop a more generalized form of delegitimization? While the state is a set of 
multiple actors, activists are likely to have it figure as a heterogeneous actor 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). State actors could either be delegitimized 
(or legitimized) solely for the issue activists are mobilized for or generally 
delegitimized (or legitimized).
Alongside their perception of state actors, activists also develop a percep-
tion of civil society actors. Activists channel their action through collective 
actors and develop a sense of this community or, at least, of the specific or-
ganization they are part of. Two different action types of civil society actors 
can be envisioned: Either there is a contentious understanding, whereby civil 
society actors intervene in politics to urge state actors to produce, maintain, 
or enlarge common goods, or the emphasis is placed on the capacity of civil 
society actors to substitute and minimize state intervention. In addition, 
the legitimization of civil society actors will be assessed. Piven and Cloward 
(1977) have stressed that activists not only undergo a process of delegitimiza-
tion of the ruling authority but also come to understand organized protest as 
a means of changing their own situation. Gamson et al. (1982) call this pro-
cess “loyalty- building to the challenger,” a process through which challengers 
legitimize the protest action they are involved in. It seems reasonable to sug-
gest that activists who are not challengers legitimize the civil society actors 
they are part of. Because different forms of civil society actors exist— either 
contentious or substituting— we also take the range of legitimization into ac-
count, that is to say, we ask whether activists legitimize different types of civil 
society actors.
As a summary of activists’ perception of politics, Figure 1.4 crosses 
activists’ perception of state and civil society actors, resulting in a conceptual 
space with four possible ideal types. Starting at the upper left corner, individ-
uals could understand politics as a field of intervention for accountability. For 
them, state actors are accountable for common good and are delegitimized 
whenever they do not fulfill their responsibility. In addition, the role of civil 
society actors is to intervene in political decision making, which is a legit-
imized role. Thus, they perceive politics as a field of political intervention 
in which state accountability can be increased. In the lower left corner are 
shown activists who perceive state actors as accountable for common good. 
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By contrast to the first category, they legitimize civil society actors who sub-
stitute state actors. Having lost faith in state actors, they perceive politics as 
a field of substitution for accountability. Activists with such a worldview per-
ceive politics as a social substitution to replace state accountability. Turning 
our attention to the right side of this conceptual space, we have individuals 
for whom state actors are not accountable for common good. They legiti-
mize state actors’ containment and want civil society actors to intervene in 
politics to advocate less state intervention. They perceive politics as a field of 
intervention for containment. Politics then becomes a field of political inter-
vention where the aim is to reduce state accountability. Finally, individuals 
who perceive politics as a field of substitution for containment also desire a 
weak state. In order to accomplish this, they do not want civil society actors 
to intervene in politics but would rather see them substitute the state actors’ 
intervention.
The relation to common good and politics not only represents the aims 
and means of activism, but it also enables us to assess how activists con-
ceive of political citizenship. These understandings are important because 
they represent democratic cultures imagined in activists’ minds which are 
transformed through interactions in commitment communities, which are 
experienced by activists, and which enter the public sphere through collec-
tive action. Simply put, activists disseminate their notion of political cit-
izenship within and across society through their actions. Democracies are 





























Figure 1.4 Distinct understandings of politics
22 Contentious Minds
way they are shaped is through civic participation, in and beyond institu-
tional politics. Democratization and de- democratization are therefore on-
going (and sometimes parallel) processes (Tilly 2007). We question what 
types of democratic cultures activists— committed to contentious politics, 
volunteering, or unionism— have in mind. At least theoretically, activism is 
a form of action that allows ordinary citizens to be active in society in the 
promotion or strengthening of common goods. To a certain extent, activism 
partakes in the model of participative democracy which relies on politi-
cally active citizens who get involved beyond electoral politics (Barber 1984; 
Pateman 1970). Can activists all be characterized as “strong citizens” con-
cerned by both common good and politics?4 In other words, do all activists 
in this study place common good before their private interests, deliberate, 
and take part in politics?
To understand how these democratic cultures play out in the activist’s 
mind, we consider how they relate to the question of political citizenship. We 
examine whether activists are concerned by the aims and means of activism, 
that is to say, by common good and politics. The first dimension is an activist’s 
concern for common good where we consider whether activists are citizens 
who adjust their own life plans to the exigencies of a shared world. However, 
as all activists already defend a specific type of common good through their 
commitment, we assess the range of their concern to evaluate their concern 
for common good. We underscore whether activists are concerned by mul-
tiple common goods, or rely only on a limited concern.
The second dimension addresses whether activists are concerned by poli-
tics. Individuals who are concerned by politics consider politics as enacted by 
state actors but also by citizens. This entails citizens being politically vigilant 
and participative. Rather than rely on a representative idea of democracy, 
they prefer participatory institutions that allow them to fully partake in the 
democratic process. Accordingly, we consider whether activists are politi-
cally vigilant by being watchdogs who monitor political elites and events, as 
well as whether they are willing to participate beyond institutional politics 
and challenge state authorities whenever necessary. We therefore scrutinize 
whether activists express a willingness to control state action, to monitor 
governmental actors when they do not fulfill their roles, and to enter the po-
litical sphere by means of contentious action.
 4 The term “strong citizen” developed in this book is one inspired by the work of Barber (1984) and 
his notion of “strong democracy.”
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Figure 1.5 combines the two dimensions of strong citizenship— the con-
cern for common good and politics— into a conceptual space with four 
possible combinations. Activists who are concerned by common good and 
politics are strong citizens. They are concerned by multiple types of common 
good and are politically vigilant, ready to partake in contentious politics. 
They are citizens who are aware of the importance of common goods such 
as migrants’ and minorities’ rights or ecological issues, and prioritize such 
goods that objectively improve people’s living conditions. Social citizens also 
place multiple common goods before their private interests. But by contrast 
with strong citizens, they are not concerned by politics and are therefore not 
concerned with the importance of political vigilance and participation in po-
litical life. Rather, they trust the government and are confident that a blend 
of state, civil, and economic actors can work together to provide common 
goods. Resistant citizens, the third ideal type, are concerned by politics but 
not by common good. These individuals are vigilant and participate in pol-
itics but only to promote a collective good pertaining to a specific group 
of the population. Finally, weak citizens are concerned neither by multiple 
common goods nor by politics. According to these two dimensions, four dif-
ferent democratic cultures are conceivable. Do activists of the commitment 
communities examined in this book all share a similar type of political citi-
zenship? Or do different types of political citizenship exist, thus enabling the 
dissemination of various democratic cultures through collective action, and, 
by extension, contribute to democratization processes in different ways? We 
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Figure 1.5 Distinct understandings of political citizenship
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Comparing Commitment Communities
We have specified the cognitive dimensions at work behind the perfor-
mance and sustainment of activism. In Chapter  2, we elaborate on how 
broad understandings of common good and politics set an activist’s inten-
tionality. Before doing so, we discuss methodological points. For this study, 
we surveyed and interviewed activists at one point in time.5 We used the 
member lists of five distinct organizations to identify them, a strategy that 
has implications for the scope of our study. All the activists in this study are 
members of at least one organization. While one could imagine that activists 
may work on their own or participate at protest events without being a 
member of a group, the activists studied here are all involved in more or less 
formally organized collective groups. They are engaged in collective action 
and try to achieve a common objective. We further divide this type of activist 
into two broad categories: active and passive members. Passive members in-
vest money only while active members invest time. The distinction between 
these two types is crucial to our research, as passive members lack opportu-
nities to enter into direct communicational interactions with fellow activists. 
Consequently, we wondered whether a similar process of mind synchroni-
zation could be observed among passive members of a particular commit-
ment community. And if this is indeed the case, how is it achieved if passive 
members do not directly interact with other members?
Surveying and interviewing activists during action only once further ori-
ented our study. The research design we opted for is appropriate to the ex-
amination of how an activist’s mind is synchronized at a specific point in 
time and highlights the impact of meaningful interactions. However, this 
means that we are not arguing that an activist’s mind allows the individual 
to join collective endeavors. Rather, we argue that the minds of such individ-
uals enable them to be committed and to sustain their commitment. We do 
not want to suggest that causality exists between activists’ understandings 
and their engagement in contentious politics, unionism, or volunteering 
action as we simply do not have the appropriate data to back such a claim. 
During the long interviews we had with activists, most of them recounted 
their life stories and the narratives behind their commitment, referring to 
past events, experiences, and thoughts. As attractive as such past accounts 
 5 All data used in this study stem from the research project “Why Stand Up for Others?” financed 
by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Nr. 100017- 122246).
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can seem, we cannot make use of them to subject to scrutiny a person’s en-
trance into activism. Retrospective accounts do not provide appropriate data 
to analyze this process. As we all know, we talk about our past with the lens 
of the present. We reconstruct it and reshape the meaning of events (e.g., 
Schacter 1995). Consequently, without a longitudinal research design, we do 
not know the extent to which the activist’s mind is transformed after com-
mitment has begun. Similarly, we are unable to highlight whether particular 
cognitions are necessary for a person to engage in activism.
Hence, we examine the understandings of activists who have already 
committed to varied causes. Comparison is accordingly a crucial element in 
our study. We compare the minds of activists involved in contentious poli-
tics with those of ordinary people who devote their time to institutional and 
volunteering action. Why opt for such a comparative analysis? As previously 
highlighted, we suppose that activists who enjoy conversational interactions 
in their commitment community relate specifically to their social and po-
litical environment, that is to say, to common good and politics. We there-
fore postulate that participants engaged in a specific commitment site should 
possess a specific mindset. A comparison is necessary to put this conjecture 
to the test.
But why do we compare distinct forms of activism? Social science has 
become more specialized and, some might say, fragmented into sub- fields 
that fail to communicate with one another. Social movement studies are 
no exception. In the last thirty years, scholarship in the field has witnessed 
an extraordinary growth but has increasingly developed into an enclave 
(McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012; Walder 2009). Protest lies at the center 
of the research cosmos. Although we acknowledge that this focus enlarges 
our knowl edge of social movements, it also presents important drawbacks. 
One major problem of this autocentric research practice is the presumption 
that this form of activism is specific and distinct from other types of commit-
ment.6 We are actually unable to support or discredit this conjecture as long 
as we do not compare contentious participation with other forms of political 
and civic commitments systematically.
In this book, we focus on the mental world of activists. Comparing three 
distinct (and important) forms of civic commitment in Western democracies, 
 6 The neglect of other players in contentious games and the overestimation of the presence of so-
cial movements in the political arena are further shortcomings of this autocentric research practice 
(McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012).
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we investigate whether the mental world of social movement activists is spe-
cific enough to depart from that of unionists and volunteers. We question 
whether the understandings of common good and politics of contentious 
activists are particular, setting a specific intentionality that orients them to-
ward contentious politics rather than other forms of activism. Moving away 
from the centric view of social movements studies and toward a comparison 
of activists mobilized in contentious politics, unionism, and volunteering ac-
tion, our research design aims to produce two types of comparison: within a 
community, and between communities.
We therefore chose to compare activists across five separate organizations. 
Three groups of activists are committed to contentious politics: Greenpeace, 
Solidarity across Borders, which defends migrants’ rights, and the Society for 
Threatened Peoples which promotes human rights, and the rights of autoch-
thonous populations in particular. This comparative strategy enabled us to 
pay attention to variations within a commitment community. The second 
comparative perspective, between communities, lies in our study of activists 
mobilized for Unia, the most important syndicate in Switzerland, in charge 
of the promotion of labor rights in the private sector, and Caritas volunteers, 
who support the poor. The selection of these five cases was directly related to 
the size and importance of these organizations. They have enough members 
to carry out a survey and, due to their size and their nationwide scope, also 
incorporate a representative character for the particular commitment com-
munities under scrutiny.
However, forms of activism— contentious politics, unionism, and 
volunteering— do not overlap with the notion of commitment community. 
Indeed, various commitment communities exist in contentious politics, and 
this remains true for unionism and volunteering action, too. For example, 
people committed in the post- industrial movement do not evolve in the 
same contentious community as skinheads do. For these two groups, there is 
no overlap in their network of commitment and their network of meanings. 
The activists studied here are hence not only committed to distinct forms 
of activism but act in distinct communities as well. Greenpeace, Solidarity 
across Borders (SAB), and the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP) are all 
protest actors who operate in the same contentious community. They are part 
of the huge protest network that emerged in the sixties in Western democ-
racies, under the banner of the post- industrial or the left- libertarian move-
ment (Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Jasper 1997). As these activists are mainly 
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engaged in the defense of moral issues (Jasper 1997), we labeled this network 
of collective actors the moral voicing community.
Comparing activists within this community allowed us to question the 
extent to which they rely on shared understandings of common good and 
politics. While Greenpeace, SAB, and STP activists belong to the same 
commitment community, they are engaged in struggles for distinct moral 
causes, and the nature of the political challenge they are confronted with 
varies: Their concern is modulated by the different forms of common good 
they pursue and the variety of state actors that regulate them. Different polit-
ical constellations hence arise. Here, we compared two mainstream or con-
sensual causes (environmental protection and the rights of minorities) with a 
highly challenging political issue (migrants’ rights). This comparison sought 
to question whether moral voicing activists perceive common good and pol-
itics through the same lenses and whether conversational interactions within 
this community shape a specific contentious mind.
Greenpeace activists are committed to environmental protection. With 
more than 150,000 members, they form one of the biggest social movement 
organizations in Switzerland and are mobilized for one of the most consen-
sual protest issues in the country. Even when it comes to energy policies, 
arguably the most challenging sub- field within environmental politics nowa-
days, the Swiss authorities support alternative energy forms and have rejected 
a proposal to construct new nuclear plants (Swiss Federal Office of Energy 
2014). Thus, state actors are supportive of challenging actors when it comes 
to environmental protection (or at least more so than in other domains).7 
Activists who engage in this kind of protest action are therefore involved in a 
mainstream cause that reduces the risk of political conflicts with state actors 
and the general public.8
Individuals committed to the Society for Threatened Peoples in the human 
rights sector are similarly positioned. These activists provide social and 
political support to persecuted minorities worldwide. Given the promi-
nent place of the Swiss humanitarian tradition within the public discourse 
(Fanzun 2003), it is unsurprising to observe that activists of the Society 
 7 Evidence from a public opinion survey shows that a majority of the Swiss population is rather 
anxious about environmental problems in general (more than 70 percent) and more than half of 
them think that no cause is more important (Stähli et al. 2014).
 8 More information about the organizational characteristics and history of all organizations of this 
study can be found in the Appendix A.1.
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for Threatened Peoples are mobilized on a mainstream issue that is usually 
supported by the public and state actors. Moreover, activists of the Society 
for Threatened Peoples challenge Swiss state actors less than they do those of 
other countries. Consequently, activists who join the Society for Threatened 
Peoples mobilize for a mainstream issue that involves low levels of political 
conflict, like those Greenpeace activists face.
Solidarity across Borders is the third organization in the moral voicing 
community. It is the umbrella organization in Switzerland for the defense of 
migrants’ rights, a field otherwise composed of small groups active in their re-
spective regions. People who defend migrants’ rights are mobilized in one of 
the most challenging protest fields in the contemporary Swiss context (Giugni 
and Passy 2004). Over the last decade, the rights of migrants were repeatedly 
reduced and the only political party that places migration issues on the polit-
ical agenda is situated at the right of the political spectrum and is the strongest 
party in the country in terms of constituency. In addition, public opinion on the 
matter is harsh.9 These factors ensure that the position of defenders of migrants’ 
rights with regard to the state and public opinion is far more challenging than is 
the case for activists of the two other organizations.
Comparing three organizations within the same community that vary with 
regard to the common good at stake, and the level of political challenge faced, 
offered a prime opportunity to test whether these differences have a bearing 
on an activist’s relation to common good and politics. For example, activists 
who defend migrants’ rights may have developed a stronger political opposi-
tion and challenging relation to state actors. Or Greenpeace activists engaged in 
environmental protection may entertain other relations to common good than 
those of activists who defend particular social groups. The challenging question 
here was whether the moral voicing community shares a similar perception of 
common good and politics.
After comparing activists within a community, we compared different 
communities with each other. Caritas is a volunteering organization of the 
so- called third sector (Anheier and Seibel 1990; DiMaggio and Anheier 
1990). In Switzerland, the sector is split into secular groups having no rele-
vant ties to confessional actors, and organizations that are either embedded 
in, or close to, religious actors. Volunteering actors therefore evolve in two 
 9 More than half of the Swiss population thinks that immigration numbers from former Yugoslavia 
and Albania are too high and that young immigrants contribute to increased levels of violence and 
vandalism in the country (Selects 2011).
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distinct communities. Caritas’s history is one tied to Catholicism and other 
Christian aid organizations.10 Caritas activists are hence not representative of 
all types of organizations included in the third sector but rather of a specific 
case in terms of volunteerism in Switzerland. The organization’s volunteers 
evolve in a commitment site we have labeled the Christian aid community, 
which departs substantially from the moral voicing community. It is an aid 
community because it provides help to individuals who face life difficulties. 
Within the Swiss third sector, Caritas belongs to the group of non- profit 
organizations that endorse the principle of subsidiarity, which means that 
they carry out state actors’ responsibilities and are supported by the state 
(Salamon 1981). This can therefore hardly be called a challenging cause. We 
included activists from the organization’s three regional branches: Caritas 
Geneva, Luzern, and St. Gallen.11 It is important to distinguish these activists 
from activists of the better- known Caritas Switzerland because they are com-
mitted to different ends. Indeed, while activists in Caritas Switzerland are 
engaged in international humanitarian aid, the Caritas activists in this study 
provide help to the poor locally. They offer concrete social and legal support, 
give emergency relief, assist with the integration of problematic youth, pro-
vide companionship for the sick and people in mourning, and organize lei-
sure activities for the elderly (Caritas Geneva 2014).
In addition to the moral voicing and Christian aid communities, we in-
cluded the radical workers’ rights community represented by the activists 
of Unia. Comprising around 200,000 members, Unia is the largest union 
in Switzerland specialized in the defense of working conditions and labor 
rights in the Swiss private sector. In particular, they negotiate collective 
labor agreements, strengthen rights of employees, and take a political 
stand for a more sustainable model of social security (Unia 2015). Unia was 
founded in 2004 after a merger of the unions of engineers and watchmakers, 
construction and industrial workers, and transport and foodstuff workers 
(Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). This composition remains visible in Unia’s 
membership base:  21  percent from craft, 29  percent from construction, 
48 percent from industries, and 12 percent from the service sector. Unia 
is composed mostly of blue- collar workers from the private sector, but the 
union is expanding its membership base to include white- collar workers. 
 10 Such as the organizations of the Protestant Social Centers, the Emaüs or Bread for All.
 11 We relied on these three regional sections of Caritas because they work on similar issues, ensured 
a sufficient number of active members, and allowed an assessment of whether there are differences 
between German- and French- speaking activists of the same organization.
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While Unia is the largest union in Switzerland, it is not the only one, and 
therefore the minds of their activists do not necessarily encompass the 
views of all Swiss union members. Although many mergers took place over 
the last twenty years, the union landscape remains fragmented. A sectorial 
division exists between the left- wing organizations and the more moderate 
unions with a Christian background. Unia belongs to the radical workers’ 
rights community, a markedly leftist syndicate engaged in the defense of 
employees in the private sector.
As far as Unia’s relation to politics is concerned, we can safely assume that 
Swiss state actors support unionists far less than they do Caritas. However, 
in contrast to challengers from the moral voicing community, they are not 
complete outsiders either, relying on access to political decision making 
through tripartite institutions. Yet unions are in a weak position due to the 
specificities of Swiss corporatism. They face a powerful business commu-
nity and must bargain for collective labor agreements at the level of each in-
dustry and company (Calmfors and Drifill 1988; Fluder and Hotz- Hart 1998; 
Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). As with the defenders of migrants’ rights, Unia 
activists are committed to a challenging political issue. They defend their de-
fiant claims with both contentious politics strategies (e.g., petitioning, sit- in, 
street demonstrations) and institutional means (e.g., negotiation with their 
economic partners and state actors) in order to stand a chance in tripartite 
negotiations.
The comparison between the moral voicing, radical workers voicing,12 
and Christian aid communities allowed us to investigate whether activists 
who operate in distinct commitment sites possess distinct minds. Do those 
activists perceive common good and politics differently? Do they rely on dis-
tinct cognitive paths that set their intentionality to perform joint action, and 
to sustain it? Do they have similar understandings of political citizenship in 
mind? This comparison allowed us to highlight the plurality of an activist’s 
mind. However, the research design did not allow us to cover the whole spec-
trum of activism, or politics, in Switzerland. Activists studied here remain 
mainly of a leftist bent. But our aim was not to be representative of the variety 
of activists’ minds that exist in Switzerland. Rather, we sought to underscore 
the cognitive- relational process that leads activists to commit and sustain 
their commitment in collective endeavors.
 12 With voicing, we want to stress that this group speak up for workers’ rights.
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Swiss Understandings of Common Good and Politics
In order to limit the variation of contextual influences, the compar-
ison of these three communities is located in one single national con-
text:  Switzerland. Yet collective understandings exist within a nation and 
have a bearing on activists’ mindscapes. We therefore briefly outline in 
this section the understandings of common good and politics available to 
activists living in Switzerland through interactions that occur within the na-
tional context. While we expect activists to depart from these worldviews 
and to construct specific shared meanings within their commitment com-
munities, some common features may exist, as activists evolve in a particular 
national context in which specific cultural scripts circulate.
When it comes to the relation to politics, Swiss democracy and political 
authorities in particular are deemed trustworthy. Switzerland is a small cen-
tral European direct democracy. The Swiss population generally displays 
high levels of political trust compared to other European countries (Bauer, 
Freitag, and Sciarini 2013).13 This is rather exceptional given global polit-
ical and economic crises. However, four reasons might explain why the 
Swiss maintain relatively high levels of trust in national political authorities. 
First, direct democratic institutions offer repeated opportunities to influ-
ence political decision making (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). As we will see, 
activists frequently mention this point in their narratives: Most perceive di-
rect democracy as a major advantage of the Swiss political system. Second, 
the nature of Swiss federalism weakens the notion of the nation- state, 
which allows political implementation to be adapted regionally (Kriesi and 
Trechsel 2008). This further results in an acute proximity regarding polit-
ical issues and politicians. Indeed, it can be said that structures of direct de-
mocracy and federal institutions permit the population to evolve in a rather 
open and accessible state. A third reason for high levels of political trust is 
 13 The most recent instance of the European Social Survey (ESS Round 7, 2014) confirms results 
obtained by Bauer, Freitag, and Sciarini (2013), who based their findings on the ESS data from 2010 
(Round 5). Based on a score of 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust), Switzerland (6.2) figures 
among the European countries that place the most trust in their national parliament together with 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden 6.2, Norway 6.7, Denmark 5.7). Other European countries (Central 
Europe: Germany 5.0, France 4.0, Austria 4.8; United Kingdom 4.4. Southern Europe: Spain 3.7; 
Portugal 3.2. Eastern Europe: Czech Republic 3.9, Hungary 3.9, Poland 2.8) score considerably lower. 
The averages were weighted by post- stratification and population size weights. While difficult to 
compare, the population of the United States also shows low trust levels in their Congress. According 
to World Values Survey data (2011, Round 6), only a little more than 20 percent claim to be very or 
somewhat confident in Congress (Dalton 2017).
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the relatively low levels of perceived corruption. In that regard, Switzerland 
scores fifth on the corruption perceptions index compiled by Transparency 
International.14 Finally, political trust can be understood as related to the 
political performance of governments (Mishler and Rose 2001). Compared 
with other Organization for Economic Co- Operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, Switzerland scored high on indicators for economic 
performance, such as unemployment rates, inflation rates, and the general 
government debt (Schmidt 2014).15 Therefore, the opportunities to delegit-
imize state actors remain rare. The president of the Federal Council in 2015, 
Simonetta Sommaruga, clearly expressed as much in an interview:16 “For 
me, Switzerland is tantamount with reliability. . . . I am proud of our direct 
democratic political system, of the fact that four times a year, citizens can 
have their say on important aspects of our country’s future.”
In addition to relatively high levels of trust in state actors, a strong opposi-
tion to state intervention is another important perception broadly apparent in 
the Swiss national context. Swiss federalism means that the notion of a cen-
tralized state remains rather weak. However, this does not necessarily mean 
 14 The corruption perceptions index established by Transparency International (2016) considers 
Switzerland to be a very clean country. Based on a score of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), 
Switzerland (86) scored fifth, neighbored by Scandinavian countries (Denmark 90, Finland 89, 
Sweden 88, and Norway 85) and New Zealand (90). The variation in other European countries is 
quite high (Central Europe:  Germany 81, France 69, Austria 79; United Kingdom 81. Southern 
Europe: Spain 58, Portugal 62. Eastern Europe: Czech Republic 55, Hungary 48, Poland 62). While 
Canada also obtained a high score (82), the United States (74) scored somewhat lower.
 15 The OECD data (2016) showed that Switzerland presented an unemployment rate of 4.9 per-
cent. In international comparison, this is low when compared to Scandinavian countries (Sweden 
7.0 percent; Norway 4.7 percent; Finland 8.8 percent; Denmark 6.2 percent), similar to other central 
European countries (Germany 4.1 percent; Austria 6.0 percent; United Kingdom 4.8 percent) with 
France figuring as an exception (France 10.1 percent). Countries of Southern Europe showed higher 
unemployment rates (Spain 19.6 percent; Portugal 11.2 percent) and the rates in Eastern Europe were 
similar to rates in Switzerland (Poland 6.2 percent; Czech Republic 4.0 percent; Hungary 5.1 per-
cent). Finally, the United States showed the same unemployment rate as Switzerland (4.9 percent).
We also use OECD data to compare inflation rates (measured by consumer price index). In 
2016, Switzerland had a very low inflation rate (−0.4 percent). This seems to have been a common 
feature across Europe (Scandinavian countries: Sweden 1.0 percent; Norway 3.5 percent; Finland 
0.4 percent; Denmark 0.3 percent. Central Europe: United Kingdom 0.7 percent; Germany 0.5 per-
cent; Austria 0.9 percent; France 0.2 percent. Southern Europe: Spain −0.2 percent; Portugal 0.6 per-
cent. Eastern Europe: Poland −0.7 percent; Czech Republic 0.7 percent; Hungary 0.4 percent), as well 
as in the United States (1.3 percent).
Finally, according to OECD data, Switzerland has a very low general government debt (meas-
ured as a percentage of its GDP) of 45 percent. Only half of the Scandinavian countries come close to 
this percentage (Sweden 60 percent; Norway 43 percent; Finland 76 percent; Denmark 53 percent). 
The other European countries (Central Europe: United Kingdom 123 percent; Germany 78 percent; 
Austria 101 percent; France 120 percent. Southern Europe: Spain 117 percent; Portugal 146 percent. 
Eastern Europe: Poland 72 percent; Czech Republic 54 percent; Hungary 97 percent), as well as the 
United States (128 percent) showed substantially higher general governmental debt.
 16 Published in Le Temps on October 3, 2015. Translation ours.
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that cantonal political actors are strong. They operate with few administra-
tive resources, hardly intervene, and rely on civil society actors when pos-
sible. In fact, Switzerland has been described as a “coordinated economy in 
which policy consultation has played an important role in the elaboration of 
public policies” (Afonso 2010). Switzerland can therefore be said to belong to 
the group of nations characterized by democratic corporatism (Katzenstein 
1985). However, what distinguishes the country from typical forms of corpo-
ratism is the fragmentation of political consultation between different policy 
sectors and the veto power conferred by direct democracy (Afonso 2010; 
Mach 2006). Civil society actors, and employers’ associations in particular, 
therefore play an important part in political decision making and reduce the 
capacity for unilateral state intervention. A consequence of this corporatist 
setting is the organizing principle of subsidiarity, characterized by a strong 
civil society. Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) are viewed as crucial 
actors when it comes to the production and maintenance of the common 
good. An example of this subsidiarity principle is the domain of HIV preven-
tion. Civil society organizations have played a tremendous role in fighting 
the epidemic and even managed to shift their position within this political 
field— from challenger outside the political regime to subsidized actor re-
sponsible for policy implementation (Bütschi and Cattacin 1994; Kübler 
2001). Regarding activists’ understanding of politics, few cultural resources 
are available for an accountable state. By contrast, there is a firm belief in 
substitution, meaning that the conception of civil society actors as capable of 
solving social problems without state intervention remains strong.17
Turning to the relation to common good, the Swiss population gener-
ally has a communitarian view of society. We could even say that a commu-
nitarian identity exists, pertaining both to cultural differences within the 
 17 To assess the level of support for state accountability, we considered the ratio of people who 
“strongly agree” that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels 
(one out of five categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly dis-
agree). The Swiss population does not lean toward an interventionist state with regard to income 
distribution. Only 18 percent strongly agree that the government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels. The Swiss share this perception with the populations in Scandinavian 
countries (Sweden 20 percent; Norway 18 percent; Denmark 8 percent). By contrast, the populations 
of other European countries favor a more interventionist state (Central Europe: United Kingdom 
20 percent; Germany 22 percent; Austria 39 percent; France 35 percent. Southern Europe: Spain 
50 percent; Portugal 44 percent. Eastern Europe: Poland 39 percent; Czech Republic 23 percent; 
Hungary 49  percent) Source:  European Social Survey (ESS Round 7, 2014)  weighted by post- 
stratification and population size weights. To compare with the United States, we looked at an indi-
cator based on a score of 1 (government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for) to 10 (people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves). The result was 
an average of 6.4. Source: World Values Survey (Round 6, 2011).
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country and beyond. Within the country, the canton constitutes an impor-
tant identity factor. Cantonal identities were historically constructed around 
religion and not, as one might assume, around language (Kriesi and Trechsel 
2008). Indeed, the establishment of Swiss federalism was a compromise be-
tween Catholic and Protestant cantons and as such can be seen as a product 
of nation building, an attempt to “transcend class and linguistic boundaries” 
(Wimmer 2002, 246). This process was only possible through a transfer of 
power to the cantons. With secularization, the relation between religion 
and cantonal identities has diminished. Nevertheless, the canton remains 
a strong cultural identifier “to a community with a common culture and a 
common origin” (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 11). Moreover, a strong national 
identity is grafted onto the communitarian view of cantonal difference, and 
a number of scholars have demonstrated that Swiss nationalism is based on 
a communitarian understanding of citizenship (Eugster and Strijbis 2011; 
Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). Civic institutions are regu-
lated by a restrictive and assimilationist access to the nation, an example of 
which is the initiative against mass immigration approved in 2014, heavily 
supported by nationalist arguments. Hence, there is largely a communitarian 
understanding of society within the country.
These elements stress how the minds of Swiss activists can be shaped by 
the national context, which various interactions in the Swiss context enable 
them to integrate. Indeed, they surface in their narratives as understandings 
that are both to be appropriated and challenged. To what extent do activists’ 
understandings adapt to the national context they evolve in? Do activists also 
trust state authorities, oppose state intervention, and hold a communitarian 
view of society? Or does their participation in commitment communities in-
fluence their minds toward acceptance of other understandings of common 
good and politics? Will specific mindsets accordingly emerge? We begin an-
swering these questions in Chapter 3. But we need to explain how we went 
about studying activists’ minds beforehand.
Studying Activists’ Minds
Our comparative research design depends on the study of activists in action 
through interviews and surveys. Such a strategy follows the logic of a con-
vergent mixed methods design with a QUAL/ QUANT approach involving 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis at similar times and 
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with the same priority (Creswell 2015; Morgan 1998; Morse 1991). Why 
choose these types of data collection? Why are interviews and surveys more 
appropriate than ethnography doubled by participant observation? While an 
ethnographic approach would be adequate for studying activists in action 
and over time, this technique overlooks the most common and most invis-
ible of activists: passive members. In Greenpeace, for example, 99.7 percent 
of members are passive. And even Solidarity across Borders, the organiza-
tion with the largest share of active members in our study, includes 82 per-
cent passive members. A better understanding of the commitment processes 
of passive members was needed given that they represent such a huge share 
of all activists and that their support guarantees the organizations’ finan-
cial survival. Despite this, they remain neglected in the literature. Here, we 
systematically examined, in our analysis of both the interview and survey 
data, whether our argument applies to passive members within commitment 
communities. That said, the examination of passive members was not the 
only reason we opted for interviews and survey data.
The main reason is that the combination of their intrinsic strengths 
enabled us to tackle our two main aims: namely, to examine the process of 
mind synchronization during action, and to assess activists’ understanding 
of common good, politics, and political citizenship. Survey data present two 
key advantages. On the one hand, they allow for the collection of represen-
tative samples of case studies and let us draw inferences on the populations 
under study. Simply put, quantitative data enable generalization. On the 
other hand, survey data with standardized questions permit a systematic 
comparison between activists of different organizations and the wider pop-
ulation. This allows us to assess whether activists entertain a specific relation 
to common good and politics.
Indicators do what they are meant to do: They indicate. Even a battery of 
indicators prevents us from comprehending the complexity of an individual’s 
understandings in detail. For example, we measured an activist’s relation to 
state actors by two indicators: the level of trust, and the perceived willing-
ness of state actors to improve on a given common good. While these two 
indicators are certainly valid and cover a substantial part of the concept, they 
do not capture the entire spectrum of meanings individuals construct. It is 
also difficult to reveal cognitive paths with quantitative measures. Survey 
data are simply insufficient to reveal the full complexity of the human mind, 
and interview material is hence necessary to gain a fuller grasp of activists’ 
meanings (Monroe 1996). We therefore conducted in- depth interviews in 
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a conversational format with activists from the five groups. These data were 
useful for three research aims. First, they provided a deeper view of the 
activist’s understandings of common good and politics. Second, they allowed 
us to sort out the cognitive mechanisms that link an activist’s understanding 
to that person’s intentionality. In other words, they highlight the cognitive 
paths that let activists elaborate the cognitive components that orient their 
action. Finally, narratives allowed us to home in on the conversational 
interactions in a commitment community. If networks are indeed “islands 
of meanings,” we needed to examine how talk and ties shape activists’ minds 
in detail. Narratives fulfill these purposes. Interview and survey data hence 
crucially complement one another.
Despite these strengths, interviews are not without their difficulties when 
the aim is to produce a deeper understanding of activists’ cognitions. Indeed, 
the information provided may be biased through several mechanisms. First, 
an interview is a speech act (Searle 1969): a particular performance within 
a specific context. In our case, the activists’ thinking, their understandings, 
is biased through language and through the particular context of the in-
terview setting in which the activist has to recount his or her life to an 
academic. Second, the data we collected may only reflect the organiza-
tional frames and not the individual’s own thinking. Finally, we risked not 
accessing participants’ deeper understanding and remaining with superficial 
perceptions. These difficulties necessitated the development and execution 
of an interview technique that comprises several measures that guard against 
such pitfalls. The outcome is the collection of information pertaining to the 
manner in which activists perceive the world and the cognitive dimensions 
that matter to their activism.
We conducted two interview sessions with each interviewee. Each inter-
view session lasted around two hours, adding to a total of four hours with 
each interviewee. For the participant’s convenience, both interviews were 
conducted at his or her home. We also made sure that the interviewee was 
alone to avoid third party influence. We tried to instill a convivial and in-
timate atmosphere in which the interviewee felt comfortable sharing deep 
understandings. We always began with a positive verbal and non- verbal at-
titude, demonstrating our interest in the participants as individuals, ready 
to listen to their personal history without judging their perceptions. At the 
same time, we were professional, explaining our affiliation to the university 
and informing them about our procedure for ensuring anonymity for all 
respondents. As both authors conducted half of the interviews, it is possible 
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that differences in the interviewer’s age and sex might have led to slight var-
iations in respondents’ narratives.18 However, we had established guidelines 
that helped to standardize our interviews.19
Inspired by the framework of a psychoanalytical interview (Kvale 1999; 
Lane 1972), both interviews were open conversations with minimal inter-
vention on the interviewer’s behalf. The main task of the first interview was 
to produce a life history (Bertaux 1997; Denzin 1989) and activists narrated 
their lives in relation to their political commitment. The instruction given 
conformed to the genre of life history: “In this first meeting, I would like to 
get to know you and your personal history. Who are you? Where are you 
from? What led you to your commitment?” The interviews were then open 
conversations and did not impose questions or suggest answers.20 Most 
activists had enough time to tell their stories as they chose, and we steered 
the conversation back on course only if the response deviated too far from 
our main questions. When we intervened, it was using the words of the in-
terviewee and with the insistence that we were interested in their words. For 
example, activists repeatedly told us that they viewed institutional politics as 
useless. We then asked: “For you, what do you mean when you say that politics 
is useless?” Three main research questions drove the first interview: How do 
activists make sense of the world around them? Do the cognitive dimensions 
theoretically postulated emerge without the interviewer’s intervention? And, 
do other cognitive dimensions emerge? The most impressive aspect of the 
first interview was that all activists talked extensively about their relation to 
common good and politics without any prompts on our behalf.
The second interview was an in- depth interview that took place about a 
week after the first one. It was somewhat more structured with two main 
purposes. It allowed us to elaborate on points barely touched on during the 
first interview, such as matters we wanted to clarify, and life periods and 
understandings the interviewee scarcely talked about. We always picked 
up the words of the interviewees and asked them to provide examples. For 
instance: “During our last interview, you said that common goods are im-
portant to you. Can you give an example for this? What type of common 
good is of particular importance to you and why?” The second aim was to ask 
 18 All the interviews (as well as the collection of the survey data) were done by the two authors. This 
certainly helped a lot to standardize the collection as well as the analysis of these data.
 19 The interview guideline is attached in Appendix A.2.
 20 All the interviews were conducted in French because both authors are not fluent in German. In 
addition, the quantitative data suggest that there are no systematic differences between the two lan-
guage regions.
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open- ended questions related to the research, centering on the participants’ 
understandings of common good, politics, and their social interactions. 
We therefore attempted to delve deeper into their minds and collect useful 
information for the analysis. Regularly, the interviewee also wanted to ad-
dress topics they had forgotten to discuss in the first interview. Often, the 
interviewees had reflected on the first session during the following week 
and gave us information that provided a more refined understanding of 
their minds.
To select individuals for interview, we chose our cases ex- ante following 
a content analysis strategy. The logic behind case selection was to achieve 
heterogeneity within our target population. Therefore, within commitment 
communities we selected activists by applying what Patton (2001) called a 
“maximum variation strategy” based on available information (gender, age, 
profession, and commitment intensity) prior to contacting the interviewees. 
We thus opted for a systematic sample strategy to select the activists 
interviewed, and this selection was carried out before data analysis. This 
strategy should not be confounded with a theoretical sampling using an itera-
tive approach as it is done in the grounded theory tradition moving back and 
forth between sampling and analyzing data and where the analytical findings 
inform further sampling choices until saturation as explained below (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967; Kuzel 1999; Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2001).
With a theoretically inspired strategy such as this one, we aimed to in-
terview four passive and four active members per organization, resulting 
in large sample of eight interviews per organization, or forty interviews in 
total. Indeed, we ended up with forty interviews, but these were distrib-
uted slightly differently. We conducted ten interviews with activists from 
Solidarity across Borders because we carried out two pre- tests to evaluate our 
interviewing techniques and guideline. Unfortunately, we only managed six 
interviews with activists from the radical workers’ community. Convincing 
Unia members to do an interview was extremely difficult. The main reason 
for this is probably the challenging nature of their activism, as their profes-
sional lives are at stake: they must conceal their commitment out of fear of 
losing their jobs. In addition, the majority of unionists work full- time in de-
manding sectors like construction work, which meant they were reluctant 
to consent to four- hour long interviews. Despite this small asymmetry, we 
ended up with a sufficient number of interviews.
As we interviewed all forty activists twice for about two hours for one 
interview, we ended up with roughly 160 hours of interview material. 
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Conducting forty interviews was a manageable amount for the two of us to 
handle.21 More important, we determined the number to be sufficient. The 
aim of this large selection was to make sure that we had enough cases and 
variation in our qualitative sample. To stress the existence of synchronized 
minds within a specific commitment community, we opted for variation to 
better examine this hypothesis. Using variation as the criteria for selecting 
activists in our sample (see our discussion above), we strategically relied on 
a conservative research approach. If, with this strategy, we found that the 
interviewees shared similar understandings, it would mean that they really 
do synchronize their views to perform joint action. In addition, we had to 
keep in mind that the main feature of interviews is to produce a high quantity 
of information for a small number of participants. Yet the risk with a small 
number of interviews is, of course, that one selects only particular cases, so- 
called outliers. As we had survey data to test whether we were examining a 
general pattern or outliers in our interview cases, we did not run this risk.
However, this large body was not adapted to allow a fine- grained inter-
pretative analysis. The study’s feasibility was challenged (we should keep in 
mind that we also had a huge set of quantitative data to analyze). Thus, once 
conducted, we transcribed all the interviews and carried out a pre- analysis 
of the entire data set. We carefully read all interview transcripts and started 
to identify activists’ understandings of common good, politics, and citizen-
ship. The next step was then to proceed to a deeper and detailed analysis we 
describe below. To analyze one case, or four hours of interviews, took about 
two weeks. To keep this type of meticulous analysis feasible we reduced our 
body of interviews.
We made use of a clear strategy to reduce the number of interviews: varia-
tion. This strategy was aimed at avoiding the analysis of similar cases and to 
ensure the heterogeneity of our target population. We could rely on this selec-
tion strategy for two reasons. First, with the pre- analysis of our data we had 
a clear idea of the content of each interview and how the variety of activists 
interviewed perceive common good, politics, and citizenship. Second, we 
selected our interviews in a deductive way. Our work is not situated within a 
grounded theory logic of theory- building but in a deductive logic where each 
choice is inspired theoretically. Therefore, both our sampling strategy based 
on theory and empirical findings from our pre- analysis guided our selection 
 21 To maximize the standardization of the interviews, the two authors conducted (and analyzed) all 
of the interviews.
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of the cases for a fine- grained interpretative analysis. This becomes very clear 
when we look at how we excluded cases.
We first excluded all interviewed activists of the Society for Threatened 
Peoples (STP). These activists belong to the moral voicing community 
together with the members of Greenpeace and Solidarity across Borders 
(SAB). Both the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 and the pre- analysis of 
the qualitative material showed that these activists share a common un-
derstanding of common good, politics, and citizenship with Greenpeace 
and SAB members. For the fine- grained qualitative analysis, we decided 
to keep only members of Greenpeace and SAB because they commit to 
two different issues (environment and human/ migrants rights) while STP 
activists are engaged on a similar issue as SAB activists:  human rights. 
We further reduced our data for analysis by excluding two out of eight 
interviews per organization. We systematically excluded one active and 
one passive member for each organization with considerable overlap with 
cases included in the final analysis. This amounted to a total of twenty- four 
cases for in- depth analysis.
Table 1.1 gives an idea of the diversity among the twenty- four interviewees.22 
They are evenly split on levels of commitment intensity and gender, with a rela-
tively wide distribution in terms of age and professions. We also took seriously 
systematic use of all cases, and all are equally represented throughout  chapters 4 
and 5.23 To bring the reader into the activists’ inner world, we applied a strict 
“one plus three” formula: We illustrate activists’ understandings through the 
story of one activist per group drawn from the six narratives systematically 
analyzed. We then discuss the activists’ relation to common good and politics 
in more depth by using excerpts from three out of the five remaining people 
interviewed. The selection was made not because it serves our argument but 
because their narratives allow us to illustrate and deepen the results of the 
survey data. Whenever relevant, we explicitly emphasize differences.
Not only did we conduct all the interviews, but we also analyzed all of 
them ourselves. To assure inter- coder reliability, we analyzed the first two 
interviews together and each of us continued to get the co- author’s opinion 
when needed. The analysis did not rely on classical content analysis but 
rather required the use of a classical interpretative approach (Denzin 1989; 
Paillé and Mucchielli 2012) inspired by grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 
 22 A table with all forty interviewees can be found in the appendix A.4, Table A.2.
 23 A table with a count of each case used can be found in the appendix A.5, Table A.3.
Table 1.1 Twenty- Four Interviewees, Different Characteristics
Name Gender Age Profession Commitment 
intensity
Solidarity across Borders
Adriana Woman 63 Housewife Active
Simone Woman 65 Housewife Active
Lisa Woman 34 Political work for a peace 
NGO
Active
Colette Woman 62 Retired laboratory assistant Passive
Wilhelm Man 87 Retired theologian Passive
Yan Man 45 Nurse Passive
Greenpeace
Margot Woman 72 Professor of social assistance Active
Nathan Man 27 Computer scientist Active
Pierrette Woman 18 Apprentice in a jeweler’s 
store
Active
Evelyne Woman 41 University teacher Passive
Maria Woman 22 Telephone saleswoman Passive
Yves Man 38 Unemployed Passive
Caritas
Christine Woman 73 Retired tailor Active
Elisabeth Woman 80 Retired secretary Active
Mathieu Man 75 Retired engineer Active
Jérémie Man 88 Retired engineer Passive
Edwige Woman 82 Retired librarian Passive
Emmanuelle Woman 58 Librarian Passive
Unia
Eva Woman 44 Clothes- saleswoman Active
Joao Man 50 Balm manufacturer Active
Nuno Man 60 Mason, Taxi driver Active
Tiago Man 33 Foreman Passive
André Man 31 Mechanic Passive
Sarah Woman 53 Secretary Passive
Note: All information was accurate at the time of the interview.
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1967). And we developed a systematic analytical framework that allowed for 
comparisons to be drawn between activists. The main challenge of the ana-
lytical process was to remain close to the words of activists during the various 
interpretative steps and to avoid overinterpretation. To do this, we moved 
carefully from the interviewee’s words to common themes, from themes to 
categories, and finally, from categories to concepts, such as the activist’s per-
ception of common good and politics. Five distinctive steps progressively 
helped us rise in the level of abstraction. First, the recorded interview mate-
rial was transcribed using a rather simple technique whereby only the content 
of the interviews— devoid of intonations, pauses, and emotional conduct— 
was transcribed. Second, we coded the transcriptions with the aid of a theo-
retically inspired codebook.24 At this point, the coding strategy involved the 
systematic coding of large parts of the narration including the interviewer’s 
question (if there was one) and coding some sentences before and after the 
section of interest. We applied this method to avoid losing the context in 
which interviewees dealt with a particular theme. This provided narratives 
in which the interviewee’s statements are linked to each theme. These in-
clude their relation to state actors, to goodness, or to their social interactions 
about commitment shared with friends or fellow activists. Third, we elab-
orated a descriptive summary of activists’ statements for each theme using 
our own words but remaining close to what activists had said. Fourth, we 
wrote an interpretative summary organizing different sub- themes into a co-
herent framework labeled with short titles. Finally, we used the titles within 
this framework to create more abstract categories and sub- categories that 
helped us compare and describe the content of the activists’ perceptions and 
interactions. This process allowed us to gain in analytical generality while 
keeping the possibility of returning to the interviewee’s words. We hence 
possess a rich and detailed body of data to describe and understand webs 
of social interactions, activists’ understandings of common good and poli-
tics, and the contingency between perceptions and intentions. This analytical 
strategy also leads us to differ from grounded theory, as our intent was not 
to build a theory. Rather, we relied on a deductive approach to derive our 
main analytical categories. Once we identified those categories in our data, 
we then made use of an inductive approach to define the content and the 
meanings provided by the interviewees about said categories. This approach 
 24 The coding procedure was based on Atlas.ti software to organize the qualitative material themat-
ically. The codebook is available in Appendix A.3.
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was essential to our work and yields important findings. For example, the 
relation of activists to human beings (humanness) and to community (inter-
connectedness) derives from the interviewees’ interpretation. Likewise, the 
way activists differentiate types of action carried out by civil society actors 
stems from our inductive approach. We therefore began our analysis with 
predefined concepts and categories and then examined how activists inter-
pret and perceive those categories inductively.
While this systematic interpretative technique reduces overinterpretation 
within the cases, survey data limit overinterpretation across them. To col-
lect survey data, we distributed a standardized questionnaire with compar-
ative indicators to activists from the five organizations. The questionnaire 
included multiple questions borrowed from general population surveys 
to test our assumption that activists possess specific understandings when 
compared to the general population.25 We selected random samples in two 
stratification layers: one for language (French and German) and one for com-
mitment intensity (active and passive members). The stratification for lan-
guage follows the organizational structure, which is usually divided between 
the French- and German- speaking regions in Switzerland.26 One can there-
fore assume that interactions and meanings differ between these two regions. 
However, the analysis of differences between French- and German- speaking 
activists did not reveal systematic differences and we therefore did not feel 
the need to introduce a weighting for language to correct the overrepresenta-
tion of French- speaking activists.27 In addition, active and passive members 
are never equally distributed among members. And, as active members al-
ways feature in smaller numbers, we introduced a second stratification 
layer to overestimate this category.28 We also decided against introducing 
a weighting for commitment intensity, as it would have led to ridiculously 
small weightings for active members and extremely large ones for passive 
 25 We used indicators from the World Values Survey (WVS 2007), the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP 2004), the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects 2007) and the European Values Study 
(EVS 2008).
 26 We excluded the Italian- speaking part of Switzerland, which makes up 5 percent of the popula-
tion if one considers the four official national languages as the main criteria (de Fluagergues 2016), in 
order to avoid translating the questionnaire into a third language.
 27 Nevertheless, we note that activists evolving in the French- speaking regions have somewhat 
more trust in state actors compared to their German- speaking counterparts.
 28 Distribution for commitment intensity within all organizations:  Solidarity Across 
Borders: 18 percent active members, 82 percent passive members; Greenpeace: 0.3 percent, 99.7 per-
cent, Society for Threatened Peoples:  0.1  percent, 99.9  percent, Caritas:  9  percent, 91  percent, 
Unia: 5 percent, 95 percent.
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members. Yet each analysis monitors differences in commitment intensity, 
and the distinction between active and passive members is taken seriously.
After an invitation and two follow- ups for each activist, we gathered a low 
response rate of between 10 percent to 44 percent.29 Three main reasons help 
explain this result. First, surveys are overused in our society. Public opinion, 
consumer, and satisfaction surveys abound and lower an individual’s will-
ingness to respond. Second, respondents received a letter of invitation to 
participate in the survey. The letter offered them the possibility of filling out 
the questionnaire online or calling us to ask for a paper version. The proce-
dure had the advantage of being inexpensive, but it lowered response rates 
considerably. Finally, the questionnaire was rather long, including fifty- six 
questions from the research. We also provided each participating organiza-
tion the chance to ask questions of their own members, which resulted in an 
additional section, comprising around ten questions. Respondents needed 
an average of forty- five minutes to complete the questionnaire.
The low response rate required that we question whether the data col-
lection procedure had an impact on the representativeness of the data. We 
controlled the socio- demographic indicators (gender and age) obtained 
from the organizations first. Based on this information, we produced repre-
sentative samples for Solidarity across Borders (SAB), Greenpeace, Caritas, 
and Unia.30 However, the sample from the Society for Threatened Peoples 
(STP) made us realize that young activists were underrepresented. We then 
compared the social profile, values structure, and social networks of STP 
activists with that of activists who belong to the same movement sector. The 
analyses show that STP respondents are comparable to activists of other 
post- industrial organizations in terms of their sociological profile. Yet this 
socio- demographic control does not provide any information pertaining to 
our research question: Are our samples representative in terms of activists’ 
cognitive profiles?
To answer this, we needed to know which types of activists were most 
willing to respond to our questionnaire. As is the case with every survey, we 
expected some bias within our samples.31 While we cannot offer a final answer 
to these questions, we assume that the activists willing to respond identify 
 29 We worked with response rates of 44  percent for SAB, 10  percent for STP, 25  percent for 
Greenpeace, 24 percent for Caritas and 18 percent for Unia.
 30 A table with these numbers can be found in Appendix A.6, Table A.4.
 31 Electoral surveys, for example, are often confronted with samples that are biased in the sense 
that respondents are more interested in politics and participate more in politics than the general pop-
ulation (Sciarini and Goldberg 2016).
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with and participate in their organization more than those who refused. For 
example, STP relies extensively on street recruitment, allowing the organi-
zation to advertise specific political campaigns. Whereas this resulted in a 
tremendous increase in their activists’ base, the downside seems to be that an 
important part of their activists (especially youth and women) do not know 
which organization they are members of. We also noted that active members 
are generally more inclined to respond than passive members.32 As a result, 
we feel confident stating that the samples used are representative for activists 
who identify with their organization. We nevertheless acknowledge that we 
probably have a slight bias for activists who pay only a small annual fee or 
contribute on an irregular basis.
Do activists in the same commitment community rely on synchronized 
minds to perform joint action? Do they share their understandings of 
common good and politics, and their mental conceptions of democracy? 
And what are the cognitive and relational mechanisms that bind activists’ 
minds to action? To come to a conclusion on the questions we ask here we 
triangulated quantitative and qualitative methods on the same problem 
(Tarrow 1995). Our methodological approach is characterized by an iterative 
process, a systematical comparison between interviews and survey data.
Outline of Chapters
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature and deploys the theoretical toolkit 
with the purpose of explaining why the mind and conversations enter into 
play in sustaining activism. We start by clarifying why the mind is central 
to our study and for human life in general. We then highlight our contri-
bution to the social movement literature, which is twofold: broadening the 
set of meanings to explain commitment and sustaining participation, and 
specifying the cognitive paths that link broad understandings to action. 
With the help of the contributions from the field of psychology, we are able 
to grasp how the mind sets activists’ intentionality concretely. Returning to 
sociological considerations, we underline that the mind is formed by so-
cial interactions. We continue by specifying the relational mechanisms that 
 32 Response rate for active and passive members for all organizations: SAB (active members: 55 per-
cent, passive members: 29 percent), STP (10 percent passive members), Greenpeace (34 percent 
active, 21 percent passive), Caritas (47 percent active, 13 percent passive), Unia (17 percent active, 
18 percent passive).
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shape the activist’s mind and expound why these cognitive and relational 
mechanisms both enable activist action and help sustain it. Chapter 2 hence 
details the nexus between an activist’s mind and conversational interactions 
to maintain action, thereby resulting in the thesis that a cognitive- relational 
process is at play in the sustainment of commitment.
In Chapter 3, we begin to assess our theoretical assumptions empirically. 
With statistical support, we begin by presenting the activists’ social and po-
litical profile before providing a first empirical appraisal of the synchroniza-
tion of activists’ minds. Whether activists rely on socially shared meanings 
to perform joint action and to sustain it constitutes the chapter’s driving 
question. We proceed in three steps: first, we show that activists rely on a 
specific understanding of common good and politics that departs from that 
held by the general population. Second, we consider how their inclusion in 
a specific commitment community provides them with a particular under-
standing of common good and politics. Comparing the activists who partake 
in the moral voicing, Christian aid, and the workers’ voicing communities, 
we show that each type of participant sees both common good and poli-
tics through specific cognitive lenses. Third, to subject our hypothesis to a 
final test, we examine whether activists who evolve in the same commitment 
site, but who are mobilized in distinct organizations and on different so-
cial problems, rely on shared meanings to perform joint action. Comparing 
the activists committed to Greenpeace, Solidarity across Borders, and the 
Society for Threatened Peoples, we observe that moral voicing activists rely 
on similar views about common good and politics. Similarly, active and pas-
sive members involved in the same organization apprehend common good 
and politics through the same cognitive lenses. From these primary analyses, 
we demonstrate that activists rely on socially shared meanings that are dis-
tinct from one commitment community to another. Their minds are syn-
chronized with those of their peers and enable them to perform and sustain 
joint action.
Chapters 4 and 5 develop the topic of mind synchronization further. Based 
on activists’ narratives, we delve into their minds in more depth to see this 
synchronization in its complexity and to trace the cognitive processes that 
bind broad understandings to intentionalities. First, we scrutinize activists’ 
understandings of common good and politics by offering a fined- grained 
analysis of the way they comprehend both cognitive pillars of activism. The 
statistics of Chapter 3 provide a representative picture of the activist’s mind 
but one that is rather cursory due to raw measurements of common good 
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and politics. In  chapters 4 and 5, we investigate the intricate ways common 
good and politics are understood inductively. In a second step, we examine 
how activists’ broad understanding of common good and politics enables 
them to develop mental constructs that orient their action specifically. We 
highlight the cognitive paths that set activists’ intentionality and orient their 
action on a number of aspects: toward certain groups of people; and to act on 
particular social problems, in a specific field of action, and with particular 
forms of action. Finally, the in- depth analysis of the activists’ understanding 
of common good and politics enables us to grasp the types of democracy 
activist adhere to. Chapter 4 delves into understandings of common good, 
while Chapter 5 investigates activists’ views about politics.
Chapter 6 proposes an explanation of the findings advanced in previous 
chapters. Why does an activist’s mind differ from one commitment site to an-
other? And why are people’s minds synchronized when they are engaged in 
the same commitment community? More specifically, the chapter adds a rela-
tional layer to the cognitive mechanisms dealt with in  chapters 4 and 5, in that 
we show how conversational interactions shape the meanings activists con-
struct about common good and politics. The chapter also shows that not all 
interactions shape the activist’s mind and that specific relational mechanisms 
are at work to synchronize activists’ understandings. First, we demonstrate 
that face- to- face interactions are the key mechanisms behind the construc-
tion of socially shared meanings. By contrast, mediated interactions (through 
discursive outcomes of the organization such as newspapers or newsletters) 
are insufficient to shape an activist’s mind. Second, we highlight how face- 
to- face interactions in interpersonal networks allow passive members to 
construct socially shared meanings with fellow activists. Third, we show 
that redundancy and abundance of interactions are not essential to nourish 
the activist’s cognitive map. Finally, the density of interactions is a crucial 
relational mechanism for cross- committed activists. This chapter ultimately 
shows the importance of conversational interactions to the synchronization 
of the activists’ minds.
Chapter 7 wraps up the book’s main findings. Our study is motivated by 
a theoretical agenda:  to highlight the interplay between mind and social 
interactions that helps explain the process behind the sustainment of com-
mitment. This concluding chapter returns to this theoretical agenda and 
highlights its implications for the study of social movements and activism 
more generally. We begin by emphasizing the necessity to bring the mind 
back in, and its inherent complexity. Second, we argue for the necessity of 
48 Contentious Minds
taking into account considerations on the interpretative dimensions of social 
networks. More generally, we call for an integrated relational perspective that 
rests on the structural, instrumental, and interpretative dimensions of so-
cial networks. Third, we advocate a better integration of culture in the study 
of social movements that effectively values the role of culture in shaping a 
person’s mind, and argue that the integration of this aspect provides finer 
theories of mobilization. Finally, as with any research, this study faces limits 
that we expose in this final chapter, providing us with the opportunity to 
point toward avenues for further research.
Contentious Minds. Florence Passy and Gian-Andrea Monsch, Oxford University Press (2020). 




It is not men in general who think, or even isolated individuals who 
do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have developed a 
particular style of thought.
Karl Mannheim
Simone, a sixty- five- year- old activist, is committed to defending asylum 
seekers. Her main task is to visit migrants in state shelters and offer adminis-
trative advocacy. For the last fifteen years she has been helping migrants ob-
tain residential permits to remain in Switzerland. Simone is also involved in 
cultural projects related to migration and was recently involved in the pub-
lication of books of drawings by children of asylum seekers. When we met 
for our last interview, our conversation ended with a cup of tea as Simone 
offered us the books. Full of tenderness, she said: “Those children carry their 
sorrows, their joys, but also their dreams with them. They are like any other 
children.” Simone is also involved in politics. She was never solely satisfied 
with providing legal counsel and making the national population aware of 
the harsh conditions asylum seekers face. For her, migration is a political 
battle.
Like Margot, who is committed to Greenpeace, Simone perceives society 
and politics through specific mental lenses. She relies on a particular under-
standing of common good which she perceives in universalist terms and as a 
matter of rights to which all members of society are entitled. For Simone, to 
be deprived of rights constitutes a real injustice. And this is how she makes 
sense of migration issues: “Most of the people who apply for asylum status 
have suffered in their home country, have risked their lives, and we deny 
them asylum. It’s insane! . . . Migrants obviously have no rights.” Her uni-
versalist understanding of common good is clear in the following declara-
tion: “It’s important that migrants benefit from support and be recognized 
as human beings. . . . [W] e are all part of the same human community.” Her 
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belief in common belonging was also stressed when she gave us the book of 
children’s paintings and said: “Those children are . . . like any other children.”
Simone also relies on a specific understanding of politics. She perceives 
politics as a field of intervention in which civil society actors increase state 
accountability. For Simone, state actors are mainly responsible for the provi-
sion of common good, that is, for the well- being and improvement of people’s 
lives. And she understands civil society actors through specific mental lenses. 
For her, they are pivotal actors who challenge the state when it fails to en-
sure common good. This is clearly articulated in her views on migration: “We 
should fight on a legal basis to defend migrants. What matters most is the po-
litical struggle. . . . It’s vital that people protest. We must raise awareness and 
say ‘enough!’; migrants can’t be treated as lesser humans.”
What theoretical explanation is available to make sense of Simone’s inten-
tionality? In other terms, how are mind and action connected? Borrowing 
from the epistemologist Bunge (2004) we ask, How does it work? How does 
an activist’s mind orient that person’s action? A second theoretical question 
we address in this chapter relates to why Simone and Margot, mobilized 
in distinct political struggles in the moral commitment community, share 
similar views of common good and politics. How is this possible? Shared 
understandings bring up the question of how the activist’s mind is shaped. 
More specifically, it raises questions about the intimate relation between mind 
and interaction. The synchronized understandings that Simone and Margot 
share ask us to reflect on the impact of social interaction in the same com-
mitment community. A final question we discuss here pertains to sustained 
commitment. Simone and Margot’s understandings of common good and 
politics enable them to sustain their commitment. But what process links the 
activists’ minds to their ability to maintain commitment? The human mind 
sets action, but a non- recursive process is also at work. We should therefore 
consider the impacts of action on the mind. More to the point, we should 
explain how commitment shapes the activists’ minds and enables them to 
sustain their action.
The aim of this chapter is to further develop the theoretical framework we 
suggested in Chapter 1. To construct our theoretical explanation we need to 
present the current research on key concepts: the human mind, social inter-
action, and sustained commitment. The literature review will also emphasize 
our contributions to the existing knowledge. We begin by discussing why the 
mind matters to human activity and action. In a second step, we discuss the 
close relation between mind and action. In a third step, we scrutinize the 
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close bonds between mind and social interaction. Finally, we focus on the re-
lation between action and mind, that is to say, the non- recursive tie between 
the mind and action. We conclude the chapter by examining the cognitive- 
relational process behind activists’ commitment and their sustained partici-
pation in collective endeavors.
The Qualitative Experience of the World
Why is the mind so central to human life? The philosophy of mind is the 
most important domain in contemporary philosophy. For Searle (2004) the 
main reason for its centrality is that core philosophical questions are inti-
mately related to the mind. Philosophy of the mind queries the ways in which 
individuals make sense of reality. Questioning who we are and how we relate 
to the rest of the world are directly linked to the most prevalent question in 
Western philosophy: “What does it mean to be human?” (Searle 2004, 7). 
With those questions at hand, it becomes obvious that mind and meanings 
are central to human life.
As Searle states, everyone understands that the mind is central to our lives. 
We understand our close surroundings with our mind, what we live and ex-
perience. In other terms, the mind allows us to make sense of reality and of 
our lived experience. In addition, we act because of our intentions that are 
first elaborated mentally. Wittgenstein has emphasized that boundaries of 
meanings and action overlap and the space of individuals’ potential action 
is delineated accordingly, while for Searle: “Not all consciousness is inten-
tional, and not all intentionality is conscious, but there is a very serious and 
important overlap between consciousness and intentionality” (p. 97). The 
mind is therefore a central element in human life because it allows individ-
uals to perceive reality and to make sense of it. But it also sets an individual’s 
intentionality.
Meaning is also central to the interpretative tradition in sociology. 
Following neo- Kantian thinkers who see reality as chaotic, Weber developed 
a conception of human beings as “voracious meaning makers” (Weber 1978). 
The construction of meaning enables individuals to make sense of a chaotic 
world as we focus our attention on certain aspects of reality to organize our 
perceptions. Rational order therefore derives from the subjective perception 
of certain elements of reality. For Weber, grasping the subject’s meanings is 
central to understanding human action. The Weberian tradition, followed by 
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Mead, Blumer, Goffman, Berger, and Luckman, among other thinkers of the 
interpretative turn in sociology, relies on three main heuristic pillars. First, 
individuals are thinking actors. Second, their interaction with their social en-
vironment and fellow humans shapes their subjectivity, and constructs their 
inter- subjectivity. Third, human action ensues from the inter- subjectivity of 
actors. Like the philosophers of the mind, interpretative sociologists argue 
that meanings are central to an individual’s life. They enable them to perceive 
social reality, to make sense of it, and to act in their social environment.
The primary question interpretative sociologists ask overlaps with that 
asked by philosophers of the mind. Questioning who we are as social individ-
uals and how we relate to the social environment, sociologists raise the fun-
damental question: What does it mean to be a social individual? Sociologists 
have never fully answered the question. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have, 
however, recently offered a compelling response. For them, the existential 
function of the social world is collaboration in the construction of meaning. 
But why does this process matter so much?
Fligstein and McAdam recognize that humans face existential fears and 
uncertainties. The very meaning of life can constitute an existential dread. 
What happens after death? What is the meaning of my life? Why am I so 
lonely facing such uncertainties? These existential anxieties are essentially 
countered by the meanings individuals construct with others, and language 
acquisition is central in this regard. It offers us three advantages. First, lan-
guage enables us to communicate with others and to produce collective 
meanings. Second, it enables us to consider ourselves as the object of our 
own reflections. This skill is at the basis of a human’s ability to empathize 
with others and to collaborate with fellow beings. Finally, language enables 
humans to engage in coordinated exchanges with others and to elaborate 
symbolic activity, especially important when it comes to naming and dealing 
with existential fears. For Fligstein and McAdam: “The existential function 
of the social is the meaning worlds we fashion in concert with others that 
insulate us from the threat of the ‘outer perspective’ and confirm our own 
significance” (p. 42). Humans not only act collectively to improve their mate-
rial conditions, but also construct meanings that enable them to silence their 
existential fears.1 The essence of social individuals is thus to collaborate in 
meaning making.
 1 Religions are a good example of this coordinated production of shared meanings as they allow 
individuals to make sense of their existential fears.
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Enriched by these various disciplinary contributions, we understand that 
individuals are symbol- making creatures and that their relation to reality 
guides their action in the social world. First, they enable individuals to relate 
to reality and make sense of their social environment. Second, meanings set 
an individual’s intentionality, for without ideas about reality, action is un-
likely to occur. Finally, the construction of meaning is a collaborative effort, 
whereby individuals make sense of their social environment through com-
munication with others.
Meanings, intentionality, and social interaction are the core concepts we 
discuss in this book to explain how activists commit and sustain their par-
ticipation. We argue that without specific understandings of their social and 
political environments, activists would not be able to act and sustain their 
action. Philosophers of the mind and interpretative sociologists have urged 
scholars of social movements to reassess the importance of the mind in 
studies of participation. Moreover, interpretative sociologists have empha-
sized that individuals do not construct meanings in isolation but through 
interactions. This means that we should consider the activists’ environment, 
and specifically the conversations that take place in their social sites if we are 
to understand the specificities of their perceptions about society and politics.
Philosophers question what it means to be a human, while sociologists 
probe what it means to be a social individual. Our study asks, What does it 
mean to be an activist? How do activists relate to their social and political 
environment? How are their qualitative experiences of the world and their 
interactions with others reflected in their minds? And, finally, what does 
their perception of their environment owe to their commitment and its sus-
tainment? To answer these questions, we rely on a specific epistemology in 
which the mind is viewed as central to social action, whereby an individual’s 
subjectivity orients his or her action, and where social interactions enable 
the elaboration of shared meanings that, in turn, lead individuals into per-
forming joint action. Interpretative sociology therefore guides us on our 
theoretical path.
The Activist’s Mind
How do social movement scholars take the activist’s mind into account? The 
subjective and cultural dimensions of contentious participation have received 
less attention compared to structural components (Goodwin and Jasper 
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2004; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 
2012; Polletta 2004a). However, this objective and structural bias has been 
recently redressed. Many works have broadened our knowledge on frames 
and identity and have also yielded insights into the impact of narratives on 
contentious dynamics (Polletta 2008). We know much more about the cul-
tural and subjective dimensions of contentious commitment than in the 
past. In the literature on social movements, four concepts— interest, identity, 
frames, and narratives— help us grasp the activist’s mind, which is defined as 
the thinking and perceiving “inner box” that sets human intentionality. We 
now examine these concepts and highlight how they depart from the notion 
of activists’ understandings we develop in this book.
The concept of activists’ interest emerged in the sixties with a new gener-
ation of scholars who were largely committed to contentious politics. They 
contested previous explanations provided by psychologists who construed 
protest activities as irrational phenomena emerging from “psychic disorders” 
and personal “breakdowns” (Davies 1962; Hoffer 1951; Le Bon 1895; Smelser 
1968; Tarde 1901). This new wave of scholars approached the question of 
contentious politics armed with a distinct epistemology, heralding ration-
ality and interest as central to their theories (e.g., Fireman and Gamson 
1979; Klandermans 1984; Kriesi 1984; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). Contention was accord-
ingly understood as an organized action driven by strategic actors who aim 
to bring about social change. Collective actors and activists act rationally 
while interests (not mental disorders) drive their action. The concept of the 
activist’s interest was popular in the sixties and the ensuing decades. It was 
indeed seminal when it came to understanding how activists reason.
Epistemologically anchored in individualist theory, the concept of in-
terest entails the satisfaction of self- interest, a significant inner force that 
motivates people to act. Olson stresses that “rational, self- interested individ-
uals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson 1965, 
2) and consequently, only individual inducements lead individuals to act in a 
group- oriented way. Interest is hence featured as the sole motivational factor 
that explains participation in collective action. The contribution of rational 
choice theorists cannot be understated, as they argued that collective action 
is not self- evident. Social problems and injustice are actually more common 
and persistent in society than collective action is.
Many critics have addressed this figuration of the human mind (e.g., 
Green and Shapiro 1994; Mansbridge 1990; Monroe 2001; Sen 1990). But it is 
A Cognitive-Relational Process 55
beyond our aim to reexamine their criticism here. Rather, we want to under-
line one major disadvantage: the narrow conception of the activist’s mind as 
it is portrayed in individualist theory. Instrumental motives guide a person 
in collective action. Yet they fail to exhaust the entirety of individual motives 
that enable someone to participate in collective endeavors. Human beings 
rely on a plurality of motivations that cannot be neatly summed up by the 
stylized individual constructed by individualist theory. Unsurprisingly, the 
sporadic enquiry of rational choice scholars into the activist’s mind lacks 
depth. Instrumental preferences do not motivate individuals to participate 
in much collective action (e.g., Knoke 1988; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Walsh 
and Warland 1983). This failure has incited scholars to open the Pandora’s 
box of human motives. Along with instrumental motives, solidarity, iden-
tity, normative, and many other “soft incentives” help explain individual 
participation in collective settings (e.g., Chong 1992; P. B. Clark and Wilson 
1961; Moe 1980; Opp 1986, 1988).2 Unquestionably, these models provide a 
more refined explanation as to what occurs when activists partake in collec-
tive endeavors. Despite this, scholars who extend the concept of self- interest 
remain indebted to a monist conception of human motivations, whereby a 
person’s action is motivated only by the satisfaction of private interests, ei-
ther instrumental or “soft.” Yet, and as underlined above with reference to 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012), humans not only act to improve their ma-
terial conditions but also to collaborate in meaning- making with others. 
Individuals rely on a plurality of logics of action that includes but also 
transcends mere logics of self- interest (Passy 2013; Sorber and Wilson 1998; 
Terestchenko 2004).3
Today, the concept of self- interest features less frequently in the study 
of social movements. Yet it remains important to expound at least part of 
the story of participation as the proponents of the individualist theory saw 
it. In doing so, however, scholars of activists’ action should rely on a plural 
conception of human motivations. The distinction between the individu-
alist concept of interest and that of activists’ understandings then appears as 
twofold. First, the latter does not refer to personal inducements conceived 
as rational and objective but rather as subjective perceptions of the world. 
 2 Opp (1986) elaborated the concept of “soft incentives.”
 3 In addition to the drawback of the monist understanding of human motives, individualist 
scholars face a loss of the predictive strength of their model when the concept of self- interest is 
stretched: Selective incentives are not selective anymore (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1994; Passy 2013).
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Second, individuals cannot be reduced to the sole mental dimension of self- 
fulfillment. Other mental dimensions are at play.
Scholars have stressed the importance of identity on activist commit-
ment, advancing an epistemology often opposed to that proposed by indi-
vidualist theorists. Identity also constitutes a mental process, whereby it is 
understood as “an individual cognitive, moral, and emotional connection 
with a broader community, category, practice, or institution” (Polletta and 
Jasper 2001, 285). Those researchers have emphasized that individuals share 
bonds with others, and that solidarity is a vital force for participation in col-
lective action (e.g., Della Porta 1995; Diani 2011; Fireman and Gamson 1979; 
Gould 1995; Kriesi 1988; Krinsky 1999; Mansbridge 2001; McAdam 1988; 
Melucci 1989; Oberschall 1973; Passy 1998a; Polletta 2005; Snow, Zurcher, 
and Ekland- Olson 1980; Tilly 1978, 2005; Whittier 1995). As Fireman and 
Gamson wrote:  “[A] person whose life is intertwined with a group has a 
big stake in the group’s fate. . . . The person is likely to contribute his or her 
share even if the impact of that share is not noticeable” (1979, 22). Solidarity 
is foregrounded in identity and allows an individual to find the motivation 
for group commitment. Identity therefore operates as an important catalyst 
that orients individuals toward collective action. This scholarly contribution 
is key: Commitment, then, is a matter of belonging. In addition, scholar-
ship has underlined that identity is helpful when it comes to explaining how 
interests emerge, rather than taking them as given, as is the case in individu-
alist theory (Polletta and Jasper 2001).
Identity undoubtedly contributes to explaining why ordinary people en-
gage in collective endeavors. But again, proponents of this view rely on a 
narrow view of the activist’s mind. Obviously, identification with a group, 
defined by boundaries between a “we- group” and the “they” of outsiders or 
opponents, is a catalyzer for commitment. But it is not the only meaning at 
work. While we draw on the subjective and constructivist dimension of the 
concept of identity, our notion of activists’ understandings goes beyond the 
notion of identity. The latter relies on belonging and sentiments of attach-
ment to apprehend what binds people together in a community or a social 
category. By contrast, the concept of activists’ understandings includes the 
notion of identity and other activists’ views, and we argue that it is also these 
that enable them to participate and sustain their commitment.4
 4 In addition, broad activists’ understandings about common good and politics generate specific 
perceptions of belongings, as we will see in the empirical chapters.
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The concept of frames also relates to mental processes. “Mobilizing people 
to action always has a subjective component,” according to Noakes and 
Johnson (2005, 2). And those elements of perception have been conceptu-
alized as a social- psychological process called framing. A frame is an “in-
terpretative schema that simplifies and condenses the world ‘out there’ by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, 
and sequences of action” (Snow et al. 1986, 137). Both collective actors and 
individuals engage in this this meaning- making work. While Snow et  al. 
(1986) understood the notion of frame in its collective dimension, Gamson 
focused on its individual counterpart, which is more directly tied to our in-
terest in the activist’s mind (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Gamson 1992). It is 
worth discussing what both contributions have to offer and outlining their 
limits.
For Snow et al., frames are collective, motivational, and strategic.5 They 
are collective constructions with which we apprehend reality and which are 
elaborated by actors through their agency and contention. This suggests 
that collective action frames are never fixed in time, being the product of 
a struggle for meaning among actors. Frames also include a motivational 
component, enabling individuals and collective entities to perform action. 
Finally, they possess a strategic component as collective action frames seek 
to draw people into collective endeavors and orient their action. The contri-
bution of framing theory is essential to the study of social movements, as it 
underscores how fundamental meaning is to collective action.
Nevertheless, the conception of frames used by Snow et al. faces a major 
shortcoming: The activist’s mind is not accounted for. While they talk about 
collective action frames, discussion of the activist’s mind is lacking, the ex-
ception being the concept of “framing resonance.” Frame resonance describes 
the degree of receptivity of a collective frame in the public arena and in the 
aggrieved community that is the beneficiary of the mobilizing effort. It is 
also through a “frames alignment process” that collective actors recruit new 
adherents into the aggrieved community (Snow et al. 1986). According to dis-
tance (or resonance) of collective frames from potential activists’ worldviews, 
members are simply bridged to the group, or they should modify, extend, 
 5 For a review of the framing process see Benford and Snow 2000; Johnston and Snow 1998; 
Noakes and Johnston 2005; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988, 2000; 
Snow and Oliver 1995. For specific studies on collective frames and contentious politics, see, e.g., 
Alimi 2006; Benford 1987, 1997; Benford and Hunt 1992; Coe 2011; Einwohner 2003; Fitzgerald 
2009; Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996; McCammon 2009; McCammon et al. 2007; S. E. Nepstad 
2004; Stern 2005.
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or, even, transform their meanings to be able to join a collective effort.6 For 
Snow et  al.— and for most framing theory proponents— collective frames 
resonate with an individual’s understandings. Yet these understandings have 
never been studied. With framing studies we never know what the activist’s 
understandings might be. The concept of activists’ understandings clearly 
departs from that of collective action frames. First, activists’ understandings 
are located in the participant’s head: They are personal perceptions. Second, 
they are meanings that emerge from personal interactions and not stra-
tegic elements elaborated for performing collective action, as the collective 
frames are.
The conception of action frame developed by Gamson is much closer 
to our notion of activists’ understandings (Gamson 1992, 1995; Gamson, 
Fireman, and Rytina 1982). Without denying the collective aspect of frames, 
Gamson focuses on the individual counterpart. He emphasizes the idea that 
specific cognitions people elaborate mentally motivate their participation 
in collective endeavors. Three key cognitions are here noteworthy. Activists 
must first develop a moral indignation, then identify with the people they 
mobilize for, and finally, construct the acknowledgment that they can re-
dress the social problem through their commitment. For Gamson, injustice, 
identity, and agency frames are necessary prerequisites for participation in 
social movements. Without those mental constructions, contentious action 
is unlikely to occur. Gamson’s work constitutes a key contribution to our 
understanding of the intimate link between the activist’s mind and partici-
pation in contentious politics. He underscores, as did Klandermans (1997) 
who followed in his theoretical wake,7 how activists’ cognitions are essential 
to commitment in contentious politics. Moreover, Gamson (1992) stresses 
how pivotal social interactions are to the construction of personal frames. 
Conversation, then, definitely has an impact on people’s minds.
However, Gamson falls short on two issues. First, he conceives the activists 
too narrowly. Participation necessitates that individuals make sense of the 
aims and means of their commitment, and that they relate to their social and 
political environments. Those environments are complex and multifaceted, 
reflected in the activists’ minds in the construction of multiple cognitions 
that allow them to engage in collective endeavors. A much broader cognitive 
 6 Snow et al. (1986) define various process of frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplifica-
tion, frame extension, and frame transformation.
 7 See also Klandermans (1984, 1989, 1997); Klandermans and Oegema (1987); Oegema and 
Klandermans (1994); van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013).
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baseline is actually at work, one that exceeds the three motivational frames 
Gamson saw as crucial. The qualitative material collected for this study 
shows that all activists spontaneously discuss their perceptions of their so-
cial and political environment.8 Stating that injustice, identity, and agency 
frames are insufficient does not mean that those cognitions do not play a role 
in orienting action. As we will see in the chapters that draw on empirical ma-
terial, those frames consistently appeared in activists’ accounts and helped to 
set their intentionality. Hence, we are not opposed to Gamson’s analysis, but 
we stress that it is not sufficient to explain why activists commit.
Yet how are broader understandings fashioned during the commitment 
process? This question stems from the second limitation we identify in 
Gamson’s analysis: The origin of the three motivational frames is left unques-
tioned. Raising this issue does not mean that we are not interested in knowing 
how external factors shape the activist’s mind. Rather, we ask how broader 
meanings enable activists to construct these three specific action frames, 
among others. As we will show in this chapter, cognitions do not function in 
isolation but form as clusters in the human mind. Cognitive mechanisms are 
hence at play, which means that broad cognitions are connected to specific 
cognitive components. Concretely, understandings about society and politics 
enable activists to construct specific cognitive components, like perceptions 
of injustice, identity, and agency, which set intentionality and orient action.
More recently, the concept of narrative has been central to studies of 
contentious action (Fine 2005; Franzosi 1998; Gamson 2005; Groves 2001; 
Polletta 1998, 2007). “A narrative is an account of a sequence of events in 
the order in which they occurred to make a point” (Polletta et al. 2011, 111). 
Only relevant events, or those perceived as such, are included in a narra-
tive, where they constitute a plot. Narratives are therefore chronicles that are 
invested with moral meaning through use (Polletta 1998, 140). Narratives 
and the notion of collective frames developed by Snow et al. overlap in many 
respects. However, they differ in at least three aspects (Polletta 1998). First, 
a narrative is constituted by a configuration of events over time. Second, the 
narrative is closely linked to outcome. Finally, as stated previously, frames 
must resonate with an individual’s values or wider culture, which is not nec-
essarily the case of narratives.
 8 This evidence was present in each activist’s narrative collected in the first interview, when we let 
them talk freely without intervening (see our methodology in Chapter 1 and Appendix A.2.)
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While the notion of narratives can be useful in understanding the emer-
gence and transformation of contentious politics (see Polletta 2006), it is 
clearly distinct from our notion of activists’ understandings. A narrative is a 
particular speech act in which the use of events is key. Individual or collective 
actors tell a story that binds a number of events to an outcome. This speech 
act is also delivered in a public setting, which can alternatively be the conten-
tious arena, the group, or the public sphere. A narrative, to be sure, is a public 
performance.9
The concept of activists’ understandings as we conceive it clearly departs 
from the notions of interest, collective frames, and narrative. Activists’ 
understandings are subjective meanings rather than objective interests, 
and personal perceptions rather than collective ones. Our notion of 
understandings shares much ground with Gamson’s concepts of frame, and 
with the concept of identity. All are subjective constructions elaborated in 
the person’s mind that motivate him or her to act. The main difference stems 
from the range of meanings: We take a much broader part of the activist’s 
mind into account than Gamson does in the concept of frames and the con-
cept of identity. And we also pay attention to the cognitive mechanisms 
that tie broad understandings to specific cognitive elements. We therefore 
develop the notion of individual frames and identity further and our con-
tribution to the social movement literature can be said to be twofold. First, 
we enlarge the set of meanings used to explain commitment and sustain 
participation. Second, we highlight the cognitive path that links broader 
understandings to action.
Setting Intentionality
As Searle and interpretative sociologists have argued, the mind is central to 
the puzzle of human action. But how does our mind set our intentionality? 
Both philosophers of the mind and interpretative sociologists remain rather 
 9 The concept of narrative presented here does not overlap with the term “narratives” used in qual-
itative methodology. Here, the concept of narratives is a public performance whereby individuals tell 
a story in the public sphere. Narrative in methodology refers to a story provided by an interviewee 
about events or his or her own life expressed to an interviewer. This narrative couches the speaker’s 
view of what is canonical; it requires the narrator’s perspective, as well as a subjective sequential 
ordering of events (Patterson and Monroe 1998:316). Narrative is actually useful in revealing the 
speaker’s concept of self, and it allows the person to explain and justify why he or she went down a 
particular road in life (Patterson and Monroe 1998). A person’s story is therefore not a public perfor-
mance as the concept of narrative in sociological theory would have it.
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silent on the topic. They admit that a substantial bond exists between mind 
and action but stop short of investigating what the nature of this bond is. To 
apprehend the paths that link the mind to action, we turn to cognitive and 
social psychologists as their empirical investigations provide substantial in-
sight. Two contributions are here noteworthy.
Many social psychologists stress that cognition includes a motivational 
component that orients human action (e.g., Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Fiske 
and Taylor 2013; Higgins and Sorrentino 1990; Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 
1993).10 However, they recognize the existence of domain- specific knowledge 
necessary to a person’s performance. This is a seminal contribution provided 
by this field of knowledge: Individuals do not rely on general or universal 
knowledge, but on a specific knowledge delimited by a field of experience 
(e.g., Fine 1979; Fine and McDonnell 2007; Fine and Turner 2001; Lawrence 
A. Hirschfeld and Gelman 2004). Cognitions, in this view, are understood 
as particular and situated (Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 1993). This insight 
invites us to specify the cognitive dimensions at work in the performance of 
activism. As established in Chapter 1, perceptions about the aims and means 
of activism constitute the domain- specific knowledge required to perform 
activism. Activists must make sense of the aim of their commitment by elab-
orating meanings about society and common good in their minds and the 
means to act so that the social problem that concerns them can be resolved. 
We accordingly postulate that common good and politics are the necessary 
cognitions in the performance of activism.
The second key contribution of psychologists is to point out that cognitive 
mechanisms bind specific meanings to individual’s intentionality and to ac-
tion. The work of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) is relevant here, as they showed 
that broad cognitions are connected to more specific cognitive components, 
which in turn construct an individual’s intentionality and lead to action. 
A cognitive funnel is hence at work. The strength of this contribution is the 
emphasis placed on the idea that cognitions are intertwined, tying parts of 
one’s knowledge together. Although the models Ajzen and Fishbein employ 
 10 Two distinct types of cognitive processes bridge mind and action together: an unthought pro-
cess and a deliberative one (e.g., D’Andrade 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Fiske 2010b; Fiske and Taylor 
2013; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). The former is based on automatic cognitions, which are 
implicit, unverbalized, and rapid. In this case, human action is grounded in routine. While the latter 
is based on deliberative cognitions, which are explicit, verbalized, and slow. Deliberation occurs 
when a new problem emerges and attracts the individual’s attention, when existing schemas fail to 
account adequately for a new situation, or when individuals are dissatisfied with the schemas avail-
able (DiMaggio 1997). Whether through automatic or deliberative cognitions, the mind motivates 
individuals to perform action.
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are linear— moving from general to specific cognitions— we can also con-
ceive of cognitive linkages in terms of networks. Neuroscientists have re-
vealed that cognitions take the form of clusters in the human mind (e.g., 
Medaglia, Lynall, and Bassett 2015; Sporns 2014), generating associated 
networks, or nodes of meanings (Cerulo 2010). Regardless of how we figure 
cognitive linkages, linear or in constellations, individuals connect different 
cognitions to construct intentionality, prior to acting.
Highlighting the cognitive paths involved in different forms of activism 
constitutes one of the major tasks we undertake in this study. We seek to ex-
plain how broad cognitions about common good and politics set an activist’s 
intentionality, and which cognitive mechanisms are involved. Investigating 
the cognitive mechanisms is a task that we mainly carry out inductively, as 
explained in  chapters 4 and 5. In the present theoretical section, our aim is 
merely to gesture toward the cognitive mechanisms that result from our in-
ductive work, sketched out in Figure 2.1. Let us first examine how the per-
ception of common good enables activists to set specific intentionalities.
As discussed in Chapter  1, two specific dimensions enable activists to 
make sense of common good. Commonness permits us to apprehend how 
activists comprehend what binds people together and how they perceive so-
ciety either on a universalist or communitarian basis. By contrast, goodness 
allows us to scrutinize how activists make sense of the social problem that 
concerns them. It can be understood according to the care or social justice 
repertoire. Both dimensions allow activists to fashion three specific cogni-
tive components that figure in the construction of their intentionality. The 
understanding of commonness enables the construction of a specific relation 
to otherness, which pertains to the way activists conceive relations to others 
and to human diversity. The way activists perceive commonness allows us to 
evaluate whether they commit for others or if their commitment is restricted 
to a group to which they belong. Commonness also constructs a particular 
concernedness about common good. According to their conception, either 
in universalist or communitarian terms, activists should be able to develop 
a wide concern or a narrow concern about common goods, restricted to the 
group they belong to. Finally, the perception of goodness allows for the attri-
bution of responsibility. The way activists perceive common good— either as 
a matter of justice or of care— enables them to identify collective actors as 
accountable for social problems and to decide where political responsibility 
lies. The attribution of responsibility should, in turn, orient them toward 
political or social action. Otherness, concernedness, and responsibility are 
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hence cognitive constructs that set an activist’s intentionality and orients his 
or her action: toward specific social groups, toward certain social issues, and 
toward the political or social arena. Those cognitive components set activists’ 
intentionality and help us explain for whom, for what, and in which field mo-
bilization occurs.
Understandings of politics also contribute to the construction of cogni-
tive components that orient action. The way activists perceive state and civil 
society actors enables them develop a particular relation to the state and 
concernedness regarding political commitment. We call these cognitive 
components state relatedness and concernedness about politics. Activists ei-
ther construct a conflictual or a complementary state relatedness. The former 
defines a relation to state actors based on such actors’ lack of accountability 
and legitimacy, whereas the latter refers to a view in which state actors are 
seen as complementary to other actors involved in the production and main-
tenance of common good. Finally, activists’ perception of civil society actors, 
e Activist’s Mind























In a specic form
of activism
Figure 2.1 Cognitive mechanisms that bind activists’ perceptions to 
their action
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which can be grasped as interventional or substituting, allows them to con-
struct ideas about what it means to be a citizen. Activists can be concerned 
about politics, which implies that they want citizens to remain critical about 
political processes and active in participatory politics. Or activists can be un-
concerned by politics and develop another idea of citizenship accordingly, 
one based on the care of others and in which participation is restricted to 
institutional politics. State relatedness and concernedness about politics are 
cognitive constructs that set an activist’s intentionality toward specific forms 
of activism and help explain what form of action is chosen.
Contributions from the field of psychology hence allow us to grasp the 
relation between the mind and an activist’s intentionality. It allows social 
movement scholars to move beyond the rather elusive bond between mind 
and action that philosophers of the mind and the interpretative sociologists 
allude to. But the account advanced by psychologists remains hindered by 
the lack of attention devoted to the mind’s social dimension.
The Social Mind
Psychologists have too often neglected to consider an individual’s mind as 
a social mind. Their approach has remained centered on “a solitary and, for 
the most part, purely intellectual being” (Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 1993, 
586). Most ignore that cognition is a fundamentally social activity, which 
does not prevent people from thinking, perceiving, feeling, and acting in 
culture- specific ways (DiMaggio and Markus 2010, 349).11 A  burgeoning 
field of cultural psychology has emerged over the last decade and provided us 
with knowledge as to how culture shapes psychological processes (Lehman, 
Chiu, and Schaller 2004, for a review). Various paradigms have underscored 
the influence of culture on the human mind, but most studies subscribe to a 
stylized conception of culture, understood in terms of norms and values.12 
Culture is accordingly frequently conceived of as static, thereby reinfor-
cing stereotypical images (Lehman, Chiu, and Schaller 2004). Finally, these 
studies are plagued by a lack of attention devoted to the manner in which 
individuals make use of culture mentally. While variations are observed, 
explanations are absent as to how the process of importation works. With 
 11 For exceptions, see D’Andrade 1995; Fiske and Taylor 2013; Heine 2008; Kitayama and Cohen 
2007; Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 1993; Markus and Kitayama 1994; Shweder 1991.
 12 See Alexander et al. (2012) for a critical discussion about culture grasped as norms and values.
A Cognitive-Relational Process 65
few exceptions (Doise and Mugny 1984; Moscovici 1984; Vygotsky 1978), 
psychologists have left aside just how crucial conversation is to internalizing 
cultural practices, and interactive processes are undermined. Finally, casting 
social factors aside has led psychologists to forget that people do not rely on 
personal cognitions to act but on socially shared meanings. We can perform 
joint action thanks to meanings we hold in common,13 the latter emerging 
through conversational interaction, as sociologists have stressed.
For sociologists, the mind is above all to be understood as a social optic 
constrained by the social world. As Zerubavel has claimed: “I experience the 
world not only personally, through my own senses, but also impersonally, 
through my mental membership in various social communities” (1997, 7). 
Sociologists hence conceive our minds as social constructs, and this involves 
a view of cognition as always particular, contingent upon specific cultural 
contexts. The mind, perceived as a thinking and perceiving “inner box” is 
therefore rooted in social processes. But how does the importation of the 
social occur?
Mead (1934) pioneered the investigation of the socially constructed 
aspects of one’s mind. For him, the importation of social processes is the out-
come of a constant dialogue between two parts of the self: The “Me” and the 
“I.” The “Me” is the organized set of meanings about others and the social 
world, whereas the “I” is the response of the individual to the “Me.” For the 
American sociologist, the emergence of the mind is therefore contingent 
upon social interaction: It is constructed through an ongoing process where 
language and conversation are key. More recently, Zerubavel (1997) also 
stressed that the social construction of our minds is achieved through lan-
guage and during conversations held in the communities we are part of. Such 
interactions allow us to construct socially shared meanings, which can lead us 
to perform joint action (Collins 2004; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Without 
shared meanings, joint action is unlikely to occur.
Drawing on Mead’s work, we argue that activism undeniably relies on 
shared meanings that enable individuals to perform joint action. Two 
questions arise at this point. The first is deceptively simply: What are those 
shared meanings? A large part of our empirical analysis is devoted to the iden-
tification of activists’ shared meanings— and their shared understandings of 
 13 Few psychologists refer to “shared meanings.” Resnick et al. (1991) and Levine et al. (1993) are 
among the few cognitivists who raise the issue of inter- subjectivity. They label “shared meanings” as 
“socially shared cognitions” whereas we refer to “shared meanings” and “socially shared cognitions” 
interchangeably.
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common good and politics in particular. The second question follows from 
the first: How do activists develop shared meanings mentally? More specif-
ically, how is the convergence of views on common good and politics pos-
sible? The task is to explain how social interactions fashion activists’ shared 
understandings that allow them to perform joint action, which will be 
undertaken in the following section. But we need first to examine how so-
cial movement scholars have understood social interaction and its relation to 
contentious commitment.
Social interaction is a key concept in the literature on social movements. 
Contentious participation has been apprehended as a relational process 
(Tilly 2002). Activists are seen as highly interconnected, part of multiple 
attachments, and engaged in constant fluxes of interactions with their peers 
(e.g., Della Porta 1988; Diani 2015; Gould 1995; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 
1988; McAdam 1988; Mische 2003; Passy 1998a; Passy and Monsch 2014; 
Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland- Olson 1980). Social interactions evidently play a 
crucial role in contentious activism. However, many processes are obscured 
by the somewhat totalizing notion of a social network. To specify how 
networks matter and influence contentious processes has become a recur-
rent concern for social movement scholars, who have worked hard to follow 
Wellman’s (1988) advice to move “from metaphor to substance” (Diani 2003; 
McAdam 2003; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003). The injunction is 
to understand the influence of networks on contention. This was an essential 
move toward a more refined comprehension of participation, but one that 
arguably suffered from structuralist and objectivist biases (Emirbayer and 
Goodwin 1994), leading culture and meanings to be undermined. Seeking to 
reinscribe the cultural logics of meaning, social movement scholars started 
a new approach: “From structure to meanings,” seeking to apprehend how 
meanings arise out of structures. In addition to the work of Emirbayer and 
Goodwin, scholars began to consider networks, not only as structural and 
instrumental settings but also as cultural ones, which depended on meanings 
and cognitions (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 
and Mische 1998).14
White’s contribution was pivotal to our understanding of networks in 
terms of cultural setting. The conception he developed saw networks and 
 14 Scholars developed different theoretical approaches to explore the relationship between 
networks and culture, starting with a relatively poor conception of the link, whereby networks were 
viewed as mere vehicles of cultural components, and arriving at the development of a richer concep-
tion, whereby networks and culture are understood as co- constructs (Mische 2014).
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culture as co- constructs. Grounding his work in the interpretative turn of 
sociology and the theory of language, White argued that networks were “is-
lands of meanings” (White 1992). For him, social networks are permeated 
by cultural components: discourse, meanings, and stories. Yet these elem-
ents also construct the networks. This view postulates that networks are 
not simply channels that feed an individual’s mind, but rather that they are 
formed thanks to meanings and narratives constructed through interaction. 
In this interpretative stance, networks are conceived as “inter- animation of 
talks and ties” (Mische and White 1998, 696).
White’s conception of networks is heuristically productive for social move-
ment scholars. First, his perspective provides analytical tools that help us un-
derstand why activists share common meanings. Through talks and ties, the 
activist’s mind is enriched with and transformed by meanings derived from 
the social and political environment. Second, White’s perspective enables so-
cial movement scholars to have a better understanding of social networks. 
They are not merely structural platforms composed of nodes, ties, and some 
coordinated actions, but envelopes of meanings that shape commitment 
performances and the minds that carry them out. Finally, White allows us to 
apprehend the emergence and transformation of networks over time, as they 
are viewed not merely as the outcome of structural ties but also of stories, 
meanings, talks, and identities exchanged through ongoing interactions.
White’s conception parallels that of Mead to a certain extent, but also that 
of Tilly, the latter having made social movement scholars aware of the in-
trinsic relation between interaction and consciousness, identity, and interests 
(Tilly 1964, 1978, 2002, 2006).15 Tilly’s more recent work clearly stressed how 
ongoing interactions shape the human mind:  “Humans live in flesh- and- 
blood bodies, accumulate traces of experiences in their nervous systems, 
organize current encounters with the world as cognitions, emotions, and in-
tentional actions. . . . However, the same humans turn out to interact repeat-
edly with others, renegotiating who they are, adjusting the boundaries they 
occupy, modifying their actions in rapid response to other people’s reactions, 
selecting among and altering available scripts, improvising new forms of 
joint action, speaking never- uttered before sentences, yet responding pre-
dictably to their locations within webs of social ties they themselves cannot 
 15 The work of Thompson (1963) and the more recent studies of Gould (1995) and Walder (2009) 
reveal similar findings: collective consciousness, identity, and interests emerge not from structural 
position but from interaction.
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map in detail. . . . We live in deeply relational worlds. And if social construc-
tion occurs, it happens socially, not in the isolated recesses of individual 
minds” (Tilly 2001, 39– 40).16
However, few empirical studies have been conducted to demonstrate the 
interplay between the activists’ meanings and conversational interactions 
advocated in White’s compelling theory. Polletta (2006) and Mische 
(2007) have enquired into the emergence and transformation of conten-
tious performances through this interpretative lens. Polletta showed how 
narratives, meanings, and identities are constructed through communica-
tional ties, and allow protest to occur, while Mische analyzed how conten-
tious leaders, located at the intersection of multiple networks, are able to 
organize and transform contention through cross- talks. Likewise, few works 
have sought to scrutinize how social networks conceived of as “islands of 
meanings” shape the activist’s mind. Specifying the relational mechanisms 
behind contentious participation, McAdam and Paulsen (1993) and Passy 
(1998a, 2001, 2003)  have shown that three relational processes help ex-
plain participation in contentious politics. One of these is the influence of 
interactions on the activist’s mind.17 However, this research, including our 
own previously, is limited by two elements. First, the studies rely on a narrow 
view of activists’ minds by examining the influence of talks and ties on a lim-
ited set of cognitions (identity for McAdam and Paulsen, and problem and 
empowerment for Passy). Second, neither work examines the extent to which 
the activist’s mind reflects the commitment community he or she evolved in.
In the present study, we wish to corroborate White’s theoretical account 
with a specific focus on individuals’ minds, and expand on McAdam, 
Paulsen, and Passy’s studies by examining the broader cognitive baseline 
that enables activists to perform joint action and to sustain it. Indeed, we 
aim to demonstrate how the “interanimation of talks and ties” nourishes the 
activist’s mind and allows for the construction of shared meanings, which in 
turn leads to commitment.
 16 During his long and exciting intellectual life, Tilly got increasingly close to relational sociology 
and finally adopted a clear relational perspective in the 1990s (Collins 2004; Krinsky and Mische 
2013; Passy 2009). This relational heuristic is visible throughout his work, be it in his theoretical 
writings, his studies on contention, social inequalities, state formation, and so forth (Tilly 1997, 
1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2008). Tilly’s readers know that macro- processes fascinated the author of The 
Contentious French. However, Tilly’s later works betray an interest in micro- processes too (Krinsky 
and Mische 2013).
 17 McAdam and Paulsen talk about a “positive/ negative influence attempts” process, while Passy 
names the same process as a “decision- shaping” one.
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Conversational Interactions
Thanks to the work of interpretative sociologists and social movement 
scholars, we have stressed how influential social interactions are on the 
individual’s mind. Questions nevertheless persist:  How do relational pro-
cesses shape an individual’s mindscape? And how do interactions nourish 
the cognitive toolkit of people committed in activism?
As emphasized in Chapter  1, people mobilized in activism act collec-
tively, in broader cultural settings we have called a commitment community. 
Therefore, once activists join contentious politics, volunteering, or un-
ionism, they actually integrate a specific social network, laden with cultural 
components (White 1992). They evolve in social sites that shape their minds. 
This echoes Mannheim’s words quoted in the introduction to this chapter: “It 
is not men in general who think, or even isolated individuals who do the 
thinking, but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of 
thought.” Commitment communities provide activists with particular styles 
of thought that allow them to construct socially shared meanings, which, in 
turn, allow them to engage in joint action with members of that community.
But how do communities provide activists with shared meanings? As 
with any social site, commitment communities are networks where shared 
meanings, stories, and identities are created and transformed through 
interactions between members and with outsiders. Commitment commu-
nities hence constitute networks in which cultural scripts circulate (e.g., 
Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Polletta 2006), each relying on specific cul-
tural scripts. A community can therefore be said to constitute a cognitive 
world in its own right. The activists in our study are part of various organ-
izations that belong to three distinct commitment communities: the moral 
voicing, Christian aid, and workers voicing communities, which should 
specifically shape their shared understandings as to perceptions of common 
good and politics, and their conception of political citizenship.
When activists integrate a commitment community, they actually prac-
tice the cultural scripts available there (Mische 2007). But how are these 
scripts practiced? Essentially, through communication with peers (Mead 
1934). Talking and disputing about issues, strategies, views on politics, or the 
contention that mobilized them allows activists to interact with their peers 
using their own cognitive toolkit as well as the cultural scripts that circu-
late in their community. By the same token, these ongoing conversations also 
construct, modify, and transform the cultural scripts and, by extension, the 
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network itself. Constant conversational interactions bear on activists’ cogni-
tive toolkits and allow them to synchronize their understandings with those 
of their peers, which leads to the construction of socially shared meanings 
that enable activists to perform joint action. Synchronization is hence an es-
sential process in action and its sustainment, but it is a process that entails 
change, whether marginal or substantial. How, then, are worldviews adopted 
and integrated?
Psychologists and neuroscientists have emphasized the plasticity of the 
human mind (e.g., A. Clark 2007; D’Andrade 1995; Davidson, Jackson, and 
Kalin 2000; Gardner 2011; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; Mercado 2008). 
Both psychology and neuroscience provide evidence that people acquire 
new cognitions, and adapt and transform their cognitive toolkits throughout 
life. This finding overlaps with that of sociologists who underscore learning 
as a lifelong process (Sigel 1995). By all accounts, we are more open to 
change than past research on socialization has suggested. Psychologists, 
neuroscientists, and sociologists have provided abundant empirical evi-
dence that shows how malleable our minds are. They also supply a theoret-
ical grounding that helps us understand how our minds change. Actually, 
our minds are both stable and adaptive. The stable part relies on automatic 
cognitions, while the adaptive one operates with deliberative cognitions. 
Inner deliberation enables individuals to face nascent problems, to respond 
to new situations and interactions, and to improve upon responses judged to 
be inadequate. Deliberative cognitions, and mind plasticity more generally, 
therefore allow us to understand how activists seize opportunities to syn-
chronize their minds. Integrating new social sites, such as commitment com-
munities, they are able to store, modify, and discard cognitions.
Synchronization is nonetheless never fixed in time. Activists experi-
ence fluxes of communicational interactions and are therefore involved in 
a dynamic process that constantly challenges their worldviews, alters some 
of the meanings they had constructed, and even transforms some of their 
understandings. In addition, conversations draw on the cultural scripts 
available, but these scripts also modify and transform in the flux of social in-
teraction Synchronization is obviously an ongoing process.
Nor is synchronization a homogeneous process, which entails that 
activists within a commitment community “simply look in the same direc-
tion.” Views can be synchronized, but not homogenized. Multiple scripts and 
stories circulate, and many shared meanings are practiced simultaneously in 
a community. Moreover, activists are involved in other social communities 
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(e.g., family, work, friends, leisure communities,) which shape their minds 
too. Hence, they must make sense of multiple meanings and organize their 
cognitive toolkit to suit the conversational interactions that occur in these 
different social sites. The integration of those multiple, and often conflicting 
and variegated, cognitions is a creative process, which also leaves room for 
human agency. This creative process is akin to what Levi- Strauss (1966) ele-
gantly called “bricolage.” Given these factors, the homogenization of activists’ 
worldviews is therefore unlikely.
One could expect that once activists participate in collective endeavors, 
their views on activism would be synchronized. Yet activists have multiple 
opportunities for peer interaction but not all interactions lead to synchro-
nization. Simply put, not all conversational interactions shape the activist’s 
mind. One question then arises: What are the relational mechanisms that en-
able individuals to develop shared meanings? Our previous research sought 
to specify why social networks matter to contentious processes (Passy 1998a, 
2003; Passy and Monsch 2014), and we here trace the relational mechanisms 
that enable activists to synchronize their understandings. More concretely, 
we ask what are the relational mechanisms that allow synchronization to 
occur. We accordingly identify six distinct mechanisms presented in Figure 
2.2 that have the potential to shape the activist’s mind.
Direct interactions (face- to- face conversations) obviously allow activists 
to synchronize their views with those held by their peers. However, most 
activists are passive members who seldom enter into direct communica-
tional interactions with fellow activists. They nonetheless intermingle with 
the commitment community indirectly, through mediated interactions, 
the support material the organization produces, such as newspapers and 
newsletters. At stake is the question of whether mediated communicational 
interactions are sufficient to convince passive members to synchronize their 
understandings. Are active participants, who enjoy direct conversation with 
their peers, the only group able to do so? It is hence necessary to empiri-
cally examine whether direct interaction and mediated conversations are re-
lational mechanisms equally apt to shape the activist’s mind, or if only one 
mechanism is required.
Conversations can of course take place in formal networks, within the 
commitment community. But they also occur in an activist’s interpersonal 
network. As established, passive members do not enjoy direct conversation 
in the formal networks. However, friends and relatives can be involved in the 
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political issues. The flux of conversational interaction in this network can 
mean that passive members synchronize their views with fellow activists. We 
therefore consider whether conversational interactions activists enjoy within 
interpersonal networks are sufficient to synchronize their understandings 
with their active peers. Does this relational mechanism suffice for passive 
members to construct shared meanings, or is this process confined to direct 
interaction within the formal network, the commitment community?
Active members and community leaders enjoy dense and multiple 
interactions, especially as many of them are engaged in several spheres 
within their community. They usually are members of various groups or 
action campaigns and often evolve in an interpersonal network composed 
of friends or relatives involved in the same commitment site. We will ques-
tion whether a multiplicity of spheres of interaction is essential to the nour-
ishment of an activist’s cognitive toolkit. We will also examine whether 
conversations that take place in only one sphere suffice to synchronize an 
activist’s understandings. How does an abundance of interactions determine 
the development of activists’ shared meanings about common good and 
politics?
Finally, some activists are engaged in several commitment communities 
and are therefore cross- pressured when it comes to conversations. As stated 
above, each commitment community relies on specific cultural scripts and 
socially shared meanings. The question is to what extent cross- pressured 
interactions shape an activist’s mind. We empirically investigate whether 
cross- committed activists have a blended mind as a result of their adherence 
to multiple commitment communities, or if shared meanings from one com-
mitment community prevail over those of another.
As Figure 2.2 indicates, various relational mechanisms are contrasted 
to evaluate the impact on the activist’s mind. By no means do we want to 
suggest that those mechanisms exhaust the list of possible interactions that 
occur within a commitment community. Rather, we advance the notion that 
they constitute key relational mechanisms behind the shaping of the activist’s 
mind. The empirical enquiry presented in Chapter 6, using both a deductive 
and inductive approach, will assess the six mechanisms (direct interactions, 
mediated interactions, interactions in formal networks, interactions in the 
interpersonal network, abundance of interactions, and cross- pressured 




The interplay between the mind and conversational interactions enables 
action, but it also allows activists to sustain their participation. In this sec-
tion, we seek to explain how shared meanings relate to the sustainment of 
commitment. But beforehand, a short detour through the literature on so-
cial movements is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1, we know little about 
what happens during action as few researchers have questioned how activists 
maintain commitment. Contention is improbable if participation is not sus-
tained (Tilly 1978, 2008). Several studies have indeed shown that sustaining 
commitment is a form of behavior more frequent than it is rare (Corrigall- 
Brown 2012; Passy 1994; 1998b).18
The few scholars who have paid attention to the sustainment of partici-
pation identify two cardinal factors:  social interactions and the activist’s 
mind. Examining how participation is sustained in the Swedish temper-
ance movement, Sandell (1999) found that activists with close friends en-
gaged in the same movement were more likely to uphold commitment over 
time:  Friendship discourages people from leaving their commitment be-
hind. McPherson and his colleagues (1992) revealed similar conclusions. 
However, they emphasized that the quality and number of ties are factors 
to be taken into account, an observation with which Corrigal- Brown (2012) 
concurs. Strong ties and dense interactions enable activists to persist in con-
tentious action.19
Other scholars have seized on the importance of cognitions in sus-
taining activism. Drury and Reicher (2009), for example, have shown that 
participation generates a social- psychological transformation. This pro-
cess necessitates two cognitive mechanisms:  identity and empowerment. 
Participation emboldens one’s identity, enabling commitment to a spe-
cific cause. It also reinforces one’s capacity to oppose dominant groups and 
authorities. Whittier’s study (1995) on radical feminists in the United States 
underlined the centrality of cognitions (identity in particular) to the sustain-
ment of activism. Klandermans’s insightful contribution pointed out that 
both motivational and relational factors concur to explain persistence in 
 18 Sustaining commitment in volunteering action is not that rare a behavior either (see Wilson 
2000, 2012).
 19 Those results suggest that the organizational setting in which activists evolve increases, or 
decreases, the possibility of their sustaining participation. Less hierarchical organizational settings 
lead to higher likelihoods of sustained commitment. According to McPherson et al. and Corrigal- 
Brown, horizontal organizational settings increase the volume of interactions between activists.
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contentious participation. Like scholars who stressed that social ties matter 
for one to join contentious action, Klandermans (1997) pointed out that indi-
viduals must be embedded in social networks, and tied to fellow activists, in 
order to pursue their contentious activity. Furthermore, he includes motiva-
tional factors in his explanation and shows that if activists perceive a higher 
ratio of benefits to costs they are more likely to maintain their contentious 
effort. For Klandermans, both cognitive and relational processes contribute 
to the maintenance of an activist’s commitment.
These studies teach us that social interactions and cognitions are crucial to 
the sustainment of participation. However, despite their pioneering quality, 
these studies have two shortcomings. First, most of them assess the impact 
of ties and cognitions separately (e.g., Drury and Reicher 2009; McPherson, 
Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992; Sandell 1999). They do not link these factors 
together with the aim of examining sustainment. Second, scholars who in-
vestigate the relation between motivations and interactions, as Klandermans 
does, adopt a “realist view” of networks,20 which means that they understand 
networks in their structural and instrumental dimensions. This concerns 
Klandermans, but it also applies to scholars who argued that ties prevent 
departure from commitment (McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992; 
Sandell 1999). The interpretative dimension of networks is hence overlooked.
Yet the influence of the interpretative side of social networks is a vital as-
pect if we are interested in understanding how participation is sustained. 
Work by Rupp and Taylor (1987) has been cardinal in this respect. They 
showed that during the McCarthy era, when few opportunities for mobiliza-
tion were available, the women’s rights movement was able to survive thanks 
to the ties among activists. In addition, the network offered the next gen-
eration of feminists a path into the arena of contentious politics. Structural 
and instrumental dimensions of networks obviously play a part in the sus-
tainment of activism. However, networks, replete with talks and ties, played 
a crucial role too. Thanks to interpersonal exchanges, activists rehearsed 
cultural scripts that secured their identities, stories, and meanings despite 
the repressive atmosphere instigated by McCarthyism. Two more studies 
can be said to subscribe to this interpretative stance. Whittier’s study (1995) 
of radical feminist networks describes a process that binds talks and ties, 
thereby enabling shared meanings and identities to be maintained, which, 
 20 For a critical assessment of the “realist view” of social networks in sociology, see Emirbayer and 
Goodwin (1994).
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in turn, helped sustain contention, while Corrigal- Brown (2012) explained 
that networks matter to sustained participation because they embolden an 
activist’s identity in relation to the contentious group. The cultural dimen-
sion of social interactions therefore appears to be intrinsic to the sustainment 
of commitment.
In this book, we seek to underscore how conversational interactions and 
understandings help activists maintain their commitment. We propose to 
formalize the process alluded to in work by Rupp and Taylor (1987), Whittier 
(1992), and Corrigal- Brown (2012). How does the “interanimation of talks 
and ties” sustain commitment? Although it is a complex relation, the mind 
and action are intimately tied. We have already discussed the relation be-
tween mind and action. This relation echoes the world of William James, 
often considered the father of psychology: “My thinking is first and last and 
always for the sake of my doing” ([1890] 1938, 960). The sociologist Monroe 
expressed a similar view, stating: “Perception effectively delineates and sets 
the domain of choice options perceived as available to an actor” (1996, 12). 
Action ensues from thoughts: Our “mental horizon” therefore defines the 
repertoire of our possible action (Zerubavel 1997). While action is unlikely 
to occur without prior thought, action shapes the mind too. A non- recursive 
process is hence at work between thinking and acting, configured as an on-
going process.
Performing action reinforces activists’ understandings about the commit-
ment itself. But how? Activists’ perform joint action because they mentally 
elaborate shared meanings about the aim and means of their commitment, 
which are reinforced and legitimized once action takes place. As underlined 
by new developments in the theory of Fishbein and Ajzen, past behav-
ior impacts the beliefs, attitudes, and cognitions that set human intention 
(Albarracín et al. 2001; Boster et al. 2014).21 As political scientists, we know 
that interest in politics favors participation in politics, but the opposite is also 
true: Participation strengthens political interest. To miss the bidirectional 
nature of this relation would hence be to misunderstand it entirely.
Individuals can face two distinct situations. First, if action resonates 
with their meanings, it tends to sharpen their worldviews. This situation is 
more likely to occur in activism. Because activists develop shared meanings 
in order to act collectively, their commitment should be aligned with their 
mindset. Otherwise said, their understandings regarding the aims and 
 21 See Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) for a review of their theory.
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means of commitment should be legitimized and reinforced through com-
mitment. A virtuous circle hence takes place between action and the mind, 
enabling sustained commitment. By contrast, if the action does not resonate 
with the understandings activists have constructed, a dissonance between 
their action and their worldviews leads individuals to modify or transform 
their views through interactions with their peers, with the aim of attaining a 
harmony of views, or, if the gap between action and worldviews is too wide, 
the dissonance culminates in their departure from the community.
A Cognitive- Relational Process
To conclude this theoretical chapter, let us summarize the cognitive- relational 
process. Throughout the chapter we have highlighted how critical the mind 
is to the performance of action, and how conversational interactions allow 
activists to construct socially shared meanings. The mind, interactions, and 
action are the three cardinal points that guide our understanding of the 
cognitive- relational process, sketched out in Figure 2.3.
The cognitive- relational process unfolds in four steps. It begins with the 
activist’s participation in an organization or action campaign. Once an ac-
tivist joins activism, he or she integrates a commitment community. There, 
conversational interactions with peers take place and available cultural 
scripts are practiced. These help shape the activist’s mind. But specific re-
lational mechanisms are at work in the construction of socially shared 
meanings. In addition, not all the activist’s mental dispositions are affected 
by those conversations: Only those tied to the domain- specific field of ex-
perience of activism are thus shaped, while specific cognitive mechanisms 
set the activist’s intentionality. The interplay between mind and interaction 
allows an activist to enter a process of mind synchronization with peers that 
enables him or her to elaborate shared meanings and, in turn, perform joint 
action. A virtuous circle is hence inaugurated, whereby conversations, so-
cially shared cognitions, and joint action allow activists to commit and sus-
tain their commitment.
The cognitive- relational process examined in this book unfolds during 
action and takes place in a particular location in the continuum of an 
individual’s participation in activism:  after joining a collective endeavor, 
and before leaving it. In both processes (joining and leaving) the activist’s 
























































































































































































































































































A Cognitive-Relational Process 79
in Figure 2.3, the journey into collective action is initiated once a person 
joins a specific contentious group, volunteering organization, or union. 
Social interactions are key in drawing individuals into activism. Karl Marx 
([1852] 1996) already singled out the importance of ties to rebellion.22 The 
individual’s mind is at stake too. The cognitive toolkit allows the person to 
be concerned about certain social problems, to be aware of certain political 
conflicts, and to identify with certain groups that gear the individual toward 
activism.23 Individual resources are also important in the game of commit-
ment. This sociological concept has been identified by social movement 
scholars through the notion of social networks (and the idea of social capital), 
as well as through our concept of the individual’s mind (values, attitudes, or 
worldviews as inner resources); also, other resources, like education, are in-
strumental to joining activism.24 Finally, biographical availabilities constitute 
an important facilitator in the joining of contentious action (McAdam 1988). 
Social interactions, the human mind, personal resources, and biographical 
availabilities are hence the key factors we see as enabling people to join col-
lective endeavors.25
If the interplay between mind and interaction is crucial to joining com-
mitment, it is also the force behind the decision to leave it. Once activists 
no longer enjoy conversations with their peers, the virtuous circle between 
mind, interaction, and joint action fades away, and a progressive disengage-
ment from the community occurs. Activists can also decide to exit once col-
lective action no longer resonates with their mindset. In both processes the 
activist’s mind and interaction with social networks remain fundamental. 
Biographical availabilities can also help explain the exit process. If personal 
constraints change, this inevitably affects the individual’s ability to main-
tain commitment. Finally, the disappearance of the social problem (and that 
of the commitment community), as was the case with the anti- apartheid 
 22 Since Marx, scholars have specified three main influences of social interactions:  they enable 
a structural platform to emerge thereby providing an opportunity for mobilization to potential 
activists (e.g., Blee 2002; Diani 1995; 2015; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Morris 1984); they strategi-
cally connect individuals to a commitment community (e.g., Della Porta 1995; Diani 1995, 2015; 
McAdam 1982; Snow et  al. 1986); finally, networks intervene culturally by shaping the activists’ 
minds. Recruiters try to convince potential activists to join the collective effort by erasing, mod-
ifying, and transforming some cognitions (Kitts 2000; Krinsky 1999; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; 
Passy 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Passy and Monsch 2014; Whittier 1995)
 23 E.g., Jasper 1997; Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 1988; McAdam 1982; Eder 1993; Passy 1998a.
 24 E.g., Klandermans 1997; Kriesi 1993, 1995; McAdam 1988; Morales 2009; Passy 1998a.
 25 The literature on volunteering also highlights such facilitating factors (e.g., Eckstein 2001; 
Handy and Hustinx 2009; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Musick and Wilson 2007; Schnabel 2003; 
Snyder and Omoto 1992; Wilson 2000; Wuthnow 1995).
80 Contentious Minds
movement once democracy was achieved in South Africa in 1994, inevitably 
leads to an exit process.
Let us rehearse what we view as our main contributions. Relying on 
philosophers and sociologists who have explored the centrality of the human 
mind on individuals’ action, we argue here that the activist’s mind is a cen-
tral piece in the puzzle of activist commitment, either in the form of conten-
tious politics, volunteering, or unionism. But what can we say that is new? 
First, we stress how the mind concretely affects action. Endorsing findings 
by social psychologists, who argue that cognitions are domain specific, we 
identify the main cognitive dimensions involved in activism. We postulate that 
understandings of common good and politics enable people to commit in 
collective endeavors and further concretize the impact of the mind on ac-
tivism by relying on contributions from psychologists who have proposed 
that complex bonds exist between the mind and action. This means that 
broad understandings about common good and politics are not directly 
linked to activism, but that various cognitive mechanisms bind worldviews 
to more specific cognitive components that set an activist’s intentionality. 
This ultimately orients his or her action toward a particular form of activism. 
We therefore aim to identify the cognitive channels at work during this process.
Second, drawing on the interpretative tradition in sociology and the idea 
that human minds are essentially social entities, we argue that conversational 
interactions shape the activist’s mind. Again, we seek to spell out the impact 
of social interactions and the relational channels at work. Communicational 
interactions enable the process of mind synchronization that allows activists 
to socially construct shared meanings behind the performance of joint ac-
tion. Talks and disputes lead activists to fashion understandings of common 
good and politics, as well as a specific view about democracy. Although mind 
synchronization occurs in the wake of a relational process, specific relational 
mechanisms allow activists to construct the shared meanings that define their 
action.
Finally, the interaction between the mind and conversations allows us to 
highlight the cognitive- relational process at work once activists commit. This 
process enables activists to perform joint action and to maintain commit-
ment. Yet, as stated, this process is not fixed in time but evolves according to 
the interactions between activists. Change is therefore likely to occur, but not 
at random. Because conversational interactions occur in commitment com-
munities, changes depend on the stock of knowledge and the cultural scripts 
available there. Changes are hence path dependent.
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Our contribution arises from cross- disciplinary enquiries between psy-
chology and sociology initiated at least two decades ago (e.g., Brubaker, 
Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; Cerulo 2002; DiMaggio 1997; DiMaggio and 
Markus 2010; Massey 2002; Wuthnow 2007; Zerubavel 1997). Di Maggio’s 
pioneering work spelled out a more complex view of culture and a more re-
fined understanding of cognition and thereby enabled the interdisciplinary 
dialogue (e.g., DiMaggio 1997) we hope to further.26 Indeed, the aim of this 
book arises from the interface of sociology of culture and cognitive psy-
chology to grasp how cognitions, culture, and action interact.27 We therefore 
hope to contribute to what Zerubavel called “a truly comprehensive science 
of the mind” (Zerubavel 1997, 4; see also Cerulo 2010).28
 26 On the one hand, sociologists understood culture as fragmented and inconsistent in its manifes-
tation and further conceived it as a cognitive resource that could be put to strategic use (e.g., Martin 
1992; Sewell 1992; Swidler 1986). On the other hand, psychologists no longer understand cognition 
as general and universal, but domain specific. In this perspective, cognition becomes richer in con-
tent (including culture) than the formal intellectual models that psychologists were preoccupied with 
(e.g., D’Andrade 1995; Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 1993; Shweder 1990).
 27 In this respect, we use the term “cognitions” from psychology, and “meanings” from interpre-
tative sociology, interchangeably. When we use the term “cognitions” we refer to socially shared 
meanings as understood in the interpretative sociological tradition. When we refer to “meanings” we 
do not overlook the cognitive processes that bind cognition to action, as psychologists stress.
 28 Zerubavel (1997) has called the exchanges between psychologists and sociologists “the cogni-
tive sociology,” while Cerulo (2010) opts for the “sociology of the mind.” Psychologists also call for a 
better integration of cognitive and sociological accounts in the study the human mind, labeled as the 
“field of sociocognition” by Levine et al. (Levine, Resnick, and Higgins 1993).
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We are symbol- making creatures, who spin webs of meaning around 
ourselves. We proliferate metaphors and language for describing the 
world; we elaborate theories, hypotheses, and predictions to satisfy 
our curiosity; and we tell each other story after story.
Jasper (1997, 10)
In the previous chapters, we examined the meanings held by the seventy- 
year- old Greenpeace activist Margot and the sixty- five- year- old Simone, a 
defender of migrants’ rights. Both perceive common good in universalist 
terms and as a question of social justice. They also share an understanding 
of politics in which civil society should intervene to increase state account-
ability. Is this a coincidence? After all, the causes they are committed to are 
rather different. Or can this commonality be explained through their careers 
as activists? Both are part of the same generation and can boast many years 
of active commitment. At this point, we want to advance an alternative ex-
planation, embedded in Jasper’s words:  that human beings are symbol- 
making creatures, who spin community- specific webs of meanings around 
themselves. The process of integration into a commitment community sees 
activists interact, practice cultural scripts, and synchronize their minds, 
allowing community- specific understandings of common good and politics 
to emerge.
In this chapter, we take a preliminary empirical step that aims to evaluate 
whether this assumption can be confirmed. Postulating that there is such a 
thing as a specific activist mind requires us to ask four empirical questions, 
which structure this chapter. First, assuming that activists develop shared 
cognitions through conversational interaction and the practice of cultural 
scripts, do activists possess different understandings of common good and 
politics when compared with the Swiss population more generally? Second, 
are these shared cognitions community- specific? We answer this question 
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by comparing the minds of activists of the moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
radical workers’ voicing community. Third, do activists who evolve in the 
same commitment site, but who are mobilized in different organizations, 
on different social problems, and with different commitment intensities rely 
on shared meanings to perform joint action? We address this question by 
comparing activists from three organizations of the moral voicing commu-
nity, and by a comparison of active and passive members within the same 
organization.1 Fourth, do all activists qualify as strong citizens, concerned by 
common good and politics? We will assess the types of democratic cultures 
encountered within these communities.
One may ask why these questions matter at all? Well, if activists possess 
a particular understanding of common good and politics compared to the 
general population, this could indicate that their minds are shaped by par-
ticipation and that social interactions and the practice of cultural scripts 
within activist communities do indeed matter. Additionally, if moral voi-
cing, Christian aid and workers’ voicing activists have developed different 
meanings, it suggests that the transmission of specific worldviews occurs 
within each commitment community. Such a result reinforces the rele-
vance of our cognitive- relational perspective as it demonstrates that activists 
 1 We measured commitment intensity with the following question: “What is currently your com-
mitment within [SAB, GP, STP, Caritas, Unia]? Please check all activities in which you participate.” The 
responses were adapted to the respective organization: SAB activists could tick the following catego-
ries: (1) I pay my subscription to the association; (2) I participate in demonstrations / campaigns organ-
ized by SAB or a member organization of SAB; (3) I participate in the organization of demonstrations / 
campaigns organized by SAB or a member organization of SAB; (4) I participate in a working group(s); 
(5) I participate regularly at general assemblies; (6) I am part of the committee. Greenpeace activists 
could tick the following categories: (1) I am a (paid- up) member; (2) I participate in campaigns/ ac-
tivities organized by Greenpeace (petitions, demonstrations, online activities, etc.); (3) I participate in 
the “Youth Sun Project”; (4) I am a volunteer, I participate in a voluntary group(s); (5) I am an activist, 
I participate in actions (blocking the transportation of nuclear waste, the destruction of genetically mod-
ified corn, stop whaling ships, etc.). STP activists could tick the following categories: (1) I am a donor, 
I support (have supported) STP with one/ several donations; (2) I am a member, I regularly support STP; 
(3) I participate in demonstrations / campaigns organized by STP; (4) I participate in the organization of 
demonstrations / campaigns organized by STP; (5) I am part of the committee. Caritas volunteers could 
tick the following categories: (1) I am a sympathizer, I support the association by financial means; 
(2) I participate in demonstrations / campaigns organized by Caritas; (3) I participate in the organiza-
tion of demonstrations / campaigns organized by Caritas; (4) I am a volunteer; (5) I am part of the com-
mittee or a commission of Caritas Geneva. Unia activists could respond to the following categories: (1) 
I am a member; (2) I participate in demonstrations / campaigns organized by Unia; (3) I participate in 
the organization of demonstrations / campaigns organized by Unia; (4) I participate in one or several 
working group(s). All respondents who checked only (1) (and (2) for STP members) are categorized 
as passive members. We also recognized SAB as an umbrella organization that accommodates many 
passive members who are actually active members in their regional organization, and took this into 
account. We controlled this with an additional question for this group aimed at establishing whether 
they are members of another organization that defends migrants’ rights and whether they are active 
or passive members in that organization.
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possess specific mindsets. But it also suggests that the process underpinning 
these particular understandings consists of social interactions, which ulti-
mately lead to synchronization within the communities. We discuss the im-
portance of social interactions extensively in Chapter 6.
Before delving into activists’ understandings of common good, politics, 
and political citizenship, a presentation of their social and political profile 
is necessary. While our main argument is that activists are involved in com-
mitment sites that shape their minds through conversational interactions, we 
should also acknowledge that these activists evolve in specific social circles. 
Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that individuals committed to activism 
come from specific segments of society, which are reflected in their polit-
ical behavior (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Eder 1993; Kriesi 1988; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). The next section of this chapter outlines the sociological and 
political profile of the activists from the moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
workers’ voicing communities.
The Activists
Mobilization for political action follows political and social conflict lines, 
so- called politicized social cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). Consequently, the workers’ voicing community originates 
from the labor movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
when class was an important mobilizing force. In a similar vein, the moral 
voicing community is the political translation of another social cleavage: the 
so- called post- industrial cleavage. Appearing in the sixties, it was animated 
by a concern for social justice, individuals’ emancipation, and toward the 
emergent risk society2 (Kriesi 1993). Protest actors therefore have a partic-
ular political potential and individuals who join in political action have a 
high probability of belonging to a specific social and political profile. Social 
and political anchorages are thus important identifiers that delimit the mobi-
lization potential (Klandermans 1997). This concept draws our attention to 
the fact that not every individual is sensitized to a specific issue and has the 
same probability to be recruited. Contrary to the moral and the workers’ voi-
cing community, the Christian aid community is not reducible to a particular 
 2 For Anthony Giddens (1998), a risk society is “a society increasingly preoccupied with the fu-
ture.” Ulrich Beck (1992, 21) defines risk society as “a sytematic way of dealing with hazards and inse-
curities induced and introduced by modernisation iteself.”
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political cleavage. Yet, do they still mobilize a particular segment of the pop-
ulation? According to Table 3.1, this is clearly the case. Table 3.1 highlights 
the social anchorage of activists and of the Swiss population— in particular, 
social classes, level of education, religious practices, and generational repre-
sentation within these communities. The most general result we observe is 
that particular social profiles evolve in these communities. But let us discuss 
these indicators one after the other.
If we compare activists with the general population, particular sectors of 
social classes are overrepresented in these organizations. For the three organ-
izations of the moral voicing community (Solidarity across Borders, Society 
for Threatened Peoples, and Greenpeace), previous research has shown that 
citizens from the new middle class were, and are, the essential carriers of the 
post- industrial contention (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Eder 1993; Kriesi 1989; 
Passy 1998a). Within the new middle class, socio- cultural specialists are 
particularly dominant, and the empirical evidence confirms this. The new 
middle class is largely overrepresented within moral voicing activists. By con-
trast, members of the bourgeoisie and the working class are less frequently 
mobilized in these political struggles. Individuals from the new middle class, 
socio- cultural specialists in particular, are most frequently mobilized. For all 
three moral voicing organizations, we detect a similar social anchorage. The 
mobilization potential of the Society for Threatened Peoples and Greenpeace 
is very similar. The social anchorage of Solidarity across Borders activists, by 
contrast, is somewhat more specific, as they are almost exclusively mobilized 
within the new middle class. This could be a result of the highly challenging 
nature of this political conflict, leading to a narrower mobilization potential.
Our results show a comparable distribution for the Christian aid com-
munity. The new middle class is overrepresented while the working class is 
largely underrepresented. What distinguishes Christian aid volunteers from 
moral voicing activists is that the Christian aid community is composed of 
more managers and fewer socio- cultural specialists. Further, Caritas is able 
to recruit slightly more members from the bourgeoisie, especially from self- 
employed professionals and large employers. Nonetheless, this type of ac-
tivism mobilizes specific segments of the social world too. Not all classes are 
similarly represented within the organization as they are within the Swiss 
society.
Unsurprisingly, working- class activism mobilizes a different class seg-
ment from that participating in the other two communities. With regard to 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are overrepresented while the bourgeoisie is largely underrepresented. The 
middle class is well represented within workers’ voicing activists with the 
exception of socio- cultural specialists. As stipulated before, an important 
share of Unia activists belongs to the white- collar labor force. Technocrats 
and managers allow for an important mobilization of the middle class. They 
come from the craft, construction, or industrial sectors where most of their 
members work. Nevertheless, workers’ rights activism remains a collective 
action of a particular class. Unia mobilizes a specific segment of the social 
world and is composed of activists who are not participants in the post- 
industrial movement or Christian aid volunteerism.
If we compare levels of education between commitment communities 
and the general population, we find that these communities mobilize par-
ticular educational levels. Activists in moral voicing communities have 
benefited from high levels of university education. In fact, more than half 
have obtained a university degree. Likewise, Christian aid activists mainly 
recruit highly educated individuals. Half of all activists have completed a 
university degree, which is substantially more than the general population. 
However, juxtaposed to the moral voicing community, they gather more 
activists, especially active members (Cramer’s V of −.21***),3 who completed 
their education with an apprenticeship. Yet, this number is not comparable 
with the workers’ voicing community, as six out of ten Unia activists finished 
their education with an apprenticeship. Education patterns confirm what we 
have observed for social classes: Particular segments are mobilized in our 
commitment communities and these segments vary between commitment 
communities.
Alongside social class and education, we took religious anchorage into 
account. Switzerland, like most Western societies, is strongly secular-
ized and attendance at religious services is rather exceptional. However, in 
Switzerland, churches are locations of many mobilizations, notably those re-
lated to migration and human rights. Furthermore, given the Catholic back-
ground of Caritas, it is interesting to compare the religious anchorage of the 
moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing communities. Generally, 
we find that none of the commitment communities shows a similar constel-
lation compared to the general population:  Concerning religion, they are 
either exceedingly or hardly observant. The level of religious anchorage is 
 3 Cramer’s V is a coefficient of statistical association calculating the relation between two variables 
(similar to Pearson’s R or Gamma). Cramer’s V is used in tables which have more than 2 × 2 rows and 
columns.
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issue specific and not homogenous within the moral voicing community. 
While activists from the Society for Threatened Peoples, and active members 
of Greenpeace especially, show very low levels of participation in religious 
services (more than half of them never attend any), activists from Solidarity 
across Borders have a strong religious background. One explanation is 
that churches play a crucial role in the defense of migrants’ rights. Church 
occupations are even a regular form of action, which means that interactions 
between church actors and activists take place frequently. Activists from 
Solidarity across Borders share this characteristic with Christian aid 
volunteers. Given the Catholic background of Caritas, this does not come as 
a surprise. Active members of Caritas are even more observant than passive 
members. In addition to a lower level of education, their religious anchorage 
is a second characteristic that separates active from passive members within 
the Christian aid community. Within the workers’ rights community, active 
members are also somewhat more religious than passive members. In the 
aggregate, however, they do not share the same strong religious background 
with Christian aid volunteers. Coming perhaps closest to the Swiss popula-
tion, they are intensely secular, as almost half never attend religious services.
Activist communities have particular social anchorages in terms of so-
cial class, education, and religion. In addition, specific generations are 
overrepresented as demonstrated by a closer look at the distribution of age 
groups. We split age into four generations. The youngest (born between 
1981 and 1998) represent Generation Y, followed by Generation X (1965– 
1980). A third category (1946– 1964) is the Baby Boomers generation, and 
the last (1922– 1945) is the WW2 (World War II) Generation. Within the 
moral voicing community, we observe that specific generations are more 
or less dominant in different organizations. The majority of activists from 
Solidarity across Borders belong to older generations compared to activists 
from the Society for Threatened Peoples and Greenpeace. In relation to the 
general population, the two oldest generations, Baby Boomers and WW2 
Generation, are overrepresented in the defense of migrants’ rights, while 
younger generations dominate in the other two groups. The generational dis-
tribution of Greenpeace activists is perhaps closest to the general population, 
as the typical Greenpeace activist, the active members in particular, belongs 
to a younger generation than the defender of migrants’ rights. Activists from 
the Society for Threatened Peoples are overrepresented in the youngest gen-
eration too. This result is somewhat puzzling as all three political conflicts 
belong to the post- industrial movement, which was launched by Baby 
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Boomers in the late sixties and throughout the seventies. An explanation 
of this result is that the defense of collective minorities’ rights and environ-
mental protection was adopted and transformed by younger generations, 
contributing to the persistence of these issues. By contrast, the challenging 
nature of the migrants’ rights conflict may explain why an older generation 
dominates this political issue. In fact, organizations that defend the rights of 
minorities or that protect the environment may manage the mobilization of 
younger generations better, due to the less challenging character of both po-
litical struggles. Perhaps commitment to a challenging issue requires some 
activist experience and a denser network to resist the harshness of the polit-
ical climate, as is the case for the defense of migrants’ rights.
Compared to moral voicing activists, Christian aid volunteerism seems 
age defined, as more than half of the activists were born before 1945.4 This 
result can be explained by the secularization of the population, making it 
difficult for a religious organization to sustain a large membership base by 
attracting younger volunteers. Finally, workers’ rights activists are overrep-
resented in the Baby Boomers generation. However, the explanation has less 
to do with generation than with professional life. As additional analyses have 
shown, unionists typically start their commitment career quite late and tend 
to put an end to their participation shortly after retirement. Only activists be-
tween the ages of thirty- six and sixty- five are overrepresented in relation to 
the general population, and this suggests that Unia is constantly challenged 
by rather a high membership turnover (Oesch 2012). To summarize, the 
social anchorage of the moral voicing, the Christian aid, and the workers’ 
voicing community is hence distinct from the broader Swiss population. 
Moreover, the mobilization potential varies between different forms of ac-
tivism as the comparison between communities has shown.
The particular social anchorage of these activists translates into a specific 
political profile. In Table 3.2, we observe a particular political anchorage in 
terms of party support with regard to the Swiss population for the moral 
voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing communities. As expected, 
all forms of activism clearly sympathize more with leftist parties than with 
the larger Swiss population. This result confirms what we stated in the first 
chapter. We are faced with particular communities, not only when they are 
compared with the Swiss population but also regarding the spectrum of 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































social movements, third sector organizations, and unions. Moral voicing ac-
tivism is definitely a political struggle of left- wing oriented individuals. At 
least three out of four activists sympathize with left- wing parties. We just 
have seen that Christian aid activists have a rather similar social profile to 
that of moral voicing activists, but this is not confirmed when it comes to 
political profiles. Actually, activists from Caritas are evenly split between left- 
and right- wing orientation (the Christian Democratic Party in particular). 
Together with observations made regarding their sociological profile, where 
we pointed to the overrepresentation of managers within the new middle 
class and a comparatively higher share of lower educational levels, we begin 
to observe particularities between the moral voicing and the Christian aid 
community. Workers’ voicing activists share their political anchorage with 
moral voicing activists to a large extent. However, they display somewhat 
more radical political orientations than other commitment communities, as 
active members especially sympathize with the radical left, notably with the 
Swiss Labor Party.
The second dimension for an activist’s political profile that we explore is 
the level of political discussions held with their parents when the activists 
were teenagers. It shows that activists of all communities benefited from a 
rather important political socialization when compared to the general popu-
lation. In fact, more than two thirds of all activists frequently discussed pol-
itics with their parents. Yet the level of political socialization during youth 
varies between activists’ communities. Moral voicing activists, and defenders 
of migrants’ rights in particular, enjoyed more political discussions as 
teenagers than did Christian aid volunteers and workers’ rights activists. In 
addition, active members also tended to have more political discussions with 
their parents than did passive members. This is what we find for Greenpeace 
and Unia activists. By contrast, a highly challenging political conflict, like the 
defense of migrants’ rights, requires fairly high political socialization for all 
members involved. Finally, as a third sector organization without political 
claims, active and passive members of Caritas also share similar levels of po-
litical socialization.
With this brief overview, we have seen that our activists have a specific so-
cial and political anchorage with regard to the general population. Moreover, 
different commitment communities do not share the same mobilization 
potential. We saw that in the moral voicing and Christian aid communi-
ties, the social classes and educational levels that are mobilized are different 
from those the the workers’ rights community. Religion and generational 
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differences also lead to a distinction between commitment communities, 
as well as within the moral voicing community. Regarding their political 
profile, we knew that we would face a largely left- wing oriented popula-
tion. However, Christian aid activists clearly depart from moral voicing and 
workers’ voicing activists. Activists mobilized in these communities have par-
ticular profiles. But do they also possess a specific mind?
Specific Minds?
We first compare the mental world of activists with that of the general popu-
lation. Do activists possess an understanding of common good and politics 
that is different from that of the Swiss population? Answering this question 
is crucial as such a finding would provide a first indication of the relevance of 
our cognitive- relational approach.
We begin our inquiry with the activist’s relation to common good. Figure 
3.1 reminds us of the operationalization elaborated in the first chapter. We 
divide common good into two dimensions:  Commonness and goodness. 
Their perception of commonness, which relates to who activists perceive 
as beneficiaries of the common good, is further distinguished into three 
categories:  Interconnectedness, to assess the perception of the social ties 
binding people together, humanness, to evaluate whether others are seized 
as human beings or as individuals embedded in social belongings and in-
clusiveness, to establish whether boundaries are set between social groups. 






















of the common good
Figure 3.1 The (sub- )dimensions that help explain activists’ perception of 
common good
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people’s living conditions are assessed, and we distinguish them between 
evaluations in terms of social justice or in terms of the perception of so-
cial care. Unfortunately, all dimensions of an activists’ relation to common 
good cannot be discussed because we lack indicators, especially to assess the 
dimensions of humanness and goodness, but we will return to this dimen-
sion through activists’ narratives in the next chapter. Throughout Tables 3.3 
to 3.5, we discuss differences between the three commitment communities 
and the general population. To compare the percentage points of the various 
indicators, we use χ2- values to assess the significance of differences between 
the two.
Table 3.3 shows that some activists have a specific relation to common 
good while others do not. In fact, moral voicing and Christian aid activists 
have more interconnected and inclusive understandings of society, while 
workers’ voicing activists score close to the general population. We will ex-
plain possible implications of this result at the end of this section, but for 
now, we begin by taking a closer look at the specific indicators. Two of them 
assess whether individuals perceive social ties binding people together. We 
have labeled this dimension interconnectedness. The first indicator examines 
the level of trust these individuals have for people they do not know, in-
cluding neighbors and people they meet for the first time, and it offers a val-
uable proxy, as trust is required in the perception of social ties. More than 
half of all moral voicing activists and three quarters of SAB activists trust un-
known others, while two thirds of all Christian aid activists are open minded. 
By contrast, less than half of the general population does not trust neighbors 
and people met for the first time (see χ2 in Table 3.3). Workers’ rights activists 
score poorly, as little more than a third deem unknown others trustworthy. 
The second indicator mainly aims to evaluate the importance of helping dis-
advantaged people in Switzerland. The reasoning behind this indicator is the 
following: If one perceives society as interconnected, one should consider 
helping others as important. In general, helping others in Switzerland is fairly 
central for activists as well as for the general population. Nonetheless, SAB 
activists and Caritas volunteers consider it significantly more important to 
provide help to less advantaged people, thus indicating that moral voicing 
and Christian aid activists clearly depart from the general population, as they 
perceive more social interconnectedness. By opposition, workers’ voicing 
activists perceive social bonds the same way the general population does.
The second dimension of commonness, inclusiveness, measures whether 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indicators listed in the bottom half of Table 3.3 present similar results as 
those found for interconnectedness. The indicators of social trust in cultur-
ally distant others, the importance of helping others on a global level, and 
the importance of boundaries all aim to measure how inclusive a society is 
imagined to be. First, moral voicing and Christian aid activists put more so-
cial trust in people from other religions or nationalities than do the general 
population and workers’ rights activists. Second, while helping others in 
Switzerland hardly separated activists from the general population, helping 
others on a global level introduces a substantial cleavage. The same parti-
tion appears between moral voicing and Christian aid activists compared 
with workers’ rights activists and the general population. The third indicator, 
boundaries, obeys to this scission as well. However, the story here is some-
what more complicated and necessitates a brief digression.
We wanted to know whether activists erect boundaries around cultural 
minorities and marginal groups. Again, we expected moral voicing and 
Christian aid activists to be more inclusive than the general population 
and unionists, which is what we found. However, this applies only to cul-
tural minorities and not for marginal groups. Marginal groups include al-
coholics, drug addicts, emotionally unstable people, people with criminal 
records, and people who suffer from AIDS. This indicator shows that, like the 
general population, activists marginalize certain social groups. More than 
half of all activists reject marginal groups and only minimal differences are 
detectable between the general population and all activists (χ2 not or only 
marginally significant in Table 3.3). In fact, marginal groups belong to the 
most excluded groups. They are scorned and dehumanized, belonging to the 
most excluded social groups because they are perceived as responsible for 
their situation (D’Houtaud 1995) and provoke a fear of contagion (Jodelet 
1991). Consequently, they are associated with negative emotions, such as dis-
gust and contempt (Fiske 2010a; Harris and Fiske 2006). Whenever we speak 
about commitment communities who have an inclusive or universalist un-
derstanding of society, we should remember that this does not necessarily 
pertain to all social groups living within a society.
After this brief detour, we return to our general argument and face a 
very different picture for cultural minorities including Muslims, Jews, Sinti 
people, and migrants. Given that a third of the Swiss population and workers’ 
rights activists exclude cultural minorities, moral voicing and Christian aid 
activists are definitely more inclusive regarding cultural minorities.
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To summarize, we provided evidence indicating that moral voicing 
and Christian aid activists possess a universalist understanding of society 
consisting of social ties that bind people together. This is less the case for 
workers’ rights activists who have views similar to those of the general pop-
ulation. These five indicators revealed a rather systematic pattern separating 
moral voicing and Christian aid activists from the general population and 
workers’ rights activists. Moral voicing and Christian aid activists have a 
broader, more encompassing understanding of society than that found in the 
national context, as we described in the first chapter, while the general popu-
lation and workers’ rights activists correspond more to this communitarian 
understanding of society.
We now turn our attention to activists’ relation to politics. As summarized 
in Figure 3.2, this understanding is also divided into two dimensions: the 
perception of state actors and the perception of civil society actors. The per-
ception of state actors pertains to two questions: What is the role of state ac-
tors? How are they evaluated? The role of state actors is evaluated with the 
notion of accountability for common good, which assesses whether indi-
viduals perceive state actors to be responsible, while the second question 
examines legitimization, that is, the trust in state actors and the range of this 
trust. Likewise, an activist’s perception of civil society actors is divided into 
two dimensions: the role of civil society actors and an assessment of this role. 
Consequently, we distinguish between the perception of the type of action 
of civil society actors which may be perceived either as politically interven-
tionist and thus challenging state actors, or as necessary substitutes to state 
actors. Finally, we assess whether civil society actors are legitimized and 
Politics
State actors
e role of state actors
and its evaluation
Civil society actors
e role of civil society














e action of civil society
towards common goods
Figure 3.2 The (sub- )dimensions that help explain activists’ perception of 
politics
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whether legitimization of civil society actors is generalized across different 
types of actors.
Do we find a similar pattern for activists’ relation to politics as we did for 
their relation to common good? Yes and no. Yes: Again some commitment 
communities have specific understandings of politics, while others do not 
diverge from the views of the general population. And no: Because this time 
moral and workers’ voicing activists depart from the views of the general 
population and Christian aid activists. Moral voicing activists therefore de-
part on both dimensions, while Christian aid and workers’ rights activists 
differ from the general population on one dimension. This general conclu-
sion sounds pretty straightforward. However, as the following reveals, we 
need to approach the two dimensions with different logics in order to un-
derstand the findings. The first dimension, the relation to state actors, uses 
an indicator for the level of trust in national executive and legislative author-
ities. Logically, an individual who trusts political institutions is supposed to 
legitimize them. As we noted in the first chapter, contentious activists are 
supposed to delegitimize state actors and accordingly, we expect lower levels 
of trust among activists compared to the general population. Simultaneously, 
we stated that Swiss citizens tend to trust and legitimize the political system 
and its actors. In fact, we encounter this pattern in the first part of Table 3.4. 
Activists of the moral and workers’ voicing community generally have lower 
levels of trust in the Federal Council as well as in the Federal Parliament. 
These activists delegitimize federal authorities significantly more than the 
general population does. By contrast, Christian aid activists tend to legiti-
mize political authorities and seem to trust political authorities more than 
the general population does. The first reaction to this result was that these 
numbers were at odds with the fact that Caritas volunteers support deprived 
people and therefore deliver a common good supposed to be the responsi-
bility of state actors. Could it be that Christian aid volunteers disagree with 
this interpretation? Have they constructed another perception of state ac-
tors? One possible reason could be that Christian aid activism is heavily 
supported by the state, contributing to a more sympathetic perception of fed-
eral authorities. However, these remain speculations for now. For the mo-
ment, we simply observe that moral voicing and workers’ voicing activists 
apparently delegitimize national political authorities more than do Christian 
aid activists and the general population.
Regarding the relation to civil society actors, we show numbers for the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































associations. Like the indicator of the delegitimization of state actors, trust 
in civil society actors is supposed to provide a reason to legitimize collective 
actors. As the literature suggests, activists generally legitimize civil society 
actors and do so more than the general population. In Table 3.4, we observe 
that moral voicing activists strongly legitimize all three types of civil society 
actors. While the general population also has high levels of trust in environ-
mental and humanitarian actors, they fall behind moral voicing activists sig-
nificantly (see χ2 in Table 3.4). Furthermore, the general population does not 
seem to appreciate unions highly, contributing to an increase in difference 
between the population and the moral voicing community. We observe a 
similar pattern for Christian aid activists, who also tend to legitimize civil so-
ciety actors more than the general population do. However, the Christian aid 
community clearly favors humanitarian actors over the two other types. The 
differentiation between types of civil society actors increases for workers’ 
rights activists, who clearly trust unions the most.
As was the case for activists’ relation to common good, we also find support 
for a specific mind for the second dimension: activists’ relation to politics. For 
the relation to state actors, we saw that moral and workers’ voicing activists 
tend to distrust state actors, while Christian aid activists and the general pop-
ulation do not. The general population, as well as the Christian aid activists, 
hence falls under the trustworthy relation with state actors described in the 
first chapter. By contrast, and as a result of their social interactions within 
their respective communities, activists from the moral and workers’ voicing 
communities delegitimize state actors. For their understanding of civil so-
ciety actors, the three commitment communities have higher levels of trust 
than the general population. However, these results arouse suspicions that 
Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists in particular, tend to cherry pick 
between the different types of civil society actors.
After an initial consideration of activists’ relation to common good and 
politics, we now turn to activists’ understandings of political citizenship. 
Figure 3.3 sums up the two dimensions to grasp activists’ perception of po-
litical citizenship: to be concerned by common good and by politics. First, 
we examine the range of their concern for common good. In order to do so, 
we use a set of indicators pertaining to the three types of common good the 
three communities are committed to: emancipation of migrants, environ-
mental protection, and the redistribution of wealth. Do the three commit-
ment communities depart from the general population? According to Table 
3.5, the answer is yes.
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The Swiss population is supportive of the emancipation of migrants and 
the redistribution of wealth, but not for paying taxes for environmental pro-
tection. These common goods therefore concern an important part of the 
gen eral population. The range of their concern, however, cannot be com-
pared to that of activists in the moral voicing community, who have de-
veloped a much broader range of concern than the general population. 
Christian aid activists depart from the Swiss population too, though to a 
lesser extent. In contrast, workers’ rights activists only surpass the general 
population in their concern for wealth redistribution. As for the concern for 
common good, moral voicing and Christian aid activists clearly depart from 
the general population, while workers’ rights activists do not. Hence, not all 
activists are concerned by a broad range of common goods.
The second dimension of political citizenship relies on whether activists 
are concerned by politics. As shown in Figure 3.3, we differentiate between 
political vigilance, that is, the importance of being a political watchdog mon-
itoring political elite and participating beyond institutional politics. The 
bottom half of Table 3.5 represents the evaluation of activists’ perception of 
political vigilance and participation compared to the general population. 
Individuals were asked how important it is for a citizen to keep an eye on the 
government, to always vote, and to be active in social and political associ-
ations. The result is a clear one. All three indicators suggest that activists are 
significantly more concerned by politics than the general population. There 
is a higher probability that activists are “watchdogs” and active citizens cor-
responding to the criteria of strong citizens. The next section, and Chapter 5 
Political citizenship
Democratic cultures
Concerned with common good
Adjusting one’s life plans to the
dictates of a shared world
Concerned with politics
e role of civil society
actors and its evaluation
Range of concern
Concerned by multiple or















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































especially, will discuss these preliminary observations in detail. For now, we 
can satisfyingly establish that activists are more concerned by politics than 
the general population is.
On the basis of the indicators presented here, activists’ minds are spe-
cific in these commitment communities. Moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
workers’ voicing differ substantially from the general population. They have 
specific minds with regard to their relation to common good, politics, and 
political citizenship. However, the numbers we came across also pointed 
to considerable variations among commitment communities. What does 
this imply? Did we get inconsistent results that shed doubts on the spec-
ificity of an activist’s mind? We do not think so. Altogether, we obtained 
systematic evidence with several indicators that showed that moral voicing 
activists depart from the general population on both dimensions, while the 
Christian aid community does so only in relation to common good and the 
workers’ rights community only in relation to politics. Two explanations 
are available: first, that there are no, or very few, social interactions within 
a specific community on particular cognitive dimensions and hence, 
that there is no immediate synchronization as a result of participation. 
According to our results, this would imply that within the workers’ rights 
community there are very few conversations and cultural scripts avail-
able on the topic of common good. Similarly, this would imply that the 
Christian aid community exchanges little socially shared cognition about 
politics and state actors in particular.
The second explanation is that the numbers in these quantitative indicators 
do not reveal the whole content of an activist’s relation to common good and 
politics. While we have presented seventeen indicators in this section, we 
could not cover all dimensions developed in the first chapter. For the relation 
to common good, we held no indicators for the dimension of humanness and 
for the dimension of goodness. For the relation to politics, we have no infor-
mation on responsibility for common good and on the role of civil society 
actors. One reason for the absence of these dimensions is that we simply have 
no comparative indicators. Another more substantial reason is that these 
dimensions emerged inductively through the analysis of the interview data. 
While we return to these issues in the rest of this book, the next section is 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30 49 18 3
59 32 8 2
63 28 8 1
52 35 12 1
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An activist’s relation to common good and politics is specific when com-
pared to the general population. This result is a first indication that an 
activist’s mind is influenced by social interactions within commitment commu-
nities. This section will develop this argument in light of three supplementary 
tests: a comparison within a given community, between communities, and 
within organizations. Our first task consists in evaluating whether activists of 
SAB, STP, and Greenpeace share a similar understanding of common good 
and politics. We expect this to be the case because all belong to the same 
commitment community and should therefore exchange and practice sim-
ilar cultural scripts. We therefore consider activists who defend different 
types of common good and are confronted with various degrees of political 
challenge. As mentioned in Chapter 1, defenders of migrants’ rights are en-
gaged in a challenging political issue, while STP and Greenpeace activists are 
committed to mainstream causes. Later, we compare activists across com-
mitment communities. Do activists from different communities possess the 
same understanding of common good and politics? Or do the opinions of 
Christian aid volunteers and workers’ rights activists differ from those of the 
moral voicing community? And if so, how do they differ? Finally, we will as-
sess variations within each organization, with the aim of evaluating whether 
an activist’s commitment intensity is related to the meanings constructed. 
According to our theory, active and passive members should not differ be-
cause they are exposed to the same cultural scripts. However, they vary in 
terms of the frequency of interactions and the way these occur. Thus, pas-
sive members are less exposed to cultural scripts within their respective com-
munity and have fewer, if any, direct face- to- face interactions. Tables 3.6 to 
3.10 help us answer these questions. These tables are organized with a sim-
ilar logic as the ones of the previous section. We start by showing percentage 
points for each indicator. After the bold vertical line we use χ2- values to com-
pare commitment communities. We first compare the three organizations 
of the moral voicing community, then we compare moral voicers with the 
Christian aid community as well with the workers’ voicing community, and 
finally, we compare the Christian aid volunteers with unionists.
In the previous section, we saw that moral voicing and Christian aid 
activists possess a specific relation to common good when compared to the 
whole population. By contrast, views of workers’ rights activists do not de-
part from those of the Swiss population. This finding indicates that the 
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understanding of common good varies among communities, as Table 3.6 
summarizes. How do they perceive commonness; and do they perceive dif-
ferently who are the beneficiaries of the common goods? To answer this 
question, we return to activists’ perception of interconnectedness between so-
ciety members. Three main results arise from the analysis of this dimension. 
First, little variation occurs within the moral voicing community. People 
committed to defending the rights of migrants, minority groups and envi-
ronmental activists trust others and are highly concerned by helping dis-
advantaged people (see percentage points in the upper half of Table 3.6). 
They perceive society as composed of ties binding people together. We also 
note that activists who defend migrants’ rights have a somewhat more in-
terconnected perception of society. A  substantially higher part of these 
activists trust unknown others and stresses the importance to help others 
in Switzerland. Second, similar shares of Christian aid activists perceive ties 
binding people together in society. Their view parallels that of moral voicing 
activists. Finally, compared to both moral voicing and Christian aid activists, 
people committed to workers voicing perceive social interconnectedness dif-
ferently. While they are numerically close when it comes to the importance 
of helping others in Switzerland, this equivalence remains exceptional. They 
have far less trust in unknown others and other indicators of the perception 
of commonness set the workers’ rights community apart from the moral voi-
cing and the Christian aid community, as we shall soon see.
The investigation of the second dimension of commonness, inclusiveness, 
recounts a similar story. The moral voicing community generally shares a 
universalist understanding of society. If we compare the different commu-
nities, Christian aid activists, like the moral voicing community, also have 
an inclusive perception, contrary to the workers’ voicing community. The 
three indicators we used in the previous section— social trust in culturally 
distant others, helping others in the world, and boundaries with cultural 
minorities— all support this conclusion (Table 3.6). Here, we focus on two ad-
ditional indicators: a self- extension scale and identification with the popula-
tion mobilized for.5 These two indicators further validate our measurements 
of the concept of inclusiveness, because the self- extension scale examines 
inclusiveness as a motivation of an activist’s commitment, while the iden-
tification measure tells us whether activists perceive themselves as part of 
 5 The self- extension scale is inspired from Inglehart’s indicators on values of post- materialism 
(Inglehart 1977).
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the groups they are committed to. While these two indicators do not deviate 
from the general analysis, they give us some additional in- depth insights that 
could not have been obtained solely from comparative indicators.
The results from the self- extension scale are quite straightforward: Four 
out of five moral voicing and Christian aid activists have a fairly high ex-
tension of themselves.6 They possess a rather inclusive view of society, set-
ting no or few boundaries between themselves and others. If we compare 
these numbers with those of the workers’ rights community, another picture 
emerges. Half of the workers’ rights activists define boundaries and view 
these as meaningful motivations for their commitment. The second indi-
cator asks activists whether they identify with the group they mobilize for 
(SAB, STP and Caritas).7 Although both moral voicing and Christian aid 
participants include the people they are committed to, differences in percep-
tion are present. While the moral voicing community perceives the people 
they mobilize for as part of the same humanity, more than half of Christian 
aid volunteers establish differences between themselves and the beneficiaries 
of their actions. This suggests that both communities have a universal under-
standing of society, but that some differences exist between the moral voicing 
and the Christian aid community. We will further examine these differences 
with our qualitative material in the next chapter.
To summarize, we have seen that activists of different organizations within 
the moral voicing community have synchronized their cultural scripts re-
garding their relation to common good. There are no significant variations 
between activists who defend migrants’ rights, participants engaged in pro-
viding autochthonous people with rights, and activists committed to envi-
ronmental protection. In addition, the moral voicing communities share this 
inclusive view of society, setting no— or few— boundaries between people 
inhabiting society with the Christian aid community and conceive society 
in universalist terms. Yet, the indicator of identification raised doubts re-
garding the perception of commonness between the two communities. By 
 6 Activists from Solidarity across Borders (SAB) have a less extensive self compared to activists 
from STP and Greenpeace. This variation is explainable thanks to an item that measures boundaries 
between social groups or individuals for SAB activists: “I want above all to improve the society in 
which I live (Switzerland).” Qualitative interviews provide insights when it comes to understanding 
the position of some pro- migrants activists on this item. Many interviewees declared that they feel 
ashamed to live in a country that violates migrants’ rights as Switzerland does and want to bring 
about social change in Switzerland because the situation is humanly unacceptable.
 7 We asked this question only of activists who defend the rights of social groups they are not part 
of. This is the case for activists of Solidarity across Borders, the Society for Threatened Peoples, and 
Caritas— but not for Greenpeace and Unia.
Synchronized Minds 111
contrast, we saw that workers’ voicing activists systematically possess a dif-
ferent conception of inclusiveness, as all indicators show they have a rather 
exclusionary view of society. Thus, on both dimensions of commonness— 
interconnectedness and inclusiveness— unionists’ views systematically de-
part from those of other activists. They are far less aware of the ties binding 
people together in society and tend to raise cognitive barriers between them-
selves and their fellow citizens. Unionists therefore seem to have developed 
a communitarian understanding of commonness. These findings underscore 
that activists’ relation to common good uncontestably varies among the dif-
ferent activists. But is this the case for the relation to politics as well?
We know from the previous section that the moral and workers’ voicing 
communities have lower levels of trust in political authorities than is found 
in the Christian aid community and the general population. We also know 
that all three activist communities have more confidence in civil society ac-
tors. Activists therefore have a specific relation to politics. But what can we 
say about variations within and between communities? Do activists under-
stand the actors involved in the political space differently? To assess activists’ 
relation to state actors, we examine not only the level of trust they place in 
different state actors but also whether they think state actors are willing to 
improve the production and maintenance of the common good they are 
committed to (political willingness). Three main results are provided by this 
analysis in Table 3.7. First, moral voicing activists undoubtedly delegitimize 
political authorities and have developed a broad range of delegitimization. 
They neither believe in the political willingness of national and international 
authorities, nor do they trust political institutions. Again, we encounter a 
common understanding among members of the moral voicing community. 
However, moral voicing activists consciously delegitimize political author-
ities and are aware of the plurality of state actors. The perception of the po-
litical willingness of international institutions, the United Nations and the 
International Monetary Fund in this case, demonstrates this clearly. More 
than two thirds of SAB and STP activists believe in the political willingness of 
international institutions to support the political issues they are committed 
to. By contrast, Greenpeace activists delegitimize international authorities 
and this makes sense, as these authorities are important targets in ecolog-
ical protest. Except for this difference, the moral voicing community adopts a 
common critical stance toward state actors.
The second key finding is that the Christian aid community legitimizes 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































authorities, and this is clearly reflected in their perception of state actors. 
The only exception to this pattern is their perception of the European Union, 
which is the only one of the four political institutions they delegitimize. 
Third, workers’ voicing activists have a similar delegitimizing perception of 
state actors as that of moral voicing participants.8 Unia activists not only op-
pose national authorities but also face a very weak international labor or-
ganization and a liberal European Union that passes legislation to shrink 
welfare states and the protection of workers.
Activists have also developed a relation to civil society actors (Table 3.8). 
As with the perception of state actors, we must differentiate between how 
activists conceive of their role and the range of legitimization they develop 
with regard to different types of civil society actors. For the role of civil so-
ciety actors, we differentiate between an interventionist stance toward 
state actors and a substituting role aimed at minimizing state intervention. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a measure to evaluate this issue by quantitative 
means for the moral voicing community. However, these activists are by na-
ture heavily involved in political struggles and therefore, we can expect them 
to have developed an understanding of civil society actors that underlines 
political intervention. Indeed, this is what we will encounter in the analysis 
of activist narratives in Chapter 5. For workers’ rights activists, this question 
becomes more challenging as one major mobilization strategy in the recruit-
ment of new members is to offer them individual benefits such as legal pro-
tection, advanced education, or unemployment insurance. Consequently, 
we asked unionists whether these individual benefits take priority over the 
collective struggle to defend workers’ rights and salaries in order to find out 
which role dominates within this community. The result is clear: Four out 
of five activists prefer contentious action. The picture is rather different for 
Christian aid activists. When we asked them to qualify Caritas as an organ-
ization, they had to choose two of the seven different qualifiers provided 
and only 2 percent qualified Caritas as a political organization.9 While these 
indicators do not allow us to offer a definite answer of whether activists per-
ceive the role of a civil society organization as contentious or substitutive, 
they suggest substantial variations concerning the role of civil society actors 
between communities.
 8 We have to interpret the numbers for political willingness with some distance as only a very small 
number of workers’ rights activists had the opportunity to respond to that question.
 9 Activists could choose from the following qualifiers: social aid, Catholic, political, regional, or 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To assess the range of legitimization, we rely on the same indicators as for 
the evaluation of state actors, that is, political willingness of and trust in civil 
society actors. A significant narrative is expressed in the numbers of Table 
3.8. To begin with, all activists strongly legitimize the type of civil society 
actor they are mobilized for. As expected, they do not doubt that the commu-
nity where they invest time and money is willing to improve and defend the 
given common good. But this, of course, tells us nothing about the range of 
legitimization. Within the moral voicing community, we encounter a broad 
range of legitimization. Although they trust unions less than humanitarian 
and ecological actors, more than 60 percent of the moral voicing community 
trust organizations that defend workers’ rights. By contrast, the Christian 
aid community legitimizes unions less. They have a narrower range de-
spite trusting environmental and humanitarian actors quite highly. Finally, 
workers’ voicing activists have the narrowest range of legitimization. While 
they strongly legitimize unions, they trust the other two types of civil society 
actors much less.
The pattern regarding the relation to politics is hence similar to that for the 
relation to common good. We encountered a homogeneous moral voicing 
community and came across variations as soon as they were compared to the 
Christian aid and the workers’ voicing community. While workers’ voicing 
and moral voicing activists perceive state actors similarly, they do not do so 
in terms of the range of legitimization of civil society actors. Further, while 
Christian aid volunteers were on par with the moral voicing community re-
garding their relation to common good, they understand politics differently. 
For them, state actors are legitimized. Engaged in the third sector, they do 
not challenge political elites but rather tend to perceive their own efforts as 
substitutive with regard to state actors. For their relation to common good 
as well as their relation to politics, we can therefore affirm that the three dif-
ferent communities produce three different minds.
What about the understanding of political citizenship? Are they concerned 
by common good and politics? To evaluate the range of concern by common 
good, we use the same indicators as for the comparison with the general pop-
ulation. Do moral voicing and Christian aid activists still share a common 
view on that dimension as they did for commonness? And does the workers’ 
voicing community depart from them? Are only the former two communi-
ties strong citizens in terms of their range of concern about common good? 
Table 3.9 helps us answer these questions. People committed to moral voi-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































all the social issues examined here: migration, environmental protection, and 
wealth redistribution. The Christian aid community comes close to this and 
their volunteers can also be described as having a broad concern for common 
good. However, while they are heavily concerned by migrants’ emancipation 
and wealth redistribution in society, they show less concern about environ-
mental protection when paying more taxes for it is involved. Nevertheless, 
this is a larger range of concern for common good than encountered with the 
workers’ rights community, whose activists are mainly concerned by the de-
fense of their rights and demonstrate less interest for other common goods.
The second dimension of an activist’s understanding of political citizen-
ship relates to the concern for politics. Three main findings are presented in 
the bottom half of Table 3.9. First, moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ 
voicing activists seem to be concerned by politics in a similar fashion. 
Compared to the dimensions analyzed so far, the three communities do not 
vary systematically on political vigilance and participation. Second, only 
about half of the activists estimate that monitoring of governmental action 
is important. Third, various types of political participation are valued differ-
ently. In fact, voting is an obvious baseline of political participation and as 
such, 70 percent and more of all activists state that it is crucial to vote when 
the opportunity is presented. Notably, taking an active part in political and 
social associations is deemed less important. What do these findings mean 
for the assessment of activists’ concern for politics? The indicators show that 
all activists think voting is fundamental, that vigilance is necessary, and that 
active commitment is less important. With regard to the second dimension 
of strong citizenship, activists therefore score rather poorly.
But does this suggest that activists are not strong citizens? The different 
scores provided by the indicators demonstrate the multi- dimensionality of 
the concepts of political vigilance and participation. Some forms of political 
vigilance and participation are important, others less so. What does political 
vigilance and participation effectively mean for moral voicing, Christian aid, 
and workers’ voicing activists? And are all communities concerned by poli-
tics in a similar way? We allow these questions to be left unanswered for the 
moment. The narratives studied in Chapter 5 will enable us to return to them.
Two additional issues must be raised before we conclude this chapter. 
First, we need to address the slightly higher scores observed for the defenders 
of migrants’ rights and on the other hand, an evaluation of the differences 
between active and passive members is necessary. In the first chapter, we 
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presented defenders of migrants’ rights as engaged in a highly challenging 
political struggle. Our findings demonstrate that SAB activists have a sim-
ilar perception of common good and politics as the other types of moral voi-
cing activists. However, they score higher on almost all indicators than STP 
and Greenpeace activists. Their relation to common good reveals that SAB 
activists adopt a more universalist understanding of society. As for their rela-
tion to politics, SAB activists are less trustful of national state actors and tend 
to present a broader range of legitimization of civil society actors. Finally, 
migrants’ rights defenders are more concerned about common good and 
politics than are STP and Greenpeace activists, indicating that their under-
standing of political citizenship is different. Hence, it appears that the un-
derstanding of common good, politics, and citizenship tends to be more 
radically synchronized for activists who take part in challenging political 
struggles.
The second point we must address are the differences in the intensity of 
commitment. Table 3.10 sums up the variation between active and passive 
members for all the indicators used in this chapter. Overall, active and pas-
sive members do not systematically depart from each other. Activists from 
any one organization possess synchronized minds, sharing a similar un-
derstanding of common good and politics. However, two exceptions pre-
vail. First, active and passive members in all organizations differ on the 
importance of being active in political and social associations. This is not 
surprising because the phrasing of the question implies an active contri-
bution, which is something that passive members, by definition, do not 
engage in. Second, we came across much disparity between active and 
passive members within the workers’ voicing community. Actually, active 
members of Unia depart significantly from passive members on the ma-
jority of indicators presented. Why is this the case? Our argument is that 
the minds of these active members are blended because, in addition to their 
active participation in workers’ rights activism, they are significantly more 
engaged in moral voicing communities than are passive members (Cramer’s 
V: .20***). They therefore face cross- pressured interactions that result in an 
understanding of common good and politics that reflects the different com-
munities they are involved in. Of course, the next question is why certain 
cross- commitments produce understandings synchronized with one con-
tentious community and result in a blended mind for others? We cover this 
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We began this chapter by demonstrating that activists have a particular so-
cial and political anchorage. Evidence for the moral voicing community 
confirmed what was known from the literature, but we also showed that 
Christian aid volunteers and workers’ voicing activists possess specific poten-
tial for mobilization. Moral voicing activists come predominantly from the 
new middle class, are highly educated, and clearly lean toward the left. The 
profile of Christian aid community activists is not too dissimilar. However, 
this community experiences difficulties in mobilizing younger generations, 
recruiting instead from a broader political spectrum. Unionists, by contrast, 
come mostly from working- class backgrounds, are on average somewhat less 
educated, and are slightly more to the radical left.
We then focused on the main aim of this chapter: the claim that activists 
have specific minds. The moral voicing community departs from the general 
population regarding their perception of common good and politics. This is 
the case for defenders of SAB, STP, and Greenpeace activists, who share a sim-
ilar mind. They have constructed a universalist understanding of common-
ness, which postulates that the benefit of common goods must not be restricted 
to particular groups. In addition, they are distrustful of state actors and do not 
believe in the state’s political willingness to improve and deliver the common 
good they are committed to. State actors are subsequently delegitimized, while 
civil society actors are broadly legitimized. Finally, they qualify as strong citi-
zens, concerned as they are about both common good and politics.
Activists in the Christian aid community possess specific minds too. They 
share perceptions of common good with that of the moral voicing commu-
nity and accordingly depart from the views of the general population. They 
also hold a universalist perception of society. However, they differ from the 
moral voicing community in their relation to politics, as they legitimize 
state actors (similar to the beliefs of the general population), are trustful of 
institutions, and believe that state actors are willing to improve the situa-
tion of the needy. Drawing a conclusion regarding the second dimension of 
their perception of politics is somewhat more difficult: What understanding 
of civil society actors do they have? They certainly legitimize civil society 
actors in their field, but they remain skeptical of the performance of other 
types of civil society actors, as their low level of trust in unions indicates. 
When it comes to their understanding of citizenship, they seem concerned 
by common good, but not by politics.
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We are presented with a specific mind with the workers’ rights community, 
in relation to the general population and the two other communities. Unlike 
the Christian aid community, unionists depart from the general population 
on the perception of politics, but not on their relation to common good. They 
perceive society in a communitarian fashion, as the general population does. 
They have rather low levels of social trust and tend to erect boundaries. Yet they 
depart from the general population and come close to the position adopted by 
the moral voicing community in their relation to politics, delegitimizing state 
actors, and legitimizing unions. They nonetheless legitimize civil society actors 
far less than other types of activists, displaying a narrow range of legitimization 
for these actors. Finally, they have a perception of citizenship unlike that held 
by the moral voicing or Christian aid communities: while they are concerned 
by politics, common good is not an object of interest for them.
Activists hold a specific understanding of common good and politics 
when compared to the general population. And we found shared cognitions 
within the moral voicing community and within each organization. By con-
trast, the comparison between the moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ 
voicing communities revealed significant variations. While particular so-
cial and political backgrounds may help explain this pattern, the argument 
we developed in the previous chapter relies on another claim: the centrality 
of the interactions that take place within these commitment communities. 
Community- specific understandings of common good and politics and 
variations in terms of political citizenship are consequences of the process 
of integration into a particular commitment community. Conversational 
interactions, the sharing of cultural scripts, and discussions within a com-
munity lead to socially shared cognitions, to the transformation of cultural 
scripts, and to the synchronization of activists’ minds. Our quantitative 
data pointed to this direction, highlighting that activist communities rely 
on specific understandings of common good and politics when compared 
with the general population. And all three communities constructed specific 
understandings of the two dimensions.
But how does the community integration process enable activists to sus-
tain their participation? What are the cognitive mechanisms (Chapter 4 and 
5) and relational elements (Chapter 6) at stake in the sustainment of partic-
ipation? Why do networks matter more than social anchorage? And how do 
activists transform perceptions of common good and politics into intention-
ality? The following chapters build on these findings through a detailed and 
systematic analysis of activists’ narratives.
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It belongs to us to care for each other.
Toni Morrison
What do we know so far of the relation to common good and politics 
constructed in activists’ minds? Chapter 3 provided two main findings on 
their mindsets. We have established that activists possess a specific mindset. 
And their perception of common good and politics through specific lenses 
means that they depart from views held by the general population. The 
second major result shows that activists’ minds are of a diverse lot: moral voi-
cing, unionists, and Christian aid activists do not share the same perception 
of common good and politics. In other terms, a plurality of activist minds 
exists. These findings provide preliminary clues toward our assumption that 
activists’ minds resonate with the commitment sites in which they evolve and 
interact. The influence of commitment sites on the activists’ mental world 
will be the subject of our enquiry in Chapter 6.
What is unclear at this point is whether activists’ understandings of 
common good and politics set their intentionality. In Chapter 2, we saw that 
the human mind is a key element for action in that it sets an individual’s inten-
tionality. Human action is unlikely to occur without mental constructions. 
Throughout the previous chapters we have argued that cognitions allow 
activists to commit and sustain their participation. It is now time to dem-
onstrate how meanings set activists’ intentions. At stake here is the identifica-
tion of the cognitive mechanisms that configure an activist’s intentionality. 
We will see that an activist’s understanding of common good and politics 
enables the mental construction of specific cognitive components, which in 
turn orient action toward a specific group of people (1), on specific issues 
(2), in a particular action field (3), and with specific action forms (4). The 
identification of the cognitive path from broad perceptions of common good 
and politics to intentionality constitutes the central aim of the present and 
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following chapters. We hence seek to show how broader meanings configure 
intentionality and guide action.
The second aim of  chapters 4 and 5 is to develop a view of activists’ concep-
tion of political citizenship. We will examine the types of democratic cultures 
activists construct in their minds and accordingly ask whether these cultures 
allow the activists to be qualified as strong citizens. As seen in Chapter 1, 
a strong citizen in democratic theory— most notably Barber (1984)— is a 
person committed to the widespread defense of common good. The strong 
citizen is also one who is concerned with politics, acting as a watchdog citizen 
when required and actively taking part in the political sphere. An in- depth 
analysis of activists’ understanding of common good and politics enables us 
to learn whether activists are concerned with the common good and politics. 
It allows us to determine whether all types of activists are preoccupied with 
the common good and politics or only some of them are. Based on the data 
presented in Chapter 3, we know that not all activists are concerned with 
the common good and, to a certain extent, by politics. A fine- grained anal-
ysis yields more information and allows us to understand whether unionists, 
moral voicing, and Christian aid activists fulfill the criteria that would qualify 
them as strong citizens.
An in- depth analysis of activists’ understandings is necessary to meet both 
our aims: to identify the cognitive links that bind meaning and intention-
ality, and to determine the conception of political citizenship that activists 
hold. We therefore need to delve into activists’ minds and examine their un-
derstanding of common good and politics in all its complexity. The quan-
titative data used in Chapter  3 prove insufficient for a refined analysis of 
activists’ understandings. While statistics provide insights into individuals’ 
perceptions, they are inadequate to reveal the complexity of the human 
mind, an entity composed of multiple cognitive links. To grasp these in-
tricate cognitive links, we must rely on the narratives provided by activists 
themselves. Opting for an inductive analysis is the only way we can isolate 
the specific orientations behind their actions. Indeed, induction shows how 
broader meanings configure activists’ intentionality and guide their action, 
so we use induction to analyze the qualitative material gathered.
As outlined in Chapter 1, the whole body of interviews (forty narratives) 
was analyzed. A first step involved a cursory analysis, after which we selected 
twenty- four interviewees with whom to conduct the systematic and in- depth 
analysis presented here and in the following chapter. Reducing the number 
of cases was necessary if we were to provide a rigorous and complex analysis 
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of the activists’ understandings of common good and politics. We made the 
reductions on the basis of redundancy criteria identified during the initial 
cursory analysis. We excluded activists from the Society for Threatened 
Peoples (STP) to begin with, as their views on common good and politics 
substantially overlap with migrants’ rights activists (SAB). We then excluded 
two of the eight interviews per organization (one active and one passive 
member). The fine- grained analysis of the activist narratives was therefore 
effectively carried out for twenty- four interviewees. We are confident of 
our case selection because we discarded only the interviewees whose views 
showed redundancy with those of retained interviewees.1
As analyzing narrative data is always challenging (Kohler Riessman 1993; 
McCracken 1988; Wolcott 1990), we must clarify our procedure. To bring 
the reader into the activists’ inner world, we applied a strict ‘one plus three’ 
formula: We illustrated activists’ understandings by taking the story of one 
activist from the six narratives systematically analyzed. We then broadened 
our example of the activist’s relation to common good and politics by using 
excerpts from three of the five remaining retained interviewees. We hence 
selected four interviewees among the six systematically analyzed per or-
ganization: The main case was supported by excerpts from three activists. 
And we applied the same logic to present the cognitive mechanisms binding 
understandings to activists’ intentionality. Again, we used the central case to 
illustrate the cognitive path and excerpts from three other activists to sup-
port our interpretation. Whereas the main case was used throughout the 
presentation of the cognitive dimensions, we changed interviewees for the 
three illustrative excerpts. We therefore adopted a systematic approach to-
ward all twenty- four cases, equally represented throughout  chapters 4 and 5, 
as shown in Table A.3 in the appendix, A.5.
This chapter focuses on how activists perceive common good. As discussed 
in Chapter  1, we distinguish two mains dimensions in our empirical ex-
amination of understandings of common good:  commonness and good-
ness. Commonness refers to the idea that the whole community must share 
a given good. Three sub- dimensions are necessary to delineate this dimen-
sion: activists’ perception of social interconnectedness; activists’ views about 
humanness, which can be apprehended universally or through particular 
 1 See the section “Studying the Activist’s Mind” in Chapter 1 for detailed information about the 
selection of interviewees and the methodology behind the analysis of the narratives (see also the 
Appendix A.4, Table A.2 on the matter).
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socio- cultural belongings; and inclusiveness, whether activists perceive so-
ciety as a world that is without distinctions or whether society is understood 
according to social and cultural differences. These sub- dimensions indicate 
whether activists understand society in a universalist or communitarian 
manner. Perceptions of commonness hence establish whether activists rely 
on an inclusive or exclusive understanding of the beneficiaries of common 
good. The second dimension, goodness, homes in on activists’ perceptions of 
goods that objectively improve people’s living conditions. And these goods 
can be understood in terms of social justice or social care. This dimension 
allows us to consider whether activists perceive common good with a care 
or a social justice orientation. Perceptions of goodness enable us to deter-
mine whether activists wish to improve the welfare of individuals or seek to 
broaden people’s rights.
We begin our analysis of understandings of common good with Adriana, 
a member of Solidarity across Borders (SAB), and first closely examine her 
perception of common good to apprehend the cognitive path between her 
broad understanding of common good and her intentionality. Regarding 
commonness, then, how does she make sense of the ties that bind members 
of society together (interconnectedness)? How does she perceive individuals 
inhabiting society (humanness)? And does she erect boundaries between 
individuals (inclusiveness)? We then continue our study by scrutinizing her 
understanding of goodness: Does she see common good in terms of justice 
or care? This will be followed by a consideration of how other SAB activists 
understand those dimensions, the aim being to determine what kind of un-
derstanding of common good they have and if they share a similar view of 
common good with other activists. In a second step, we consider how this 
broad understanding of common good sets pro- migrant activists’ intention-
ality and orients their action specifically. We will ultimately be in a position 
to know what conception of political citizenship pro- migrant activists hold, 
allowing us to evaluate whether they belong to the category of strong citi-
zens. The same method will then be replicated for activists of Greenpeace, 
Caritas, and Unia.
Activists for the Rights of Migrants
Adriana is a sixty- year- old woman and a native of Ticino, the Italian- 
speaking part of Switzerland. Her personal route to activism began in the 
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1970s when she moved to Geneva to study sociology. Throughout her life, 
she has been engaged in different contentious activities, mainly linked to the 
post- industrial movement: in peace, women, human rights, and solidarity 
concerns. Adriana also made brief incursions into Christian aid voluntarism 
to help poor people. However, she quit soon after because the faith- driven 
discourse did not suit her. In the Christian aid circle, poverty is not conceived 
as an injustice to be fought on political grounds. Compared to her other 
commitments, Adriana’s advocacy for the rights of migrants is a fairly recent 
one. A decade ago, distressed by massive deportation of illegal migrants, she 
joined a local group called In five years, we take roots2 and became a member 
of SAB a few years later. Adriana has therefore had a long journey in ac-
tivism and has been engaged in a number of social problems. Despite this, 
her understanding of common good largely overlaps with that of the other 
migrant’s rights activists interviewed.
First, Adriana perceives a strong sense of interconnectedness among 
members of society and makes sense of the society she inhabits with others 
through social ties. For her, society is made primarily of social links be-
tween people, essential to living together. For no reason should those ties 
be destroyed. As she says: “The world, the society, is above all made of re-
lations between humans. All human constructions, art or buildings, can 
be destroyed. But this is of no importance because we can rebuild them. 
However, if we break relations between people we can’t rebuild them. If 
we start to say: ‘You’re Muslim so you have the right to do this; you, you’re 
Catholic, you have the right to do this and not that,’ and so forth, this breaks 
bonds between human beings. For instance, if we start to break the ties de-
veloped between the Swiss population and the Tibetans settled here, we can’t 
reconstruct them.”3
Adriana also relies on an inclusive sense of society. She establishes no cog-
nitive distinctions between people or between groups of citizens. To un-
derstand her inclusive perception of society, it is useful to examine how she 
makes sense of the individuals living in society: “A human being is something 
marvelous, and the world is above all made of human beings. I like people, 
I believe in people and this is why I don’t believe in God anymore [laugh]. 
 2 En cinq ans on prend racine.
 3 We collected oral communications from activists, and these are difficult to replicate in a book, 
which is a written communication. To make these oral statements readable, we rewrote them. 
“Rewriting” means that we used the activist’s own words, expressions, and images, and we deleted 
repetitions, added phrase connections when they were missing, and changed grammatical errors. At 
all times we stayed faithful to the activists’ purposes expressed in the oral format.
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I believe in human beings because they have extraordinary abilities. I’m al-
ways interested in seeing what people do, how they think or see the world, 
and this could be my neighbor, who is Swiss like me, or the people coming 
from Sri Lanka. What I want to say is that people are not very different from 
one country to another: We are all human beings.” Humans hold a central 
place in Adriana’s cognitive world and what she intends by “human being” 
is actually a “universal human”: “I learned something fundamental from my 
commitment to Amnesty International: to bring support to people and to 
defend their rights independently of the person who is in front of me. There 
are people who I can’t stand. For instance, I defended people who approved 
of the Bosnian Genocide and were convinced that it was for the best! I also 
defended men who were violent with their wives and sought to justify their 
recourse to violence. In those cases, even if I’m profoundly shocked by what 
they did or thought, I do my best to defend them because they are human 
beings. No matter who the person is, all humans have fundamental rights, 
and that idea is central to my activism.”
But how does Adriana universalize human beings? It is actually through 
an essentialist understanding of humans. Indeed, it is through the intimate 
characteristics of the individual, that person’s essence, that Adriana makes 
sense of human beings: “I fundamentally believe that human beings are all 
the same. I also notice this with the asylum seekers we defend. When we face 
core problems or suffering, we are all the same. When a mother comes with 
her baby, she has the same feelings that I experience with my children. What 
do people want? What do migrants want? They want to live peacefully and, 
if possible, with loving people around them. They wish to enjoy life, to have 
happy moments, and to have a job. I often quote an African proverb: Life is 
about ‘carrying water and carrying wood.’ Human beings want only this: To 
live peacefully. You know I don’t idealize people from abroad. I know a lot 
of migrants and I know that there is exactly the same proportion of good 
and bad people [in all societies]. In this respect, we are fundamentally all the 
same: We are human beings with our dark and light sides.”
Finally, Adriana does not erect boundaries between people inhabiting 
society. When she speaks of the Swiss melting pot, we see just how exten-
sive her vision of society is: “Switzerland is now so mixed. It’s such a great 
richness to have people coming from abroad, bringing other values to mix 
with our own. What a wealth! Why should we refuse them? We can keep on 
rejecting them, but Switzerland would not be the country it once was. Are 
we to stop, close our eyes, and repeating: ‘We are in Switzerland, we are the 
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Swiss people.’ I always say that if in the sixties Switzerland had closed the 
doors to Italians and Spaniards we would still be in the Alps eating fondue 
(laugh). You know, we are in the same world; that’s for sure. They are 
boundaries, but those boundaries are constructed. People create barriers 
out of fear of difference: I regret that a lot.” Adriana sees the ties binding 
people together, relies on a universalist conception of human being, and 
perceives that we all live in the same world, without establishing bound-
aries between groups of people. She clearly relies on a universalist under-
standing of commonness.
But how does she perceive goodness? How does Adriana perceive the good 
(migrants’ rights) that mobilizes her? The defense of migrants is under-
stood with the repertoire of social injustice. Adriana is aware that the viola-
tion of migrants’ rights impacts their welfare as most migrants live in poor 
conditions. However, she sees her commitment in terms of rights provision 
and social justice: “Migration is a history of blatant injustices. We actually 
create victims. Rich countries create victims in poor countries, and once 
people migrate to those rich countries, we shut the door on them! It’s a fun-
damental right to settle where one wants. This is not only my own view; it’s 
actually stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But this 
right is far from respected. If I go to Africa, I can settle down where I want 
without any trouble. In contrast, migrants who are coming to Switzerland 
can’t settle here; we reject and deport them. You know, there are terrible mi-
gration stories. I can give you one example among many others: Two years 
ago the Swiss authorities deported a Beninese father who was separated 
from his wife and two kids still here, in Switzerland. For two years, we have 
been trying to get them a family residence permit. They fulfill all the cri-
teria in Article 14 to receive the necessary permit. They have been settled 
in Switzerland for more than five years, are economically independent, and 
the kids attend public school, etc. For the third time in a row, we received a 
negative response from the federal authorities. The wife and kids will there-
fore soon be deported. It’s a dramatically unjust situation.” Clearly, the good 
mobilizes Adriana is perceived as a social justice problem.
Other SAB activists interviewed lead a different life from Adriana’s. They 
belong to other generations and have other professions, family settings, and 
life experiences. Despite these variances among individuals, we were struck 
by the overlaps in their understanding of common good with that of Adriana. 
First, all share a common view of society. Interconnectedness between people 
could be thought of in terms of interdependence between people, social 
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trust, or ties binding people together. Yet all are highly aware of the ties that 
bind people together:
We are interrelated, that’s for sure. For me, it is impossible to remain indif-
ferent to poverty, injustice, or to people whose rights are violated. It’s un-
thinkable to act as if others don’t exist. (Simone).
I’m living in this world, I'm thus connected to the world. We’re living in so-
ciety and for me this means that we necessarily depend on others. Society is 
fundamental; we can’t live without it. We really are social animals. (Colette)
For me, to live means to improve things, to contribute to society. It means 
to be open toward others and to be committed to them. I’m living in society 
and I am tied to others. For me, it’s crucial to do things for others, but also 
with them. What one does alone is of no interest. (Lisa)
Activists committed to the rights of migrants share an extensive under-
standing of society, where no boundaries between people are established. 
Their universalist perception of society is ultimately tied to a view of the in-
dividual, understood first and foremost as a human being. As we saw with 
Adriana, it is through an essentialist understanding of the human being— 
with similar desires, suffering, and sources of happiness— that the human is 
constructed, and engages with others:
We are all humans. I’m a historian, and as a historian I find that all major 
human problems are essentially the same. For me, differences and racism 
is rooted in a hatred of others: To not accept others as human beings like 
oneself. (Wilhelm)
Take the example of the new juridical status put into effect by the author-
ities: The NEMs (Non- entrées en matière).4 With this status, non- humans 
are created. They are already not citizens; but now, they are not treated as 
human beings anymore. This is just unacceptable! Those people who are 
coming in this country, they are just humans like me. But we don’t consider 
them to be human beings. This makes me crazy! I grew up with the idea that 
all humans have the same value and the same rights. (Lisa)
 4 NEM is a French abbreviation for “Non- entrée en matière” and refers to individuals whose 
asylum application has been dismissed.
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We are all the same! What we look for in life it’s to find a place that suits 
us: to get a job, have a family and friends. It’s certainly trivial to say this, 
but I think it’s what drives most people, whether they are migrants or not. 
Prejudice toward migrants conveys falsities. When you hear:  “Asylum 
seekers are lazy, they would not work,” that is simply not true. They want 
to work because they want to live. I can fully identify with all the people 
coming to Switzerland, because in their situation, I  would do the same 
thing. Human beings are fundamentally the same. (Yan)
It becomes clear that activists for migrant’s rights do not erect boundaries 
between people and understand individuals as part of the larger human 
community:
I’m against discourses of cultural difference. Nowadays, this is a prevalent 
public discourse but I think such ideas are completely wrong. For me, it’s 
just the opposite. I’m always amazed to see what we have in common. We 
share so much despite coming from different countries, evolving in dif-
ferent cultures, and speaking different languages. It’s the reason why I don’t 
support identity- based discourse based on claims that we are all culturally 
different. Those groups scare me and constitute a real threat for society. By 
advocating diversity, they contribute to creating social fault lines. (Simone)
We are all part of the same species. If all humanity does well, the little 
human that I am does well too. We should never forget that we all belong to 
mankind; we are part of this humanity, and nothing else. (Colette)
When I was working in Java as a theologian, I gave regular conferences. 
I knew that people listening to me came from different faiths — Muslims, 
Hindus, Buddhists, Christians— and adhered to various political 
ideologies— Marxism, nationalism, and so forth. Those conferences led to 
real exchanges. I always saw my job as fostering dialogue between people, 
occasions where you can be influenced by others, and even be converted to 
another religion. I never saw boundaries between religions. It’s the reason 
I have been committed to inter- religion dialogues my whole life. There are 
no frontiers between humans, or between confessions. (Wilhelm)
Taking the goodness dimension of common good into account, we see that 
the contentious issue that mobilizes activists is perceived in terms of social 
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justice. Of course, they are well aware that the problems migrants face are not 
only a question of rights. They know that migrants in Switzerland, as in many 
countries, belong to the poorest social groups in society. But for them, the 
migrants’ plight is above all an issue of social justice:
The way we welcome asylum seekers is intolerable. We pretend to provide 
them with accommodation, but that’s a joke! They are put in civil protection 
shelters under the surveillance of security guards. It’s like being in jail. Many 
asylum seekers come from countries at war and have experienced dramatic 
situations, such as violence, imprisonment, and other violations of human 
rights. What do we do when they arrive in Switzerland? We lock them up in 
overpopulated shelters with guards to keep them in. Welcoming migrants is 
a façade. Reality is cruel and highly unfair for those people. A few years ago, 
when I was working as a nurse in an asylum seekers shelter, I met a young 
woman who suffered from cancer. The state only supported emergency care, 
and of course she had no private health insurance. At the hospital, she was 
told: “You can’t afford surgery, you don’t have a residence permit and no in-
surance, we can’t do the surgery.” It clearly meant, you can keep your “tumor.”  
Can you imagine that? This is the way we treat asylum seekers in this 
country. (Yan)
When I  see asylum seekers or NEMs (Non- entrées en matière) being 
deported, I’m disgusted. These are the people that society wants to reject 
and erase. What is unbelievable is that these people evolve in spaces of non- 
rights. In addition, we turn them into scapegoats. As individuals, they have 
no future: no job, no home, no food, nothing. In a democracy, we can’t ac-
cept it when people are excluded and rejected in such a manner. (Simone)
Settlement right should be granted to any human being. I can settle where 
I want, easily receive a Visa for traveling, enter and leave a country without 
problems. For migrants, it’s just impossible. They flee their countries and 
face dramatic situations, then are ejected from wherever they arrive. They 
have so many problems in getting residence and work permits. If I compare 
my situation and theirs, it’s clear that there is an obscene injustice. They are 
denied basic rights. (Lisa)
What emerges from our systematic analysis of the accounts provided by 
activists for migrants’ rights is first that they perceive people as interconnected 
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and interdependent. Second, their understanding of the society they in-
habit with others is highly inclusive. Indeed, they do not believe in cogni-
tive boundaries between people, even for individuals coming from diverse 
cultures, different regions of the world, or different social groups. Their con-
ception of individuals as universal humans is uncontestably the most impor-
tant cognition that configures their extensive- self. Third, they perceive the 
common good they mobilize for in terms of rights and rights violation. SAB 
activists consider common good as “justice for all.” The social problem for 
which they are mobilized is apprehended in terms of “social justice” and for 
“all” by relying on an all- inclusive category, to paraphrase Douglass (1980). 
All members of society should benefit from those goods that objectively im-
prove people’s lives. Pro- migrant activists rely on what we have termed a uni-
versal social justice understanding of common good.
“Social Justice for All” and Intentionality
Defenders of migrants’ rights perceive common good with a specific lens. 
But how does this perception set their intentionality? How does their un-
derstanding of common good as a “social justice for all” allow them to 
elaborate cognitive components that orient their action? What are the cog-
nitive mechanisms or the cognitive linkages that bind their perception of 
common good to their intentionality? As we will see, the specific under-
standing of common good developed by pro- migrant activists enables them 
to construct three cognitive components— otherness, concernedness, and 
responsibility— directing their action in distinct ways: toward others, for a 
global change in society, and in the political sphere.
First, a universalist perception of society, allows them to construct a spe-
cific relation to otherness. Their inclusive view of society is unrestricted 
and favors a specific cognitive construction toward others. This construc-
tion relies on two cognitive pillars: first, a centrality of the human being in 
their mental world, and second, an identification with the people for whom 
they mobilize as human beings. This cognitive construction sets their in-
tentionality, and enables them to mobilize for others, beyond their own 
personal socio- cultural belongings. Let us highlighted this cognitive path 
with Adriana. The centrality of human the being is self- evident in her dis-
course: “I like people, I believe in people. . . . I am deeply tied with and in-
terested in human beings.” Her identification with migrants as humans is 
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evident too, as she said above: “When a mother comes with her baby, she 
has the same feelings that I’m experiencing with my children. When there 
is a drama, we all have the same sadness.” It is through the human essence 
that identification with migrants occurs and is extended to other people 
in need. It is notable that the activists who also have migrant pasts, such 
as Colette and Simone, identify with migrants as human beings and not as 
former migrants (see Simone’s quote infra). The centrality of the notion of 
the human and identification with migrants accordingly constitute two pil-
lars that enable Adriana to develop a specific relation to otherness. They en-
able her to mobilize for others, for people who do not belong to her social 
and cultural groups: “Whatever my commitments are, they originate from 
my understanding of the human being. When human beings suffer from in-
justice, I am committed to improving their lives. I must act.” The other pro- 
migrant activists interviewed follow a similar cognitive path that set their 
intentionality:
Of course the human being is central for me. We do not live alone in so-
ciety, we are among other human beings.  .  .  . It’s unthinkable to act as if 
others do not exist.  .  .  . You know, at the beginning of my commitment, 
I was affected by what migrants underwent as a people in exile. Being a 
migrant myself, I was sensitive to what migration is. But my situation was 
different from theirs. I migrated from France willingly. Although I suffered 
from exile, I can’t identify directly with their sufferings, with what they have 
gone through. Most of them experienced war and violence; they have had 
to abandon their children in their home country and live under a constant 
fear of deportation, etc. I have never experienced such hardships. I identify 
with them as a fellow human being would.  .  .  . We must commit to dis-
sent. We must defend others in need, those who are made into scapegoats 
as migrants are. It’s important that migrants benefit from support and be 
recognized as human beings. That is why I’m committed to defending and 
supporting migrants. (Simone)
For me, the individual is very important. As a nurse, I find it’s important 
to be committed to the patient, to listen to them, to engage in a real rela-
tionship. When dealing with a patient, I face another human being, and 
that’s what matters for me. . . . We’re all the same, we’re just looking for a 
place that suits us. . . . Migrants want to live. I can fully identify with these 
people who come into Switzerland. In their situation, I would do the same 
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thing. .  .  . Well .  .  . the financial support I provide for various organiza-
tions and my volunteer work as a therapist for prisoners are tied to the fact 
that we have humans who need support right in front of us. Our struggle 
should be for them. (Yan)
As I told you, I grew up with the idea that all humans have the same value 
and the same rights. This is fundamental for me. What matters to me is 
the human. It’s really central for me. For instance, when I’m traveling, what 
I like above all is too meet people. Frankly, when I travel, I’m really not fas-
cinated by sceneries, as beautiful they may be, but by the people, the people 
I meet. . . . You asked me before how I see the migrants that I’m fighting for. 
It’s quite simple: I identify with migrants as humans; they are humans like 
me. That’s it. . . . And you know what I’m doing, I mean my commitment 
to migrants, as well as my new professional commitment to peacekeeping, 
are above all commitments to others. To be open toward others beyond the 
family circle is what drives my political commitments. (Lisa)
The universalist conception of society enables pro- migrant activists to con-
struct a second cognitive component: concernedness. This perception of so-
ciety leads to a concern for various common goods, and not only for the good 
for which activists are currently mobilized, such as the defense of migrants’ 
rights. This cognitive component enables them to commit, or to desire to 
commit, to the resolution of various social problems. A specific construc-
tion of concernedness sets their intentionality, orienting their action toward 
various social issues and toward changing society as whole. Concernedness 
enables activists to mobilize for a widespread change in society. Adriana’s ac-
count well illustrates this cognitive path: “When I see situations of injustice, 
I feel concerned. I think that I should resist those inequalities; I can’t accept 
them. I could be committed to a many number of things, but of course I can’t 
be involved in each and every fight. Nowadays, the struggle I’ve committed 
myself to is that of the human beings in my vicinity: migrants. You know 
fighting for a better world is what vitalizes me. I’m committed to attempting 
to construct a different society, a fairer and more human one.”
I’ve been involved in many issues throughout my life: for human rights, 
pacifism, ecology, women rights, against apartheid in South Africa, and 
helping the poor. Today, I’m a very old man, and my commitment consists 
essentially in providing financial support to various organizations. 
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I’m concerned by human problems and injustice. It’s the hope to live 
in a better world with more justice that has always driven me and my 
commitments. (Wilhelm)
For me, justice and equal opportunities are central. Every time I  see 
injustices and inequalities I  feel concerned. It’s what motivates me to 
commit myself to various struggles such as gender equality, workers’ rights, 
migrants’ rights, and basic infrastructure for people living in developing 
countries. The spirit is always the same: to fight against injustice.  .  .  . To 
counter injustice and selfishness with humanity is essential, that’s why 
I have devoted my energy to helping others. (Colette)
When I see injustice, I always feel concerned and I want to act. The only 
problem is that I’m not really an activist. I mean I’m not a person who could 
actively commit to a cause. I always feel torn between the necessity to act 
against injustice and the feeling of not really being an activist. I solve this 
conundrum by supporting organizations involved in struggles against in-
justice financially. I support many associations [laugh]. My financial com-
mitment to all these organizations, all of these causes, is driven by the desire 
to improve our society, to make it better, and less unfair. (Yan)
Finally, a particular perception of goodness enables the activists to con-
struct a last cognitive component that we identify as responsibility. Perceiving 
the good for which they mobilize as a struggle against an injustice enables 
them to attribute responsibility to collective actors and to frame the social 
problem in terms of a political struggle. Pro- migrant activists do not per-
ceive migrants as responsible for their situation or fate. They are viewed as 
victims of state legislation. State actors are considered accountable for the vi-
olation of migrants’ rights. This cognitive component sets the intentionality 
of defenders of migrants’ rights, leading them to mobilize in the political field. 
Adriana’s account provides evidence of the cognitive linkages between so-
cial injustice, the attribution of responsibility, and the necessity for political 
commitment: “Migration is a history of blatant injustices. We actually create 
victims. Rich countries create victims in poor countries, and once people 
migrate to those rich countries, we shut the door on them!” For Adriana, 
fighting for migrants’ rights is a political conflict, and this perception orients 
her action toward the political sphere:  “In the asylum and migration do-
main, it’s clear that we must challenge the government if we are to change 
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things. Without political struggles these rights would remain violated, that’s 
for sure.” Other pro- migrants express a similar cognitive path that sets their 
intentionality.
Migrants are victims of state violence. They have to wait for five years 
before receiving a response from the authorities. It’s an unbearable psy-
chological pressure. The state keeps them on a leash.  .  .  . There are also 
problems with the civil servants working in the field of asylum seekers. 
Most of them follow restrictive practices, even though they have a consid-
erable margin in which to interpret the law. In addition, I know that many 
of them do not read the migrants’ personal records. They simply skim 
through them. Without lawyers defending their case, most of the asylum 
seekers would have no chance to stay. I’m committed to asylum seekers’ 
defense by providing legal counsel and by defending cases before the ad-
ministration and courts, but I’m also engaged politically. Migration laws 
will keep on being strengthened without political struggles to oppose such 
measures. (Lisa)
It’s intolerable the way we welcome asylum seekers. . . . It’s like being in jail. 
If people knew what was really going on, how we treat migrants and asylum 
seekers, they would all protest. Government practices toward migrants are 
unjust and inhuman. It is our duty to denounce them. Of course, we have to 
fight on the political terrain if change is to happen! (Yan)
The laws are so rigid. Arbitrariness is also a major issue. When you think 
that most of the people applying for asylum have suffered in their home 
country, they have risked their lives, and we don’t give them asylum. It’s 
twisted! When you know that, you just rebel. Recently, I  defended an 
Iranian woman; she was economically independent, spoke French, and was 
perfectly integrated, meeting the government’s requirements to receive a 
resident permit. Yet she never received the right to settle in Switzerland. 
We must fight legally to defend migrants’ situation, but the most important 
thing is to be involved in political struggles if we are to improve the rights of 
migrants. (Simone)
Defenders of migrants’ rights perceive common good with a specific lens. 
As Figure 4.1 summarizes, this specific understanding enables them to 
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construct a specific relation to otherness, to develop concern toward a large 
set of common goods, and finally to elaborate meanings toward responsi-
bility when migrants are conceived as victims of state practices. These spe-
cific cognitive components set their intentionality, facilitating and orienting 
their action. First, their specific relation to otherness allows them to mobilize 
for others. Second, their concernedness enables them to commit to social 
change. They are inclined to engage in multiple social struggles in order to 
improve society as a whole. Finally, attribution of responsibilities to collec-
tive actors, and here to state actors in particular, orients their action toward 
the political sphere.
Regarding pro- migrant activists, a last dimension remains to be exam-
ined. Are migrants’ defenders concerned by common good? Or does the range 
of their concerns about common good go beyond this specific problem? 
As we saw above, migrants’ rights activists are concerned with broad so-
cial issues and are not exclusively committed to one social problem. They 
are concerned by various social problems that are cognitively structured 
around the idea of improving community life in general. As Wilhelm 
stated: “It’s the hope to live in a more just world that drives me.” Adriana, 
Colette, Lisa, Simone, and Yan express similar views that demonstrate that 
they are cognitively committed to improving society and to broaden access 
to the common good. In this regard, following the definition of strong cit-
izenship under the first pillar, they can be considered strong citizens; they 
are concerned by the common good, and their commitment seeks to im-
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Figure 4.1 From the perception of common good of the pro- migrant activists 
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142 Contentious Minds
Common Views on Common Good?
People committed to Greenpeace are involved in political struggles for en-
vironmental matters. Their contentious battle is therefore not analogous 
with that of migrants’ right activists. Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 1, 
they share a similar contentious milieu as both groups take part in the 
post- industrial movement. But do Greenpeace participants share a view of 
common good with that elaborated by defenders of migrants’ rights? Or, do 
they perceive common good from a different perspective? Again, we enter 
the green activists’ mental world through an activist’s account.
Nathan is a thirty- year- old man. He was born in Bourgogne and lived there 
until his mid- twenties. After studying information technology, he found a 
job in Switzerland and moved to Geneva where he now lives. Nathan was 
not always aware of environmental issues. He discovered ecological activism 
when he was in Finland completing his studies. Four years ago, when he set-
tled in Switzerland, a good friend took him to a Greenpeace meeting, and 
since then, he has been committed to the organization. Before joining envi-
ronmental contention, Nathan was occasionally involved in student protests 
in France. He protested against state reforms that hindered access to higher 
education. Nowadays, alongside his participation in Greenpeace, Nathan is 
committed to making relations between developed and developing nations 
fairer, and he seeks to provide poor people with support. More recently, he 
was fired from the international company he worked for and subsequently 
joined the workers’ syndicate Unia.
Let us first investigate how Nathan perceives the society he inhabits with 
others. Like the pro- migrant activists, Nathan perceives interconnectedness 
between members of society. In his mind, we are all interdependent. This 
perception requires that solidarity be displayed and social trust be developed. 
Interdependence, social trust, and solidarity are the cognitive resources that, 
in Nathan’s view, bind social members together. As he says: “For me trusting 
others is crucial. If you don’t trust others, you become an individualist wor-
rying about your own fate and interests. It’s important to trust others and 
show solidarity and we must strive to strengthen bonds regardless of nation-
ality. This is true on an ecological scale too: Pollution in one country impacts 
the environment in other countries, and advances in protecting the environ-
ment in one country benefit all of us.”
As Nathan’s last idea stresses, he does not establish boundaries between 
people. His understanding of society is inclusive, and it parallels the view 
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shared by the migrants’ right activists. As with the pro- migrant activists, 
Nathan perceives individuals in society as belonging to a universal hu-
manity. When he talks about members of society, he always refers to humans, 
unmoored from social or cultural belongings: “We should connect humans 
and nature together. If we don’t bind humans to nature, we will face tre-
mendous problems. This much is obvious. For me, it is a major concern. 
Too often, we oppose human beings to nature. We don’t have to choose be-
tween saving humans or saving nature; both can go hand in hand.” Nathan’s 
thoughts concerning the human are slightly less developed than those for-
mulated by migrants’ rights activists. Despite this, he has a universalist un-
derstanding of society, setting no boundaries between people who make up 
society. As he declares: “Recently, I went on Médecins du Monde’s website and 
I found what they do to be highly interesting because they provide medical 
assistance for people both in Switzerland and abroad. They are committed 
nationally and internationally. As I see it, we should act against poverty here, 
in Switzerland, but also everywhere in the world. To return to your question, 
I think that we should respect people’s diversity. We must respect people who 
are different from us and show solidarity with people who are not from our 
community, our family, or who are not necessarily like us.”
Does Nathan’s perception of goodness overlap with that constructed by the 
defenders of migrants’ rights? The common good to which Nathan is com-
mitted is perceived both in terms of care and social injustice. For Nathan, 
extensive predation on natural resources, massive pollution, and energy 
problems directly impact human survival and care. As Nathan stated: “If na-
ture doesn’t exist anymore, human beings cannot survive.” Environmental 
problems are therefore seen in terms of human care. However, the connec-
tion to social justice is not far away. For Nathan, environmental problems 
are linked to issues of social justice: “I am very concerned with the conse-
quence of human activity on the environment. For example, waste is a se-
rious problem. We solve it by sending our surplus to developing countries. 
We are told that our televisions and computers are sent to developing coun-
tries to be recycled, but that process is a very harmful one for the environ-
ment and for people. The devices are full of toxic substances and people are 
ill equipped to recycle those products. It’s unbearable; we send tons of elec-
tronic equipment to landfills in developing countries where people can’t af-
ford computers! We are not all equal in terms of environmental destruction 
and it’s the same with global warming. Developing countries are much more 
affected by global warming than first world countries. Switzerland will have 
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enough money to cope with floods or hurricanes, but this is not the case for 
Bangladesh and many other poor countries. There, most of the people live in 
slums and will suffer directly from the effects of climate change.”
Nathan sees environmental problems in terms of both care and social in-
justice. Indeed, the question of social justice goes beyond the challenge of 
human survival due to environmental destruction. For Nathan, the impact 
of global warming is not equally distributed, and this unevenness constitutes 
a major injustice. Further, subsequent generations will suffer from the envi-
ronmental destruction we are engendering. Again, he thinks of this idea first 
and foremost in terms of injustice and unequal treatment between genera-
tions. In this respect, Nathan conceives of common good similarly to the way 
pro- migrant activists do, as a universal social justice.
The other Greenpeace activists interviewed share Nathan’s understanding 
of common good to a large extent. First, they perceive interconnectedness 
between people in all societies. Like Nathan, they feel that bonds between 
people should be displayed, in terms of interdependence among people, so-
cial trust, or solidarity. With some individual idiosyncrasies, green activists 
perceive interconnectedness between people in a similar fashion:
Society exists thanks to social ties and humans relations. Without such ties, 
societies can develop but are imbalanced. Since childhood, and throughout 
our adult lives, what matters are the ties which bind us to others. Each of us 
exists, as a person, because of those ties; we are just a fraction of a whole. 
Several years ago, I realized that I exist in relationship to a larger whole. To 
live, I need to belong to that whole: to construct with others, and to solve 
problems with others. (Margot)
We can’t live by ourselves. As long as things go well you could live by your-
self. But when things don’t, you realize that you need others. When you’re 
open to others, you realize that everything becomes easier. I think that the 
more we share, the more our relationships tend toward equality. (Evelyne)
It might be nice to think we can manage everything by ourselves, achieve 
that sort of total autonomy from others. But I don’t believe that’s possible 
anymore. Before, we were able to be independent from others, we were 
hunters and gatherers. Nowadays, we are all specialized in one domain. 
There are people who produce our food, others the water we consume, 
the electricity we need, etc. We can’t expect a train driver to build his own 
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house, to grow his food, to create his clothing. In our modern society, we 
are all interdependent. (Pierrette)
Greenpeace activists are aware they dwell in society with others and there-
fore share a universalist understanding of society. However, they depart 
from pro- migrant activists on one point. Indeed, many Greenpeace activists 
perceive humans through a negative lens by underlining humanity’s darker 
aspects: ecological destruction and the endangerment of human survival as 
well as a generalized sense of irresponsibility and carelessness. Nevertheless, 
the generic umbrella of life remains intact:
I feel really close to animals. If I had to choose between saving an animal 
or a human, I might just save the animal. Of course, animals live under the 
law of the strongest and eat their fellows when necessary. However, if they 
kill it’s always for a good reason: either to eat, or to save their babies. They 
don’t display unwarranted violence as is the case with humans. I think that 
humans are fundamentally stupid creatures— you, all others, and me. We 
are unable to live with nature. All we do is take from nature incessantly, be 
it minerals, wood, oil, or water. We think that we own the planet. Humans 
are crazy! (Pierrette)
We are all human beings. We should all benefit from the same rights, be 
treated with respect, and act freely. Certainly differences exist: We don’t 
all share the same faiths, cultures, or ethnicities. However, while our 
worldviews are slightly different, we are above all human beings. (Evelyne)
If I’m driving and I see a cat run over, I think: “Oh the poor cat, it’s so sad, 
it’s too bad.” If I see a child hit by a car, I will scream, I will be shocked. 
This child is a human like me. I profoundly think that we human beings 
are much more important than animals. Of course, we should respect an-
imals and treat them kindly. However, humans are much more important. 
(Maria)
With this understanding of individuals as human beings, green activists do 
not establish cognitive boundaries between people, or groups of people in 
society. They make use of a universalist repertoire to understand society. Yet 
again, their perception overlaps with that of pro- migrant activists. For green 
activists, we all belong to the same world:
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Racism is a real problem, but it is a misconception. Between white and 
black people, there are no differences. Black people are not less smart 
than us; they are not less hard workers than us. There is no difference. 
It’s just a matter of skin color; it’s nothing more than that. Black, white, 
or yellow, it makes no difference. In any case, I have no nationalist fiber:  
I could be Cambodian, American, or from another nationality. I  don’t 
care about that. I find it totally foolish to draw boundaries between each 
other. (Pierrette)
I have experienced situations of exclusion, above all with my husband. 
Sometimes, in restaurants, people seated next to us say:  “Look at those 
Jewish faces.” Several times, I've seen people stare at him. People don’t see 
my husband as an individual like others, an individual belonging to a larger 
set of people. They perceive him as a Jew. This is difficult and of course un-
bearable. I share this experience to claim that we should work for a more 
open world: A world without social, faith- based, or cultural distinctions. 
This is an imperative for me. (Margot)
I like diversity. That’s why I have friends from abroad, people who are open 
to others. I think that someone who has remained in a small village for their 
whole life is much less open to others than people who have traveled and 
lived in other countries. I  think the more you exchange with others, the 
more you open yourself to difference. It’s what I  learned when I  lived in 
Ghana. When you live abroad you realize that we are not so different from 
each other. (Maria)
Greenpeace activists also share the same perception of common good as 
migrant rights’ activists, as social injustice is part of their cognitive world 
too. As observed with Nathan, when it comes to environmental problems, 
this common good is apprehended both in terms of care and injustice. 
Pollution, excessive consumption, the exhaustion of natural resources, 
and global warming worry these activists because of the impact on human 
living conditions. Environment protection is hence considered in terms of 
social care. However, social justice remains a key factor. Concerns about a 
legacy for subsequent generations are notably expressed by all Greenpeace 
activists interviewed. Environmental destruction threatens the livelihood of 
those who will come after us, and this constitutes a major injustice for all 
Greenpeace activists interviewed:
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We inherited the earth, a place full of life. We use portions of those elem-
ents, and we destroy others. But the earth is a common good and we are 
undermining the legacy we received. With all species that have already 
disappeared, those that are disappearing, and those that will disappear in 
a near future: This legacy is now under threat. This is worrisome because 
we are all responsible for this legacy, and we should be aware of that. If it 
appears absolutely normal to destroy this legacy, we are far away from the 
idea of co- responsibility shared with future generations. This behavior is 
wrong and, above all, unfair toward future generations. (Margot)
We must stop polluting and think of new modes of consumption. We must 
put a stop to advertisement urging us to consume ever more. This maddens 
me because we don’t have the resources to consume in those quantities. It’s 
the same with electricity; we waste too much energy in useless lighting. So 
many shops and buildings are illuminated at night when they need not be. 
Consumerism is an aberration! We won’t leave much for the next genera-
tions and that is deplorable. (Pierrette)
I learned a lot about nature thanks to my mother. We were always in na-
ture, walking either in forests or in countryside. She transmitted a love of 
the earth to me. But I wasn’t aware of environmental problems from the 
onset. For example, I started recycling only much later in life. Now, I’m very 
aware of those problems. I can’t stand throwing a can or a battery in the 
trash and I don’t throw away things that I can reuse or transform. We must 
stop wasting because the earth is so polluted. . . . We should put an end to all 
of this. How will future generations inhabit such an earth? (Maria)
The narratives provided by Greenpeace activists reveal that their under-
standing of common good is in line with that of defenders of migrants’ rights. 
First, they perceive interconnectedness between individuals. Second, their 
understanding of the society they inhabit with others is inclusive, with no 
cognitive boundaries between people. Like defenders of migrants’ rights, 
Greenpeace activists perceive individuals as universal human beings, and 
by this they define themselves as extensive. Third, green activists grasp the 
good for which they mobilize with the repertoire of both care and social jus-
tice. However, the social justice repertoire matters more than care. As we 
will see in the following section, they perceive other common goods exclu-
sively through a social justice lens. Social justice is a structural perspective 
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when it comes to understanding common good. Like the migrants’ rights 
defenders, green activists conceive common good in terms of “justice for all.” 
Again, they rely on a universal social justice understanding of common good. 
While they are involved in contentious battles pertaining to specific polit-
ical issues, migrant defenders and green activists share common views on 
common good.
While all Greenpeace activists interviewed share a similar concern for 
common good, Yves, one of the green activists interviewed, differs from the 
cohort. First, he does not rely on a universalist understanding of common 
good but rather perceives individuals as formed by social and cultural be-
longings, and he defines boundaries between groups of people inhabiting 
society. In his mind, society is highly segmented, and we live in specific so-
cial groups. Second, Yves does not apprehend common good with the so-
cial justice repertoire. His cognitive world departs from the one elaborated 
by other Greenpeace activists interviewed. Yves’s relational setting provides 
clues toward perceiving why this particular activist relies on a distinct under-
standing of common good. We return to this issue in Chapter 6.
Green Activists’ Intentionality
Green activists perceive common good in a similar way as defenders of 
migrants’ rights. Does their understanding of common good enable them to 
elaborate cognitive components that overlap with those of migrant activists? 
If so, do those cognitive components orient Greenpeace participants to-
ward types of action similar to those of pro- migrant activists? In other 
terms, do the cognitive mechanisms binding their perception of common 
good to their intentionality parallel those of SAB activists? By analyzing 
the content of the three cognitive components— otherness, concernedness, 
and responsibility— and examining for whom, for what, and in which field 
Greenpeace activists orient their action, we will be able to answer those 
questions.
To begin with, like pro- migrant activists, their inclusive view of society 
favors a specific cognitive construction toward others. This construction 
relies on two cognitive pillars: a centrality of the human being in their mental 
world and a concern for the universality of environmental issues. Mobilizing 
on environmental issues, ecological activists do not speak about the ways in 
which they identify with the humans they mobilize for as the pro- migrant 
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activists do. Despite this, they problematize the universality of the issue they 
are mobilized for. Both cognitive pillars set their intentionality, and enable 
them to mobilize for others.
Actually, ecological activism might be motivated by two distinct 
concerns: by activists’ self- protection (or protection of their relatives) and 
the preservation of the environment surrounding them, or by a more uni-
versalist preoccupation that transcends self- preservation and goes beyond 
one’s “backyard.” Greenpeace activists belong to the latter category of green 
activism. In our long conversations, none of them hinted at the idea that their 
commitment replies to a concern about their own lives. Indeed, community 
as a whole and the lives of others drive their commitment. Moreover, eco-
logical problems in their immediate surroundings do not matter as they are 
mostly burdened with universalist environmental issues. “Not in my back-
yard” (NIMBY) is not a meaning present in their minds.
The centrality of the human being in their mindset and a universalist di-
mension of environmental issues are two cognitive sets orienting their mo-
bilization toward others, as Nathan’s accounts well illustrated. “As I already 
told you, I’m concerned about human beings. And my anxiety about envi-
ronmental issues is related to others. You know, even if I live to be one hun-
dred years old, I wouldn’t suffer from the consequences of our destruction of 
the planet. I will not be personally affected by this destruction, but the next 
generation will. We must think about future generations, and it’s for their 
well- being that I am committed. Similarly, global issues are of huge concern 
to me: protecting endangered species, combating the use of nuclear energy, 
reversing global warming, among others. We should always bear in mind that 
environmental issues have an impact on us all. We are not equal regarding 
those problems, and people living in poor countries are much more exposed 
to the effects of ecological destruction, and we should mobilize our ener-
gies for them too.” The cognitive path— from the centrality of the human in 
the cognitive map presented by Greenpeace activists and their concern with 
universal issues pertaining to their willingness to act on behalf of others— 
appears in each of the Greenpeace activist’s narratives:
A long time ago, I realized that I exist in something global and that I’m 
just a small cog in something bigger, so, I exist through others. To meet 
the other, to communicate with the other, to listen to the other, and to be 
committed to the other, matters to me. . . . You know, environmental issues 
have an impact on us all, here and elsewhere. We must act locally but also 
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globally. Global issues are important, and I also commit to these kinds of 
issues. (Margot)
Human beings are important to me:  We must protect them and act for 
them. With environmental issues, I am not mobilized for myself but for all 
of us. We must leave a sustainable planet for everyone. We all have a respon-
sibility in protecting the environment. All of us should do something, like 
improving the protection of forests here and in other places in the world, 
saving polar bears, putting a halt to the fishing of endangered species, etc. 
A commitment to the environment is a commitment to humanity, because 
without nature our species won’t survive. My commitment to Greenpeace 
resonates with what I believe in: a global commitment for all. (Maria)
Of course the human being matters for me. As I told you, we should all 
be concerned by others and be committed to improving others’ lives. . . . 
With the environment, I’m concerned by an issue which affects all of us. For 
instance, overfishing, nuclear energy, ocean pollution due to oil platforms 
worries me. We must protect our planet. I support Greenpeace because the 
organization acts on global issues for all: Others and me. (Evelyne)
The universalist understanding of society also favors a specific construction 
of concernedness for the Greenpeace activists. As we found for defenders of 
migrants’ rights, multiple common good issues concern them. Their views 
on common good are not restricted to environmental problems. As with 
the pro- migrant activists, these cognitive components allow Greenpeace 
activists to commit, or desire to commit, to solving various social problems. 
Their extensive concern with the common good enables them to mobilize 
for various social causes encapsulated in the wish to bring global social 
change in society. Nathan’s narrative provides evidence regarding the cog-
nitive linkage. “I feel concerned by many social causes. I’m committed for 
more equity between rich and poor countries; I would like to provide sup-
port for poor people; and I joined Unia after my company fired me. The com-
pany made huge profits but fired us to outsource the production to countries 
where wages are much lower. As I told you, we should be concerned by local 
and global problems. Most of them are interrelated: It’s the case for issues 
of labor, North- South relations, the environment, etc. We need to fight for 
a sustainable world and a fairer society.” The following excerpts by Margot, 
Evelyne, and Maria provide further evidence of this cognitive path, from 
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an inclusive understanding of commonness, a concernedness for multiple 
public issues, to the development of an intentionality that urges Greenpeace 
activists to mobilize for various social problems with the wish to bring about 
an overall change in society.
Many injustices preoccupy me. For years, I have been involved in the de-
fense of of migrants who do not have legal status to be here and I could 
commit to many other causes. I’m committed to making a better world. My 
mom transmitted this concern to me: to be engaged against injustices re-
gardless of where or what they are. (Evelyne)
For me it’s obvious that we must fight against injustice and for anyone. We 
can’t live in a society excluding people and treating some of them so un-
fairly. Many social issues concern me and I’m committed to addressing 
them. All my life, I was engaged in professional organizations, trade unions, 
as well as on matters of migration. Since I retired, I’m no longer in those 
associations, but I remain concerned by those issues. Today, I’m involved in 
guardianships: I defend and mentor individuals who face life difficulties. As 
long as I have the strength, I will remain committed. For me, there’s always 
this idea to try to improve our society; to make it better and fairer. (Margot)
When I  see injustice, I  want to do something to amend it. When I  see 
migrants deported, I’m revolted and want to act. When I see poverty, here 
or in developing countries, I want to do something about it. I want to fight 
against those injustices. I don’t always do it: I don’t have enough money to 
support all these organizations, nor do I have time to commit. You know, 
I always want to change this society, to make it better [laugh]. (Maria)
The understanding of goodness that green activists develop enables them 
to construct a final cognitive component: responsibility. Like defenders of 
migrants’ rights, green activists perceive the good they mobilize for in terms 
of social justice, which allows them to attribute responsibility to collective 
actors. Although they consider individuals as accountable for the planet’s de-
struction due to consumerism, two collective actors are perceived as impor-
tant players in this destruction: economic and political actors. Attributing 
responsibilities to both actors allows them to view environmental problems 
as a political conflict, which in turn favors a mobilization in the political field. 
Nathan’s narrative illustrates these cognitive connections:  “Multinational 
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corporations are responsible for environmental degradation and predation 
of resources. They must change their behavior and assume responsibility. 
For example, food companies using GMO5 have a huge responsibility to-
ward the environment. It’s the same with companies producing nuclear en-
ergy. These are real problems. Well, in that case, political authorities are also 
accountable. The authorities ultimately agree or not to power plants, and 
actually they favor building more of them. Government always posits the en-
vironment in opposition to the economy, and the economy wins. The other 
problem with political authorities is their short- term view on such matters. 
Look at how they handled the economic crisis: They provided huge amounts 
of money to rescue banks, but no money is to be found when it comes to 
halting global warming. We should continuously pressure governments to 
do something for the environment.” A similar thought process appears in ac-
counts by Margot, Pierrette, and Evelyne:
Large companies are accountable and should assume responsibility, and 
so are supermarkets that sell products with GMO, or chemical industries 
in Basel or in Bhopal. Of course, they should be held accountable, but so 
should political authorities. Look at Bhopal; the Indian government is re-
sponsible for the decontamination of this industrial site but has done 
nothing. With political authorities it’s always difficult because they have 
conflicting interests. They are bound to the economy and profit. So they are 
not very active in environmental protection. It’s the reason why we must 
act: We must contest their policies, and put them under pressure in order to 
make them act. Otherwise, they will never take action. (Margot)
Capitalism is a real problem. It encourages us to consume unnecessarily. 
Businesses and large companies are fueled by that logic:  unending con-
sumption. They are based on growth logics and must be held accountable 
for spoliation of resources and creating pollution. But the state is also ac-
countable:  It’s not committed enough to environmental protection. The 
state is driven by capitalist logics. Consider oil companies; governments 
support these polluting companies and let them destroy our environment. 
If companies and state interests overlap, political authorities are not really 
engaged in protecting the environment. This responsibility is therefore 
 5 Genetically modified organisms.
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bestowed upon us. As citizens and activists, we must put pressure on the 
state and industries. (Pierrette)
Industries and the economic world are accountable for the destruction of 
the environment, but so are political authorities. State authorities start to 
do something, but they are very slow and have to do much more. We should 
commit on the political level to making them act! (Evelyne)
Greenpeace activists’ understanding of common good in universalist terms 
and with the social justice repertoire enables them to construct three cogni-
tive components: otherness, concernedness, and responsibility. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, those cognitive components orient their action toward others, 
lead them to be involved in multiple social issues aiming to improve the so-
ciety as a whole, and encourage them to mobilize in the political field. As 
for migrants’ defenders, these three cognitive components set their inten-
tionality. In the opening of this discussion on how understandings set green 
activists’ intentionality, we wondered whether the cognitive mechanisms 
binding perceptions of common good to intentionality matched those of 
pro- migrant activists. The answer is clearly yes. The cognitive mechanisms 
are the same and enable Greenpeace activists to orient their action in a direc-
tion similar to that adopted by defenders of migrants’ rights. Like the latter 
group, green activists’ specific understanding of common good sets a distinct 
intentionality: It allows them to mobilize for others, on multiple issues, and 
in the political realm.
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Figure 4.2 From the perception of common good of the Greenpeace activists to 
their intentionality of action
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Finally, like pro- migrant activists, members of Greenpeace demonstrate 
a concern for various social problems. Indeed, as underlined above, their 
concerns are not strictly restricted to environmental problems. All Greenpeace 
activists interviewed share views similar to the one expressed by Evelyne: “I 
could commit to many other causes.” They have an extensive concern about 
the common good. Like the pro- migrant activists, then, Greenpeace activists 
can be considered strong citizens under the criteria of the first pillar of strong 
citizenship: Their action is dedicated to improving our common good.
Christian Aid Volunteers and Common Good
A distinctive inner world unfolds once we consider activists committed 
in Christian aid organizations, as their relation to common good does not 
overlap with that of moral voicing activists. Caritas volunteers have a rather 
distinct understanding of common good. Let us look at what views emerge 
from their narratives by considering Mathieu’s account first. Mathieu re-
tired from his architect position a decade ago. While he was at the head of 
a fairly large company, Mathieu managed to be socially and politically ac-
tive in his community. He even reduced his involvement with the architec-
ture office and worked a part- time position to set aside enough time for his 
commitments. From the time he was a child and up to his twenties, Mathieu 
participated in a scouting movement. A few years later, he joined the Geneva 
division of Emmaus, an organization that provides help to the homeless. 
After he had spent a short period in this volunteering association, a close 
friend brought Mathieu to Caritas. He was, and still is, deeply involved in 
the organization. Along with his volunteering work, Mathieu also took part 
in the Christian Democratic Party, and for thirty years served as a member 
of the Geneva parliament. Both party politics and volunteering were hence 
important aspects of his life. Mathieu left the Christian Democrat Party a 
decade ago but remains active in Caritas, even if his commitment is not as 
strong as it was in the past. Mathieu has been committed to his community 
throughout his life. But what perception of community does he have? And 
more generally, what is his understanding of common good?
For Mathieu, interconnectedness between people is self- evident. Individuals 
are bound together and depend on one another, and each individual needs 
the help of his or her fellow citizens. Social links and solidarity with others 
are the main prisms through which he perceives interconnectedness. As he 
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declares: “We live in a society; we belong to a society. In our life, we can have 
kids, a wife, brothers and sisters, but there are all the others too. Each time 
we have the opportunity to develop social ties among people, we must do 
it. Once we develop ties between people— for instance, between misfits and 
people who are better off— it’s always positive. Community life is extremely 
important because it brings people together.”
Mathieu also relies on a universalist understanding of commonness. Yet his 
understanding of commonness is less extensive than that of the moral voi-
cing activists. Actually, Mathieu has an ambivalent perception of individuals 
in society. His Christian background provides him with substantial cognitive 
resources to view individuals as universal human beings. As he explains: “I 
was born and raised in a Christian family: My parents were always concerned 
by respect for others. In my view, religion means the other above all. I see 
fellow humans in front of me: This person is like me, with their flaws and 
qualities. I’m convinced that every person has marvelous abilities which 
simply need to be discovered and developed.” However, his self- extension is 
less generous than that of moral voicing activists. Contrary to moral voicing 
activists who include others in their own world, Mathieu perceives others, 
and particularly the people he mobilizes for, as distinct from him, and he 
never seeks to absorb others into his own world. Throughout his account, 
Mathieu speaks of the poor in pejorative terms: They are “lost,” “misfits,” or 
“broken.” Cognitive boundaries are set between his self and the “misfits”: “In 
Caritas, once we say ‘others,’ it actually means people who are lost and bat-
tered by life. These are the misfits who need help. You know that Emmaus 
companions started like this. Abbé Pierre met a misfit man in the street, a guy 
who was totally lost and nobody was interested in, and told him: ‘Come with 
me, I need you.’6 Recently, I have been helping an architect who is completely 
lost. I spend time with him and I listen to him. I try to do my best to help him, 
but this guy is a complete misfit.”
Throughout Mathieu’s narrative, this ambivalence— between a universal 
human and a categorized individual— is present. This ambivalence leads 
him to construct a less inclusive understanding of society. He does not think 
that “we all belong to the same world,” as moral voicing activists do. His 
understanding of society is less extensive, as he emphasizes: “Rather than 
saying we’re in the same world, I would say that we are in the same region.” 
 6 Abbé Pierre was a French Catholic priest. In 1949, he founded the Emmaus organization. 
Nowadays, the organization is represented in many countries. The French priest was highly popular 
in France and in many French- speaking countries.
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Mathieu’s conception of society is rather that of a community, the one in 
which he lives. However, this understanding of community is viewed in uni-
versalist terms. He does not erect boundaries within the community, and 
his community is conceived as rather extensive, including Swiss and French 
people: “Community holds a central place in my life. All my commitments 
relate to this core idea: I live in a community; I should therefore be com-
mitted to it. I have always been, and still am, highly involved in the com-
munity. For me, community means the Geneva region including the French 
region around Geneva. People from Geneva and the surrounding French 
region live in the same community. We shouldn’t distinguish them, and we 
must solve community problems together.”
Does Mathieu’s perception and assessment of goodness match that of moral 
voicing activists? The answer is clearly no. Mathieu’s actions for poor people 
are exclusively framed with the social care repertoire in mind. The common 
good for which he is committed relates to a care problem and he never raises 
the question of social justice. Mathieu never states that poverty is an injus-
tice, nor does he question the social causes that lead to poverty and social 
inequality. The common good for which he mobilizes is essentially viewed as 
caring for underprivileged people: “My commitment to Emmaus was above 
linked to Abbé Pierre. He opened a shelter in Geneva for homeless people, 
and I joined him. He provided support for people who were freezing to death 
in Paris, and was committed to providing them with housing, clothing, and 
food. His action was appealing to me. Helping people in distress has always 
motivated me. And it’s exactly what we are doing in Caritas. We help people 
bruised by life.”
Mathieu’s specific understanding of common good is one shared by other 
Caritas volunteers. All are aware of the social ties that bind people together 
and apprehend interconnectedness mainly through the lens of interdepend-
ence between individuals, which calls for solidarity with others:
We live in an increasingly individualist society where people are isolated 
from each other and worry essentially about themselves, their jobs or their 
own families. They don’t help others anymore. That’s so sad because they 
forget that we need others to live and that to live in society means living 
with others. (Edwige)
We are bound to others and we must show our solidarity to them. In my 
family, we’ve always helped others. My father helped sick people going to 
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Lourdes and my grandmother was always giving to people around her. I re-
member, during the war, she helped French people living across the border. 
At night, over barbed wire, she gave them eggs and milk from our farm. We 
weren’t rich, but each time we could help others we did it. It was a way of 
living. And nowadays, I continue doing the same thing [laugh]. (Christine)
It’s important to care about common good, on issues such as education, ac-
cess to water, among many other things. We should protect those goods but 
also pay attention to their distribution, so that we all can profit from them. 
Today, caring and sharing common good is not done properly; it’s not sat-
isfying. Then again, maybe, it never was. . . . I believe that citizens should be 
aware that common good is more important than their own personal wel-
fare. You know, living in society means helping one another. (Emmanuelle)
Like Mathieu, they rely on an ambivalent understanding of commonness. 
Their Christian background offers them well- defined cognitive resources to 
view society in universalist terms, and this enables them to perceive individ-
uals as universal humans. But their accounts also reveal that their perception 
of society is based on a categorized individual, conceived of along national, 
religious, racial, or class divides. Caritas activists perceive individuals in their 
social and cultural specificities. Their universalist understanding of com-
munity thus functions in tandem with a categorical understanding of indi-
viduals. This sort of categorical thinking was absent in accounts provided 
by moral voicing activists. The ambivalent understanding of humans— 
sometimes as generic, and sometimes in their categorical specificities— 
shows that Christian aid volunteers have a much less extensive- self than 
moral voicing activists. On a continuum of universalist thinking, moral voi-
cing activists form one extremity, relying on an unbridled universalist view 
of society, while Christian aid volunteers are situated on the other extreme, 
with a less inclusive understanding of society.
I’ve been immersed in Christian values. Respecting others, caring and 
helping them are part of my values. We all know that some people face tre-
mendous difficulties and need help to overcome hardship. We should do 
something to help them with their plight. And Caritas does a great job by 
supporting human beings who need help. . . . Speaking of hardship, I don’t 
put everyone in the same bag: There are different categories of poor people. 
Drug addicts destroy themselves and are difficult to handle as they often 
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have mental problems. It’s what I  call human misery. They shouldn’t be 
compared to working- poor people, whom we must help. You know, there 
are good and bad poor people. When you look at the history of poverty 
in Europe, it has always been like this: There has always been a distinc-
tion between categories of poor people. And I  see the need to maintain 
distinctions. (Emmanuelle)
For me, Catholicism is a religion defined by charity, driven by the idea 
of loving and helping others. To be a Christian is to be kind to others, to 
be concerned for others, to help others. It’s why it shocks me that some 
people show disdain for poor people. It’s shocking because they are human 
beings, and should be respected accordingly. That said, I enjoy working in 
the Caritas shop. We meet people from all over the world; we have people 
from all ethnicities. In that respect, it’s an interesting job, but sometimes 
not an easy one. Some people under stress are not always that polite. Then 
we explain that we are volunteers, and that calms them down. You know, 
foreigners are always impressed when they know that we are working for 
free. Then, you have people who always seek to haggle. Usually they are 
Arab. Bargaining is part of their culture, but they are nice people. You also 
have Muslims who disdain us because we’re women. (Christine)
I was raised in a very religious environment. My mother has always been a 
generous person who sought to help others. Having been raised in such a 
context, to share with other and to help them comes normally to me. I find 
the scale of social discrepancies tragic: Some people waste large quanti-
ties of food, while others, millions of human beings, go to sleep without 
having eaten. . . . Also, you have various types of poor people. You have the 
working- poor people and people who have lost their jobs, and, on the other 
side, individuals who never have, and will never have, enough money to live 
because they are unable to manage money when they have it. Those people 
waste. They buy lots of foods and let it rot in the fridge. And, of course, at the 
end of the month, they come to Caritas for food. There are huge differences 
between rich and poor people. Rich people never waste. They know how to 
manage and save their resources. People from the bourgeoisie have been 
educated to become what they are. They were sent to private schools for 
strict education. And thanks to that, they’re now part of the elite. By con-
trast, workers’ children are too pampered. (Edwige)
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The above excerpts clearly emphasize the ambivalence of Caritas activists and 
the extent to which their accounts are strewn with social and cultural divides 
that serve to categorize individuals. Sometimes people in need are perceived 
as universal humans, while at other times they are categorized along racial, 
religious, national, or class divides. Christian aid activists hence rely on a 
peculiar universalist understanding of commonness, tinted by categorical 
conceptions. This ambivalent perception affects their view of society, which 
is less inclusive than that of moral voicing activists. Moral voicing activists 
claim that “we live in the same humanity,” while Christian aid volunteers 
could be grouped under Mathieu’s view when he claimed that “we live in 
the same region.” Actually, Caritas volunteers depend on a strong sense of 
the community shared with others. This understanding matches the one 
that emerged from Mathieu’s narrative, where a local community extended 
over the Swiss city of Geneva to include French surroundings. Despite the 
pride expressed regarding their local community, Caritas activists perceive it 
in universalist terms without setting boundaries between people inhabiting 
that particular community:
I think Switzerland welcomes too many foreigners; the earth’s entire pop-
ulation comes to our country. We can’t keep the borders open anymore. 
We need to curb this openness. We wouldn’t be able to accommodate all 
of them. It’s the same with cross- border commuters. In the past, it was our 
friends from Savoy. Nowadays, the whole of the North of France settles in 
the region for jobs in Geneva, and we don’t have jobs for all those people. 
Speaking of Savoy, you know I like Savoyards. They are like us, we come 
from the same world. (Christine).
I think that the “melting pot” is a difficult idea. It’s difficult for cultures to co-
exist. We were idealist to think that everyone coming in Switzerland could 
easily integrate. It was fine with Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese because 
they wanted the same things that we do. But with people from the Middle 
East, Africa, or the Balkans it’s difficult. We don’t have the same values and 
understandings. They couldn’t integrate our community. (Emmanuelle)
One day, a French lady said to me: “What a shame to be Swiss! All these 
horrors you committed during WW2.’ It was the first time that I heard 
such a terrible thing about Switzerland. I started to be uncomfortable with 
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my national identity. Then, I told her that Switzerland is a small country 
and we couldn’t accommodate all the refugees. I  remember this period 
well. It was hard to find food or primary goods. But I’m a patriot. I’m Swiss, 
and primarily from Geneva. Today, people say that they are citizens of the 
world, but that doesn’t mean much. You always belong to a piece of land, to 
a region. (Edwige)
Christian aid activists rely on a sort of universalist understanding of society 
that overlaps somewhat with that of moral voicing activists, while relying 
on a less extensive view of society. By contrast, they depart from moral voi-
cing activists in their understanding of goodness. They see the good they are 
mobilized for not in terms of social justice, but solely through the social care 
repertoire. In their minds, they are committed to caring for a population 
whose well- being is not provided for. Their actions aim to offer this pop-
ulation material support so they can have a better daily life. Poverty is not 
considered in terms of a denial of rights, and Christian aid activists do not 
enter the social justice terrain but perceive their actions as caring for under-
privileged people:
There are people facing great difficulties. We should care for them; we must 
improve their daily lives. My mom always said:  “There are poor people 
living close to us, they need care.” I followed the same path. (Edwige)
We need to provide care and assistance for others:  older people, people 
with AIDS, people deprived of basic means, among many other groups. 
(Christine)
Caritas volunteers do not change the world, that’s for sure. But they try to 
make the daily life of people better. They care for people with difficult lives. 
I think this is important. They are not only caring for disadvantaged people 
but also for people with chronic illnesses, people at the end of their life, 
youth in difficulty, etc. That work is essential. (Emmanuelle)
The understanding Caritas activists have of the common good only partly 
overlaps with that of moral voicing activists. Although their self- extension 
is less ample than the perception of moral voicing activists, they neverthe-
less rely on a somewhat universalist conception of common good. First, 
they see people as interconnected. Second, they do not set boundaries 
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between people or groups of people inhabiting their region. While they 
have an ambivalent understanding of individuals, defined in either uni-
versalist or categorical terms, they rely on an inclusive view of the people 
who should benefit from a common good that is contingent upon the re-
gion they inhabit. If their understanding is less extensive than pro- migrant 
and Greenpeace activists, they nevertheless perceive the beneficiaries of 
common good in universalist terms. By contrast, Christian aid and moral 
voicing activists do not perceive the goods with the same lens. Caritas 
volunteers grasp the problem they mobilize for in terms of care. Caring 
is at the core of their cognitive world, while social injustice is central for 
moral voicing activists. Christian aid activists rely thus on a specific under-
standing of common good that differs from that of moral voicing activists, 
as Christian aid activists conceive common good not as “social justice for 
all” but as “social care for all.” Their actions are therefore predicated on a 
universal social care understanding of common good.
The Caritas activists interviewed share a similar assessment of common 
good, with the exception of Elisabeth and Jérémie. Their divergent views 
are easily explained, however. Alongside their commitment to Caritas, both 
take part in moral voicing activities. For the last forty years, Elisabeth has 
been committed to defending migrants’ rights, while Jérémie has worked 
toward the establishment of fairer relations between developed and devel-
oping countries. Their cross- commitment shapes their view on the common 
good, as their understanding is a blend of perceptions conveyed by both the 
moral voicing and the Christian aid communities. As Elisabeth’s account 
reveals, common good is perceived with the repertoire of care, in addition 
to that of social justice.7 Furthermore, their understanding of common 
good is more extensive than that of the Christian aid activists interviewed. 
We return to the issue of a blended mind as well as the impact of cross- 
commitment, in Chapter 6.
Caritas is committed to improving people’s daily lives. We provide care to 
people who need it because they face life difficulties. One of my jobs is to 
organize the distribution of clothing for people in need. I have met so many 
waves of refugees over time:  WW2 refugees; refugees from Communist 
countries; from South American dictatorships; from Zaire; from the 
 7 Due to space constraints, we offer excerpts only from Elisabeth’s account. Similar views were 
expressed by Jérémie.
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Balkans; and today, new wars bring new refugees our way. We should help 
and care for them. It’s a necessity because they have nothing. But we should 
also fight against injustice and inequality. You know, the gap between the 
rich and the poor people should be reduced; but it expands daily. We must 
struggle for a fairer distribution of wealth and resources. You know, each 
time I see injustices, I should commit, I should get involved in struggles 
against them. I’m approaching the age of eighty- five, I can’t commit any-
more, but I remain revolted by blatant forms of injustice. (Elisabeth)
We must be open to others regardless of who they are. We are, above all, 
human beings and we share the same humanity. My involvement in Caritas 
and my commitment to migrants’ rights are commitments to struggle 
against poverty, inequality, and racism. A person could be black, yellow, 
red, or anything else; it doesn’t matter. We should give up prejudices: “I 
don’t like black because they are black; I don’t like white people because 
they are white.” It’s so absurd! Having said that, I also have a deep sense of 
belonging to my community. I belong to a country, which has qualities and 
faults. I have much criticism to formulate toward Switzerland; nevertheless, 
I belong to this country. To be from Geneva, from this region, means some-
thing to me. (Elisabeth)
“Social Care for All” and Intentionality
As we have seen, the understanding of common good enables defenders 
of migrants’ rights and Greenpeace activists to develop specific cognitive 
linkages with otherness, concernedness, and responsibility that orients 
their action in a specific way. But what are the cognitive mechanisms 
binding Christian aid activists’ perception of common good to their 
intentionality?
First, their somewhat universalist understanding of commonness allows 
them to construct a specific relation to otherness. This construction relies 
on a main cognitive pillar: the centrality of “human” in their mental world. 
As was the case with the moral voicing activists, human beings hold a sig-
nificant place in the mind of Caritas volunteers. However, contrary to 
pro- migrant activists who identify with migrants, Caritas activists do not 
identify with disadvantaged people. Human beings are important to them, 
but the people they mobilize for are not included in their own world. Their 
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ambivalence about individuals and their less extensive- self can serve to ex-
plain the differences between both types of activists. Caritas volunteers do 
not identify with the people they provide support for; however, the cen-
trality of human beings in their mindset supplies them with the cognitive 
resources allowing them to construct a relation to otherness that enables 
them to mobilize for others. This cognitive construction sets their intention-
ality; it enables them to commit to others, beyond their own socio- cultural 
belongings. Mathieu’s words aptly illustrate this cognitive path: “Others in-
terest me, they are important to me. We must be attentive to others, listen to 
them, and help by taking some of their suffering away. I follow Abbé Pierre’s 
ideal in that regard: ‘If someone is lost or in great suffering, you should take 
their pain on your shoulders and try to solve it.’ But you know, the deep 
Caritas milieu, the people they help, all the things they do for misfit people, 
I’m very far from that milieu and those people. I can’t say that I’m close to 
those misfits: We don’t have the same life. But it’s important to commit to 
their well- being. For me it’s obvious that we must be engaged in our com-
munity to help others, to support people in distress, and I have been com-
mitted to that idea my whole life.” The other Caritas volunteers rely on 
similar cognitive links:
All the people I work with at Caritas are interested in others. Human beings 
matter to us. As I told you, for me to be a Christian is to be kind to others, 
but also to be concerned about others and to help others. And honestly, 
I have to say that I enjoy volunteering: I meet a lot of people through the 
Caritas shop. They are so different from me: We have black women dressed 
with wonderful boubous who come to buy at the shop and a lot of foreigners 
come as well. These days, I work with a young lady who is facing major dif-
ficulties, and who is a little bit lost. I like talking with her and try my best to 
give her advice, to help her in her disorganized life. (Christine)
Others are important and we must take care of them. We know that some 
people face dramatic situations, live with difficulties, and really need help. 
We know it, so, we must help them and that’s what I’m doing. As I told you, 
we all belong to the human race. However, identifying with the marginal 
and the misfits is a difficult task. Many of the people helped by Caritas are 
addicted to drugs. They ruin themselves because only drugs get them up 
in the morning. To be honest, it’s impossible to identify with such people. 
(Emmanuelle)
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It’s normal to help and rescue one’s neighbor; I was raised with values where 
others were important. For me, it’s obvious to share and to provide others 
with help. For instance, we should support poor people, although most of 
them don’t know how to manage money. Often, they waste their money; 
they don’t know how to save their money. Poor people are often irrespon-
sible. (Edwige)
Like the moral voicing activists, Christian aid volunteers’ understanding 
of society enables them to set a second cognitive component that orients 
their action. Concernedness for multiple common goods— not only the 
one they mobilize for— is a result of their universalist perception of com-
monness. This broader scope permits them to commit to various social 
problems. Concernedness sets Christian aid activists’ intentionality and 
orients their action toward various issues, enabling them to mobilize for 
multiple issues aiming to improve people’s social welfare. Mathieu clearly 
displays such a cognitive linkage: “Improving the lives of people has al-
ways motivated me. I feel concerned about various social issues: poverty, 
families facing difficulties, children dropping out of school, the well- being 
of elders, etc. I have always been drawn to others. My commitments have 
always resonated with this attraction, whether in scouting, or Caritas, 
Emmaus, or the Christian Democrat Party. My commitment to the party 
and my position as a city councilor were above all social commitments 
with the aim of improving the lives of others.” Fellow Caritas activists dis-
play the same cognitive path, as the accounts of Christine, Emmanuelle, 
and Edwige exemplify:
I feel concerned by people who suffer. Poor people, families in trouble, 
teenagers in social breakdown, sick people, people at the end of their lives, 
all of them are a concern to me. In my opinion, we must be concerned 
about others and try to help them. That’s why I support Caritas, Emmaus, 
Aid to Mountain People, Terre des Hommes, and Children of the World. 
(Emmanuelle)
There is so much misery in the world that we can’t simply remain blind to 
it. We must act for people whose lives are extremely difficult. Caritas fulfills 
this aim for me: helping others, and trying to make lives better, here and 
elsewhere. Perhaps you know that Caritas is present all over the world; this 
is an essential aspect of the organization. (Christine)
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Oh, you know, I worry about various social problems: poverty, children’s 
education, the care of elders, environmental issues, especially as they gen-
erate poverty. Take the example of Kenya. They grow beans and export 
them, so they don’t farm for their own nation but to feed the Europeans and 
Americans. Foreign companies bought their lands and make huge profit 
with bean exportation. Now, Kenyans don’t have enough land to grow their 
own food supply. I’m close to the Liberals, which is the party of bankers, 
but I can’t accept this! It’s this concern about people’s lives which is behind 
my commitments: to Caritas, the Red Cross, Emmaus, Aid to Mountain 
People, and other organizations. (Edwige)
Finally, their specific perception of goodness leads them to construct a final 
cognitive component: responsibility. As underscored above, Caritas activists 
conceptualize the good they mobilize for in terms of social care. This per-
ception does not facilitate the social attribution of responsibility to the pov-
erty problem. Contrary to moral voicing activists, Caritas volunteers do not 
perceive the people they mobilize for as victims of state policies or of our 
economic system. Actually, for Christian aid activists, poor people are re-
sponsible for their own fate: Lack of luck or the inability to manage their lives 
is viewed as the main factor for people in poverty. With this perception in 
mind, Christian aid activists cannot identify political or economic issues as 
underlying the problem of poverty. The way they construct responsibility 
favors a mobilization in the social field with the aim of providing help to the 
needy but not to make claims in the political sphere to solve social problems. 
Mathieu’s narrative offers an illustration of this cognitive mechanism: “There 
are people hurt by life and misfits. Some of them are responsible for what 
happens to them, others are not. As I told you, I’m helping an architect who 
is a total misfit, a poor guy. I try giving him a hand, to the best of my abilities. 
But he got himself in trouble. It’s sad but he got himself into this situation. 
Nevertheless, we must commit to helping these people. It’s our duty to show 
solidarity with people in distress and our task to help them.” Individual re-
sponsibility is also present in the mind of the other Caritas volunteers. No 
collective actors are blamed and, in their view, citizens and society are ac-
countable for providing support to people in need; making claims in the po-
litical arena is not an option.
People are often responsible for their own difficulties. Let me give you 
an example:  Last month, a mother living on social aid received money 
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in her bank account. She went to the bank and withdrew all the cash. 
Unfortunately, when she got out of the bank, her bag was stolen. When 
you have so little money to live on, you must mind it. You can go withdraw 
everything from your bank account. It’s senseless! Lots of people get them-
selves into such difficult situations. But we should help them; we should do 
something for them. It’s not the state’s responsibility to provide this type of 
help, the state has enough to do. (Edwige)
Among disadvantaged people you have unlucky people, like those who lose 
their jobs. But you also find people who are responsible for the situation 
they are in. I recognize that I may sound harsh, but it’s reality. Drug addicts 
are accountable for their own situation. They systematically destroy them-
selves. But society must support these people. It’s our responsibility to help 
them. It’s not the task of the state to help those people. (Emmanuelle)
In Switzerland, on the whole, we live well, but there are still people who live 
in poverty. Everything is so expensive. Debt is a real problem: People have 
credit cards and spend too much. Young people live beyond their means. 
They work hard, are always under stress, and all that just so they can live be-
yond their means. It’s sad. Moral misery is also a big issue: Many people are 
depressed and lonely, and children abandon their elderly parents, because 
they live in small apartments and can’t accommodate their parents. It’s ter-
rible, but it’s like that. As I told you, we must provide assistance to these 
people; they need it. (Christine)
A specific understanding of common good allows Christian aid activists 
to construct a distinct relation to otherness, to elaborate a form of 
concernedness toward a large set of common goods, and to construct re-
sponsibility when poor people are seen as responsible for their fate, and 
these cognitive components set their intentionality. These cognitive paths 
are summarized in Figure 4.3. First, their conception of otherness enables 
them to act for others. Second, concernedness with many common goods 
favors a commitment to various social issues, and not only by providing 
support to the poor. Their commitment on multiple issues is encapsulated 
in their wish to improve people’s social welfare. Finally, responsibility is 
constructed through individual responsibility and does not orient Christian 
aid activists toward the political arena. People are responsible for their situ-
ation, and it is the citizens’ responsibility to help distressed people with their 
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Figure 4.3 From the perception of common good of the Caritas volunteers to 
their intentionality of action
plight. The specific understanding of common good put forth by Christian 
aid volunteers defines their intentionality, allowing them to mobilize for 
others, on global issues and in the social field. While their intentionality 
overlaps that of moral voicing activists— because their action is oriented to-
ward others and on multiple issues— it stems from an interest for action in 
the social and not in the political field, contrary to the political dynamics 
that drive moral voicing activists.
Finally, moral voicing and Christian aid activists share a broad concern on 
common good. As their accounts underscore, multiple social causes concern 
them. The social welfare of different groups (poor, sick, old, young people, 
etc.) who live in Switzerland, and elsewhere, constitute key issues in their 
eyes. Christian aid volunteers are not cognitively engaged in bringing so-
cial change in society, unlike moral voicing activists, but seek to strengthen 
social welfare in society, and for all types of people. They are committed 
to enlarging access to common good. In that respect, like moral voicing 
activists, Christian aid activists are strong citizens, at least as defined by 
the first pillar of strong citizenship. Their multiple actions are dedicated to 
improving our common good, and not a specific collective good.
Unionists and Common Good
With workers’ rights activists, we encounter another understanding of 
common good, which overlaps with neither that of moral voicing activists 
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nor with that of Christian aid volunteers. Joao’s account will help us make 
sense of what the unionists’ conception of common good might look like. 
Joao is a fifty- year- old man, strongly committed to union activism since he 
emigrated from Portugal to Switzerland, seventeen years ago. He grew up in 
Portugal where he experienced dictatorship and civil revolution. According 
to Joao, the Carnation Revolution was a defining life experience. It sensitized 
him to politics and brought him into contact with communist youth and the 
ideals that animated them. Joao has a long protest career driven by a single 
issue. Although he financially supports a few post- industrial organizations— 
environmental, human rights, and north/ south solidarity— such matters 
are peripheral when compared to his commitment to unionism. As typ-
ical with union activists, he started his activist career after he encountered 
problems in his workplace. His company outsourced production to countries 
with cheaper wages and fired most of the employees. This initial battle in the 
workplace was the beginning of his long road into unionism.
Joao perceives interconnectedness, the ties binding people together in so-
ciety, mainly in terms of solidarity between society members. In his mind, 
individuals should provide each other with mutual protection and support. 
However, Joao thinks of solidarity mainly in terms of mutual aid between 
workers or among people who are less advantaged in society. His sense of 
solidarity is therefore restricted to a specific group of people: “We are in a 
world where we are forced to live together. But my assessment is that eve-
ryone defends his own interest. We live in a society where only money and 
profit matter, and this will never change! In such a capital- driven society, 
I don’t see how we can bring about effective change. We should all live with 
the same basic conditions, but reality is very different. We should show sol-
idarity with people who are less advantaged. Solidarity is an important as-
pect for living in society, but unfortunately, there is little of it among people. 
For example, at the workplace we try to explain that the more unionized we 
are, the stronger we become when we need to defend our rights. But, you 
know, many people are afraid and will never be able to stand with others. It’s 
a pity, but that is the way it is.”
Joao clearly frames interconnection in terms of solidarity. However, this 
perception does not include a universalist understanding of society, as so-
ciety is grasped through the lens of social difference and division among 
people. Joao relies on a communitarian view of society. He does not perceive 
individuals as universal humans but as part of social categories. The major 
dividing line which structures his mind is the distinction between workers 
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and employers. This fundamental social rift is constituted by the split be-
tween blue and white collars, which can be due to political, economic, or 
cultural factors. Joao declares: “If we had a different government, one that 
represented the workers better, and if workers became aware that it’s nec-
essary to vote with that aim, things could be changed. Individual interests 
guide politics. Look at the federal councilors and parliament members; they 
are all board members of private companies. Obviously, they are not the ones 
who will be defending workers’ rights! They back up those who pay them 
and they advance their own interests. In general, I don’t think that the Swiss 
government is very socially oriented [laugh]. Of course, Switzerland is a 
rich country, a capitalist country, and I find that the state favors employers’ 
interests far too much. The state makes laws and rules for the country but not 
in the interest of all, certainly not in the interest of workers.”
The division between employers and workers constitutes the basic prism 
through which Joao views his social environment. He repeatedly explains 
how fractured society is: between company owners and workers, within the 
workers group, and between people of different nationalities. Joao’s view is 
not a universalist one as, according to him, we do not live in a shared hu-
manity but in a segmented world: “We are all different: We are in different 
industrial sectors, the working conditions are different, wages are different; 
everything is different. Basically, we are all workers who seek better working 
conditions, but differences exist. They structure relations between employers 
and employees, and among employees too. But there are also differences 
between nations:  There are rich and poor ones, powerful and powerless 
states. Then, you have differences of race and religion. The world is full of 
distinctions.”
With unionists, a social justice repertoire is at the basis of perceptions of 
common good. The good Joao mobilizes for is, above all, set in terms of injus-
tice and rights. Of course, Joao is well aware that struggles for workers’ rights 
improve their situation. His activism seeks to secure the workplace against 
practices of mass firing, to increase salaries, or to improve general working 
conditions. But in Joao’s mind, these goods are above all framed in terms of 
social justice. As he says: “When Americans buy companies, they fire people 
and then outsource work to countries with cheaper wages in order to in-
crease profits. This is the main mechanism of economic globalization where 
the stock exchange and shareholders rule. Capitalism fosters injustice be-
cause profit is made at the expense of workers’ rights and welfare. As workers, 
we always face pressure from employers. They repeat that “we must remain 
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competitive,” “in Switzerland, salaries are too high,” and threaten us with 
outsourcing saying that “the company could outsource labor to China or the 
Czech Republic.” Yet outsourcing is not the only problem we face. For ex-
ample, temporary labor is a major issue. Companies hire more and more on a 
temporary basis. Of course, we need those people during production peaks, 
but employers keep them on for years without converting their contracts into 
permanent ones. It’s much easier for them to have temporary workers: They 
can fire them at any point! Companies take too much advantage of tempo-
rary workers. They don’t respect their rights.”
Like the other workers’ voicing activists interviewed, Joao’s activism depends 
on a different understanding of common good, which matches neither that 
of moral voicing activists nor that of Christian aid volunteers, as the percep-
tion of commonness is much less developed than for other activist groups. For 
unionists, ties binding people together are rather tenuous. They are perceived 
in terms that are restricted to people in their immediate group. Most unionists 
act in solidarity with their neighbors, relatives, or co- workers, but that sol-
idarity is confined to those circles. In Chapter  3, the quantitative findings 
underscored that interconnectedness ranks fairly low in the minds of workers’ 
voicing activists. The qualitative data consolidate this evidence. Unionists’ per-
ception of social links among society members is restricted to people in their 
close surroundings. In addition, solidarity is often perceived as reciprocal:
I grew up with the idea that solidarity is important. We must rely on each 
other. To show solidarity with relatives was important, but it also extended 
outside the family circle. When I  lived in Argentina, solidarity among 
neighbors was essential. For instance, my mother got a phone and we re-
ceived phone calls for the neighbors. The neighbor across the street had a 
car and we could rely on him to share it in the case of an emergency. These 
experiences clearly shaped the way I see the world. We should show soli-
darity with people, especially those in our proximity. (Eva)
My family, and my mother in particular, were always helping people 
around us. We should all show solidarity with others. Yes, I’m really in favor 
of exchanging with others, helping others. I like the idea of mutual help; it’s 
a good system for living together.” (Sarah)
We depend on others. If you do nothing for society, if you remain in a 
cocoon, or you stay outside of society, it doesn’t work. We should show 
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solidarity with others. If you want to have a better life, you can’t stay in a 
cocoon. You have to meet people and build relationships, because the more 
relationships you have, the easier your life becomes. We all need such a sup-
portive network. (Tiago)
As Joao’s account highlights, unionists rely on a categorical conception of 
human beings. It is through their social, cultural, or economic belongings 
that individuals are classified. For them, individuals are either workers or 
bosses. This is the primary dividing line between social groups and leads to 
further social divisions: among workers, categorized in types, and among 
people from other cultures. Racial, religious, or national categorizations are 
structural too:
A bank boss is paid a fortune every month while plumbers or builders 
earn at least four times less. These are the guys who build the boss’s house, 
who put a roof on his head. Workers fight every day for a salary of shit, 
and, if one day they face a shit in their life, their entire world collapses be-
cause they own nothing. Facing them, you have bosses who make a for-
tune. I know them well because I often work in their houses by the Geneva 
Lake, with swimming pools, tennis courts, dozens of bedrooms, gyms, and 
home cinemas; it’s unbelievable! There are too many differences between 
employers and workers. Well, there is this difference, but many others as 
well. I’m not a racist, but when I see Gypsy people hanging around on the 
street, pfff. The state supports them and helps them, using our pensions to 
support people who don’t work. It’s the same with asylum seekers. They 
hang around with their Nikes and iPhones. Those people don’t work, but 
receive money from the state, from us, the workers. We pay for people who 
do nothing! (André)
The working world is totally divided, between employers and employees, but 
also among employees. I see three different groups of employees: leaders, 
workers, and temporary workers. Their role, salaries, problems, and their 
place within the company are very distinct. There are differences due to 
nationality too. In the construction sector where I work, you have many 
nationalities: Yugoslavs, Turks, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, etc. And I see 
right away who is an Italian, a Spaniard, or a Portuguese. Italians, as they 
were the first to come in Switzerland, they always believe that they are the 
best workers. I’m always involved in disputes with them. With ex- Yugoslavs, 
172 Contentious Minds
it’s also difficult. It doesn’t go well with them because they don’t like to work. 
We, Portuguese, are well known to be hard workers. So, with Yugoslavs, it 
isn’t easy. (Tiago)
In Switzerland, there is no state control on collective agreements be-
tween bosses and workers. Workers always control the implementation 
of agreements, and when it’s not done properly they make a request to the 
boss. In my company, I’m the one responsible for the enforcement of col-
lective agreements. This means that I’ve to challenge my boss when neces-
sary; . . . however, as the boss has the power to fire employees, you can guess 
how fraught the issue is. I can provide another example: If we salesmen take 
home a free fabric sample, we can be fired on the spot. Even though the 
cloth has no market value, the act is considered by company owners to be 
theft, and we can be dismissed in less than five minutes! (Eva)
By categorizing individuals in their specific social rank, either by class or na-
tion, worker activists clearly see society as segmented into many different 
groups. This results in an understanding of commonness as communitarian. 
Actually, their communitarian view reflects the main dividing line they per-
ceive in society: between company owners and the working class. Their iden-
tification clearly resides with the latter group. But this identification should 
not obscure the fact that their communitarian view of society is also assem-
bled on cultural differences:
Society is totally fractured. The economic crisis we are in clearly 
demonstrates this. It’s not a crisis for everyone. In Europe, the number 
of Ferraris sold has never been this high. So what happens? A small pro-
portion of people earn huge amounts of money despite the crisis. Many of 
those people play the stock market. Actually, they play with people’s lives. If 
they lose, their firms close. But they don’t care. On the other side, you have 
masses of employees who earn less and less. I fear that the working class is 
sinking and joining the margins of society: those who have nothing. More 
and more employees can’t survive on their salaries. So yes, our society is di-
vided. And as I told you, I have a strong class- consciousness. I belong to one 
side of the social barrier, and I’m well aware of that. (Nuno)
In society, there are lots of differences, above all between bosses and 
workers. You know, the owner of my company flies in a helicopter to take 
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his Sunday breakfast in Monte Carlo, while I’m saving each last centime 
living in a tiny apartment. I take my Sunday breakfast at the popular baths 
of Geneva [laugh]. Actually, I feel comfortable there because you meet all 
types of people and class distinctions disappear. It’s rare to find such a loca-
tion; usually class distinctions are blatantly obvious. (Eva)
Cultures always clashed, and they will always clash. It’s like the story of 
the Tower of Babel. They spoke different languages and were unable to 
understand each other. One asked for a hammer, the other gave him a 
saw. It didn’t work. Finally, they stopped building the tower. This is an 
example of cultural differences. It makes living together difficult. You 
know, I understand when authorities exclude migrants. I understand it 
perfectly well. They should limit the number of people coming into the 
country. (Tiago)
While unionists and moral voicing activists do not see commonness through 
the same cognitive lens, they share a common understanding of goodness, as 
they make sense of the common good for which they mobilize in terms of 
social justice:
People working in the construction sector are highly disadvantaged, com-
pared to people, like me, who work in the tertiary sector. Builders face 
harsh working conditions. They work outside, exposed to varying weather 
conditions. It’s a very difficult job, and they earn next to nothing. If Unia 
could obtain retirement at the age of sixty for these workers, it would be a 
real achievement. They can’t work beyond that age. For me, it’s above all a 
question of justice. I want people to be treated fairly, to earn a salary pro-
portionate to their work and in suitable working conditions. This is not the 
case for builders, and it’s a crude injustice. (Sarah)
Injustices have always been there. Today, billions are made thanks to the 
outsourcing of production and the dismissal of employees. With computer 
technology, company owners see their benefits on their screen without un-
derstanding that behind numbers there are people who work hard to feed 
their families. Employees are fired with a mere computer click. Capitalism 
is the real problem. It turns the rich into the richest, and the poor into the 
poorest. Marx was right:  Capitalism always goes in the same direction. 
And now with neo- liberalism, it’s even worse. The system is much more 
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aggressive leading to massive increases in injustice and vulnerability in the 
name of profit maximization. (Nuno)
The salary inequality is unacceptable. Company bosses fuck workers over. 
A worker toils for twelve hours a day and gets 3,000 Swiss Francs per month. 
A company owner works three hours a day but earns 12,000 each month. Is 
this fair? As a worker, I’m at the bottom of the scale. Everyone who works 
should receive a fair wage. It’s a matter of justice. (André)
With workers’ voicing activists, we face a different understanding of common 
good. Their views depart from the perceptions displayed by moral voicing 
and Christian aid activists. Unionists rely on a communitarian social care un-
derstanding of common good. First, their perception of social ties is rather 
thin and mainly thought of in terms of solidarity with people in their imme-
diate surroundings. Second, they understand the society they inhabit with 
others as fragmented, the major dividing line being that between workers 
and employers, and identification occurs with the working component of the 
social division. Unionists belong to a specific group: the workers, the people 
who are less advantaged in society. Finally, they perceive the good for which 
they mobilize with the social justice repertoire, with rights and rights vio-
lation lying at the basis of their discourse. Workers’ voicing activists rely on 
a specific understanding of common good: For them it is “social justice for 
a specific group.” As the next section will demonstrate, unionists are con-
cerned not so much by common good as by a collective good for a specific 
social group.
“Social Justice for a Specific Group” and 
Unionists’ Intentionality
How does the understanding of common good of unionists set their in-
tentionality? As we have done previously, we now examine the con-
tent of the three cognitive components— otherness, concernedness, and 
responsibility— in order to show how those cognitive components orient ac-
tion toward a specific group, on a single issue, and in the political field.
As was the case with pro- migrant, Greenpeace, and Caritas activists, the 
understanding of commonness shapes the relation toward otherness. Yet 
unlike the other activist groups, for the unionists the human being is not a 
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core concept. They favor a communitarian understanding of commonness 
which is grounded in a specific group defined by strong identification with its 
members: the workers. This limited relation to otherness orients unionists’ 
actions mainly toward the group they identify with and to mobilizing for 
their group primarily. Joao’s account aptly illustrates the way this cognitive 
linkage materializes: “The working world is vital to me, and I identify with 
this world, and with the people who are part of it. I was always conscious 
of being a worker, and this consciousness was present before I joined Unia. 
But of course, belonging to a union strengthened my class consciousness. As 
I told you, many differences exist in the labor world: Employees face different 
work conditions, salaries are different; everything is different. But we are all 
workers, and in my view, I mobilize to get better conditions for all workers, 
regardless of their professional sector. I’m primarily committed to improving 
our rights, because if we do nothing, our working conditions are not going to 
improve by magic.” The other Unionists display a similar cognitive path:
I’m a real unionist, a real worker. Many workers are afraid to commit. Many 
colleagues told me not to commit, not to challenge our boss, but I did it 
despite their warnings. I joined Unia when I was fired for the first time, but 
my commitment stretches beyond my personal history: I want to improve 
work conditions for all of us, for all workers. (Eva)
Workers matter to me, and I have a fairly strong class consciousness. Society 
is divided and I am aware of where I am located in the class spectrum. I be-
long to a class that must speak up for its rights, and I am committed to 
doing so because we are the only ones who are going to defend our interests. 
Do you think that the boss wakes up in the middle of the night and says to 
his wife: “Honey, I’ve decided to increase the salaries of my employees”? 
[laugh] (Nuno)
We must respect workers, who get up early in the morning to go to work. 
And I belong to that world. I’m dedicated to defending our rights, the rights 
of those who work and get up early. (André)
Unionists’ communitarian perception of common good allows them to con-
struct a second cognitive component: concernedness. Contrary to activists 
relying on a universalist understanding of commonness, workers’ voicing 
activists define their struggle through a limited range of concerns. They are 
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mainly preoccupied with goods pertaining to their own group. Their limited 
concernedness does not enable them to improve society as a whole, to en-
gage in various social issues. Rather, it orients their action toward a narrow 
set of issues and to mobilizing essentially on workers’ problems. Joao makes 
this clear: “I feel concerned by workers’ rights, and I am mainly committed 
to improving our rights and work conditions. Of course, the protection of 
the environment is important. Greenpeace’s work is exemplary in this regard, 
but the most important thing for me is to fight for better working conditions.” 
The other Unia activists display a similar thought process. Indeed, at no point 
do unionists emphasize that other common goods matter for them:
I’m a communist and for me improving the working- class situation comes 
first. Working conditions concern me, and I am committed to improving 
our rights with the aim of bettering our situation. Unia is how I contribute 
to the enhancement of this particular class situation. (Nuno)
There are huge gaps between company owners and workers. One major dif-
ference is, of course, in the wages. We must fight against such unacceptable 
inequalities and demand respect, we, the people who get up early to feed 
our families. This is the only struggle that I am mobilized for. (André)
Injustices at the professional level are unbearable. To defend our rights, our 
work conditions, our salaries is central to me and I am committed to that 
objective: the defense of our rights! I’ve always been a union member, and 
this is my sole political commitment. (Sarah)
Finally, unionists’ perception of goodness enables them to construct the last 
cognitive component: responsibility. As previously underlined, unionists per-
ceive common good with the social justice repertoire. With this perception 
in mind, they are able to identify economic actors and political authorities as 
accountable for workers’ conditions. For unionists, a political conflict places 
economy actors and state members against workers. This cognitive compo-
nent leads them to orient their action in the political field. Joao’s statement 
exposes the dynamics of this struggle: “I don’t think that capitalism makes 
anything easy. This economic system is designed to make employers want 
more. It’s a vicious circle: Companies always seek to make more profit than the 
year before, at the expense of workers. They have the power to decide, to out-
source, to dismiss, to put pressure on workers, and workers can do nothing. 
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And the state isn’t on the workers’ side either. As I told you before, the state 
doesn’t do much for workers. It makes laws and rules for the country, but not 
with the interest of workers in mind. We must commit politically; that’s where 
things happen. If we want to advance our cause, we must act politically.” The 
accounts of Eva, Tiago, and André provide other evidence on this path:
Employers don’t stick to their commitments. In the department store where 
I worked, they wanted to open on Sundays. It was decided that employees 
working on Sunday would receive double payment for that day, but that 
agreement wasn’t upheld. I went to the press to denounce this problem, and 
I was fired on the spot. But you know it’s not better with the state. It takes 
a very short amount of time to talk about labor laws in Switzerland: They 
simply don’t exist! Switzerland doesn’t even comply with the international 
labor laws. Political authorities don’t support us. Nowadays, laws become 
increasingly restrictive:  The retirement age is extended; unemployment 
acts are revised. This is totally senseless: They make unemployment laws 
more restrictive even though the unemployment rate is only at 7 percent, 
and 93 percent of the population is working. This is unbearable! So yes, we 
must fight politically to change that; we have no other choice. (Eva)
Employers have too much power. One day, I needed to take my daughter 
to the doctor, but my boss threatened to fire me. No law protects us when 
we need to take relatives to the doctor during work hours. The law depends 
on the boss’s will. In the construction sector, a law states that in case of bad 
weather, workers must stop working; I can assure you that in my company 
we never stopped working. In Switzerland, workers aren’t really protected. 
The state is on the boss’s side. You can work in a company for five years and 
one day the boss can tell you: “I do not need you; you're fired.” So if we want 
to defend ourselves, we must engage politically, at least to enforce laws that 
exist and aren’t implemented. (Tiago)
Employers of large companies fuck workers over. We are workers and 
they don’t hesitate to tell us that we are replaceable. If you’re not satisfied, 
the door is wide open. They do what they want and the government says 
nothing; it just shuts its trap. Few laws protect us, and the government does 
nothing to improve our working conditions. So we are left with no choice; 
we must fight; we must organize ourselves politically; we must commit to 
trade unions and improve our situation. (André)
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Unionists’ view of the common good enables them to develop a partic-
ular relation to otherness, concernedness, and responsibility. Those cog-
nitive components set their intentionality in specific ways. As summarized 
in Figure 4.4, first, their relation to otherness is indebted to workers, who 
hold a central place in their minds and with whom they identify. This iden-
tification favors a mobilization essentially oriented toward the workers as 
the sole social group. Second, their limited concern with the common good 
orients their action mainly toward the problems workers face. Although 
some unionists are committed to other social issues (like Joao, who 
supports actions by Greenpeace), those issues are peripheral when com-
pared to workers’ problems. Third, conceiving common good in terms of 
justice enables them to identify collective actors as accountable for the poor 
conditions workers labor in. Economic and political actors are identified as 
the main actors responsible for the unjust treatment workers experience. 
The attribution of responsibility and the identification of political conflict 
orient their action toward the political field. The specific understanding 
of common good adopted by unionists defines a specific intentionality: It 
allows them to mobilize for a specific group, on a single issue, and in the 
political field. In this respect, the intentionality of unionists overlaps with 
neither that of moral voicing activists nor with that of Caritas volunteers.
Finally, unionists have a limited range of concern toward the common 
good. As their accounts show, they are mainly concerned with social problems 
that workers face. They are not committed to improving and enlarging the 
common good, but are engaged in strengthening a specific collective good: 
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Figure 4.4 From the perception of common good of the unionists to their 
intentionality of action
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that of workers’ rights and conditions. The Aristotelian definition of common 
good does not apply here, as unionists are committed to a specific category 
of people, not to all citizens. In that respect, unionists cannot be qualified as 
strong citizens.
Common Good and Diverse Intentionalities
We dealt with three core questions in this chapter. First, we asked what 
understandings of common good activists construct? In- depth analysis re-
vealed that activists committed to moral voicing, Christian aid, and unions 
rely on different understandings of common good. The statistical findings, 
discussed in Chapter  3, had already highlighted variations regarding 
activists’ perception of common good. The analysis of activists’ narratives 
deepens this finding: Activists clearly do not comprehend common good in 
the same way. As summarized in Figure 4.5, neither commonness nor good-
ness is envisioned in the same way by all groups.
Moral voicing activists rely on a humanist understanding of common 
good based on social justice. They are conscious of the ties that bind people 
together, and they perceive society with an inclusive lens: They see them-
selves as inhabiting a common world with others. Ultimately, moral voicing 
activists understand common good in terms of universal social justice. Both 
pro- migrant activists and Greenpeace activists share this understanding. 
Commonness




















Figure 4.5 The different understandings of common good of the moral voicing, 
Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists
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However, Christian aid volunteers hold a different perception of common 
good, preferring a humanist understanding based on social care. Like moral 
voicing activists, they understand social ties through a universalist lens, 
albeit with a somewhat less extensive conception than that of moral voi-
cing activists. Nonetheless, Christian aid activists envision common good 
through the care, and not in terms of justice, as moral voicing activists do. 
Christian aid volunteers perceive common good in terms of universal social 
care. Unionists offer yet another understanding of common good: Their per-
ception of the ties that bind people together is much more restricted, con-
fined mainly to solidarity with proximate others. Furthermore, they view 
society as segmented, leading to a view of society that is communitarian. 
Finally, they perceive common good in terms of social justice. Unionists have 
a very narrow view of common good, perceived in terms of a communitarian 
social justice, a social benefit for a specific group. They therefore differ from 
moral voicing activists and Christian aid volunteers on this point.
We hence face three distinct views of common good. These findings sup-
port our postulate:  that activists’ minds reflect the commitment site they 
evolve in. Participation in specific social sites shapes minds and leads to var-
ious perceptions of common good. Activists interact in different commit-
ment sites and, unsurprisingly, their understandings of common good differ. 
The social mechanisms that allow for activists’ perceptions to be synchro-
nized will form the basis of Chapter 6.
The second question addressed in this chapter enquired into the way 
perceptions of common good orient action. We were not simply inter-
ested in asserting that understandings of common good and politics direct 
activists’ intentionality. Rather, we sought to understand what type of inten-
tionality these understandings determine. We aimed to trace cognitive pro-
cesses, highlighting cognitive mechanisms at work as they bind activists’ 
understandings of common good to their intentions. The inductive analysis 
of activists’ narratives highlighted three distinct cognitive mechanisms. First, 
activists’ perception of society enables them to construct a concept of oth-
erness that orients their action toward specific social groups. Second, their 
perception of society also allows activists to elaborate a specific cognitive 
component— concernedness— which allows them to act on specific issues. 
Finally, the last cognitive mechanism— responsibility— binds activists’ per-
ception of the good for which they are mobilized to a specific field of ac-
tion. The cognitive mechanisms at play are similar for all types of activists. 
However, because common good is perceived through different lenses, the 
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construction of the three cognitive components— otherness, concernedness, 
and responsibility— leads to different meanings and different orientations of 
their action. Intention to act can then be said to vary according to the way 
activists perceive commonness and goodness. Figure 4.6 highlights the cog-
nitive mechanisms at work.
The first aspect, underlined in Figure 4.6, was how activists perceive so-
ciety, in either universalist or communitarian terms, thereby enabling them 
to build a specific relation to otherness which, in turn, leads them to mobi-
lize for all others or for a specific social group. Moral voicing and Christian 
aid activists rely on a universalist understanding of society and construct a 
specific relation to otherness in which human beings are central. This leads 
them to mobilize for others regardless of social and cultural groups. A dif-
ferent cognitive path appears in the case of unionists. Their communitarian 
understanding of society is pitted on the predominance of a specific social 
group: workers. And this particular relation to otherness favors a mobiliza-
tion focused on advancing workers’ rights and interests.
Second, perceptions of society enable activists to construct another cog-
nitive component: concernedness for common good. Activists are concerned 
by either various common goods or by a limited range of them. Their spe-
cific relation to concernedness provides them with cognitive resources to 
mobilize for various social issues, driven by the desire to change society, or 
to focus their mobilization on a single issue, with the aim of promoting the 
well- being of a specific social group. As with the construction of otherness, 
moral voicing and Christian aid participants share similar cognitive paths. 
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Figure 4.6 The summary of the cognitive mechanisms that bind the activists’ 
perception of common good to their intentionality
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Their universalist understanding of society provides them with cognitive re-
sources that facilitate a concern for various common goods. This broad con-
cern favors a mobilization for, or a desire to commit to, multiple social issues. 
Improving society as a whole is what matters most to them. Unionists take a 
different cognitive path. Their communitarian conception of society leads 
to a limited concern about common good. Outsourcing production, unem-
ployment, precarious work contracts, or the problems caused by our capital- 
driven society, are issues essentially articulated in relation to workers. This 
specific construction of concernedness therefore favors a form of mobiliza-
tion dependent on a single issue: the defense of workers’ rights.
Finally, we wanted to outline the way activists perceive common good, as 
either a care problem or a question of social justice, and the way this factor 
leads them to construct a specific relation to responsibility. Their under-
standing of common good allows them to identify the collective actors ac-
countable for promoting and strengthening common good, and the specific 
perception of common good that ensues permits them to evaluate whether 
the promotion of common good entails political conflict. The way respon-
sibility of common good is viewed orients their action in either the political 
field or the social sphere. In that regard, moral voicing activists and unionists 
share a similar understanding of common good defined by a comparable in-
tentionality: social justice. With this construction in mind, they clearly iden-
tify collective actors as accountable for the promotion or denial of common 
good, a realization that defines their mobilization in the political field. 
Political conflicts are there to be fought, urging them to enter the political 
arena with the defense and promotion of common good in mind. Christian 
aid activists pursue a different cognitive path. For them, common good is a 
matter of social care. This means that they do not identify or hold collective 
actors accountable for common good, as individuation is central to them. 
This specific relation to responsibility requires a mobilization in the social 
field, whereby their actions are oriented toward supporting and helping 
people whose well- being is at stake.
Philosophers of the mind, interpretative sociologists, and cognitive 
psychologists have alerted us to the fact that the qualitative experience of the 
world nourishes a person’s mind and sets his or her intentionality. There is 
no action without meaning. We have seen that the manner in which activists 
adopt specific meanings sets their intentionalities, leading them in turn to 
commit to specific collective endeavors. We have also seen that cognitions 
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set activists’ intentionalities, orienting action toward distinct collective 
struggles, and maintaining it.
The last question addressed in this chapter was related to activists’ concern 
for common good. Is it a concern for them, and if so, to what extent? Are 
they strong citizens as defined by the first pillar of strong citizenship (Barber 
1984)? Aristotle’s influential definition was that common good was an ob-
jective good that improved people’s lives and that benefited all members of 
society. Regarding the first dimension— objective goods improving people’s 
lives— moral voicing, Christian aid, and unionists are all committed to 
defending or securing objective goods, regardless of the fact that some of 
these are considered in terms of social justice or of social care. Migrants’ 
rights, environmental protection, the well- being of the poor, or workers’ 
rights are goods that objectively seek to ameliorate an individual’s life.
Variations appear when the second dimension— goods that benefit all 
members of society— is taken into account. Activists who rely on a univer-
salist perception of society, as the moral voicing and Christian aid activists 
do, are acutely aware of who the beneficiaries of common good are. Their un-
derstanding is in line with Aristotle’s definition of common good, whereby 
all social members benefit from a good. As we saw throughout the chapter, 
their specific understanding of commonness enables them to act for others, 
beyond their own groups of belonging, and for various problems pertaining 
to common good. Moral voicing and Christian aid activists seek to improve 
society as a whole, whether by providing social justice or welfare. They are 
concerned by a large range of common goods and are committed, or have the 
desire to commit, to resolving various social problems. By contrast, activists 
like unionists, who rely on a communitarian perception of society, restrict 
the beneficiaries of common good to a specific group of people. Further, as 
we saw from the qualitative data, their understanding of commonness leads 
them to act for a specific group and with localized action. Other common 
good is not of concern.
Are they all strong citizens? The answer is a clear no if we stick with 
Aristotle’s definition of common good. Moral voicing and Christian aid 
activists are dedicated to common good, while unionists act in favor of a collec-
tive good. To paraphrase Barber (1984), moral voicing and Christian activists 
are citizens “who are made capable of common purpose” (p. 117) and who 
are committed to enlarging shared public goods (p. 132). They are dedicated 
to improving common good in Aristotelian terms. This does not mean that 
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the action of unionists is of no value or that their commitment is not socially 
relevant, merely that their action is limited to the social group of workers. 
Moral voicing and Christian activists can easily lay claim to Toni Morrison’s 
thought at the head of this chapter: “It belongs to us to care for each other.” 
The distinction between moral voicing and Christian activists and unionists 
essentially pivots around the range of concern on common good. Do they 
therefore seek to implement a strong democracy as Barber conceived of it? 
If we take the first dimension of his definition of a strong democracy— a cit-
izen who “adjusts his own life plans to the dictates of a shared world” (Barber 
1984, 224)— the answer is yet again no.
We want to return to the theory developed in Chapter 2 to conclude. There, 
we saw that the notions of identity and the frames developed by Gamson 
are comparable to our concept of activists’ understandings. However, as 
stated earlier, scholars working with Gamson’s conception face two major 
shortcomings: Their view of the activist’s mind is too narrow, and they fail 
to discuss how identity and frames are developed in an activist’s mind. To 
state the question simply, where does the impulse to act come from? First, 
we have seen in this chapter that identity and the three cognitive dimensions 
put forth by Gamson are inadequate to encompass the cognitive dimensions 
that activists deploy. Undoubtedly, identity, injustice, and agency constitute 
motivational factors behind activists’ desire to commit, and to sustain their 
commitment. For example, we saw that the injustice frame is present espe-
cially in the narratives of moral voicing activists and unionists. In this re-
spect, it constitutes an important motivational factor, allowing them to act. 
Similarly, as we will see in Chapter 5, identity and agency are also present 
in activists’ minds, setting activists’ intentionality. However, several other 
cognitive dimensions are involved. Activists’ perception of the ties that bind 
people together, of human beings, of society as a universalist or communi-
tarian space, and social problems viewed either as care or justice problems 
are all cognitive elements that enable action. This set of cognitions, linked 
to understandings of common good, defines the activists’ motivation to 
act: identity and Gamson’s frames are largely exceeded.
Second, we saw that motivational cognitions are fashioned into complex 
cognitive paths to orient action. These motivational components are formed 
by broad understandings of common good held by activists and are derived 
from specific relations to common good. In other terms, the impulse to act 
comes from a broader cognitive baseline that was largely ignored by Gamson 
and scholars who came after him.
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Finally, we also showed that similar social problems are perceived 
differently and lead to mobilization in different forms of collective ac-
tion. Some activists are committed to similar issues:  Participants in 
SAB and Caritas support migrants. For SAB activists, helping migrants 
constitutes the main focus of their activist commitment, while for the 
Caritas volunteers, supporting the poor is key. Yet migrants, and asylum 
seekers and immigrants without legal status in particular, form part of the 
poorest population group in Swiss society. SAB and Caritas activists are 
hence mobilized for the same people and social problem. Despite this, the 
way they relate to common good enables them to perceive the migration 
and the social problem it creates differently. Similarly, Unia and Caritas 
activists are also mobilized on comparable issues, but again these are per-
ceived differently. For unionists, fighting for better working conditions re-
mains at the heart of their activist commitment. They provide support for 
workers who face difficulties, like employees who have been fired, the un-
employed, and the working poor, whilse Caritas volunteers are committed 
to helping the poor. There is therefore substantial overlap when it comes to 
the target groups. Nonetheless, diverse perceptions abound. The specific 
understandings of common good held by Unia and Caritas activists enable 
them to construct cognitive components that construct the social problem 
differently, orienting their commitment in distinct fields of action and in a 
distinct manner.
These findings reveal two theoretical issues. First, they show that a sim-
ilar social issue can be perceived with totally distinct mental lenses. This 
is far from being a revolutionary claim. Since Weber and the develop-
ment of the interpretative sociology, we know that social facts are socially 
constructed. And the same goes for activism. Second, and this is perhaps 
more of a novelty, the way activists perceive a social problem leads them to 
different forms of collective action. The innovation stems less from the idea 
that distinct meanings lead to distinct action, but the demonstration that 
distinct views favor distinct action. By subjecting to scrutiny the cognitive 
path from broad activists’ understandings to intentionality, and then ac-
tion, we observed that the SAB activists’ perception of migration problems 
in terms of justice drives them to perform joint action in the political field, 
whereas the same problem construed as a question of care favors activism 
in the social field for the Caritas volunteers. Similarly, seeing workers’ is-
sues with the injustice repertoire pushes unionists to act politically, while 
apprehending the same issues with the care repertoire leads members of 
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Caritas to provide direct services in the social field. It remains for us to 
show how activists committed in the same organization, and in the same 
commitment community, are able to develop shared meanings about the 
aim and means of action. This will be done in Chapter 6. Beforehand, we 
must turn to activists’ understanding of politics, and underscore how this 
dimension sets their intentionality.
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We are not simply to bandage the wounds of victims beneath the 
wheels of injustice, we are to drive a spoke into the wheel itself.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Moral voicing activists, Christian aid volunteers, and workers’ voicing 
activists possess various understandings of common good, but they also per-
ceive politics differently, as shown in Chapter 3. But how do they really per-
ceive politics? How do these perceptions set their intentionalities? Are they 
concerned with politics, and consequently, are they strong citizens in terms 
of their relation to politics? When it comes to their understanding of politics, 
the core questions dealt with in Chapter 4 return. The relation to politics is 
the second crucial dimension to underline when we depart from the idea that 
meaning is important for setting an activist’s intentionality. We argued that 
the notion of identity and Gamson’s action frames are insufficient cognitive 
conditions when it comes to understanding how activists sustain contention. 
A specific understanding of common good is insufficient, too. In this chapter, 
we show how activists understand politics and how these understandings en-
able them to construct specific cognitive components, which in turn set their 
intentionality toward specific forms of collective action. By understanding 
activists’ relation to politics, we seek to apprehend the cognitive mechanisms 
that orient them toward specific forms of action.
An in- depth analysis of the activist’s mind allows us to understand why 
activists committed in different communities make use of specific forms of 
collective action. For example, activists in Greenpeace and Solidarity across 
Borders are committed to different issues:  environmental protection and 
the defense of migrants’ rights, respectively. However, they defend these dif-
ferent causes with the same form of action: contentious politics. Despite the 
range of issues for which they mobilize, activists perceive politics in a similar 
way, and this common understanding of politics directs them toward protest 
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action. By contrast, Unia and Caritas activists are partly engaged for the same 
groups but employ different forms of action. As stated in Chapter 4, workers 
who have been fired or people belonging to the working poor constitute a 
large portion of Caritas’s target population. This population overlaps with 
the one defended by Unia. While similar groups focus the attention of these 
activists, the forms of action used by each group vary: contentious and insti-
tutional politics on one side, volunteering on the other. Different perceptions 
of politics are at stake and these specific understandings of state and civil so-
ciety actors orient activists toward either a political or a civic commitment. 
The cognitive mechanisms that link the understanding of politics to action 
orientation will be our focus here.
As presented in Chapter 1, we define politics as the regulation of conflicts 
of interest between different actors. Therefore, an activist’s relation to pol-
itics is the cognitive link an individual constructs with the actors who 
manage political interests and ongoing conflicts within a given political field. 
Perceptions of two particular types of actors are at stake here: the activists’ 
relation to state actors and their understanding of civil society actors. In a 
democracy, state actors are the most powerful actors within a given political 
space. Therefore, the perception of the role of state actors and its evaluation 
is crucial. Different perceptions of the role of state actors are conceivable: On 
one hand, activists could acknowledge that state actors are accountable for 
common good as they desire state actors who take responsibility for the pro-
duction and maintenance of common good. If state actors do not fulfill this 
task, activists’ assessment of the state actors’ role will be negative and result 
in their delegitimization. On the other hand, activists may perceive state ac-
tors as not, or less, accountable for common good: In this view, state actors’ 
intervention has to be contained (i.e., reduced) and activists can delegitimize 
state actors when they intervene too much. Moreover, activists perceive the 
state as a heterogeneous actor. Consequently, the range of delegitimization 
can vary. State actors can either be (de- )legitimized solely regarding the issue 
that activists advocate, or state action can be (de- )legitimized more generally.
Civil society actors promote, defend, and strengthen common good also. 
They pursue these actions with the aim of bringing about social change, by 
helping people in need or by stepping in and substituting their actions for 
state intervention. Because of these collective efforts, committed activists 
should legitimize civil society actors. However, the role of civil society ac-
tors can be understood in different ways. Civil society can be understood 
as either actors who intervene politically for state accountability or who 
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substitute for state intervention in order to contain— or limit— state actors’ 
accountability. In addition, the range of the legitimization of civil society 
may vary. In line with activists’ concern for common good, this legitimiza-
tion can be focused on a specific issue or more broadly encompass multiple 
common goods. As with their understanding of state actors, we will therefore 
assess whether the legitimization of civil society actors is focused on the issue 
activists are mobilized for, or whether activists have developed a generalized 
form of legitimization.
Three questions guide this chapter. How do moral voicing activists, 
Christian aid volunteers, and unionists perceive state and civil society actors? 
Do these understandings enable activists to construct cognitive components 
that orient them toward different forms of collection action? Are all activists 
strong citizens as described by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the epigraph to this 
chapter?1 A thorough look at activists’ understanding of politics will pro-
vide answers to these questions. In what follows, we proceed with the “one 
plus three” formula adopted in the previous chapter:  We present the un-
derstanding of politics that activists construct through the account of one 
activist for each community. But we choose other cases to illustrate cogni-
tive mechanisms in this chapter. This change in narratives does not occur 
because the narratives suit our argument better but because our objective is 
to underline perceptional similarities between individuals despite different 
biographical backgrounds. In a later step, we offer more evidence regarding 
activists’ relation to politics by selecting excerpts from three out of the five 
remaining people per organization. We do so to build robust evidence for 
the comparison of activists within and across communities. Further in the 
chapter, we show the cognitive mechanisms that bind understandings of pol-
itics to action orientation. Finally, we offer an overall assessment of the infor-
mation put forth in Chapter 4 and this chapter. 
Defenders of Migrants’ Rights
Lisa is a thirty- two- year- old mother of two. In her free time, Lisa defends 
asylum seekers, advocating fairer migration and asylum policies. Lisa began 
her activist career when she was a university student, as she was involved 
 1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran theologian and member of the German resistance against 
National Socialism.
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in protests against increases in tuition fees. At the time, she was also com-
mitted to the squatters’ scene2 where she came to understand political ac-
tivism as a vital dimension of democratic societies. Two friends from these 
movements convinced her to join the pro- migrant activist community and 
Solidarity across Borders (SAB) in particular. Lisa has fought to improve 
the rights of migrants for the last eight years, revolted by the absence of 
equality between migrants and people in privileged situations such as her-
self. Whereas she can travel and settle down almost anywhere, migrants 
who arrive in Europe cannot. Although her personal background frames 
her understanding of politics, her perceptions of state and civil society ac-
tors are nevertheless close to the perceptions of other defenders of migrants’ 
rights whom we interviewed.
For Lisa, state actors are accountable for common good. Regarding issues 
of migration, this means that they must care about migrants, because respon-
sibility for migration on the national level is a fact the state must deal with. 
While the state does intervene, Lisa criticizes the way state actors handle mi-
gration: “State action is repressive and not welcoming to migrants as it should 
be. It’s a difficult task but they are in charge of these people, and should there-
fore welcome migrants without creating xenophobia. It’s of no help to stig-
matize them, to cut budgets, to place them under social care, and to create an 
artificial juridical status such as the NEMs.3 With such measures, state actors 
create non- humans: Migrants are neither citizens, nor human beings.”
In Lisa’s view, state action is everything it should not be: repressive, hypo-
critical, and inhuman. If Lisa attributes the accountability of dealing with mi-
gration to state actors, she also acknowledges that this is a difficult task. Lisa 
proceeds by delegitimizing state actors: “Migrants are victims of state vio-
lence. They have to wait for five years before they receive a response from the 
authorities. It’s an unbearable psychological pressure. The state keeps them 
on a leash. Will they get the right to stay or will they have to go back to their 
home country? They are left in uncertainty and therefore can’t start a new life 
somewhere under such psychological violence. We don’t have the right to 
treat human beings like this. We have to ask ourselves: How would we handle 
living for five years without knowing anything, without working, without the 
right to leave, without the right to stay, in a state of suspension. State actors 
 2 Squatting is the act of occupying an abandoned or unoccupied building. In Switzerland, these 
sites usually host cultural events like concerts, theatres, or bars where people can meet and interact.
 3 NEM is the French abbreviation for “Non- entrée en matière” and refers to individuals whose 
asylum application has been denied.
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do not even recognize psychological illnesses migrants may suffer from. This 
is just a silent violence that is directly at odds with Swiss humanitarian tra-
dition.” Lisa’s negative evaluation of the way the state recognizes its respon-
sibility toward the migrant population has three parts: inhuman treatment, 
excessively long procedures, and a forceful application of existing legislation. 
“The laws we voted for were already a disaster, but there is always a margin of 
interpretation and application. In Switzerland, we apply them in the harshest 
possible way.” Lisa thus criticizes the state actors’ accountability regarding 
migration.
Despite this, she recognizes the plurality of state actors and does not gen-
eralize her negative view of the state. She possesses a complex understanding 
of the state actors involved and is able to distinguish them: “The migration 
office is the biggest problem. I know a person who works there and I’m really 
shocked by some of the stories she relates. It is truly a state institution in its 
worst possible form.” The migration office is the main actor Lisa criticizes 
when it comes to the state actors who deal with migrants’ rights. Conversely, 
Lisa legitimizes other state actors based on their management of matters 
that result in the common good:  “Some other governmental domains are 
better. For example, environmental protection is rather effective, because 
the issue was a popular one and politicians won votes by adopting ecological 
arguments. The interests of the civil society and of politicians are aligned and 
it becomes possible to advance a whole legal system for the better.” While 
she is not always happy with the state and democracy in Switzerland, there 
is no generalized delegitimization of the state. She understands the state as 
what it is: a multifaceted but central actor that is accountable for the common 
good and the people living within its territory: “I have a rather ambiguous 
perception of the state. I think the state has a tremendously important role 
to play and I’m a proponent of a strong state because the state’s purpose is to 
take responsibility for its citizens. However, I disagree with the laws the state 
dictates to me.”
In order to push state actors to account for migration, civil society actors 
have to intervene politically: “I see it as a kind of lobby. If there is no pres-
sure on politicians or at least groups on which politicians can rely, there is no 
progress. Concerning migration, I have the impression that state actors are 
going in the wrong direction, but it would certainly be worse without us. The 
defense of migrants’ rights is a necessary act, that much is clear.” Civil society 
actors play a crucial role for politics and they influence the decision- making 
process by pressuring politicians.
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In contrast to state actors, differentiated by Lisa in terms of multiple ex-
isting actors, civil society actors are generally legitimized: “To me, civil so-
ciety actors are the basis of democratic societies. A state cut off from the 
demands of its population isn’t a democracy anymore. I don’t really believe 
in political representation. I know how politics works: Getting elected is the 
main aim, while dealing with the real questions citizens are confronted with 
is down the list. While there are some politicians who maintain a strong re-
lation with what happens on a social level, they remain a minority and they 
generally belong to the left or to the greens. So it’s extremely important that 
people organize themselves to make their claims heard.” The democracy in 
which Lisa wants to live is clearly a participative one and elective represen-
tation is not enough. Civil society actors emerge as the necessary force re-
quired to pressure state actors in every domain.
Lisa’s robust critique regarding the accountability of state actors on the 
issue of migration and her legitimization of civil society actors with regard to 
political intervention adequately represent how defenders of migrants’ rights 
perceive these two key actors. The perception would have in no way differed 
whether we began our description of activists’ understanding of politics with 
Adriana, Simone, Yan, Wilhelm, or Colette.
First, all underline the accountability of state actors in relation to mi-
gration and harshly criticize the current status quo. As we saw with Lisa, 
procedures are drawn out, and legislation is harsh and interpreted in a re-
strictive manner:
For migrants, a system with many trying procedures awaits. Laws are harsh 
and unrealistic. It’s an abstraction; state actors think they can control eve-
rything. They think they can simply keep the good people in and eliminate 
the bad ones. It’s incredible to see how we head toward more restrictive and 
coercive directions. There has to be a procedure, of course. But to think we 
can control everything is absolutely insane and has terrible consequences. 
Several migrants are in situations without any rights, they are just thrown 
into the wild, and it’s frightening. (Simone)
I have seen catastrophic situations in the medical facility where I worked. 
People, who have been here for fifteen years, suddenly they lose their right 
to work: Such actions are simply meant to drive migrants crazy. In addition, 
they have to renew their visas every three months. They are forced to live 
in a dreadful state of insecurity. I also know people in such situations who 
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suffer from psychological or somatic pathologies, individuals on dialysis or 
people with cancer, and we leave them in these precarious conditions for 
fifteen years! (Yan)
Switzerland is highly restrictive when it comes to migration. Sometimes 
the government sends fathers back to their country and destroys families! 
The law is always interpreted in the severest way in order to expel a max-
imum number of people. Between doors left completely open and doors 
completely shut, there is a gray arena in which the law can be interpreted. 
(Colette)
This negative critique is not generalized to all state actors or political 
institutions. Once again, the understanding of the other SAB activists 
overlaps importantly with Lisa’s perception: All draw a differentiated picture 
of the state, which matches its complexity:
We are a democracy; not everything is bad. We have the freedom to vote. 
If somebody wants to vote, nobody will prevent them from doing so. 
I benefited from the social security system a lot; it allowed me to under-
take an apprenticeship. Without all these social laws, it would not have been 
possible for me to obtain the things I have, and I’m really grateful for that. 
(Colette)
I love reflecting on our political system here in Switzerland. If one compares 
it to the French one, for example, I think that it takes much longer to change 
or enforce something in Switzerland, and here we have many opportunities 
to participate: The people’s opinion matters. (Yan)
A semi- direct democracy like the Swiss political system is very demanding 
for citizens. Yet, because of this, we have many opportunities to express our 
views. Even if citizens are not specialists in all fields, I think it’s really im-
portant that they can voice their opinion. This is a crucial advantage com-
pared to a representative democracy like France. (Simone)
In these accounts, Swiss democracy is evaluated positively when compared 
with other countries. A semi- direct democratic system, however, also has 
drawbacks. Procedures generally take longer, and the system, as a whole, 
requires participation from a lot of its citizens. A  way to cope with this 
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demanding system is through civil society actors, especially protest actors, 
who intervene in politics, advocating change in the field of migration:
We have always recognized that by joining forces and by defending a claim 
we can achieve our goals successfully. For example, for the cause of the “523,” 
we managed to ensure that the large majority of the migrants could stay 
in this country.4 Two or three of them did not get the official right to stay, 
but even they have remained nonetheless [laughs]. All other refugees got 
permission to stay and this was not thanks to any political party. We had 
to pressure political parties vigorously before they actually got involved. In 
my opinion, the traditional left lacks courage; they do nothing for migrants’ 
rights. They just oppose everything that the political right puts forward. Why 
don’t they initiate motions or question other political parties in the national 
parliament as the right does? Why don’t they suggest something like the reg-
ularization of people who have been here for five years? This would advance 
some issues, or start a discussion at the very least. But they do not put these 
demands forth and that’s why we have to push them to act. (Adriana)
I think it’s vital that people protest. We have to raise awareness and to say 
stop; migrants can’t be treated like that. That’s the task of protest action 
groups like the one I’m involved in. It’s a necessity; it’s our task to bear wit-
ness and to ring alarm bells. This can be carried out through various forms 
of action, other than protest action. For example, a primary school class 
recently visited the place where we receive migrants because one of the 
schoolgirls was in a terrible situation and the teacher wanted to understand 
her condition better. Sometimes, simple actions can change minds. But that 
does not replace direct action. It’s crucial to have all forms of protesting, 
sensitizing, and helping organizations. (Simone)
In the asylum and migration domain, it’s insufficient to elaborate reflections 
and herald humanist values. Those values won’t be implemented anyway. 
We need act as counterpoints to the power in place, to achieve some sort of 
a balance. That’s why protest action is vital. We need to influence politicians 
because, in the end, they make the decisions. (Yan)
 4 “523” is the name of a political campaign derived from the number of asylum seekers political 
authorities wanted to expel. Among other events, this campaign included occupying a church where 
we hid denied asylum seekers. It proved to be a very successful campaign as activists managed to get a 
right to stay for almost all of the 523 asylum seekers.
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Civil society actors need to push state actors, and this type of intervention 
for migrants’ rights is generalized to other causes. Civil society actors are im-
portant in every political field. Adriana, for example, tells us that her group 
matters because it pushes political parties that lack courage, while Simone 
claims that “all forms of protesting” are necessary. Political interventions of 
such groups constitute essential countervailing powers for social change and 
bring new issues into the political arena:
We have to show up, and demonstrate relentlessly. The powerful actors— 
politicians, financiers, and economic actors— are very present. Civil 
society also has to get a move on! This is the only way to bring change 
about. I  don’t believe that the G20 will change the world. There must 
be tough demonstrations, like street demonstrations; I think it’s crucial. 
(Adriana)
Protest is perhaps just a drop of water in the sea, but after all, the sea is made 
of drops of water. I think civil society actors are important in every domain. 
They initiate the first step and focus attention on a problem. (Colette)
I know that Switzerland can’t accept everybody. But I’m shocked by the 
fact that everyone knows that many people work without a work permit, 
because we need those workers. It’s important to denounce such matters 
and build on past struggles. There were women who went on strike against 
their husbands, workers who striked. Struggles like those are important no 
matter what the issue is. (Wilhelm)
Defenders of migrants’ rights share a clear conception of politics. State ac-
tors are accountable for the common good and for migration in particular. 
Regarding migration, all activists have developed a negative evaluation 
of state action and delegitimize the state when it comes to the issue they 
are committed to. Activists advocating for migrants are able to differen-
tiate between the various state actors and consequently do not proceed to 
delegitimize them generally. They all also underline the critical need for 
civil society actors to intervene politically. They legitimize the actions of 
these actors for migration and for other political issues as well, resulting 
in a generalized legitimization of civil society actors who intervene in pol-
itics. Taken together, they perceive of politics as a field of intervention for 
accountability.
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Intentionality and “Intervention for Accountability”
Defenders of migrants’ rights perceive politics in a specific way. We will now 
show how such perceptions enable them to develop cognitive components 
and set their intentionality to act. Does their understanding of state and civil 
society actors help us see why they favor a particular form of action over 
another? What are the cognitive mechanisms, and the cognitive linkages, 
through which their perception of politics is connected to their intention-
ality? In this section, we illustrate how the perception of politics enables pro- 
migrant activists to develop two cognitive components— state relatedness 
and political concernedness— that orient them toward a specific form of ac-
tion: contentious politics.
On the one hand, state actors are perceived as accountable for promoting 
the common good, and it is this their administering of this accountability 
that is delegitimized. This leads to the development of a first cognitive 
component: a conflictual state relatedness. The procedure of state actors in 
carrying out their accountability is criticized, thereby leading activists to de-
velop a conflictual relation with these actors who do not fulfill their role. Lisa 
expresses this cognitive component explicitly: “It’s the responsibility of the 
state to care for migrants but it doesn’t fulfill its mission. We have to push the 
state to fulfill its responsibility. But this does not mean that the state has to 
cease to exist.” This conflictual relation with state actors is deeply rooted as 
she speaks often and explicitly about injustices that migrants face: “We need 
to counter injustices committed by the state. Migrants leave their home for 
a reason; they always suffer a primary form of violence before arriving in 
Switzerland. Following that, violations accumulate once they are here. We 
have to fight against such injustice and challenge state actors when neces-
sary!” All other activists have also developed a conflictual relation to state 
actors:
We need to act against the government, not collaborate with them. 
Especially, but not only, in the asylum domain, we have to confront the gov-
ernment and challenge existing laws. (Adriana)
Some laws will change but we need to protest for that to happen. (Wilhelm)
Movements can influence political decisions of the federal state, or work 
against cantonal implementations of these decisions. We have to challenge 
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state actors on every level because the final outcome can be very different 
from the decision made in parliament. (Yan)
On the other hand, the perception of civil society actors leads activists to 
think about their role as citizens:  Should we be concerned with politics? 
Should we be vigilant and participate in protest action in order to enable civil 
society actors to intervene politically? Lisa affirms: “First, I think that as citi-
zens we should be concerned by the people in our surroundings, by the place 
we live in and then ask questions such as, Why are my neighbors sent back 
to their home country? Then, we should react against unjust decisions. We 
should gather and voice our opinion on important matters. A citizen should 
have an active role in protest organizations.” Like other SAB activists, Lisa 
has clearly developed a political concernedness as a consequence of her per-
ception of civil society actors:
I believe that citizens can change many things. I believe that we can change 
things in our surroundings, in our neighborhoods or in our schools. 
Politics isn’t something we do and then forget. We need to live politics be-
cause it determines our living conditions. We should not accept anything; 
we can take part in political decision making, and it’s our civic duty to do 
so. If we delegate this task to others, we can’t be surprised when they take 
decisions we do not support. (Adriana)
We need to be actively engaged in political struggles. That might be for jus-
tice or against an enemy. We don’t know what our actions will yield and we 
need to remain vigilant. (Wilhelm)
Voting, for people who represent our ideas is important, of course. So first, 
you need to vote to be a citizen. But associational life exists beyond that. 
I think it’s important that there are societies, people who do gymnastics or 
neighbors who organize parties once or twice a year. To value collective ac-
tion is a civic attitude. Likewise, you also have to demonstrate, to strike and 
defend your ideas when needed. (Colette)
Their understanding of both state and civil society actors enables these 
activists to construct a conflictual state relatedness and a strong concern for 
politics. These cognitive components orient them toward a specific form of 
action. Lisa clearly expresses her action orientation in her account: “We have 
198 Contentious Minds
to push the state to do something. The Socialists do not push enough. I’m 
more to the left than the Socialists are.” All activists agree that pressure must 
be placed on state actors through protest action:
I think it’s important for citizens to be committed politically. They have to 
vote, to carry petitions through, to intervene and to react. We need to resist 
some political ideas and suggest other ones in their place. In our democra-
cies, it’s vital to resist. I don’t believe in political parties; I don’t have a mem-
bership card and I vote less and less for the Socialists. (Simone)
I hate it when we don’t react against injustice. Alone, I couldn’t do anything 
but that’s not the case. We just have to stand together and try to change these 
things, because, by creating a countervailing power, we can actually change 
things. Nowadays, it’s more difficult but this does not mean we should give 
up. The Socialists don’t act. They don’t seem interested in issues of mi-
gration and, frankly, I don’t know what exactly they are concerned with. 
Because of such a lack of action, I stay clear of political parties. (Adriana)
To support protest action through financial contributions is useful because 
organizations need money to exist. They have to send letters, print bulletins, 
and pay people to do these things. If we don’t support activists financially, 
they can’t do all things they want to. I enable them to do what they want. 
The Socialist Party, however, irritates me. I held a membership card, but 
I did not renew it. They are like the French Socialists; they just oppose eve-
rything the right- wing parties do, without proposing alternatives. (Colette)
They are clearly oriented toward contentious politics over other forms of 
action and are especially reluctant when it comes to participation in polit-
ical parties. As charted in Figure 5.1, their perception of politics as a field 
where political intervention by civil society actors is required in order to 
increase the state actors’ actions in ensuring the common good lies at the 
heart of the cognitive mechanism that orients their action. Activists con-
struct a conflictual state relatedness and are concerned about politics. These 
cognitive components enable them to privilege a particular form of ac-
tion: contentious politics.
A question arises: Are defenders of migrants’ rights strong citizens in terms 
of their concern for politics? We saw that everyone shares Lisa’s ideas on what 
constitutes a political citizen: To be informed, to be vigilant, and especially 
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to participate in protest action when necessary. SAB activists are concerned 
with politics and therefore can be considered strong citizens not only re-
garding the common good, but also under the second pillar that defines 
strong citizenship: concern for politics.
Green Activists’ Perception of Politics
As the quantitative data in Chapter 3 indicated, Greenpeace activists also 
belong to the moral voicing community. In the previous chapter, they dis-
played a similar perception of common good, but do these similarities also 
apply to their perception of politics? Do green contenders perceive state and 
civil society actors in a similar fashion, although they are committed to a less 
challenging issue?
To introduce Green activists’ perception of politics, we return to Margot, 
the seventy- year- old we met in the first chapter. She was a social worker 
and later became a teacher at a university for applied sciences. Margot has 
been active her whole life and her commitments can be summarized in 
four parts:  the radical left, unions and professional organizations, the sol-
idarity movement, and finally, environmental protection. She was also an 
active member of the Green political party. However, today, she is merely 
a party sympathizer, as she can no longer bear the endless meetings and the 
compromises her party concedes. For around two decades, Margot has been 
a highly active member in Greenpeace and this has gradually become her 
main commitment. She translates educational material from German to 
French and delivers lectures in schools to sensitize pupils on environmental 
protection. She also participates in various forms of contentious action such 
as street demonstrations and other modes of direct action.
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Figure 5.1 From the perception of politics of the pro- migrant activists to their 
intentionality of action
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As we saw in Chapter 3, for green contenders, state actors are account-
able for environmental protection. Margot relates: “Once finance intervenes 
in environmental politics, action comes to a halt. We will see if during the 
Copenhagen Summit they take measures to slow down climate change.5 
They will make promises. But decisions need to be taken and measures 
implemented. We will be in even greater difficulties if the issue stagnates.” 
For Margot, state actors should clearly take care of the common good. 
Unfortunately, they do not do enough: “I entertain a difficult relationship 
with state actors. They have many conflicting interests and they are very 
profit oriented. They decide something but then the implementation is su-
perficial.” As was the case with the defenders of migrants’ rights, Margot 
clearly attributes accountability for environmental protection to state actors, 
and delegitimizes them for their lack of responsible action.
However, like the defenders of migrants’ rights, Margot does not extend 
this negative assessment to all state actors. For her, the state is an important 
heterogeneous entity and state actors have a crucial duty in ensuring the 
common good: “Politics is everywhere. By politics, I mean those who decide 
what laws we vote on, which credits are allocated and to which domain. Will 
the money be spent for the army or in another department— environmental 
protection, perhaps?”
Margot shares her perception of state actors with pro- migrant activists as 
well as her perception of civil society actors, seen as influential to political 
decision making. “We demonstrated last Saturday. We had a two- hour long 
authorization to walk along the main road and go to the supermarket where 
we could talk with people, and tried to win them over to our cause. After 
that, we went to a company and protested against their production of geneti-
cally modified seeds. We had big banners and also distributed small pieces of 
bread. It was a huge success. The people listened to us and they learned about 
this business in their neighborhood.” For Margot, protest action leads to 
sensitization, but it also enables people to voice concerns and pressure state 
and economic actors. While she shares a similar understanding of politics to 
that of defenders of migrants’ rights, we sense that, as a Greenpeace activist, 
she occupies another position. Margot is engaged in a less challenging po-
litical issue and consequently is in a better place to reach out and sensitize 
people: “In my view, Greenpeace does vital work. They inform people and 
 5 The interviews took place just before the Copenhagen Summit (UN Climate Change Conference) 
in December 2009.
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allow them to form an opinion on ecological matters. For example, whenever 
I go to a school to deliver an informative lecture, I also take the opportunity 
to exchange with the students. I always try to start a debate and I try to ex-
plain what we do at Greenpeace, and why we do it.”
For Margot, civil society actors are generally legitimized because they are 
the actors who intervene in politics within a participatory democracy:  “I 
think civil society actors are an absolute necessity if one thinks about the po-
litical decision- making process. Think about how ordinary people form an 
opinion on important issues like nuclear energy, electricity, and others. Civil 
society actors have a crucial role in influencing opinions. They make the pop-
ulation aware of existing problems and their actions receive media coverage. 
Everybody needs to be aware of environmental issues, but also with regard to 
other social problems. I think this is where civil society actors come in.” To 
sensitize and inform the population appears necessary alongside opposition 
to state action, and this double form of commitment is relevant for environ-
mental protection as well as the protection of other types of common good. 
For Margot, civil society “is a world carrying ideas. These actors are very im-
portant to me.”
Margot’s account resonates with the understanding of the political sphere 
put forth by pro- migrant activists. State actors are accountable for common 
good and criticized when they are reluctant to promote environmental pro-
tection. Moreover, civil society actors play a crucial role in the protection of 
the environment as well as on other social problems. These actors are gener-
ally legitimized because they intervene in politics by sensitizing the popula-
tion and by pushing state actors to solve existing problems. The sensitization 
aspect did not appear in the narratives provided by defenders of migrants’ 
rights. The explanation of this difference probably lies in the less challenging 
and long- lasting nature of environmental struggles, where it has become 
easier to gain the population’s support. Despite their focus on different types 
of common good, defenders of migrants’ rights and green contenders share 
the same views on politics. They perceive politics as a field where civil society 
actors need to intervene to push state actors to act responsibly, as the other 
green contenders make clear:
As I  told you, political authorities are responsible and must be held ac-
countable. It’s the authorities who ultimately say “yes or no” to power plants 
and are in favor of building new plants. The government always opposes the 
environment and favors the economy, and the latter often wins. The other 
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problem with political authorities is the short- term views they adopt. Look 
what they did with the economic crisis. They gave huge amounts of money 
to rescue banks. Amounts like those were never allocated to stopping global 
warming. State money is used to support the economy above all. (Nathan)
State actors are responsible for the environmental problems we now face. 
They could do so much but choose not to. For example, they could suppress 
all the electronic advertising or forbid unnecessary store lighting. They 
could invest more money in bicycle paths and public transport instead of 
highways. (Pierrette)
The state must do more. I have the impression that people living in cities 
pollute much more than people who live in rural areas, and this is no doubt 
due to the treatment of waste. People in villages are more sensitive toward 
the environment. In cities, I feel that people are far less aware of these things. 
Look at waste separation for example. On the one hand, you could have a 
neighbor who separates waste really well and another who mixes it all up. 
This is ridiculous and there should be a control mechanism— for example, 
the use of a card through which one gets taxed according to the amount of 
garbage put into the garbage truck. State actors should really look into the 
waste system of cities. (Maria)
State actors evidently need to do more in terms of environmental protection 
but are also accountable for the protection and promotion of the common 
good generally. Whenever they do not fulfill this role, green contenders dele-
gitimize state actors.
The state could build more accommodations for homeless people. We have 
the means to do it but we use this money to renovate our train station. This 
angers me. I wanted to tell the government that their intention to renovate 
the train station was ridiculous. It made me sad and I was ready to take part 
in a demonstration. (Maria)
As the privatization of public services increases, the state takes less and less 
care of our problems. While schools remain more or less public, hospitals 
turn into private clinics. The health system and health insurance are all 
privatized. I  completely disagree with privatization. Some domains, like 
health, water, and electricity, must remain public and accessible to all, not 
profit oriented. (Nathan)
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The state can be an opponent, but it can also be an ally. Migrants’ rights 
are a good example of this dynamic. To give a concrete example: The state 
is against the idea of collective regularization. In this regard, the state 
constitutes an opponent. However, the state can also be an ally: When we 
want to regularize the situation of some migrants, we can go to a public 
official and explain a person’s specific situation. In one case, we told them 
a man had been a seasonal worker for fifteen years and asked if they could 
find a way to give this person a resident permit. We really need to make state 
actors our allies because they have the power to change things. (Evelyne)
Greenpeace activists also view the operational dimensions of political 
institutions positively. As such, the existing direct democratic institutions 
are perceived as opportunities for action, and the Swiss democracy is con-
sidered to be a valid system. State actors are not generally delegitimized. 
For Greenpeace activists, state actors do a bad job regarding environmental 
protection. However, state actors are crucial when it comes to the common 
good in general, and this responsibility is assumed to a certain degree. Green 
contenders and pro- migrant activists share a critical but heterogeneous un-
derstanding of state actors.
They also have a common view of civil society actors:
Civil society actors are indispensable. For example, ecological associations 
use the right of recourse from time to time, and are often successful with 
this kind of action. These actors are fundamental in positing a counter-
vailing power with regard to all the other economic and nuclear lobbies. We 
need to have associations that think about ecological problems. (Nathan)
Civil society actors are really important. Greenpeace is useful because eve-
rybody sees their posters and these sometimes make people reflect on these 
issues. For this reason, I think Greenpeace and their actions are efficient in 
sensitizing the population. (Pierrette)
Ecological associations are an important lobby. At least that’s what they say 
in their bulletins. But I don’t know if they just want to make a good im-
pression on readers so that the sympathizers continue to pay [laughs]. That 
said, I do have the impression that they are efficient lobbyists. They get real 
results and inform the population. For example, if Greenpeace had not pur-
sued these big French ships and circulated the information about their nu-
clear tests, we would know nothing about the whole affair. We would be in 
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the dark about the community that faces a destroyed sea and can no longer 
rely on healthy fish. All that just so more nuclear tests could be carried out. 
(Evelyne)
Civil society actors are indispensable for political intervention. By contrast 
to migrants’ rights activists, however, Greenpeace activists are conscious that 
the population is sensitive to environmental problems and therefore can be 
addressed with ease. This is not the case for challenging issues like the de-
fense of migrants’ rights. Despite this difference, the role of civil society ac-
tors is the same: They must guarantee the accountability of state actors for the 
common good— in their case, on the issue of environmental protection.
What is true for civil society actors in the environmental domain also 
applies to other types of civil society actors, who are crucial actors in dem-
ocratic decision making, because they bring a plurality of opinions into the 
political arena. Civil society actors are thus generally legitimized:
In a very general way, protest organizations are fundamental political ac-
tors. These organizations launch initiatives and nourish public debate. They 
are actors who address social and political issues either through initiatives, 
through referenda, or through action campaigns and are important be-
cause they display a multitude of existing opinions. (Evelyne)
Protest groups are important because they allow people to show that they 
are unhappy. Without them, everybody would stay at home instead of 
speaking up. And this is important for any cause, be it combating homo-
phobia or, racism, etc. (Pierrette)
Civil society plays an important part in the political game. They pressure 
the state and voice problems. If state actors don’t do their job, protest or-
ganizations intervene. To me, civil society, which comprises organizations 
helping refugees, development aid, etc., play a vital part in the improve-
ment of our society. (Nathan)
Green contenders share a common understanding of politics, which is the 
same as that of defenders of migrant’ rights. State actors are accountable for 
the common good, for environmental matters in particular, but also for other 
forms of common good. When state actors do not fulfill this role, they are 
delegitimized. State actors do not go far enough because they are caught in a 
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conflict of interests between ecological and economic lobbies. Unfortunately, 
the impact of economic lobbies on the final decision often prevails. Like their 
pro- migrant counterparts, green activists also have a nuanced and complex 
perception of the state. Thus, state actors not only constrain environmental 
protection but also provide activists with the opportunity to influence pol-
itics. Finally, moral voicing activists have a common understanding of 
civil society actors. They are of the utmost importance because they bring 
new ideas to the political debate and are able to influence decision making. 
Consequently, green contenders also perceive politics as a field of interven-
tion for accountability.
All but one of the green contenders shared this perception of politics. 
As was the case in Chapter 4, Yves proves to be an exception. On the one 
hand, he legitimizes state actors: “You can’t expect that the government will 
invest billions for renewable energy, that’s just not possible. State actors al-
ready do a lot.” On the other hand, he is quite reluctant when it comes to the 
legitimization of civil society actors. “We need radicals in order to change 
things. But do they really change something? I have the impression that they 
tilt at windmills; we are all sheep who like following the government.” In a 
nutshell, Yves does not fit the understanding of other Greenpeace activists’ 
interviewed. Why is it that Yves’s conception of the common good as well as 
his understanding of politics is different from that of other green contenders? 
We will address this issue in Chapter 6.
Green Activists’ Perception of Politics and Intentionality
Do we find the same cognitive mechanisms connecting perceptions of pol-
itics to action orientation as we did for defenders of migrants’ rights? In 
other words, does the understanding of state and civil society actors by green 
contenders help us to see why they favor contentious politics over other 
forms of action?
Their perception of state actors as accountable for the promotion of 
common good enables them to construct a specific cognitive component. In 
line with pro- migrant activists, they have a conflictual relation with state ac-
tors who do not take care of a given common good. Margot’s account exem-
plifies the importance of this struggle: “We are a cog in the decision- making 
process. For example, regarding political decisions on nuclear energy, elec-
tricity, or other means of energy, I think we are absolutely necessary.” The 
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other Greenpeace activists interviewed also underline the conflictual nature 
of their relation to state actors:
Obviously, politicians have to respect a certain legal framework. However, 
they can also develop it further and it’s often our role as activists to push 
politicians in that direction, to hand them the right arguments. It’s our role 
to suggest developments in legal frameworks. (Evelyne)
Greenpeace is really efficient when it comes to raising media and political 
awareness on a specific issue. Unfortunately, it takes so much time between 
the denunciation of a problem and the reaction of the government or the 
companies. (Nathan)
Ecologists will try to put pressure and to focus attention. Everybody should 
protest, not only organizations. You might say that if the state would take 
care of things, there would be no need for these organizations, but I prefer 
to think that organizations must always have an eye on the state. (Pierrette)
Green contenders have also developed a strong concern for politics, which 
sits alongside their conflictual state relatedness. This means that their per-
ception of civil society actors enables them to construct the cognitive com-
ponent that citizens should be politicized and act accordingly. In a similar 
fashion to migrants’ rights defenders, they value vigilance and participation 
in contentious politics with the aim of influencing the democratic decision- 
making process. Margot explains this view as follows: “To be a citizen means 
to exist through what one can do: to exchange, to communicate and to use 
one’s ability to transform social situations. A society cannot develop without 
exchanges. I understand myself as a fraction of a whole. People have to be 
an active element in a society and one becomes active by communicating 
and transforming the elements of his or her society.” The other Greenpeace 
activists are also concerned about politics:
It’s important to participate: Given that we are in a democracy, it’s impor-
tant to vote and to be active in protest organizations. If we don’t do so, we no 
longer live in a democracy. (Pierrette)
We are interested in environmental problems, we get the newspaper and we 
read the information. We all use environmental friendly bulbs and we all 
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have some solar panels on our balcony. We all do some small gestures, we 
have a very small car or we buy only organically grown food. After a while, 
however, you realize you should do more, at which point you become an ac-
tivist. You take part in demonstrations and you show that you disagree. We 
need to do more than just small gestures. (Nathan)
It’s through discussions that you become vigilant. Discussions are held 
whenever you participate. So, you have to be active in your community, to 
be present in order to improve things. (Evelyne)
It becomes clear that green contenders have the same perception of politics 
as the other activist groups studied. With a conflictual state relatedness and 
concern for politics, they are clearly oriented toward contentious politics and 
less toward other types of action, such as participation in political parties. 
Margot relates: “I’m also a member of the Green Party, but that membership is 
more like a memory than anything else. Political parties are institutions that 
erase personalities and drain commitment away. I’m a member and I pay my 
fees, but I want to commit to an organization that allows me to rebel, where 
people are committed to real change.” Other Greenpeace activists stress their 
intentionality in a similar fashion and developed cognitive components sim-
ilar to those of the defenders of migrants’ rights.
There is no political party with which I agree a hundred percent. They 
have to compromise all the time. I prefer committing to an association 
I totally agree with. We have to pressure the whole political class to be-
come more environmentally friendly and this is best done through pro-
test action. That is why I’m at Greenpeace. Look at the visual forms of 
action we use: You see activists obstructing trains carrying nuclear waste, 
and using banners to denounce certain issues, or blocking factory ships 
used for whaling; that’s the type of action which led me to take part in 
protest action. (Nathan)
I admire the way Greenpeace alerts people. Their actions require a small 
number of people but usually receive tremendous media coverage. You see 
four of them climbing up the side of a cooling tower to affix a big banner 
with the help of a helicopter. These are the forms of action that effec-
tively lead to social change. There is a reason I take part in these organiza-
tions. I want them to have the means to do the work, and I support them 
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financially. In contrast, the Socialist Party is not really aware which political 
strategy they want to adopt. They have to be active in every sector which 
makes it difficult to formulate clear in- depth strategies. (Evelyne)
I really take my commitment to heart. We face serious planetary problems. 
I know I won’t change the world, but I can try to contribute to its progres-
sive transformation. Greenpeace is recognized internationally and are ex-
cellent at getting their messages across. The more we are at Greenpeace, the 
more we can do to attract media attention. I’m ready to climb up a tree of 
the Amazon rainforest to stop people from cutting it. Or I imagine chaining 
myself to a Panda to protect it. The Greens, by contrast, are a party who de-
fend the environment because it’s fashionable. More often than not, they 
shoot themselves in the foot with all the political compromises they have to 
agree on. (Pierrette)
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, green contenders have developed the same cog-
nitive mechanisms as the defenders of migrants’ rights, setting their inten-
tionality in a particular way. This action orientation is constructed through 
a specific cognitive mechanism: a belief that state actors are accountable for 
the common good, but that they neglect this task. In addition, an impor-
tant role is attributed to civil society actors. They are legitimized because 
they intervene to influence state decisions. This understanding enables green 
contenders to construct two cognitive components: a conflictual state relat-
edness and a strong concern for politics. The combination of such a conflic-
tual relation with a politically active conception of citizenship orients them 
toward contentious politics and highlights why participation in other forms, 














Figure 5.2 From the perception of politics of the Greenpeace activists to their 
intentionality of action
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The analysis of the narratives of Green contenders has shown that they 
are concerned with politics. They stress the need to be informed, to be vig-
ilant, and to resort to action when necessary. They are politicized citizens, 
and it is their perception of civil society actors that consolidates that politi-
cization. Thus, different types of moral voicing activists, whether engaged in 
challenging issues or in mainstream protest, are strong citizens, concerned 
not merely with the common good, but also with politics.
Christian Aid Volunteers and Politics
We now inquire into a different understanding of politics with Caritas 
activists, as the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 has shown. With Christine, 
a longtime activist, we engage with the way volunteers perceive politics.
Christine is a seventy- three- year- old woman and has been committed to 
Caritas for twenty- three years. She became a volunteer after her children left 
home and she decided she needed something to do in her free time. During 
much of her life, Christine was a housewife and took care of her four chil-
dren. Before getting married and becoming a mother, Christine worked as 
a clothes saleswoman. She loved this job as it gave her the opportunity to 
attend fashion shows. Her experience in selling clothing items also partly 
explains why she decided to become a volunteer at Caritas, as she manages 
one of the clothing boutiques the organization operates to raise funds. By 
contrast, Christine was never an activist for moral voicing, or unions. How 
does Christine, who has a long history of volunteer work, perceive political 
authorities and civil society organizations? How does her perception of poli-
tics differ from that of moral voicing activists? And do these perceptions also 
contribute to orienting her action?
Christine favors state actors’ containment. For her, they are clearly less 
accountable for common good than was the belief among moral voicing 
activists. She believes that state actors intervene too much and are too gen-
erous, making their intervention inefficient: “The state should force unem-
ployed people to take jobs. Instead of pushing them toward work, the state 
pampers them. I know it’s difficult for most people to be unemployed, but 
there are many who enjoy it. I don’t think it’s normal to stay unemployed for 
a very long time, and abuse of state welfare remains unchecked.” Christine 
belief about state actors’ accountability for unemployed people is also true 
for her regarding migrants, the second major group Caritas handles: “Caritas 
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needs to help them because it’s not only the state’s task to care about migrants, 
it’s the duty of Caritas and like- minded organizations.” As we saw in 
Chapter 4, the Christian aid community does not see the matter of migrants’ 
rights as an injustice, and Christine’s understanding of the appropriate roles 
for state actors supplements this explanation. For Christine, state actors are 
not accountable for marginal groups like migrants or unemployed people, 
and state intervention can be contained by substitution of help from other 
actors. Between an accountable and a containing state, Christine clearly 
tends toward the latter. While this does not mean that state actors are not 
at all accountable, they are clearly less accountable than in the eyes of moral 
voicing activists.
Despite her belief that state actors are too helpful in terms of unemploy-
ment and migration, Christine nevertheless offers a generally positive eval-
uation of state actors. She continues:  “Personally, I  think the Swiss state 
performs its duties well. They try to handle things as competently as pos-
sible as it’s impossible to satisfy everyone. All in all, I think the state does 
a really good job.” Christine generally legitimizes state actors and does not 
hold them accountable for the common good. Individuals are responsible for 
themselves.
Christine mentions unemployment and migration as matters where state 
actors should be discharged from most responsibility. But who has the ca-
pacity to substitute for state actors? According to Christine, civil society ac-
tors should substitute for state actors on such issues, thereby leading to the 
containment of state actors: “Caritas has become a very professional organ-
ization. When I started, there was the director, the person who took care of 
the volunteers, and two secretaries. It was really small. But today, we have 
many offices, and lots of people work for the organization, which is great!” 
She continues: “The organization has become vital in cities, where poverty 
is a real issue.” For Christine, Caritas fulfills a crucial social requirement by 
providing help to people. By contrast with moral voicing activists, civil so-
ciety actors do not have an intervening function in the democratic process 
but are indispensable in order to contain state intervention. Although moral 
voicing and Caritas activists legitimize civil society actors on the issues they 
are committed to, they go about the process differently.
Another difference between moral voicing activists and Christine is that she 
does not generalize her legitimization of civil society actors. There are other 
types of organizations, which do not substitute for the state and are there-
fore not necessary. She is especially critical of protest organizations: “These 
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associations behave like sects. I think of ecological associations in particular. 
They get on our nerves with this climate change affair. Remember last winter? 
We never had such a long one.” Christine does not extend her legitimization 
of civil society actors to include protest organizations.
With Christine, we deal with a new representation of politics: State actors 
care too much and their intervention should be minimized or substituted by 
civil society actors like Caritas. She believes that state actors are, by far, less 
accountable for common good than they are in the understanding of moral 
voicing activists, who criticized state action claiming that the state does not 
care enough about social problems. Further, her understanding of the role 
of civil society actors is also opposed to that expressed by moral voicing 
activists: Civil society actors do not need to push for more state accounta-
bility but to reduce it. Christine perceives politics as a field of substitution for 
containment. The view of Christian aid volunteers resonates with the cogni-
tive landscape Christine displays:
I’m a member of a political party which believes that the state should not 
do what the private sector can handle. Of course, the state must also handle 
issues. For example, elderly people, those who don’t want to die. We can all 
turn ninety nowadays, and the state should take care of aged persons. But 
we have to remain selective and not assign responsibilities to the state when 
unnecessary. (Edwige)
As you know, I’m a member of the Christian Democratic Party. What 
fundamentally differentiates us from the Socialists is that we don’t solve 
problems by asking the state to handle them. This has always bothered me. 
I have always based myself on the principle of subsidiarity. As long as the 
private sector can solve a problem, there is no reason that the state should 
take care of it. As long as a municipality can solve a problem, there is no 
reason that the canton needs to take care of it. And as long as the canton 
can solve a problem, there is no reason for the federal state to take care of it. 
(Mathieu)
If you look at the amounts spent on social action and social insurance, you 
get the impression that resources exist. They give the money but then it’s 
difficult to judge how these resources are used. Not so long ago, I saw a re-
port about the financial situation of regional unemployment offices: They 
get a lot of money, but don’t seem very efficient. In addition, you hear 
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from unemployed people that these offices simply apply schemes instead 
of responding to personal situations. So you never know if a policy is well 
implemented. (Emmanuelle)
For these volunteers, state actors are less accountable for common good and 
they emphasize the importance of containing the state wherever possible. 
This is not only true for the issue these volunteers are committed to, but they 
also legitimize state actors’ containment in general and in turn criticize state 
actors’ involvement:
You can’t imagine the money we lose when the state intervenes. I don’t con-
sider all of them to be thieves but you have to think about all these officials 
we have to pay. (Edwige)
Our society has become too critical. The consequence of this is that we have 
become static. My city is a case in point. Everybody wants more housing to 
be constructed but popular opposition then blocks most housing projects! 
It seems to have become fashionable to systematically oppose the state. 
Citizens don’t trust the state anymore. We elect people but we don’t trust 
them. All these obstructions leave me speechless. Let’s be honest, it’s raining 
initiatives and referendums, especially during electoral periods. I think this 
is a sign of a very interesting political crisis. With our democratic system, 
we can hinder the process when we want to. (Emmanuelle)
It’s due to subsidiarity that we live in such a wonderful country. Because we 
have a strong civil society and economic sector we don’t need to rely too 
much on the state. I’m always a little bit critical when the state actors want 
to take care of something. It’s never easy if you have to rely on the state. 
If the state intervenes, you can be sure that it will cost a fortune and then 
you’re not even sure if it will improve matters in the end. (Mathieu)
These volunteers believe that not only should state intervention be reduced, 
but they also criticize the participative political institutions that, in their 
view, slow down and even prevent political solutions. By contrast with moral 
voicing activists, they therefore favor a representative idea of democracy, not 
a participative one. Citizens should elect politicians and let them do their job. 
Similarly, civil society actors are not political but social actors. As we saw with 
Politics and Intentionality 213
Christine, civil society actors are presented as professional and efficient, jus-
tifying a reduction of state accountability:
Caritas clearly states that all the money donated goes directly to the poor. 
Well, I’m aware that Caritas is an organization and the director and the so-
cial assistants receive wages. But I think the money for this is taken from 
somewhere else. Anyway, donation money is given to help poor families 
and children who don’t have the means to go on holidays. (Edwige)
I think it’s an organization that works well. As always, if you support an 
organization, you want it to be as efficient as possible. That’s why I will con-
tinue to support Caritas. They are present everywhere. I know what they do. 
They publish a bulletin and it is important because it informs me on what 
goes on and what they do. (Emmanuelle)
Caritas has a very important role. When I think about all the volunteers 
and the work they do, this is incredibly important. As I’m not a socialist 
[laughs], I think that the private sector has a role to play. The state can’t do 
everything. I am certain of this. (Mathieu)
Caritas, unlike the state, needs no intermediaries. Instead, the money goes 
directly to the people in need. As with the moral voicing activists, civil so-
ciety actors are thus viewed in contrast to state actors. However, the content 
of this dissimilarity is completely different, as civil society actors are efficient 
and able to substitute for state intervention. It is interesting to note how re-
current this perception of efficiency is, as the interviewees are convinced 
of Caritas’s professionalism, omnipresence, and experience in the domain. 
This positive evaluation of civil society actors is, however, not a general one. 
As was the case for Christine, volunteers at Caritas are rather dismissive of 
other forms of collective action, especially protest organizations. Civil so-
ciety actors are thus legitimized as long as they tend to substitute for the state. 
However, protest organizations are perceived critically:
Those who say we need to protest are often doctrinaires. These people think 
that it’s only the state which can do a good job. But I know that this is by no 
means true. That’s why I’m not too taken with protest organizations. I’m 
more for substitution. (Mathieu)
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All the people from the left think that the state is everything. That’s dan-
gerous. The Socialists and all the people on the left, those who go out in the 
street, they have no idea about the state’s finances, and therefore, don’t care 
about expenses. (Edwige)
I remember when I was at college, it was just after 1968 and we had to draft 
the regulations ourselves. There was this participative process. I didn’t have 
the patience to work in a group like this. It was impossible. I was impatient 
and wanted to move forward. If you work in a group you can’t move for-
ward. I think it’s for this reason that I don’t have a mind for protest action. 
(Emmanuelle)
The understanding of politics these volunteers have developed is different 
from that of moral voicing activists. For Christian aid volunteers, state actors 
are less accountable for common good. The prefer containment of state actors, 
with an emphasis on economic liberty and the minimization of state interven-
tion. Consequently, state actors are generally legitimized. Furthermore, civil 
society actors fulfill a different, yet crucial, social role: They act as substitutes 
for the state. In addition, protest actors and other left- wing oriented groups 
are delegitimized. While moral voicing activists understand politics as a field 
of intervention for accountability, Christian aid activists perceive politics as a 
substitution for containment— a replacement of the state by the private sector 
in matters that should not be the state’s responsibility.
However, Elisabeth and Jérémie do not subscribe to this pattern. As we 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, their understanding of common good 
and politics is due to their long- term commitment to moral voicing com-
munities. For half of their lives, Elisabeth and Jérémie have been advocates 
for the defense of migrants’ rights and development groups, respectively, 
and these cross- commitments result in an understanding of politics shaped 
by social interactions in both communities. As a short excursion into 
Jérémie’s mind shows, their understanding of politics sways between con-
tention and substitution.6 Such instances of blended minds, and the effects 
of cross- commitment in activists’ understanding, will be discussed further 
in Chapter 6.
 6 We provide only excerpts from Jérémie’s account. Similar views are expressed in Elisabeth’s 
narrative.
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The state is accountable for many things and they do a lot, as with the 
medical sector. People who are treated at home, for example. But there 
will be an increase in this demand with the rise of the population’s age. 
Will the state be able to handle this increase in demand? I don’t know. 
But we will certainly need civil society actors, such as Caritas, to help 
them. (Jérémie)
Caritas also has a political mission. Whenever they talk about refugees, 
for example, they have to challenge the state. It’s true that most of the 
volunteers are not politically committed. However, as an organization, they 
have to formulate political expectations and these are often challenging 
voices. Once cannot separate the social from the political. (Jérémie)
“Substitution for State Containment” and Intentionality
Moral voicing activists perceive state and civil society actors in a specific way 
enabling the construction of two particular cognitive components: a con-
flictual state relatedness and a strong concern for politics. Taken together, 
these cognitive components orient their action toward contentious politics. 
By contrast, Caritas activists perceive politics differently. How does their per-
ception of politics set their intentionality?
Christian aid activists construct the same cognitive components but 
with a different content: For them, state actors have to be complemented and 
there is no conflict at stake. As we saw in Chapter 4, for Caritas volunteers 
the problem of poverty is a care problem and it is the duty of civil society 
to take care of it. State actors should not intervene in such instances. For 
Christine, civil society actors should not be political because they are com-
plementary to state actors: “State actors and Caritas work hand in hand. 
Caritas takes care of children in difficulty but they do so in conjunction 
with the state. Therefore, Caritas can’t be political. It has to be an apolit-
ical association. They take care of youth in difficulty, among many other 
issues where the state and Caritas work complementarily. I  think this is 
absolutely normal and a very good thing. In addition, Caritas is also sub-
sidized by the state, so can’t become a political organization.” Christine, as 
well as the other volunteers who were interviewed, relate to state actors in 
a similar way:
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Look at all the volunteers working for Caritas and everything they accom-
plish! If the state had to do all that, it would cost a fortune. Even then, I’m 
not sure if the state would do it any better. Again, if a private organization 
can do the work efficiently and in a professional way, why should we assign 
these tasks to the state? It makes no sense at all. There are certainly domains 
where the state is better suited to solve a problem, but I’m convinced that 
there are many others where the private sector can handle things. So, it’s ob-
vious that the two of them are really complementary.  (Mathieu)
I think it’s really a pairing. Private charity has always existed and, histori-
cally, dominated social care. State charity came much later. (Emmanuelle)
We should prevent state intervention wherever we can. Caritas does an ex-
cellent job and they are more efficient than state actors. (Edwige)
By contrast with moral voicing activists, volunteers at Caritas are not con-
cerned with politics. However, this does not mean that they are not interested 
in politics. For Christine, voting is important: “I always vote. We have the 
right to do so we must use it.” Volunteers do not stress the need for political 
vigilance and participatory politics and are therefore not concerned by poli-
tics as we define it. For them, politicians should be elected and allowed to do 
their job without citizens incessantly intervening.
The most important thing is to pay taxes and vote. A colleague of mine 
never votes. I told her that there are people who are tortured and mur-
dered because they fight for the right to vote. She said I was right, but 
I don’t know if she has voted since (laughs). In my view, the right to vote 
is a privilege and in Switzerland the people are really consulted about eve-
rything. (Edwige)
A citizen has to elect his government and try to trust its representatives. 
You can be vigilant of course but this does not mean that everybody 
should think that we are the government. Citizens should be aware that the 
common good comes first and personal well- being second. It’s clear that we 
have to control what the government does, they shouldn’t try to trick us. 
But to continuously claim that the state is wrong and to protest against eve-
rything is to be a hypocrite. (Emmanuelle)
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I always hear people complain and do nothing to change what bothers 
them. This affects me. There are so many people saying we have to do this 
or that. I always ask them, what do you do to change things? Obviously, 
nothing. I’m always motivated if there is a problem. What can I do about it? 
How can I do my share to solve the problem? This is the way I approach an 
issue, and the result of this is that I’m committed a little bit everywhere. It 
doesn’t get more complicated than that. (Mathieu)
Christian aid volunteers are not concerned with politics the way moral 
voicing activists are. While the latter stress political vigilance and partic-
ipatory politics, Caritas activists emphasize the importance of caring for 
others and believe a citizen’s participation in politics should be limited to 
voting. Although Mathieu’s ideas seem to go further than other volunteers, 
he does not share the views of the moral voicing activists on political com-
mitment. His perception of politics and the cognitive linkages allow him 
to act. However, that action is not a contentious one, but volunteering. 
Voting, paying taxes, and caring about others are the main tasks for Caritas 
volunteers. With these narratives, we aimed to show that Christine, Edwige, 
Emmanuelle, and Mathieu are not concerned with politics. They do not value 
political vigilance, nor are they ready to join contentious action. Instead, they 
underline the importance of participation in institutional politics and the 
need to trust existing political institutions.
Christian aid volunteers have another perception of politics and have 
accordingly developed different cognitive components. Alongside a non- 
conflictual and complementary relation to state actors and being uncon-
cerned with politics, they have developed the mental components that orient 
their action toward volunteering. In fact, the very meaning of commitment 
changes through this cognitive mechanism as Christine explains: “We know 
we work to help others. We know that the money we earn in our shop is given 
to the poor. We are a charitable organization. We give our time for these 
people and for the cause. That’s what we love doing and we love the people 
who come in need of help.” For all Christian aid activists, volunteering means 
doing good by spending time or money. Their commitment allows them to 
share, to help others, to make something out of their privileged situation and 
to satisfy their desire to participate in volunteer action:
For a while, I supported the Bern Declaration, because I think it’s important 
to work toward a sustainable environment. But I left the movement because 
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they were too politicized. My commitment to Caritas is important. I do it 
as a Christian. I think we have to share. Caritas matters to me because some 
people are really in need. Whenever I receive the bulletin and look through 
the cases described I want to help them. (Edwige)
I like my commitment because it allows me to satisfy my social intentions. 
My commitment allows me to help people in need. (Mathieu)
I think it’s important to realize that if one is in a privileged situation he or 
she should not forget others in less enviable positions. There is civic en-
gagement that leads one to support organizations like Caritas and another 
form of engagement which leads to politics. These are two different things. 
(Emmanuelle)
In addition, an action orientation toward volunteering does not foreclose 
political commitment. As we have seen, voting is crucial for Christian aid 
activists. Some of them are also involved in political parties. Mathieu, for ex-
ample, was involved in a party for a long time: “For more than twenty years, 
I was committed to the Christian Democratic Party. First, I was elected to 
the municipal council and then I went on to the cantonal parliament. I re-
ally liked this form of commitment because many things were going on in 
the construction sector where I am professionally involved and those issues 
resonated with my stance on social matters.” Edwige, too, is a member of 
a political party: “The Liberal Party suits my ideas: They advocate for self- 
responsibility. One has to care about oneself and not just count on the state’s 
help. I became committed to politics at an early age. Being a woman, this 
wasn’t obvious. You know, I voted for the first time in 1960!” To be oriented 
toward volunteering does not necessarily mean there is no political commit-
ment, but it is present and is located in established political parties, not in 
protest organizations.
As Figure 5.3 illustrates, the perception of politics shared by Christian aid 
volunteers results in a specific intention to engage and support collective ac-
tion: volunteering or “civic engagement” as Emmanuelle labels it. For them, 
volunteering means to give time to help and share with others. In order to 
construct this action orientation, their perception of politics is important. In 
their view, state actors are less accountable for the common good than was 
the case for moral voicing activists. Accordingly, state intervention should 
be contained, or limited. By contrast with state actors, civil society actors— at 
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least in the volunteering sector— are efficient and able to substitute for or at 
least complement state actors. Their perception of state actors leads them 
to construct two cognitive components: a complementary state relatedness 
and a lack of concern for politics. Regarding the former, the work of state 
actors has to be complemented and substituted for wherever possible, while 
the latter means that politicians should be elected and left to do their job. 
These are citizens who want to be represented rather than participate in the 
decision- making process. If participation in politics occurs, as with Edwige 
or Mathieu, it is through political parties. Finally, such an understanding of 
politics orients them toward a specific form of action, which in this case is 
volunteering.
Are Christian aid volunteers strong citizens like moral voicing activists? 
The answer is clearly no. While Chapter 4 revealed that they are strong cit-
izens in terms of their concern for the common good, they would not be 
considered strong citizens under the criteria of the second pillar, being nei-
ther vigilant nor ready to take part in participatory politics. For them, the 
duty of a citizen is to take care of others and to participate in institutional 
politics.
Unionists and Politics
We now turn to still another form of collective action: unionism. The action 
repertoire of unionists is particular because they use a blend of institutional 
and contentious politics. Do these activists consequently develop a different 
kind of perception of politics? Nuno’s account will help us make sense of 














Figure 5.3 From the perception of politics of the Caritas volunteers to their 
intentionality of action
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Nuno is a sixty- year- old man. He grew up in Portugal and moved to 
Switzerland at the age of thirty. When he was young, he started working as 
a locksmith and later became a welder in a refinery. At that time, he did not 
care about politics. However, after his military service, things changed. He 
was deployed to Timor where he began to criticize colonization and real-
ized that Portugal was actually a dictatorship at the time. The Carnation 
Revolution was on the verge of beginning when he returned from his mil-
itary service. He became an active member of the Communist Party and a 
union sympathizer. This was forty years ago. When he moved to Switzerland, 
he maintained his union commitment. For over thirty years now, Nuno has 
been an active member of Unia, takes part in many demonstrations, and is a 
member of several committees within Unia’s federal structure.
Regarding state actors, Nuno clearly perceives a discrepancy between 
what state actors should do for workers and what they currently do. “In my 
opinion, the Swiss state does not exist for workers. I really don’t understand 
this federal system and the lack of power and accountability of the govern-
ment. The Federal Council is not really concerned with workers’ rights.” For 
Nuno, state actors lack accountability for common good when it comes to 
workers’ rights. “There is no culture of a labor secretary, as in other coun-
tries. In Switzerland, the commerce secretary is linked to the state secretary 
for economic affairs (SECO), who is in charge of workers’ rights. An indi-
rect system links the labor force to the state, and that is a handicap, because 
there is no reliable interlocutor with a clear labor agenda. I’m very skeptical 
about the Swiss government when it comes to workers’ rights. They ignore 
our claims and do not care about our salaries.” Nuno clearly delegitimizes 
state actors regarding the issue he is committed to.
When Nuno speaks of state actors in general, however, his perception is 
more positive. As was the case with the other activists, he is able to differ-
entiate the various state actors, as with the example of cantonal commission 
for the integration of foreigners:  “It’s a cantonal commission. Around the 
table, there are good and bad people. There is the committee for foreigners, 
politicians, the church, and other people. Sometimes, I disagree with what 
happens in this commission, but I want to underline our canton’s awareness 
of the issue. They were the first canton to establish such a commission for 
the integration of foreigners. It was innovative. Sometimes, it’s difficult to in-
tegrate foreigners, so they established this commission to help people who 
just arrived. For example, you come from Portugal and you present yourself 
at the municipality. Thanks to the commission, you will get a brochure with 
Politics and Intentionality 221
the essential information in Portuguese. That’s the way we approach here the 
problem of cohabitation with other communities.” While state actors do not 
care enough about workers’ rights and protection, they do care about other 
common goods, and Nuno is satisfied with the existing political system. 
Nuno does not generally delegitimize state actors: “Switzerland is the only 
country in the world where there is this specific form of direct democracy. 
Just count the amount of ballots cast in a year. In other countries, you have to 
wait for years to be able to vote or to express your opinion on a referendum.” 
Like moral voicing activists, Nuno delegitimizes state actors when they lack 
accountability.
Though institutions of direct democracy are good, they are not sufficient 
when it comes to the protection of workers’ rights. Civil society actors, and 
especially unions, play a key role: “The unions are crucial because they set 
the agenda. Without them, governmental decisions would just be arbitrary. 
The union continues to fight. Like the Communist Party, they still have the 
same energy and the same conviction as before. As long as there is class in-
justice, a strong Communist Party is necessary. The union is important too 
because if a person has a problem, there is always a good lawyer who tells 
him or her what to do. This is crucial.” For workers’ voicing activists, unions 
have to intervene politically by participating in and influencing political de-
cision making: “Despite the difficulties and the weaknesses of the union, it’s 
thanks to them that people have a civil code, and right to take at least three 
weeks of holidays, or work a maximum of forty- five hours per week. This is 
the strength of the union; they fight hard against existing injustices and for 
our rights.” For Nuno, Unia is the most significant actor for the protection of 
workers’ rights and has secured many victories.
The perception of civil society actors Nuno displays matches that of moral 
voicing activists with two exceptions. The first is the level of generalization. 
Indeed, Nuno generalizes far less: “I was engaged in Portuguese associations, 
in the Portuguese centers, and in the parents’ commission for the Portuguese 
school. These were all associations that sought to improve the integration 
of the Portuguese community. I wanted to organize the Portuguese com-
munity in a more coherent manner so we could advance better claims. We 
are entirely Portuguese; we want to have a consulate here and we want to 
have a Portuguese cinema for children. And we are successful sometimes. 
For example, we obtained Portuguese language courses.” While Nuno’s ac-
count shows some form of generalization, it also illustrates how this gener-
alization is linked to his communitarian perception, a topic developed in 
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Chapter 4. In fact, his generalizations pertain exclusively to the groups he 
belongs to: workers and the Portuguese community. The second difference 
with moral voicing activists is that Nuno perceives a strong link of the union 
to the Socialist Party: “Unia is somewhat under the umbrella of the Socialist 
Party. There’s also the president of the union of the Swiss unions who is a del-
egate at the national parliament. Some directors of Unia are delegates at the 
parliament for the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party really supports us, they 
are generally a strong ally of the workers’ movement.” In fact, the Socialist 
Party and the union are complementary and Unia represents the activist 
wing of the party. Thus, Nuno’s perception of politics is specific when com-
pared to Caritas volunteers but very similar to that of moral voicing activists. 
He sees politics as a field where civil society actors must intervene to increase 
state actors’ accountability.
The perception of state actors by other workers’ voicing activists resonates 
with Nuno’s view. They criticize state actors for failing to protect workers’ 
rights and subsequently see unions as the crucial civil society actor able to 
struggle for social justice for workers. State decisions are seen as heavily 
influenced by economic interests, which are, of course, detrimental to 
workers’ rights:
I want to have another government, one that actually represents workers. 
For now, personal interests are being defended, and these interests are 
those of the capitalists. We all know that every federal councilor as well as 
members of parliament is a board member of big corporations. So obvi-
ously, they won’t be defending workers, but the interests of those who pay 
them. (Joao)
Politicians have no guts. They don’t want to review the labor law although 
it’s virtually inexistent. For example, the collective labor agreement has to 
be controlled by somebody. But nobody does it! We, the workers, need to 
defend our workplace. But I have to do what the boss tells me and if I de-
nounce my miserable working conditions I will be dismissed, because there 
is no protection for workers. That is the reality of Swiss politics! (Eva)
As I  told you, employers fuck workers over. A  worker slaves for twelve 
hours a day and gets 3,000 Swiss Francs at the end of the month. The owner 
of a company works for three hours a day but earns 12,000 per month. It’s 
totally unfair. As a worker, I’m at the bottom of the social ladder. (André)
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For these activists, Switzerland is a capitalist country with non- existent 
labor laws, and outrageous injustices exist between workers and employers 
who are indebted to the state for the lack of laws and regulations that would 
protect employees. This critical stance on state actors concerning workers’ 
rights is in sharp contrast with the general perception of state actors. State ac-
tors’ accountability is generally not delegitimized. State actors do care about 
common good except the protection of workers’ rights. In addition, residents 
of Switzerland live in a political system that allows them to take part in polit-
ical decision making. Unionists are hence also able to differentiate their cri-
tique of state actors with regard to different state institutions in the same way 
that moral voicing activists do. Contrary to Christian aid volunteers, however, 
they have a perception of the state as being accountable for the common good.
State actors generally do a good job and have constructed excellent 
infrastructures. The streets are always in a good shape. School is free: You 
don’t pay for books, for example. You go to the lake and everything is clean. 
Life in Switzerland is good and the medical system and health insurance are 
excellent. If my daughter has to go to the doctor, I only need to pay a tenth 
of the bill. If an emergency operation is required, you just have to wait a 
month. You pay a lot but you are well treated. There’s a good quality of life. 
(Tiago)
Switzerland is a very well structured country. State actors organize every-
thing properly; it’s fantastic. There are also things to change, of course, but 
there is no perfect country or society. We are certainly not in a bad place in 
Switzerland. (Joao)
Just compare the Swiss context with the French one. They have way more 
strikes. Why? That’s because here, we can express our opinion. If we want to 
work forty, forty- two, or thirty- six hours, we will ask for it. We are able to say 
what we like and what we don’t like. We can pay our taxes as we want. The 
French don’t have these possibilities. In terms of democracy, we are a very 
good country. That’s also true for the common good. If you need hospitali-
zation you are treated even though you don’t have health insurance. (Sarah)
In order to improve the situation with regard to workers’ rights, unions have 
to intervene in politics. They are a cog in the democratic machine and allow 
the population to be sensitized to problems workers are confronted with and 
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to influence political decision making. As far as unions are concerned, civil 
society actors are crucial for the functioning of democracy. Unlike Christian 
aid volunteers, they see their role as a clearly political one, as was the case for 
moral voicing activists.
Contention is always of value because it raises awareness. Imagine a perfect 
world where everybody contributes their part; we would achieve beautiful 
things. But we aren’t in a perfect world and therefore protest is necessary in 
order to change the world into a better place for workers.” (Sarah)
I think that protest is really important. Unions are a crucial link in the polit-
ical machine in Switzerland. We are able to influence political decisions. In 
general, union members are left- oriented people and that’s why it’s also im-
portant that they inform the population in order to sensitize them on issues 
related to workers’ rights. (Joao)
There is no other place for the defense of workers’ rights than the union. 
I remember a demonstration that half of the population was against and 
the other half approved of. But last Thursday, we demonstrated again from 
the train station to the old town and we supported those who were striking. 
It was a two- or three- kilometer- long march and we saw only one person 
who was against the strike. All the others congratulated us, told us to con-
tinue, and took pictures. It was really gratifying. Within a year, a tremen-
dous change has occurred both on the level of public awareness and for the 
working conditions of those on strike. (Eva)
However, this strong legitimization of civil society actors pertains mostly to 
unions and the groups they belong to. Unionists have therefore a narrower 
range of legitimization than moral voicing activists. In addition, unionists 
have developed a strong link between the role of Unia and the Socialist Party 
where Unia is the activist wing of the party. Both actors are complemen-
tary:  Institutional as well as contentious forms of action are important in 
influencing political decision making.
There is certainly a link between the Socialist Party and Unia. If you want 
to change a law, you have to be linked to a political party. I think they pro-
tect Unia and especially active members. You know, they are trying to draft 
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legislation that protects the active members of Unia, and members of the 
Socialist Party will try to enforce this law. (Tiago)
I’m currently closer to the Socialist Party. I  realized that the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Greens are too far to the right for me. However, 
I also sympathize with other left- wing parties. If I had to choose a party, 
I would choose an established party, probably the Socialist Party. (Eva)
The Socialist Party is a strong ally of the unions and this link is very impor-
tant in influencing state actors. (Sarah)
“Intervention for More Workers’ Protection” 
and Intentionality
Workers’ voicing activists share their perception of politics with moral 
voicing activists to a large extent. The most striking difference, however, 
is that their perception is more focused on workers’ protection and the 
groups they belong to. In addition, political parties, and the Socialist Party 
in particular, play a crucial and supportive role in the unionists’ political 
struggle. How does this kind of perception orient their action? And more 
specifically, toward what form of action are they oriented? Does their per-
ception of politics allow us to understand the cognitive mechanism that 
orients them toward contentious action and toward workers’ rights ac-
tivism in particular?
The perception of politics is not the only element of overlap, as unionists 
also have cognitive components in common with moral voicing activists. 
They have a conflictual state relatedness regarding state actors who do not 
take care of the particular common good the unionists are concerned with, 
that is, workers’ rights. In Nuno’s words:  “The union opposes the gov-
ernment. Without the unions, the government would just not care about 
workers. Employers’ associations were obviously important interlocutors 
during strikes on construction sites. The government was reluctant and 
intervened in the process only later, and when they did, they sided with the 
employers. In the end, it was the strength of the workers’ strike that allowed 
us to succeed.” The other workers’ rights activists developed the same chal-
lenging state relatedness:
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Of course, the unions have an impact on the political elite. The political 
elite is constrained to accept the unions. Unions are a thorn in the flesh 
for the political elite because they force them to represent the people.
(André)
There’s no written law about flextime. We have to enforce a law to register 
flextime. If we don’t, all what matters is the goodwill of the employer. The 
union has to do something. If you have a boss without any goodwill like the 
one I had before, workers will be treated like animals. That’s why we need 
laws. It’s not easy trying to enter a factory when the boss says you can’t. 
I participated in a demonstration where we wanted to protest on a con-
struction site and it didn’t go smoothly. (Tiago)
I’m ready to go as far as possible. I told this to the union. I’m desperate to 
win the struggles I’m involved in. I want companies to recognize their be-
havior and: change. My wildest idea is to have the labor law revised. We 
should protest for that. (Eva)
Workers’ voicing activists have hence constructed a conflictual state re-
latedness. In addition, they have a concern for politics. As civil society actors 
need to intervene politically, the unionists as citizens should be politically 
vigilant and participate in protest politics to protect workers’ rights. Again, 
this is similar to views expressed by moral voicing activists. Why, then, do 
workers’ voicing activists opt for unionism instead of contentious politics 
more generally? The answer to this question is linked to their communi-
tarian and issue- specific perception of society discussed in Chapter 4 and 
influencing their perception of politics. Nuno’s opinion is exemplary: “To be 
vigilant and critical is a civic obligation for every worker. They must forge an 
opinion. I always said to my people that they have to go to elections. Even 
if I don’t like anybody, I cast a blank vote. Voting is a civic obligation; it’s an 
exercise of our right. And it’s the same with being critical toward the govern-
ment. If the government does a good job, all right, but if they do a bad job, 
you need to criticize and go into the streets to protect workers’ rights!” The 
other unionists do not differ from Nuno’s line of argument:
Citizens need to participate in political parties and in workers’ organiza-
tions: It’s not enough to vote. Of course, you must vote, but in order to know 
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how to vote one has to be somewhat interested. You can get the information 
through the radio, the TV, the Internet or the newspaper. But if you partic-
ipate actively in a party or organization, you understand the stakes much 
more. (Joao)
Voting for the left is good, but it’s insufficient. Paying your annual subscrip-
tion to the union is good, but it’s insufficient. Being a good, accountable, and 
conscientious worker is good, but it’s insufficient. Being a good Catholic, 
going every Sunday to Mass, praying for the well- being of the world is good, 
but it’s insufficient. I became aware that I needed to do more; it’s insufficient 
to stay at home and watch the news. If you don’t commit yourself actively, 
it’s insufficient. (Eva)
Everyone should do what he or she can do. You have to participate in so-
ciety. You have to work. A person who is unemployed gets excluded from 
the society and should be reintegrated as quickly as possible. It’s important 
to take part in some kind of organization. We need to stay alert and actively 
defend our rights. (Tiago)
With a challenging state relatedness and a concern for politics, workers’ 
voicing activists have developed the mental predisposition that allows 
them to be oriented toward contentious action. However, as their percep-
tion of politics is almost exclusively concerned with workers’ protection, 
their intentionality is set toward unionism. Nuno relates:  “I will always 
remain activist. I think this is very important. With the union I can con-
tribute to my social ideal.” Unionists are thus oriented toward contentious 
action in order to protect workers’ rights and sometimes specifically their 
own rights.
If you do nothing, you let the things go. Things do not take care of them-
selves. If everyone participates, we can improve many things and that’s re-
ally important for the workers of this country, even primordial I would say. 
One should not only participate if one has a problem. Demonstrating is an 
everyday engagement. (Joao)
The words I use mean something to me. We are “comrades in arms” and 
I’m engaged in a “social struggle.” Before, I could never imagine getting 
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involved in struggles. Today, however, I know that I will not let employers 
abuse me. (Eva)
The union means two things to me: On the one hand, it provides legal pro-
tection and there are opportunities for education so I have advantages as a 
member of the union. On the other, it’s a collective fight to improve certain 
things. (Tiago)
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, unionists are oriented toward contentious action 
in a similar way as moral voicing activists are, and this action orientation is 
the result of a specific cognitive mechanism. In their view, state actors are ac-
countable for the protection of workers’ rights. Accordingly, they criticize state 
actors who do not embrace this task and who support the financial interests 
of employers’ associations. Therefore, civil society actors, especially unions, 
have to intervene politically in order to advance workers’ rights. Without 
them, workers would stand alone against powerful and abusive employers. As 
a consequence of their perception of politics, unionists have developed a con-
flictual relation with state actors and are concerned with politics. They do not 
comply with a state that ignores workers, and they feel it is their civic duty to 
be vigilant and participative in order to make the intervention of civil society 
actors possible. These two cognitive components, as well as their strong iden-
tification with their social group, orient them toward a specific form of con-
tentious action with the aim of defending their community.
Even though unionists do not display a broad political vigilance on many 
issues and are not oriented toward each type of contentious action, they 
clearly constitute strong citizens when it comes to their concern for the polit-














Figure 5.4 From the perception of politics of the unionists to their 
intentionality of action
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Different Perceptions, Different Intentionalities
This chapter has provided answers to two crucial questions regarding 
activists’ understanding of politics. First, it showed what activists mean by 
politics and thereby enhanced the results provided in Chapter  3. We em-
phasize that activists committed in the same community share similar 
understandings of politics and that cognitive variations between activists 
committed in distinct communities exist. Second, it unveiled cognitive 
mechanisms for action orientation— in particular, the ways in which specific 
perceptions of politics enable activists to elaborate cognitive components 
that direct their intentionality. Figure 5.5 summarizes the understanding of 
politics of the activists’ communities and shows that they do not understand 
state or civil society actors in a similar fashion.
Moral voicing activists perceive politics as a field of intervention for ac-
countability. They want state actors to be accountable for common good and 
civil society actors to intervene in politics where this is not the case. For the 
issue they are committed to, moral voicing activists delegitimize state actors 
because they do not fulfill their role. This, however, does not lead to a gen-
eral delegitimization of the state. By contrast, they are well aware that the 
state is a heterogeneous entity comprised of a complex set of actors with dif-
ferent interests and roles. Civil society actors are generally legitimized. They 
sensitize the population about existing injustices and push the state to inter-























Figure 5.5 The different understandings of politics of the moral voicing, 
Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists
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political decision making and are therefore essential in ideals of participative 
democracy.
Workers’ rights activists perceive politics in a similar way. What 
differentiates them from moral voicing activists is the narrowness of their 
perception as well as their strong link to the Socialist Party. Affected by 
their communitarian perception of society, unionists’ perception of politics 
concentrates on workers’ rights and the cultural groups they belong to. In ad-
dition, they have constructed a strong link to the Socialist Party. Institutional 
politics plays an important role for unionist negotiations, and the Socialist 
Party is perceived as an indispensable ally. Nevertheless, state actors are ac-
countable for protecting and strengthening workers’ rights, and unions are 
meant to politically intervene for accountability.
Christian aid volunteers elaborate a different interpretation of politics. 
They want to shrink state actors’ responsibility for the common good by 
replacing them with civil society actors. While such a perception enables 
them to criticize state actors in domains where they intervene too much, they 
are proud of the effectiveness of the Swiss state and proceed to legitimize state 
actors in general. Nonetheless, civil society actors remain relevant, insofar as 
they reduce state intervention. Indeed, they have to take care of crucial social 
needs and problems in various social domains. In addition, this legitimiza-
tion of civil society actors is not extended to protest organizations. In fact, 
Christian aid volunteers draw a clear line between social and political collec-
tive action. In their view, civil society actors, like Caritas, are there to manage 
social collective action, while political collective action should remain the 
task of political parties and officials. We have termed this understanding of 
politics a substitution for containment.
The second crucial question dealt with in this chapter was how activists’ 
understandings of politics orient them toward specific forms of action. How do 
understandings produce cognitive components linking perception to inten-
tionality? We differentiated between two cognitive mechanisms. The first tied 
understandings of state actors to action orientation. In fact, activists perceive 
the role of state actors in particular terms and evaluate them according to 
these standards. These understandings, accountability for moral voicing and 
union activists and containment for Christian aid activists, allowed them to 
establish a specific state relatedness: Those who criticized state actors for their 
lack of accountability for common good developed a conflictual relation to 
the state while those who legitimize state containment desire to complement 
state actors.
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The second cognitive mechanism that results from their understanding of 
civil society actors is the way activists define their role as citizens in the polit-
ical framework and influences whether they have a concern for politics. As we 
have shown, moral voicing activists and unionists believe they should inter-
vene in politics, resulting in a strong concern for politics. In their narratives, 
they stress that individuals should be politically vigilant and active in partici-
patory politics. Christian aid volunteers, however, want civil society actors to 
substitute for state actors and consequently, are not concerned with politics 
according to our definition. They operate on a representative idea of politics 
where political activity is restricted to traditional political participation. This 
evaluation is by no means negative on our behalf. Christian aid volunteers are 
interested in politics and participate in elections. Some are also members of a 
political party. Politics thus matters to them, but the way they perceive it differs 
completely from the perception of moral voicing activists and unionists.
Understandings of politics are central for all three types of activists to un-
derstand why they are oriented toward specific forms of action. Those who 
combine a conflictual relation to state actors with a participative ideal of cit-
izenship seek to challenge state actors and are accordingly oriented toward 
contentious politics. This applies to moral voicing activists and unionists. 
Following our interpretation, it is the communitarian perception of so-
ciety that ties unionists to defend only their own group rights. Christian aid 
volunteers have a complementary relation to state actors and are not con-
cerned with politics. Therefore, they want to substitute their own services for 
state actors’ responsibilities in the services area, which orients them toward 
volunteerism.
As summarized in Figure 5.6,  chapters 4 and 5 argued that to understand 
activists’ action orientation, we need to look at broad cognitions as they delin-
eate specific cognitive paths that set their intentionality. While there are sim-
ilar cognitive mechanisms linking perception of common good and politics 
to intentionality, the variation in the way activists perceive these two broad 
dimensions results in different intentionalities. Figure 5.6 displays why moral 
voicing activists, Christian aid volunteers, and unionists are oriented toward 
specific groups (for whom), for a specific issue (for what), within a given field 
(in which field), and for a particular form of action. These are the cognitive 
processes that allow activists to sustain their commitment. It summarizes 
three main claims of this book: first, which types of understandings are im-
portant; second, which types of cognitive links are constructed; and third, 
how this inner world sets an activist’s intentionality.
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Activists’ understanding of common good is a crucial element of their 
mental world. Their perception of society allows them to make two cogni-
tive linkages: It configures how they perceive other groups within their so-
ciety (otherness) and accordingly, whom they should mobilize for. It also 
influences their level of concern for the common good and thereby directs 
their intention on the object of mobilization. Next, their perception of good-
ness enables them to attribute responsibility, which provides them with the 
intention related to the field they should mobilize in. Finally, their percep-
tion of politics helps them develop different meanings for the two cognitive 
components— state relatedness (or relation to the state) and concern for 
politics— which in turn orients them toward specific forms of action.
More generally  chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that Gamson’s action frames 
are insufficient when it comes to understanding how an individual can be 
oriented toward collective action and how these commitments are sustained. 
This does not mean, of course, that these three dimensions are not important. 
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Figure 5.6 Summary of the cognitive mechanisms that bind the activists’ 
perception of common good and politics to their intentionality
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Injustice, identity, and agency frames appeared consistently in accounts and, 
therefore, certainly play an important role in understanding how individ-
uals decide on their intentions. In Chapter 4, we saw that social problems 
are framed either as injustices or as care problems. Gamson was therefore 
correct in highlighting that for contentious politics, issues are constructed in 
terms of injustice. Moral voicing activists, as well as unionists, perceive social 
problems as injustices. However, narratives by Christian aid volunteers dem-
onstrate that injustice is not the only way to frame a social problem. Instead, 
a social care frame can also constitute a mobilizing factor.
Further, activists’ understandings of politics analyzed in this chapter 
clearly reveal the presence of agency and identity frames for all activists. 
Agency frames exist in activists’ narratives, through the development of a 
sense of individual efficacy. All believe that their contribution is of some 
value, either by supporting collective action financially (passive members), 
or through their own active contribution (active members). In other words, 
they all have developed an understanding of the importance of their con-
tribution toward social change or their offer to help and support people in 
need. This is most visible in their concern for politics, when activists stress 
the importance of participating in either volunteer or contentious action. 
However, this feeling of individual efficiency is mediated through a collective 
sense of empowerment: Numbers count. It is only through their respective 
groups that they believe individuals can change the world. Collective and in-
dividual efficiency are hence important in understanding how activists sus-
tain commitments and how their intentionality is set. Yet, this is only a part 
of the cognitive mechanism guiding their understanding of politics toward 
specific forms of collective action.
The same is true for their identity frame. Returning to the narratives 
presented in this chapter enabled us to see how activists differentiated be-
tween their social group and others. They frequently mentioned how they 
identify with the group or the community they mobilize for and delimitation 
occurred naturally. For moral voicing activists and unionists, state actors 
constitute the opposition. The state is also a significant other for Christian 
aid volunteers. However, the way in which state actors are perceived differs. 
Activists’ identity frames are thus made up through their understandings 
of common good and politics. These perceptions define personal identities 
and delimit boundaries between social actors. Injustice, agency, and iden-
tity frames are thus crucial cognitive dimensions for understanding activists’ 
action orientation and how commitment is sustained. However, activists’ 
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minds are cognitively more complex than social movement scholars have ac-
knowledged so far. Primarily, we saw how their understandings of common 
good and politics, together with their complex cognitive linkages to specific 
mental components, orients their action toward specific collective endeavors.
The findings of  chapters 4 and 5 have two additional implications. First, 
they demonstrate the variation of activists’ understandings empirically. We 
can therefore establish that a plurality of activists’ mindsets exists across dif-
ferent activist communities. We also showed that shared understandings 
exist within the moral voicing community as well as between active and 
passive members involved in the same commitment site. Theoretically, this 
implies that ongoing interactions in these communities lead to the develop-
ment of shared understandings, which then enables activists to perform col-
lective action. We return to this theoretical implication in Chapter 6.
Further, our findings concerning the level of concern for common good 
and politics also has implications for political citizenship. As we see in 
Figure 5.7, not all activists are cognitively strong citizens. In fact, different 
types of activists have various ideas of their role as citizens. It therefore 
appears that every community constructs different democratic cultures, 
disseminates these ideas through their actions in society, and contributes in 
a specific way to the democratic life in a country. To borrow the words of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Not all activists “drive a spoke into the wheel” in order 
to keep society rolling, some also keep “bandaging the wound of victims.” 
Different understandings lead to different action orientations.
Moral voicing activists are concerned by both common good and politics. 

















Figure 5.7 Are all activists strong citizens?
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upper left square in Figure 5.7. Christian aid volunteers are, as we label them, 
social citizens. They have a concern for common good but not for politics, 
which prevents them from engaging in contentious action as moral voicing 
activists or unionists do. While unionists are concerned with politics, they 
are not concerned with common good. They are resistant citizens, driven by 
their intention to protect their own group rights. Finally, in the lower right 
corner, we find what we would call weak citizens. For individuals without a 
concern for either common good or politics it will be difficult to participate 
in collective action: either volunteering or protest action. This last category is 
not a result of our empirical analysis but a conclusion we draw on the basis of 
the analysis of activists’ narratives studied here. If weak citizens really exist, 
the intentions they develop would require further research.
Chapters 4 and 5 provided us with a lot of answers but, as is always the 
case, they opened other questions. Why does an activist’s mind different 
from one commitment site to another? How do we explain these variations? 
And what about individuals engaged in multiple communities? How do 
cross- pressured interactions in plural communities impact activists’ under-
standing of common good and politics? All these questions direct us toward 
a relational explanation. We therefore turn to the meaning of social networks 
in Chapter 6.
Contentious Minds. Florence Passy and Gian-Andrea Monsch, Oxford University Press (2020). 




Transactions, interactions, social ties, and conversations constitute 
the central stuff of social life.
Charles Tilly
The activist’s mind is nourished by specific worldviews. It departs from the 
mindset of the wider population, as we saw in Chapter 3. It also appears as dis-
tinct from one commitment site to another. As underlined in  chapters 4 and 
5, moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists do not perceive 
common good and politics through the same lens. Activists’ cognitive maps 
are dissimilar. This is the central finding derived from previous analyses. The 
second finding is that activists who evolve in the same commitment site rely 
on a synchronized cognitive map. Their understandings of common good 
and politics overlap. However, the views they share do not mean that their 
cognitive maps are homogenous; they are simply synchronized. Individuals 
mobilized in the same commitment community do not form a homogenous 
group; idiosyncrasies exist. As the previous accounts have shown, activists 
often express themselves with different words to emphasize their relation to 
common good and politics. Individuals, whether they are activists or not, 
are engaged in multiple interactions and in different life spheres. These webs 
of interactions shape their minds and make an individual a complex person 
with a multifaceted mindset. Therefore, we did not find homogeneity, but 
rather activists who are “looking in the same direction.”
The aim of this chapter is to explain these findings. Why do activists’ 
minds differ from one commitment site to another? And why is an activist’s 
mind synchronized with the minds of people in the same commitment com-
munity? In other terms, how could we explain variations between communi-
ties and synchronization within the same commitment site? In this chapter, 
we move from a primary description highlighting activists’ understandings 
of common good and politics to the explanation of why such worldviews are 
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present in their minds. To borrow from Bunge (2004), we move from “how it 
is” to “how does it work” as we now look for explanatory mechanisms.
In Chapter 2, we saw with Searle (2004) that the qualitative experience 
of the world feeds human minds and sets human intentionality. However, 
Searle remains silent as to what mechanisms allow for the translation of 
qualitative experience into human minds. We know from psychologists 
and sociologists that we experience the world through our interactions with 
others. For psychologists, child development is possible due to the child’s 
interactions with his or her close surroundings. As Trevarthen (1979) shows, 
in the very first moments of a baby’s life, interactions with parents instantly 
shape the child’s mind and ensure his or her first intersubjective experiences. 
Sociologists who have emphasized the central role of interactions on the 
mind- shaping process have also underlined this view (e.g., Blumer 1969; 
Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1967; Mead 1934; Schutz 1932). Both psychologists 
and sociologists agree that we experience the world through our interactions. 
“Transactions, interactions, social ties, and conversations constitute the cen-
tral stuff of social life,” as Tilly (2004) reminds us. Throughout his work, Tilly 
clearly states that “if social construction occurs, it happens socially, not in 
the isolated recess of individual minds” (Tilly 2005, 59– 60). Individuals ex-
perience fluxes of interaction with others and these interactions allow them 
to define who they are, to adjust the boundaries they occupy, to modify 
understandings by selecting and transforming available scripts, and to invent 
new forms of being, feeling, seeing, and acting (Tilly 2004, 2005). Hence, our 
explanation of the differences between activists’ minds from one commit-
ment site to another, and why minds are synchronized for participants in the 
same commitment community must be understood in terms of relationality. 
Communicational interactions shape, and reshape, an activist’s mind. 
Those interactions take place within each commitment context and feed 
the activist’s cognitive toolkit with specific cultural and cognitive elements. 
Networks can be viewed as “islands of meanings,” as White (1992) reminds 
us, and those islands of meanings are different from one commitment site to 
another. But how do interactions actually shape an activist’s mind?
Activists committed in moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voi-
cing evolve in different commitment communities. In fact, they evolve in 
a specific cognitive world as stories, narratives, identities, and worldviews 
circulate in each community. Communities therefore rely on distinguish-
able cultural practices, and these constitute meaningful universes in which 
activists evolve and interact. Participants interact within a social site laden 
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with specific cultural scripts and progressively adopt them through prac-
tice leading to a synchronization of their views with those of fellow activists. 
However, synchronization is a dynamic and negotiated process mobilizing 
the actor’s agency. First, it is a dynamic process whereby multiple and often 
contradictory scripts circulate within a commitment community. Moreover, 
scripts transform over time through interactions and external events. 
Consequently, individuals need to make sense for themselves of multiple and 
transforming meanings, and their agency is at stake. Second, individuals do 
not practice cultural scripts in only one social site but evolve in multiple so-
cial sites laden with cultural scripts. As discussed in previous work, activists 
evolve in various life spheres (e.g., family, work, friends, leisure, politics), and 
conversational interactions that take place in each of these life spheres enrich 
their personal toolkit with specific meanings (Passy 1998a; Passy and Giugni 
2000). Therefore, they are exposed to diverse and contradictory meanings. 
They must negotiate these meanings to construct their own. This process 
relies on creativity. The consequence of this dynamic and negotiated process 
is that the synchronization of the activists’ cognitive map can be neither ho-
mogenous nor stable over time.
In Chapter 2, we noted that social movement scholars attempt to specify 
what networks really mean and how they matter in social processes, following 
Wellman’s advice to move “from metaphor to substance” (Diani and McAdam 
2003). Two heuristic moves were undertaken:  a move from “networks to 
relational mechanisms,” and a move from “structure to meanings.” In pre-
vious work, we have endorsed those heuristic concerns in the study of indi-
vidual participation in contentious politics (Passy 1998a, 2001, 2003). First, 
we sought to disentangle the relational mechanisms at work in an activist’s 
participation process. As social movement scholars, we know that social 
networks matter, but the question is how do they matter? Second, we exam-
ined not only the structural and instrumental impact of networks but also 
their constructivist effects in shaping the activists’ meanings, the effect of 
networks as “islands of meanings.”
The empirical findings from our study of activists committed in the Bern 
Declaration and WWF demonstrated that before deciding to take part in 
contentious activities, they experience three distinct social mechanisms 
(Passy 1998a, 2001, 2003). First, a socialization mechanism is at work. Once 
individuals evolve in networks close to a specific political issue, they enter 
communicational interactions that allow them to redefine their worldviews. 
More precisely, those interactions build and strengthen an individual’s 
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identity, and create and solidify the person’s consciousness regarding a given 
political issue. Conversational interactions hence create or reinforce initial 
dispositions to participate by developing and reinforcing specific meanings. 
This is the first constructivist mechanism. Second, networks influence an 
individual’s decision to become a participant in contentious activities by 
giving someone who is sensitive to a political issue a concrete opportunity 
to participate. This mediating and structural mechanism ensures that poten-
tial activists can convert their initial dispositions toward participation in ac-
tion.1 Finally, networks intervene at the very end of the decision process by a 
decision- shaping mechanism. Before activists actualize their potential for par-
ticipating in a specific contention, they make a series of decisions. They assess 
various parameters pertaining to the protest itself (e.g., the risks involved, the 
chances of success, the likelihood of government reform in the absence of 
protest), and their willingness to take action (e.g., the utility of their involve-
ment in bringing about social change, assessment of their biographical avail-
abilities2). Contrary to what rational choice theorists think, individuals do 
not make isolated and autonomous decisions. Conversational interactions 
taking place in an individual’s formal and informal networks affect the as-
sessment of their preferences, which, in fine, enable the individual to act. This 
last relational mechanism, which enables potential activists to convert their 
readiness to take action into effective participation, is also a constructivist 
mechanism that stresses how networks form “islands of meanings.”
Three mechanisms are singled out amid this work: Socialization, medi-
ating, and decision- shaping mechanisms. Among those three relational 
mechanisms that impact n contentious participation and the intensity of 
activists’ commitment, two are of a constructivist nature: socialization, and 
decision- shaping mechanisms. This means that an “inter- animation of talk 
and ties” is at work (Mische and White 1998, 696), shaping minds accord-
ingly. Conversational interactions occur in the process of joining contention, 
and these happen before a person participates in a protest organization. In 
this book, the activists studied are already committed and are in the process 
of sustaining their participation. We will examine how communicational 
interactions enable them to sustain their commitment through synchroniza-
tion of meanings. Of course, this process is not the only one allowing them to 
 1 Activism is a “non- volitional action” (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Without an opportunity to act, 
the initial dispositions of an individual remain latent or unrealized.
 2 For the concept of biographical availability, see McAdam (1988) and Beyerlein and Bergstrand 
(2013).
240 Contentious Minds
sustain their commitment; we will discuss others in our final chapter. But the 
synchronization of minds is obviously an important element where networks 
as “islands of meanings” play a decisive role. But how do these networks 
come to matter? Through which relational mechanisms do networks nourish 
an activist’s mind?
In this chapter, we seek to trace the relational mechanisms at stake that 
enable the synchronization of activists’ understandings. Without a syn-
chronization of views on the social and political environment, joint action 
is improbable. Relational processes shape individuals’ minds to perform 
actions and to maintain their commitment. However, many relational 
mechanisms can potentially shape the activist’s mind as he or she has mul-
tiple opportunities for conversational interactions in the commitment com-
munity. Our purpose is not simply to emphasize that communicational 
interactions shape the activist’s cognitive map but rather to highlight which 
relational mechanisms actually feed their minds. Do some communica-
tional interactions impact the activist’s mind more than others? Three spe-
cific mechanisms pertaining to three distinct relational situations in which 
activists evolve will structure our analysis.
First, most activists are passive members who interact with fellow activists 
only indirectly, mainly through the discursive mediums of the organiza-
tion (newspapers or newsletters). Regarding these activists, we ask whether 
mediated communicational interactions are sufficient in the synchroniza-
tion of understandings, or if they are not. Do mediated or direct (face- to- face) 
relations play a similar role in shaping the activist’s mind? Second, many ac-
tive members engage in multiple communicational interactions within their 
commitment community. Some of them are members of various groups and 
have an interpersonal network tied to this community, while others interact 
only in one communicational sphere: the organization they were interviewed 
for. We examine whether a multiplicity of spheres of interaction is essential 
to nourish an activist’s cognitive map, or if exchanges that take place in one 
sphere are sufficient to synchronize an activist’s understandings. In other 
terms, we investigate whether redundancy and abundance of interactions 
are essential in shaping an activist’s mind, or if they are not. Finally, several 
activists are cross- committed in several commitment sites and therefore 
enjoy cross- pressure interactions. We explore the impact of such interaction 
on the activist’s mind. Specifically, we want to explain why cross- commitment 
produces synchronized understandings with one commitment community 
in certain situations, and constructs a blended mind that reflects the different 
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communities in which activists are committed in other instances. We there-
fore inquire into why cross- pressure interactions impact differently activists’ 
understandings of common good and politics, and highlight what relational 
mechanism is at work in the process.
The study of relational mechanisms is what concerns us here. The survey 
data will enable us to examine the importance and range of activists’ 
embeddedness in formal and interpersonal networks which ensure po-
tential communicational interactions in a given commitment commu-
nity. By contrast, qualitative data will show us the relational mechanisms 
that shape an activist’s cognitive map and allow us to disentangle processes 
and mechanisms at work. In this chapter, we rely mainly on cases— the 
activists interviewed— to emphasize the relational mechanisms. Here, the 
rationale is not statistical (how many activists are in such type of relational 
configurations) but rather to emphasize the social mechanisms at work, and 
qualitative data are suitable for this end. The cases we make use of to trace 
relational mechanisms are those of activists committed in Solidarity across 
Borders (SAB), Greenpeace, Caritas, and Unia whose narratives were previ-
ously analyzed in  chapters 4 and 5.3
Embeddedness and Conversational Interactions
Many relational paths can shape an activist’s mind. Within a commitment 
community, participants enjoy various opportunities to engage in communi-
cational interactions. They can also evolve in interpersonal networks tied to 
their commitment community: Friends, relatives, or acquaintances offer fur-
ther conversational interaction opportunities. Many relational mechanisms 
can potentially enable activists to synchronize their understandings of 
common good and politics. We must first examine the magnitude of oppor-
tunities for communicational interaction activists enjoy. In other terms, we 
need to understand their relational reality in order to map their conversa-
tional opportunities. Second, we must investigate whether activists are really 
engaged in communicational interactions. Criticism against studies on so-
cial networks has pointed out that embeddedness in networks does not mean 
that activists necessarily engage in communicational interactions. Indeed, 
most of the research on social networks, including our own work (Passy 
 3 Our body of cases is hence composed of twenty- four activists.
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2001, 2003; Passy and Monsch 2014), assumes that participants who take 
part in social networks are engaged in concrete interactions. But are they re-
ally in communicational interactions? Do they discuss, exchange ideas, and 
practice cultural scripts available in their commitment sites? Before exam-
ining the relational mechanisms that can shape an activist’s mind, let us first 
examine the activist’s relational reality and then assess whether they are en-
gaged in real conversations.
Relational Reality
Beyond their participation in Solidarity across Borders (SAB), Society for 
Threatened Peoples (STP), Greenpeace, Caritas, and Unia, we would like to 
know whether activists benefit from other relational spheres that can shape 
their minds within their respective commitment community. To identify 
activists’ relational reality, we use the survey data that guarantees statistical 
representativeness.
First, let us consider embeddedness in formal networks. The matter here 
is to know whether activists enjoy potential conversational interactions 
in organizational networks. Along with their commitment in SAB, STP, 
Greenpeace, Caritas, and Unia, do activists participate in other organiza-
tions of their respective commitment community? As shown in Table 6.1, 
the answer to this question is clearly yes: Commitment in formal networks 
is fairly important and many participants have a plural commitment within 
the same community. One out of two moral voicing activists participates in 
other organizations linked to post- industrial contention. Around 40 percent 
of unionists are committed in other workers’ voicing groups, and a third of 
Christian aid participants are involved in other volunteering associations. 
Hence, between 30 to 60  percent of the activists are engaged in multiple 
formal spheres where they have communicational interactions with other 
activists. We also show that SAB and Unia active members benefit from a 
wider embeddedness in formal networks than do passive activists. By con-
trast, for Greenpeace activists and Caritas volunteers, the passive members 
are the ones who are slightly more embedded in formal networks in their 
respective commitment community. Differences between active and passive 
members aside, the statistics show that a large proportion of moral voicing, 
Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists experience other opportunities 
to engage in communicational interactions within their commitment site.
Table 6.1 Current Embeddedness in Formal and Interpersonal Networks of Moral 
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Note: SAB= Solidarity across Borders, STP= Society for Threatened Peoples, GP= Greenpeace.
We measured activists’ embeddedness in formal networks with the following questions: “Here is a list of 
associations/ groups. Could you tell us if, today, you are committed to these associations?” Embeddedness in 
informal networks is measured with the question: “Would you say that your close friends, acquaintances, and 
family members are sensitive to, or aware of, the problem of [migrants’ rights; autochthonous population rights; 
environmental protection; poverty; workers’ rights]?” For each type of network (close friends; acquaintances, 
neighbors, co- workers; and relatives) we asked how sensitive people were to the social problem using 
a five points ordinary scale. Cramer’s’ V compared active members with passive ones; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001.
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While embeddedness in formal networks is important for a large 
number of activists, opportunities for conversational interactions about 
social problems occur in their interpersonal networks also. As shown in 
Table 6.1, only 1 to 10 percent of activists do not have ties among their 
friends, acquaintances, and family members that can bind them to their 
commitment site. In other words, about 90 percent of the activists com-
mitted to moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing declare that 
their interpersonal network is either sensitized to the social problems their 
respective commitment community addresses or are committed to this 
community as well. This finding reveals that almost all activists have an 
interpersonal environment where they can discuss the issues of their com-
mitment community. Moreover, as Table 6.1 emphasizes, liked- minded 
people constitute strong ties, being either close friends or family members. 
In their private sphere, activists therefore have relations with whom they 
can discuss strategies, issues, and views. Those exchanges are genuine 
and probably frequent, as they take place with close friends or relatives. 
Another important finding that emerges from the statistics is that passive 
members benefit from a similar relational context. Despite never engaging 
in an active process of commitment, their interpersonal network is, like 
that of active members, full of people close to their commitment commu-
nity. Hence, passive members benefit from large opportunities to have con-
versational interactions.
Moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists benefit from 
numerous opportunities to engage in communicational interactions in their 
respective commitment site, either in formal or interpersonal networks. 
Actually, the number of opportunities for communicational interactions is 
impressive. As highlighted at the bottom of Table 6.1, between 1 and 6 per-
cent of activists have no other spheres of interaction than the organization 
they were interviewed for. This percentage is perhaps slightly overestimated;4 
however, these findings are not exceptional. We found similar results in pre-
vious studies (Passy 1998b, 2001, 2003). Other scholars have obtained results 
that point in the same direction, specifically for forms of activism that are for-
malized and as well established as the ones studied here (see Diani 2011 for 
an overview on the topic studies). Moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ 
 4 The overestimation is due to the interpersonal network indicators which do not distinguish be-
tween individuals who are sensitized to the aims of the commitment community and individuals 
who are actually committed to this community.
Networks as “Islands of Meanings” 245
voicing activists are largely embedded in networks close to their commit-
ment site. But do they really exchange ideas and opinions with their fellow 
activists, friends, and relatives?
Real Interaction?
Active members who organize public campaigns and rallies are part of the 
committee or working groups and are committed to various activities of their 
organization; obviously they interact within the organization. They enjoy an 
ongoing communicational process with peers based on the exchange of ideas 
and the elaboration of collective action frames. These ongoing conversations 
in their respective organization shape their cognitive maps. By practicing the 
scripts available, their minds are nourished by new cognitive elements. As we 
see in Table 6.2, all active members interviewed enjoy frequent face- to- face 
interactions with other active members of SAB, Greenpeace, Caritas, and 
Unia, respectively. In their narratives, all emphasized how important those 
conversations are. Christine, who is actively committed in Caritas, clearly 
underlines those influences on her mind: “You know at first I just wanted 
to get involved as a volunteer. My children left home and I wanted to invest 
my time in a cause. When I joined Caritas, I didn’t really think why I would 
commit to helping people in need. Once I was committed, I started to read 
Caritas’s reports and the newspaper, but I  was also in contact with other 
volunteers. I was first active in the group responsible for the distribution of 
clothing, then I joined the Caritas committee. Thanks to those contacts and 
exchanges, I realized what my commitment means. Helping others— people 
in distress— became central.” Lisa, a pro- migrant volunteer, also became 
aware of many issues pertaining to migrants’ rights through conversations 
with her fellow activists: “I learned a lot when I joined the organization— how 
to provide legal aid to asylum seekers, for example. But I also became aware 
of various migration issues, such as the awful living conditions of asylum 
seekers and state violence against migrants. Actually, I learned, and still learn 
a lot from the volunteer lawyers: We exchange a lot. It’s nice, but also ex-
tremely informative. Those exchanges obviously shaped, and still shape, my 
understanding of what the defense of migrants’ rights is, and more generally 
what the real problems of migration and asylum are.”
Within their respective organizations, active members benefit from many 
opportunities to engage in communicational interactions: committees, think 
Table 6.2 Current Communicational Interactions of Active and Passive Members 
in Their Respective Commitment Communities
Communicational interactions
Activists Committed to In their respective 
organization




Adriana SAB X X X
Lisa SAB X X X
Simone SAB X X X
Nathan Greenpeace X X — 
Pierrette Greenpeace X X — 
Margot Greenpeace X X X
Joao Unia X X — 
Nuno Unia X X — 
Eva Unia X — — 
Tiago Unia X — — 
Mathieu Caritas X X X
Elisabeth Caritas X X X
Christine Caritas X — — 
Passive members
Colette SAB x X X
Wilhelm SAB x X X
Yan SAB x X X
Evelyne Greenpeace x X — 
Maria Greenpeace x X X
Yves Greenpeace x — — 
André Unia x X X
Sarah Unia x X — 
Edwige Caritas x X X
Emmanuelle Caritas x X — 
Jérémie Caritas x X X
Note: SAB= Solidarity across Borders.
“X” (bold capital letter) highlights direct communicational interactions (or face- to- face interactions), 
and “x” (lowercase letter) mediated communicational interactions (via the organization newspapers/ 
newsletters).
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tanks, training groups, working groups, and so forth. Margot, a Greenpeace 
activist, explains how this communicational dynamic works: “In Greenpeace, 
we discuss things a lot and we educate ourselves too. A few years ago, I visited 
a nuclear power plant with one of our members, Juan, who is a physicist. We 
were a bunch of people from Greenpeace who wanted to know more about 
nuclear plants and talk with the people working in them. After that, we met 
with Juan regularly: We exchanged on environmental matters, among other 
issues. I learn a lot from him, but also from exchanges I have with the profes-
sional staff. We always have long and deep exchanges within the small group 
of activists in charge of ‘direct actions.’ ”5 To become part of these groups, we 
first follow an extensive training. Then, we prepare for each action with two 
or three prior meetings. The day before a direct action, we spend the eve-
ning and the night together to mentally prepare ourselves to committing il-
legal, and sometimes risky, actions. We always have a debrief after the action. 
Finally, being in charge of environmental education at schools, I am also part 
of a working group where we often exchange. We discuss ways in which to 
present social problems to pupils, to inform them about our action, about 
who we are, etc. So, obviously we exchange a lot among activists [laugh].”
Exchanges with peers also reinforce, or reorganize, existing cognitive 
components. We find many evidences of this, as Nuno, an active member of 
Unia, stated: “Once you’re involved, obviously you have a lot of exchanges: I 
know a lot of unionists in Unia, but in other unions too. We constantly talk 
with each other. Those people are very important to me because I  learn a 
lot by discussing issues with them. It’s also through such exchanges that my 
working- class consciousness is strengthened. I have always been aware of 
belonging to the working class, even before joining Unia. However, this con-
sciousness developed and deepened thanks to my union friends and to our 
exchanges.”
For active members, communications within their organization con-
stitute an important sphere of interaction. As shown in Table 6.2, all active 
members interviewed are involved in such discursive exchanges. This table 
also demonstrates that most active members are also engaged in face- to- face 
interactions in their interpersonal network, either with friends or relatives. 
Conversations about issues, strategies, commitment, understanding, and the 
perception of others related to their commitment community occur in this 
 5 “Direct actions” are disruptive and illegal actions, as climbing on nuclear plants buildings, 
blocking trains carrying nuclear waste, clambering out of oil platforms, etc.
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network too. For many active members, a participant met they meet during 
joint action often becomes a close friend, and discussions about issues that 
relate to their activism occur outside sites of formal activism. Nuno told us 
how important unionists are in his life. During the interview, he said: “Many 
of them are close friends: They mean a lot for me. And, of course, when we 
meet we talk about Unia, Unionism, politics, and many other related issues. 
I enjoy those exchanges!” Simone, a pro- migrant activist, describes a similar 
situation: “You know, I made real friends in this group. Now, those people are 
part of my closest friends, and my husband knows my fellow activists very 
well. We meet frequently and of course, we talk about many things but also 
about our commitment [laugh].” Mathieu, a member of Caritas, tells a sim-
ilar story: “I’ve a very diverse network of friends, but you know, my closest 
friends are those I have made through Caritas. Those are old friends, and we 
share a lot together. We talk about everything: Our commitment in Caritas, 
social issues, but also about our lives. When I am facing a problem in my life 
or need advice, I call them straightaway.”
The interpersonal network of active participants is replete with friends 
who are committed in the same commitment site, but with relatives too. 
Mathieu also explains that “I met my second wife in Caritas, and share every-
thing with her. It’s fabulous! We have the same values and share a strong com-
mitment in Caritas. Of course, sometimes we disagree on issues and, because 
both of us have strong personalities, we may yell at each other [laugh]. But 
basically we see the world in the same way. Her respect for others never fails 
to fascinate me. I really admire her. I can debate for hours on end with her.” 
Simone shares a similar account:  “My husband understands my commit-
ment to migrants’ rights. He was committed to refugees and human rights 
and together we also opposed nuclear energy. Those issues are part of our life, 
and we have had many discussions about migration, social justice, ecology, 
etc. My brother- in- law is highly active too: He was a key figure in human 
rights in Geneva for many years. I still debate a lot with my husband and 
brother- in- law, and also love to talk with my son. He is a marine biologist, 
and in a couple of days, will embark on a ship belonging to several ecologist 
associations to investigate plankton levels in oceans. I love talking about en-
vironmental protection and global warming with him, asking him how we 
could redress these problems. Our family dinners are exciting events!”
Active members engage in communicational interactions with their com-
mitment community, both within the organization for which they commit 
and also often within their interpersonal network. But what about passive 
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members who do not benefit from direct interactions within the organization 
for which they mobilize? As indicated with the survey data, most of them 
are sensitized and evolve in an interpersonal network or,are often engaged in 
their commitment community. But do they really interact with those friends 
and relatives on issues pertaining to their commitment? In Table 6.2, we see 
that the passive members interviewed often have direct communicational 
interactions in their private sphere, with friends and for some with family 
members. They exchange ideas and practice cultural scripts available in their 
respective commitment community within their interpersonal network.
Colette, a passive member of various moral voicing groups, explains how 
important interactions in her interpersonal network are: “I met Jacqueline at 
my workplace; she was a lab technician like me. She and her husband were 
committed to defending human rights their whole lives. We became friends 
straightaway. We have many views in common and above all, a concern for 
justice. Actually, I supported many political battles thanks to them, such as 
the Anti- Apartheid movement and Amnesty International. Another couple 
of friends, Manon and Fernando, help people in developing countries, and 
for several years now, have been committed to improving children’s educa-
tion in Colombia. We all share the same ideals. They are really good friends, 
and we debate about politics and our commitments on a regular basis. Oh, 
but not all my friends are sensitive to these issues [laugh]! However, social 
justice is a concern to some of them, and a few are politically committed. My 
son worked at the International Red Cross to protect refugees. Each time he 
returned from his missions, we talked about his experiences and his frustra-
tion, because of the thousands of refugees he saw, but whom he could do little 
for in the end. Nowadays, Tristan does not work for the Red Cross anymore, 
but those issues still concern him, and I know that he supports some organi-
zations. Tristan was always sensitive to my commitment; maybe I influenced 
him— who knows [laugh].”
Those face- to- face interactions are not specific to moral voicing activists. 
Indeed, workers’ voicing activists are also engaged in conversational 
interactions in their interpersonal networks. When they have friends or 
relatives who are sensitive or committed in the commitment site, they discuss 
their own commitments with them. For example, André tells us: “I met my wife 
at my workplace. She was unionized before I was. She played an important role 
in bringing me closer to the union. My father played an important role too. He 
was never an active member in unions but regularly followed meetings at his 
workplace. When he came back home, he always spoke about the meetings and 
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discussions. He always told me that if we aren’t aware of our rights, employers 
would take advantage of our ignorance. I started to be interested in those issues 
and my father incited me to join Unia. Today, I still talk a lot with my father, my 
wife, and some unionized co- workers. We question our work situations, com-
pany outsourcing, and work agreements in our branch.”
Passive members interact within their interpersonal network in Caritas too. 
Emmanuelle has friends who are passive and active members in Christian aid 
associations. She discusses their commitment and the situation of poor people 
they are committed to:  “Sometimes, we think about the Caritas newspaper, 
or some articles we have read in it.” For about a year, she has given a helping 
hand to friends who run a market and sell products to provide money to a small 
Christian aid group: “It’s fun. I go there once a month. We have a nice time to-
gether. We discuss our lives, our families, grandchildren, but also our commit-
ment. I like those moments.” Many other accounts show that passive members 
are engaged in conversational interaction within their interpersonal networks.
As we see in Table 6.2, when passive members have friends who are 
sensitive to the social issues related to their commitment site, real ex-
change occurs. At this point, a new question arises: Given the face- to- face 
interactions in their interpersonal network, why do passive members remain 
passive? Three elements can help explain their low level of commitment. 
First, they may have no biographical availability to engage actively in a com-
mitment community. However, statistical findings raise some doubts about 
this hypothesis.6 Second, as we have underscored in previous work (Passy 
1998a, 1998b, 2003), once an activist recruits members, the latter tend to join 
into activities with a high intensity of commitment. In a similar vein, once an 
active member recruits them, members commit with intensity. Here again, 
our statistics show that passive members of moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
workers’ voicing activists are offered fewer opportunities to commit through 
such ties (Passy and Monsch 2014). Finally, in our previous work, we also 
found that perceived personal efficacy to bring about social change (the 
feeling that commitment successfully translates into social change) increases 
an activist’s level of commitment. The analysis of survey data also shows that 
passive members are less confident than active members when it comes to 
 6 Three indicators weaken the argument of biographical availability. First, only in Greenpeace do 
active members have fewer children at home than passive members (Pearson’s r: −.24***). Second, 
only for Caritas do we find that fewer active members are employed than passive members (−.17**). 
Third, only in Greenpeace are there fewer unmarried active members than passive members 
(−.25***). Active and passive members in the other organizations do not differ significantly for these 
indicators.
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social change. Like active members, they trust the organization they mobi-
lized for to bring such social changes about (see Chapter 3), but they are less 
confident that their personal commitment will contribute toward change. 
These three factors help us make sense of why passive members, who evolve 
in dense conversational interactions, remain passive activists.
A huge proportion of activists, active as well as passive members, are 
embedded in social networks, and specifically interpersonal ones (around 
90 percent of them). This level of embeddedness in networks allows them 
to practice the scripts available in their commitment community and this 
could enable a synchronization of their views on common good and poli-
tics. Furthermore, active members enjoy various opportunities to engage 
in communicational interactions within their respective commitment com-
munities through formal and interpersonal networks. Finally, we saw that 
activists are concretely engaged in conversational interactions. They dis-
cuss, debate, and exchange with their fellow activists either in the organ-
ization for which they mobilize or within their interpersonal networks, 
or both. Many relational paths can therefore shape and synchronize their 
minds. We must now investigate the relational mechanisms that actually en-
able this synchronization.
Mediated Interactions
A relational path that bears the potential to shape the activist’s mind involves 
mediated interactions. Such interactions do not engage activists in direct, 
or face- to- face, communication, but are indirect, such as the newspapers 
and newsletters published by the organization. The organization’s written 
production conveys meanings, stories, and collective worldviews that can 
play an important role in shaping the activist’s mind. But does such mate-
rial lead to synchronized views with other activists? Passive members are the 
participants generally involved with mediated interactions. As they simply 
support the commitment effort through money donation, they do not en-
gage in direct interactions with active members of the organization (as shown 
above in Table 6.2). However, as previously discussed, passive members have 
an interpersonal network of friends and relatives who are sensitized or com-
mitted (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). The question is now whether mediated 
communicational interactions are able to shape the activist’s mind, or if only 
direct interactions that take place in their interpersonal network are able to 
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synchronize their views with the views of other activists on common good 
and politics.
To address this issue, we must first examine whether activists read the dis-
cursive outcomes produced by the organization they mobilize for. Through 
this material (newspapers, pamphlets, or newsletters), passive members 
are engaged in mediated interactions with their respective commitment 
communities, indirectly practicing cultural scripts that circulate within it. 
Statistics shown in Table 6.3 reveal that almost all passive members interact 
with their community through the written material.7 About 80 percent of 
them regularly read the material produced by the organization they support. 
Like active members, passive supporters read the material of their respective 
organizations.8 Narrative analysis reveals similar findings. Passive members 
are therefore in contact with the stories, narratives, and worldviews of the or-
ganization they supply financial support for and indirectly practice the cul-
tural scripts made available in their commitment site. But do those mediated 
interactions shape their minds? As a large proportion of passive members 
have discussions within their interpersonal network about issues impor-
tant to them (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), the role of mediated interactions in 
shaping activists’ cognitive maps remains open. The relational mechanisms 
shaping minds should be untangled: Are they mediated interactions or direct 
interactions in their interpersonal networks? To sort out which relational 
mechanism is at work, we rely on our cases.
As shown in Table 6.4, all passive members interviewed engage in both 
mediated and direct interactions in their respective communities, except in 
one instance: Yves. This Greenpeace supporter has no tie with his conten-
tious community, other than the ecological organization. He does not sup-
port other moral voicing groups, and has no friend, acquaintance, or relative 
 7 Unfortunately, we do not have comparative indicators. At the end of our survey, we provided a 
free space where each organization could ask questions useful for their mobilizing work. All of them 
used this space to assess the consumption of their discursive material. However, questions were for-
mulated differently among organizations. SAB and Caritas asked their members whether they receive 
their newspaper without asking if they read it. Greenpeace and Unia asked their members whether 
they read their newspaper, webpage, and newsletter. Finally, STP asked their activists whether they 
receive and read their information sources (newspaper, webpage, and newsletter). By comparing re-
ceiving and reading practices among activists, and specifically with the help of STP statistics, we are 
assured that our distinct indicators are still valid for all activists compared in this analysis. First, as 
shown in Table 6.3, the percentage of STP activists receiving the discursive production is similar 
to the percentage we found for SAB and Caritas (more than 80 percent). Second, the percentage of 
reading practices is highly similar for activists committed in STP, Greenpeace, and Unia. We deduce 
from those results that SAB and Caritas participants should have reading practices fairly similar to 
those of the other activists studied in this research.
 8 Cramers’ V are statistically insignificant.
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Table 6.3 Percentages of Passive Members Who Receive and Read Discursive 
Information (Newspapers or Newsletters) Published by the Organization 








SAB STP GP Caritas Unia
% % % % %
Reception of newspapers 83 79 — 89 — 
Reading of newspapers — 79 82 — 87
(n) 299 385 487 247 427
Commitment intensity 
(Cramer’s V)
ns — ns .14** .22***
Note: SAB= Solidarity across Borders, STP= Society for Threatened Peoples, GP= Greenpeace.
The question for SAB activists was the following: “SAB produces an electronic newsletter and a trimes-
tral bulletin. Do you receive it?” The percentage represents the number of individuals who receive at 
least one form of information.
For STP members, three sets of questions were asked: (1) “STP publishes the journal “Voice” twice 
a year. Do you receive it? Do you read it?” (2) “Do you know the STP webpage? Do you read it?” (3) “Do 
you know about the STP newsletter? Do you read it?” The first percentage represents the number of 
individuals who receive at least one source of information, and the second one the number of people 
who regularly (or very regularly) read at least one source of information.
For Greenpeace activists, we relied on the following question: “Greenpeace uses several sources 
to inform its members. Please indicate for each source (journal, webpage, newsletter) if you use it very 
regularly, rather regularly, rarely or never to be informed on environmental issues.” The percentage 
represents the number of individuals who use at least one information source regularly or very 
regularly to be informed on environmental issues. The same question and indicator was used for 
Greenpeace and UNIA activists.
Finally, for Caritas volunteers, the question was: “Caritas publishes the journal Caritas. Do you 
receive it?” Cramer’s V compared active members with passive ones; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
who participates in moral voicing activities. Yves is isolated from this com-
mitment community. He has communicational interaction with the moral 
voicing community only indirectly, through the Greenpeace written mate-
rial. We know that Yves frequently reads the organization’s newspaper and 
that this reading enlarges his knowledge about environmental issues:  “I 
joined Greenpeace because I was worried about the destruction of my nat-
ural surroundings, specifically the forest where I grew up. I was also con-
cerned by the extinction of species, but not that much. Before I  started 
reading the Greenpeace newspaper, I  wasn’t aware about nuclear waste, 
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renewable energy, or about over- fishing and its consequences. I learn many 
things reading the newspaper.”
Mediated interaction enables him to enlarge his knowledge about envi-
ronmental issues, but does it allow him to synchronize his understandings 
of common good and politics with his commitment? The answer is no. As 
we underlined in  chapters 4 and 5, Yves neither relies on a universal social 
justice understanding of common good nor perceives politics as a field of 
intervention to increase state actors’ accountability, as is the case for other 
moral voicing activists. He has no shared understandings with the moral 
voicing community, nor do his views on both dimensions overlap with other 
Greenpeace activists and moral voicing activists (Table 6.4). Maria and 
Evelyne, who are passive members in Greenpeace, and Colette, Wilhelm, 
and Yan who are financially committed to defending migrants’ rights all rely 
on shared understandings of common good and politics. While their views 
are synchronized with the views of the moral voicing community for which 
they mobilize, Yves’s is not.
As we see in Table 6.4, besides mediated interaction with their commit-
ment community, passive members committed in moral voicing activities 
all enjoy direct communicational interaction within their interpersonal 
networks. Further, all of them have synchronized views of common good 
and politics. Similarly, all passive members committed to Christian aid 
(Edwige and Emmanuelle) and workers’ voicing activism (André and 
Sarah) enjoy direct interactions in their personal networks and rely on 
understandings of common good and politics that are synchronized with 
those of members of their respective commitment communities (Table 
6.4).9 Passive members debate about issues pertaining to their commit-
ment site with friends or relatives, and they participate in communicational 
interactions that enable them to practice the scripts available within their 
respective communities. Those interactions allow for a progressive synchro-
nization of their views with those of activists in their respective commit-
ment milieus. By contrast, Yves, who never engages in direct interactions 
with his peers, does not have opportunities to practice the scripts available 
in his commitment community effectively.
The power of mediated interactions in shaping the activist’s mind is hence 
limited. As we saw with Yves, the influence of organizational material is 
 9 Apart from Jérémie, a cross- committed activist. His understandings of common good and pol-
itics reflect both of the commitment sites for which he mobilizes. We discuss his case in the last sec-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































circumscribed to the dissemination of knowledge on contentious issues but 
is insufficient to create similar understandings among members of a given 
commitment community. By contrast, direct communicational interactions 
in interpersonal networks are able to synchronize activists’ understanding. 
All passive members who have such communicational interactions have 
views that are very similar to those of members of their respective commit-
ment communities. Our finding on the weak power of mediated interactions 
relies on only one case: that of Yves. However, this finding agrees with results 
found in public opinion studies, which show the weakness of mediated in-
formation on affecting an individual’s opinion (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995). Studies actually highlight the importance of interpersonal networks 
in the integration of opinions mediated by newspapers, radio, or television. 
Interpersonal networks are increasingly important when they are presenting 
thoughts, information, or worldviews that are different from an individual’s 
opinion (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004). Direct communication 
with peers in an interpersonal network is thus necessary if an individual is to 
process, accept, and integrate opinions or cognitive elements.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, mediated 
interactions are insufficient to change an activist’s mind. This relational mech-
anism is unable to synchronize activists’ understandings and does not allow 
a sufficient amount of practice of cultural scripts available in the organiza-
tion. This is true even for a long- term commitment. Yves has been engaged in 
mediated communicational interaction for seven years, yet his cognitive map 
still does not overlap with that of other moral voicing activists. The second 
conclusion relates to the crucial role of interpersonal networks. For passive 
members, interactions in interpersonal networks are central as they enable 
these members to synchronize their views with those of other members in 
their commitment community. Direct conversational interactions allow 
them to effectively practice cultural scripts from their commitment site, and 
to synchronize their understandings. Hence, we can claim that direct inter-
action in informal networks is the key relational mechanism that shapes the 
minds of passive members.
Multiple Spheres of Interactions
Contrary to passive supporters, who engage in direct interactions only 
through their interpersonal network, active members are engaged in direct 
interactions in multiple networks. As discussed above and shown in Table 
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6.1, several active members enjoy discursive interactions, respectively, in 
SAB, Greenpeace, Caritas, and Unia, but they also are engaged in other or-
ganizations of their respective commitment community. In addition, many 
of them take part in conversations in their interpersonal networks. They are 
therefore engaged in multiple spheres where conversational interactions 
take place.
Adriana’s narrative illustrates this dynamic aptly. As we see in Table 6.5, 
she discusses issues with her fellow activists committed in SAB, but also 
with activists participating in “In five years, we take roots,” a local group 
defending migrants’ rights in which Adriana is also an active member, 
and in Amnesty International, to which she is actively committed. Besides 
the conversations she has in those formal networks, she also discusses her 
commitments in her interpersonal network: with her friends, husband, and 
daughter. Like Lisa, Joao, and Nuno she practices the scripts available in her 
commitment community in three different spheres, and certainly more reg-
ularly than active members who have communicational interactions in a 
single sphere. For example, Eva practices the scripts available in the workers’ 
voicing community only when she meets her fellow activists in Unia. She is 
not committed to other unionist organizations and her interpersonal net-
work is not composed of friends or relatives who are sensitive to unionists’ 
issues or committed to the workers’ voicing community. As summarized in 
Table 6.5 (last column), Eva, like Tiago and Christine, enjoys conversational 
interactions in only one network.
Adriana and Eva clearly experience different relational configurations. 
Adriana has multiple opportunities to practice the scripts of importance to 
her commitment community, while Eva faces limited conversational oppor-
tunities within her commitment site. The issue is to know whether com-
municational interactions in a single sphere are sufficient to synchronize 
understandings or if multiple spheres of interaction are necessary to feed the 
activist’s mind. In other terms, is redundancy and abundance of interactions 
decisive in synchronizing an active member’s understandings? Again, we 
rely on case studies to sort out which relational mechanism is at work and 
will compare activists who evolve in distinct relational configurations.
We have three active members who are engaged in conversational 
interactions in a single network in our qualitative interview data. Eva, Tiago, 
and Christine practice scripts available in their respective organization (Unia 
and Caritas, respectively). They do not participate in other workers’ voicing 
or Christian aid groups, and they have no friends or relatives tied to their 
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politics reflect the views of their respective commitment communities? And 
do they share similar understandings with active members who enjoy com-
municational interactions in various spheres?
As shown in Table 6.5, the answer to both questions is yes. First, their 
views are synchronized with those of members in their respective commit-
ment sites. Second, their ideas do not depart from those of active members 
who enjoy multiple spheres of communicational interactions. Like other 
unionists, Eva and Tiago rely on a communitarian understanding of common 
good based on social justice, and they see politics as a field of intervention 
to increase state actors’ accountability for workers’ rights. Both share these 
understandings with Joao and Nuno, who practice workers’ voicing scripts 
in multiple spheres: in Unia, in other formal networks, and in their interper-
sonal networks. Although their opportunities to practice the workers’ voi-
cing scripts are very distinct, Eva’s, Tiago’s, Joao’s, and Nuno’s understandings 
of common good and politics are nonetheless synchronized. We find similar 
results with Christine, who shares a Christian aid understanding of common 
good and politics with other Caritas volunteers. Second, her views match 
those of active members who enjoy multiple spheres of communicational 
interactions. For example, Mathieu, who practices the Christian aid scripts 
in Caritas and in his interpersonal network, relies on similar understandings 
of common good and politics as Christine.10
This first comparison suggests that practicing cultural scripts in a single 
sphere is sufficient to synchronize activists’ understandings. A second com-
parison also shows that a redundancy and abundance of interactions do 
not affect activists’ minds. We see that activists’ understandings of common 
good and politics are all synchronized with those of their respective commit-
ment communities when we compare active members who have two types 
of communicational interactions with activists who multiply their com-
municational interactions— in the organization they mobilize for, in other 
formal networks, and in their interpersonal network. As shown in Table 6.5, 
Simone, Nathan, Pierrette, and Margot exchange views on moral voicing is-
sues with both their fellow activists committed in SAB or in Greenpeace, and 
within their interpersonal networks. They enjoy direct communicational 
interactions in both spheres. Those active members all rely on moral voicing 
 10 We cannot compare Christine with Elisabeth, another Caritas active member (see Table 6.5). 
Elisabeth is a cross- committed activist, active in both Christian aid and moral voicing activism. 
Elisabeth’s cognitive map reflects this dual commitment, as she demonstrates a blended under-
standing of common good and politics.
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understandings of common good and politics. Interestingly, their views 
overlap those of Adriana and Lisa. Yet both women are involved in commu-
nicational interactions in three distinct networks. Hence, a multiplicity of 
spheres of conversational interactions does not lead to a different synchroni-
zation of activists’ understandings.
These cases comparisons stress that a single sphere of communicational 
interactions where activists could enjoy direct exchanges is sufficient to syn-
chronize active members’ views with those of their commitment commu-
nity. Redundancy and abundance of interactions are not necessary. The case 
comparisons actually underline the importance of direct communicational 
interactions within the organization in which participants actively commit. 
Those interactions are frequent, intense, and, as stressed in the first section of 
this chapter, highly meaningful. Enjoying additional discussion and exchange 
in other networks does not alter the views acquired in one single sphere. 
Communicational interactions in the organization to which active members 
commit are particularly relevant in nourishing the participant’s mind, and 
synchronizing their views with those of their commitment community. As 
for passive members, direct interactions are necessary to feed their minds. 
However, one single relational path is sufficient to shape an activist’s mind.
Cross- Pressured Interactions
Activists have various opportunities for conversational interaction in their 
own commitment community but also in other commitment sites. Many 
activists are engaged in multiple sites of protest, and cross- commitment is a 
reality for about a third of the participants studied here. Table 6.6 shows that 
between 20 percent and 33 percent of moral voicing activists are also engaged 
in Christian aid volunteering. They are also committed in workers’ voicing 
activism, even if the percentage is slightly less important than their com-
mitment to the Christian aid community (between 10 to 24 percent). Many 
Caritas volunteers are also cross- committed: 42 percent of them participate 
in moral voicing contention, and a few of them participate in union activi-
ties (9 percent). Cross- commitment is also present in unionism as 34 percent 
of unionists also take part in moral voicing activities, and 17 percent sup-
port Christian aid activism. Activists can also be committed in numerous 
commitment sites. As reported in Table 6.6, between 25 and 45 percent of 
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activists are engaged in at least one other commitment site and between 4 
and 13 percent participate in all three commitment communities: moral voi-
cing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing.
For these cross- committed activists, many relational paths concur as 
they evolve in cross- pressured interactions. They enter conversational 










SAB STP GP Caritas Unia
Another Commitment to % % % % %




Workers’ voicing community 24 15 10 9 — 
Commitment intensity 
(Pearson’s r)
ns — ns −.10*
Christian aid community
33 27 20 — 17
Commitment intensity 
(Pearson’s r)
.09* — −.10** .12**
n 878 434 736 717 827
In two communities 45 36 25 43 38
Commitment intensity 
(Pearson’s r)
.09* — −.12** ns .21***
In three communities
12 6 4 8 13
Commitment intensity 
(Pearson’s r)
.07* — ns −.09* .10**
n 878 434 736 717 827
Note: SAB= Solidarity across Borders, STP= Society for Threatened Peoples, GP= Greenpeace.
We measured the activists’ commitment to various organizations with the following 
questions: “Here is a list of associations/ groups. Could you tell us if, today, you are committed in these 
associations?” We computed percentage points for activists belonging to one other commitment site, 
to one of two commitment sites (e.g., Christian aid or workers’ voicing for the moral voicing com-
munity) and to both commitment sites (e.g., Moral voicing and workers’ voicing for the Christian aid 
community).
Pearson’s r compared active members with passive ones; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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interaction in their various commitment communities. So, the questions 
are twofold. First, how do they make sense of their cross- pressured 
interactions? The issue is to understand whether cognitive maps are syn-
chronized over various activism sites. Second, if their minds are affected by 
cross- commitment, how are they affected? More precisely, what are the re-
lational mechanisms at play in shaping a cross- committed an activist’s cog-
nitive map? In our qualitative data, we distinguish three distinct types of 
cross- commitment. First, we have activists who participate in both moral 
voicing and Christian aid commitment. And we know that activists com-
mitted in those communities do not share the same view of politics (see 
Chapter  5). Second, we have participants who are currently engaged in 
moral voicing and workers’ voicing communities. Here again, the activists 
involved in those communities rely on distinct understandings, notably on 
the issue of common good (see Chapter 4). Finally, in the data we have 
one activist who is committed in three communities:  the moral voicing, 
Christian Aid, and workers’ voicing commitment sites, and in those com-
munities the understandings of both common good and politics diverge. 
By scrutinizing those cases and their narratives, we aim to understand 
what actually happens in activists’ minds.
The first finding relates to the differential impact of cross- commitment 
on activists’ minds. Out of the ten cross- committed activists included in our 
qualitative data, we observe two different outcomes on the activists’ cogni-
tive map: a mind synchronized with a single commitment site, and a blended 
mind fed by cognitive elements provided by various commitment communi-
ties. For several cross- committed participants, understandings of common 
good and politics are synchronized with only one commitment site and their 
cognitive map does not include cognitive elements from other activist milieus 
in which they are mobilized. However, in the case of other cross- committed 
activists, the different commitment sites in which they participate are mir-
rored in their cognitive map. Cross- pressure interactions therefore impact an 
activist’s mind in different ways. Our explanation is a relational one: The den-
sity of an activist’s conversational interactions is the relational mechanism that 
explains such variation. The frequency and coherence of communicational 
interactions clarify why several cross- committed activists have a cognitive 
map synchronized with a single commitment community, while for others 
this map is synchronized with various communities. Let us examine this re-
lational mechanism empirically.
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Dense Conversations in a Single 
Commitment Community
As shown in Table 6.7, several cross- committed activists have a cognitive 
map that is synchronized with a single commitment community. Despite 
the fact that cross- commitment varies (some activists participate in moral 
and workers’ voicing groups, others in moral voicing and Christian aid com-
mitment sites), all activists have a mind synchronized with a single com-
mitment site. Relational paths also vary: Several participants enjoy direct 
communicational interactions in both formal and interpersonal networks, 
others engage in direct exchange only in their interpersonal network, some 
benefit from direct exchanges in one commitment site, and others engage in 
conversations in various commitment sites. Despite variations in the types 
of cross- commitment and in the relational context, all cross- committed 
activists have one thing in common: Their minds are synchronized with those 
of members in a single commitment site. Another aspect in common is that 
they enjoy dense conversational interaction in one commitment site.
Joao and Nuno are both unionists who support moral voicing conten-
tion. Furthermore, Nuno participates in Christian aid groups. Although 
they are cross- committed activists, their cognitive map does not reflect this 
cross- commitment. As shown in Table 6.7, their understandings of common 
good and politics are those of the workers’ voicing community. Their views 
are synchronized with this commitment milieu, and not with activists in the 
moral voicing or Christian aid sites. By examining their relational configura-
tion, we note that the density of their communicational interactions is highly 
dissimilar from one commitment site to another. Joao and Nuno exclusively 
enjoy conversational interactions in the workers’ voicing community. As 
Unia active members, both have various and meaningful interactions with 
their fellow unionists. Besides Unia, both are actively engaged in other un-
ionist organizations, where they practice scripts available in the workers’ 
voicing community. Finally, their interpersonal network is full of unionized 
friends with whom they discuss issues pertaining to unionism. In these three 
spheres, Joao and Nuno engage in direct conversational interactions ena-
bling them to practice the workers’ voicing scripts. Joao states this clearly: “I 
regularly met with unionists in Unia, but also in other groups. It’s always the 
same people you meet and talk with. We share similar views; we have the 
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of them have become friends and we often meet outside unions.” Both Joao 
and Nuno evolve in dense and meaningful conversational interactions in 
the workers’ voicing milieu. By contrast, in the moral voicing and Christian 
aid communities, they do not engage in such conversational interactions, as 
the summary columns of Table 6.7 indicate. Joao and Nuno support these 
collective endeavors financially, and therefore enjoy mediated interactions 
with those commitment sites, but they never engage in direct interactions 
in the moral voicing and Christian aid commitment sites. They mainly in-
teract with the workers’ voicing community, with whom they enjoy direct 
and dense conversational interactions, allowing their cognitive maps to be 
synchronized with the views held in this commitment community.
We face a similar situation with Margot and Evelyne. Both participate 
in moral and workers’ voicing communities, yet their minds reflect a 
single commitment site. Like Joao and Nuno, they engage in dense con-
versational interactions in only one contentious community (Table 6.7). 
Margot and Evelyne are active members in moral voicing groups: Margot 
in Greenpeace, and Evelyne in a local organization defending migrants’ 
rights. In their respective groups, both enjoy intense discursive interactions 
with peers. Moreover, Margot and Evelyne enjoy dense conversations in 
their interpersonal network. Several friends and their partners are also 
committed to moral voicing contention that leads to further discussion. 
By contrast, Margot and Evelyne currently have no direct communica-
tional interactions with the workers’ voicing community.11 They support 
unions by paying membership fees. While both express the importance of 
unions in society and are concerned by work relations, they nonetheless 
never engage in direct exchanges with this commitment milieu. As passive 
members they experience mediated interactions by reading newspapers 
prepared by the unions, but they do not have direct interactions. Moreover, 
their interpersonal network is not made up principally of friends or 
relatives who are committed in the workers’ voicing site. Here again, with 
unbalanced interactions in both contentious sites, Margot and Evelyne are 
synchronized with a single contentious site: he moral voicing community. 
Their minds do not present a blend of cognitive elements derived from the 
workers’ voicing community.
 11 When she was working, Margot was an active member of the workers’ voicing community, there-
fore benefiting from direct interaction with peers. After leaving her job twenty years ago, Margot has 
not entered in direct interactions with this contentious group.
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Contrarily to Joao, Nuno, Margot, and Evelyne, who are actively com-
mitted in one contentious site, Yan, Colette, and Maria are exclusively 
passive members. They support various causes but never engage in activ-
ities. While their relational configuration differs from that of Joao, Nuno, 
Margot, and Evelyne, they nonetheless share a synchronization of their 
understandings of common good and politics with a single commitment 
community. In Table 6.7, we see that they enjoy dissimilar interactions in 
their respective commitment sites. Yan, Colette, and Maria are passively 
committed to various moral voicing actions. Alongside this commitment, 
Yan is a member of a union, while Colette and Maria provide financial sup-
port to Christian aid groups. As passive members, they benefit from medi-
ated interactions through discursive material with all the communities they 
are committed to. However, in the moral voicing community, in addition 
to mediated interactions they also interact directly, in their interpersonal 
networks, with friends or relatives who are sensitive to moral voicing is-
sues or engaged in this commitment milieu. Above, we saw how dense the 
communicational interactions of Colette are with her friends and her son. 
Similar interactions occur in Yan’s and Maria’ s interpersonal network. For 
example, Yan relates: “I like to talk about those issues with my wife. Emma 
works with migrants. At her workplace, she meets many activists who come 
to discuss the juridical situation of the asylum seekers. They talk about the 
migrants’ personal situations, but also more generally about migration. 
And then we often discuss those issues at home. She is really upset about 
what she sees at her workplace and because of the ways Switzerland treats 
asylum seekers. I also discuss those issues with my brother: He supports 
an organization that advocates migrants’ rights. However, it’s with my mom 
that I talk the most. She was involved in providing Eastern European chil-
dren with help her whole life and is politically dedicated to the development 
of fairer relations between countries in the global North and South.” Yan, 
Colette, and Maria benefit from mediated interactions in the moral voicing 
community, but those interactions are doubled by direct exchanges taking 
place in their interpersonal network. By contrast, they do not benefit from 
such conversational interactions in their other commitment sites. Yan has 
no friends or relatives committed in unions, and Colette and Maria do not 
enjoy direct exchange on Christian aid issues in their private sphere (Table 
6.7). Their communicational interactions are denser in the moral voicing 
community than in the other commitment sites in which they are engaged. 
The minds of these cross- committed activists are synchronized with the 
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commitment community where most of their interaction occurs: the moral 
voicing community.
Nathan provides a final interesting case of activists who participate in 
various commitment communities, yet have a mind synchronized with a 
single commitment site. Activists in the previous cases discussed are cross- 
committed, but not cross- pressured. Their conversational interactions occur 
in a single commitment site. By contrast, Nathan has direct interactions in 
both commitment communities in which he participates. Nathan is therefore 
clearly cross- pressured by both the moral and workers’ voicing communities. 
But here again, the density of his direct interactions in a dominant commit-
ment community is a key explanatory mechanism: His mind is synchronized 
only with the moral voicing community. Nathan is actively committed in 
Greenpeace and, like any active member, has abundant communicational 
interactions inside this organization. In addition, Nathan is involved in 
dense exchanges in his interpersonal network with Lou, a close friend, with 
whom he incessantly discusses social and environmental problems. He told 
us that Lou plays a crucial role in making him aware of many environmental 
issues. Besides his commitment to Greenpeace, he has recently joined Unia 
after being dismissed by his company. As a passive member, Nathan does not 
enjoy direct exchange with other unionists but engages in direct interactions 
with the workers’ voicing milieu thanks to his interpersonal network, as his 
parents are active in unionist struggles in France. After he was fired, they ad-
vised him to join a union. They used to talk a lot about unionist issues, but 
since Nathan settled in Switzerland those interactions are much less frequent 
than they used to be. Although Nathan enjoys conversational interactions in 
both commitment communities, the intensity of those exchanges is never-
theless distinct. While he has frequent and dense conversational interactions 
with the moral voicing community through Greenpeace’s active members 
and his friend Lou, his direct interactions with the workers’ voicing commu-
nity exist, though they occur sporadically.
Dense Conversations in Various Commitment Communities
With Elisabeth and Jérémie, we face a different situation. They are also cross- 
committed activists, but their cross- commitment is mirrored in their cog-
nitive map. As shown in  chapters 4 and 5, their understandings of common 
good and politics are imbued with cognitive elements that reflect both 
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commitment sites they are committed to. They possess blended minds. Again, 
their relational configuration offers an explanation. Elisabeth and Jérémie 
enjoy direct interactions in the commitment sites they are engaged in (Table 
6.7). Their communicational interactions in both sites are balanced, contrary 
to what we found for the other cross- committed activists interviewed.
For more than forty years, Elisabeth and Jérémie have been involved in 
Christian aid volunteering, as both were active members in Caritas. Elisabeth 
is still actively involved in this organization, while Jérémie left it about ten 
years ago. However, Jérémie remains committed to the Christian aid com-
munity by supporting people in the last stage of their lives. In addition to 
these commitments, Elisabeth and Jérémie actively participate in moral voi-
cing contentions: Elisabeth in the defense of migrants’ rights, and Jérémie 
to ensure fairer relations between developed and developing countries. Both 
have lifelong engagements in both commitment sites. Nowadays, Elisabeth 
and Jérémie are over eighty years old, and both are less actively committed in 
the Christian aid milieu than in the past. Recently, they both quit their moral 
voicing commitment. Nevertheless, they remain close to this activist milieu 
and continue to support their respective organizations financially. Elisabeth 
and Jérémie have a similar career in commitment. Their communicational 
interactions are also alike, and their cognitive maps are blended regarding 
common good and politics. To avoid redundancy, we have chosen to present 
Elisabeth’s narrative.
In Caritas, Elisabeth has discussions and debates with her peers. She is 
active in the team organizing the clothing shop and in the committee. She 
enjoys dense conversational interactions with other volunteers in both 
spaces: “I like to converse with members of the professional staff, but also 
with unpaid volunteers. I have always learned a lot from them: how to face 
poverty, to manage people in great distress.” With years of commitment in 
Caritas, her interpersonal network is composed of friends who were com-
mitted, and still are, to Caritas or other Christian aid organizations. In the 
Christian aid milieu, Elisabeth still benefits from dense communicational 
interactions, both in Caritas and in her interpersonal network (Table 6.7). 
For years, she practiced the scripts available in this commitment site, and 
still practices them today. Those direct and dense interactions shape her 
understandings on common good and politics.
Elisabeth was also highly active in the moral voicing community, above 
all in groups that defend migrants’ rights. She relates:  “Nowadays, I don’t 
have the same strength as before. In the past, I went to Caritas on a daily 
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basis, and was also involved in the network defending migrants’ rights. I took 
part in all the street demonstrations too: for asylum rights, against torture, 
against war, etc. Now, I have to give up these escapades. I can’t follow street 
demonstrations anymore. . . . [A] fter half- an- hour, I’m exhausted [laugh].” 
But, until recently, she was actively committed in the defense of migrants’ 
rights. And like each active member, she enjoyed dense exchanges with her 
fellow activists (Table 6.7). Elisabeth’s interpersonal network was tied to this 
commitment site throughout her life (Table 6.7): “I have a very close friend 
who was a lifelong activist: fighting against torture and for human rights. 
We had very many meaningful exchanges; about migrants, refugees, human 
rights, social justice, and other issues. But we used to talk a lot about our 
religious faith too. We share the same view: For us, faith should bring love, 
humanity, and justice. My husband was a very important person too. An up-
right and honest man who was committed to justice his whole life. He was 
a true humanist. He was editor of a leftist Catholic newspaper, and I was al-
ways the first to read his articles before they went to print. He knew that we 
had the same political sensitivity and that I could offer valuable comments. 
During our lives, we were committed together. And we did risky things, 
like providing clandestine shelter to migrants. When someone’s life was at 
stake, when there was a question of justice that enters into play, we com-
mitted. For us, protecting those people was a humanitarian and a political 
question: We had to counter the injustice. And, inevitably, we participated in 
many demonstrations [laugh]. Our friends belonged to those networks too, 
not all of them, but the majority. We chose to have these friends with whom 
we could share and debate.” Today, Elisabeth’s discursive interactions are less 
abundant than they were in the past, due to the loss of her friends and her 
husband, and because of her reduced mobility. However she continues to ex-
change with friends at home.
Like Jérémie, Elisabeth benefits from balanced interactions in the Christian 
aid community and in the moral voicing contentious site. Both have con-
versational interactions through the activist milieu of their formal and in-
terpersonal networks (Table 6.7). Elisabeth and Jérémie therefore benefit 
from dense interactions in both commitment sites and this is mirrored in 
their minds. They share an extensive view of society with other Christian aid 
volunteers. However, this view is closer to moral voicing activists as it is more 
extensive than what we found for Christian aid activists. Like them, Elizabeth 
and Jérémie perceive social problems in terms of rights and justice, not 
through the repertoire of care. Although caring for people is important for 
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them, both believe that social problems are above all a question of injustice 
and the violation of rights. Their view on politics is blended too. They think 
that the state cannot be engaged in all social problems and that delegation to 
civil society actors is necessary. However, they claim that actively working 
for justice is also essential, as they apprehend most of the social problems 
as injustices against which people should rebel. Contrary to Christian aid 
activists, and in line with moral voicing activists, Elisabeth and Jérémie are 
inclined to voice their indignation by entering the political sphere to address 
social injustice. Their minds are composed of cognitive elements from both 
commitment sites for which they have been committed as they have prac-
ticed, and still practice, scripts available in both Christian aid and moral voi-
cing milieus.
Relational Minds
We have seen that activists are highly embedded in relational settings. 
However, they are not just embedded in social networks but also interact 
with fellow activists. Activists therefore have various relational opportuni-
ties to practice the scripts available in their commitment community. Yet 
not all relational opportunities allow them to synchronize their minds, or 
are useful for sharing understandings on common good and politics with 
their respective commitment communities. Some relational mechanisms are 
more inclined to shape activists’ minds than others. Let us summarize those 
mechanisms.
First, we saw that mediated conversational interactions are insufficient 
when it comes to the synchronization of an activist’s understandings. Those 
indirect interactions can enlarge knowledge about the issues for which 
activists commit at best, but they do not allow shared understandings, 
which are essential to for a person to take part in action, to be developed. 
Activists actually need to practice the cultural scripts available in their com-
mitment community, and face- to- face conversational exchanges are there-
fore necessary. Direct communicational interactions are the key process in 
shaping the activist’s mind. This result is particularly relevant regarding pas-
sive participants who have no direct exchange with activists involved in the 
organization(s) they financially support. It is through direct conversational 
interactions with friends and relatives that they effectively practice the scripts 
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circulating in their commitment milieu. For these activists, conversations 
within their interpersonal network are essential in the synchronization process.
Direct conversations in interpersonal networks are important, not only 
theoretically— by highlighting a specific relational mechanism impacting 
passive members’ mind— but also pragmatically. In Western democra-
cies, passive members constitute the largest bastion of activists, and also of 
unionists and volunteers. In the West, societies are, as Meyer and Tarrow 
(1998) stress, “movement societies,” but this social movement society relies 
mainly on passive members. Our finding shows that mediated interactions 
are insufficient to synchronize views with a commitment community for the 
largest bastion of activists. To be an activist and to sustain commitment, com-
municational interactions in private networks are required. Findings from 
our quantitative data, like results from other research (e.g., Diani 1995; Della 
Porta 1995; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1988; Passy 1998a; Snow et  al. 
1986), show that passive members are embedded in interpersonal networks 
where friends and relatives are in agreement with their issues, or committed 
to contention. It means that activism goes well beyond formal adherence to a 
specific organization: It is anchored in a much vaster social context.
Second, our results emphasize that redundancy and abundance of direct 
interactions are not needed to shape an activist’s mind. Direct interactions are 
essential in feeding an activist’s mind; however interactions that take place in 
a single sphere are sufficient to synchronize the activist’s views. We saw that 
passive members only enjoy conversations in their interpersonal networks, 
yet their understandings of common good and politics are synchronized. 
Similarly, active members who engage in communicational interactions with 
their peers only in the organization they are actively committed to display 
synchronized minds. The multiplicity of relational paths is thus not essen-
tial. A single relational path is sufficient but should be made of direct com-
municational interactions. This means that direct exchanges in interpersonal 
networks are crucial for passive members, while conversations in the organi-
zation to which they are committed are vital for active members. Direct con-
versational interactions are a necessary condition to practice scripts available 
in commitment communities and to synchronize activists’ understandings. 
The fact that communicational interactions in a single sphere are sufficient 
makes commitment slightly more accessible to people. At the very least, it 
does not add other relational constraints to one’s becoming an activist and 
sustaining participation.
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Finally, we saw that cross- commitment impacts an activist’s mind in dif-
ferent ways. The density of direct interactions is the relational mechanism 
at work, which explains why cross- committed activists can have minds 
synchronized with the beliefs of one single commitment community, or 
blended minds reflecting the multiple commitment communities in which 
they are engaged. While about a third of moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
workers’ voicing activists are cross- committed, not all of them actually 
evolve in a cross- pressured environment. Cross- committed activists, en-
gaged in direct conversational interactions in only one commitment site, 
have understandings synchronized with this community. Those activists 
are cross- committed, but not cross- pressured, and their cognitive maps 
synchronize with the commitment community where they enjoy direct 
and dense interactions, not with the other sites where they engage only in 
mediated interactions. Other cross- committed activists, who face unbal-
anced direct interactions in the various commitment communities they are 
involved in, synchronize their understandings with the community with 
whom they have denser direct interactions. Here again, those participants 
are cross- committed but not cross- pressured. Finally, other cross- committed 
participants are effectively cross- pressured. They benefit from balanced 
interactions in the various commitment sites and engage in direct conversa-
tional interactions in all sites of their commitment. This pattern of commu-
nicational interactions enriches their cognitive map with cognitive elements 
of all these commitment sites. Consequently, their minds reflect each of these 
communities. Their minds are of a blended sort.
The activists’ minds reflect their commitment community or communi-
ties to a large extent. As we know from sociologists, an individual’s mind is 
a social mind. It reflects the social environment in which individuals evolve. 
The activist’s mind is a social mind too and the activist’s understandings of 
common good and politics reflect those that circulate in the commitment 
community he or she is mobilized for. The synchronization of his or her views 
with those of fellow activists enables the person to join action and to sus-
tain participation in commitment activities. However, the social process that 
explains the synchronization of minds is a relational one. Social networks 
constitute real “islands of meanings” enabling individuals to be activists. An 
activist’s mind is undeniably a social mind, but it is a relational one above all.
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We’re actually a part of reality, and if we don’t realize that we are to-
tally irresponsible. We are a productive reality. We are the reality, but 
that part of reality means that we need to produce another reality.
Ai Weiwei
We are part of reality, we are a productive reality, and we need to produce 
another reality once the one we live in is no longer satisfying. Ai Weiwei’s 
words are those of an artist who knows that art is a major lever for producing 
and transforming reality. As an activist, Weiwei also understands that polit-
ical commitment is another important means for modifying reality. If one 
considers Ai Weiwei’s works, one rapidly becomes aware of how traditional 
Chinese culture imbues them and enables him— with many other cultural 
resources he has in mind— to attempt to alter current reality. As individuals, 
we perceive the world through the lens of our own minds, and our inner 
worlds are nourished by specific cognitions that orient the way we are able to 
act in reality and to try to bring about another reality. Yet as Swidler (2001) 
shows, our cognitive toolkit is culturally configured. Culture is constitutive 
of interests and identities, but it also circulates through networks in which we 
evolve (Polletta 2008). Scripts laden with cognitions and stories define these 
networks, and practicing those scripts is a crucial process in which culture 
feeds our cognitive toolkit.
As we have shown throughout this book, activists perceive the world 
through specific lenses. Their mindset is nourished with cultural resources 
that orient their action and enable them to act and sustain their action. This 
last chapter aims to gather the main findings of our study. Beside attempting 
to explore the minds of activists involved in moral voicing, Christian aid, and 
voluntarism, the book was motivated by a theoretical agenda: We aimed to 
underscore the dynamics between the mind and social interactions that con-
tribute to setting an activist’s intentionality and orienting his or her action 
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in a specific manner. This theoretical perspective enabled us to develop a 
cognitive- relational framework that explains activists’ participation in spe-
cific collective endeavors, and their ability to sustain their commitment. 
This conclusive chapter returns to this theoretical agenda and discusses its 
implications for the study of social movements. Finally, we envision avenues 
of future research.
Meaningful Conversations and Mindful Interactions
Participation (and sustained participation), the mind, conversations, and a 
resulting cognitive- relational model are the four cornerstones of this book. 
These in turn structure the following summary of our major results. In this 
study, we focus on sustained participation, and this emphasis allowed us to 
underscore two elements: First, collective action scholars should scrutinize 
the whole continuum of participation, and move beyond an analytical effort 
exclusively aimed at understanding the initial impulse to engage in collec-
tive endeavors. Participation involves much more than the decision to join 
a collective movement. Maintaining and disengagement processes are also 
important for understanding civil commitment. Our understanding of this 
social phenomenon is expanded not only by providing substantial knowl-
edge on the continuum of participation as a whole but also by enlarging our 
theoretical understanding of citizen commitment, and this constitutes our 
second point. What we see is that the ways in which activists sustain their 
commitment rely on a cognitive- relational process. But this process, taking 
place through the mind and meaningful conversations, is also at work, as 
stated in Chapter  2, in the other steps of the participation continuum, 
namely, the person’s initial engagement and decision to disengage. Hence, 
the cognitive- relational process this book highlights encompasses the acts 
of joining and of exiting (Passy 1998a, 2001, 2003, 2005; Passy and Giugni 
2001). The mind and conversational interactions are at stake in all the key 
stages of an activist’s participation. The interpretative facet of social networks 
therefore plays a crucial role through the continuum of participation. We re-
turn to this issue in a following section of this chapter.
One question drives our study: How do activists participate and sustain 
their collective effort? To answer this question, we turn to the other three 
pillars of this book:  the mind, conversations, and the cognitive- relational 
model. First, throughout the study, we accumulated evidence supporting 
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the argument that a process of mind synchronization is an important ele-
ment in sustained participation. Second, conversation is the mechanism that 
serves to explain why and how this synchronization occurs, ultimately sus-
taining participation. Third, we developed the links between the mind and 
conversations into a cognitive- relational model for sustained participation, 
which is our main theoretical contribution. Over the following pages, we 
briefly return to these three arguments and synthesize our main results.
Individuals are symbol- making creatures who spin webs of meaning. We 
are constantly trying to make sense of the world out there, and some of us 
commit in collective efforts because what we believe is challenged. These 
meanings are at work once we commit to contentious politics, volunteering 
action, or unionism. To prove that activists rely on a process of mind synchro-
nization in their commitment, we first examined how their meanings depart 
from those held by the general population. Comparing the statistical data 
concerning activists’ understandings of common good and politics with 
that of the population, we found that an activist’s views of common good 
and politics do not overlap with those of the whole population. Moral voi-
cing activists depart on both dimensions, Christian aid volunteers possess 
only a particular understanding of common good, and unionists differ from 
the general population only for their perception of politics. Activists with a 
particular view of common good perceive society in a more interconnected 
and inclusive way and are concerned by a broader range of common goods 
than the general population. A specific perception of politics is characterized 
by less trust in state actors; skepticism regarding state actors’ willingness to 
improve and deliver the common good activists are committed to; a broad 
legitimization of civil society actors; and finally, a conception of the citizen 
as a vigilant and politically active being. These findings constituted the first 
element that allows us to stress that cognitions are integral to commitment in 
collective endeavors: Activists possess a specific mind.
With the support of statistics and narratives, we then showed that activists 
not only rely on distinct views about common good and politics when com-
pared with the whole population, but that these views vary among different 
groups of activists.. Activists who evolve in different commitment com-
munities possess their own understandings of politics and common good. 
There is no unique model for an activist’s mind, but a plurality of minds. Our 
findings show that moral voicing activists understand common good in terms 
of universal social justice. For them, access to common goods is a question 
of social justice and rights that should benefit all members of society. They 
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also see politics through specific cognitive lenses, viewing it in terms of inter-
vention to increase state actors’ accountability. The state is perceived as the 
main actor responsible for the development and implementation of common 
good. When social problems arise, civil society actors (perceived as a major 
political force in society) must challenge the state if social issues are to be 
solved.
Christian aid volunteers rely on distinct meanings about common good 
and politics. Common good is perceived in terms of universal social care. 
It should benefit all members of society, as was the case for moral voicing 
activists. However, common good is essentially conceived in terms of care 
with the aim of improving an individual’s well- being. Their view of politics 
also departs from that of moral voicing activists. Civil society, not state ac-
tors, is perceived as accountable for the provision of care. For Christian aid 
activists, politics therefore appears as a substitution for the state in providing 
this care.
Unionists rely on another understanding of common good and politics, 
which does not overlap with that of Christian aid volunteers and only partly 
with that of moral voicing activists. Common good is framed in terms of 
communitarian social justice. For workers’ voicing activists, common good 
is a matter of rights and justice, but for specific social groups. They perceive 
a specific collective good rather than a common good. Their conception of 
politics is also specific. Indeed, like moral voicing participants, they view 
politics through the lens of contention:  The state is perceived as the pri-
mary actor accountable for the protection and implementation of common 
good and it must be the first challenged when social problems arise. Politics 
thus emerges as a field of intervention to increase state actors’ accounta-
bility. However, contrary to moral voicing activists, contention is uniquely 
focused on workers’ social problems. And accordingly, unionists do not le-
gitimize all social actors to push contention forward: Only unions are con-
sidered as trustworthy actors capable of strengthening workers’ collective 
good. Activists who evolve in distinct commitment communities hence rely 
on different cultural resources to understand common good and politics. 
While their minds overlap on some aspects, activists of different commit-
ment communities do not share the same understandings of common good 
and politics.
Although activists’ minds differ from those of the population and even 
from different commitment communities, statistics and narratives re-
vealed a third issue that underlines the importance of the mind for sustained 
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participation. Indeed, activists engaged in the same commitment commu-
nity share similar cognitions when it comes to common good and poli-
tics: Their minds are highly synchronized. This argument is based on two 
findings: First, understandings of activists committed in the moral voicing 
community, but mobilized in distinct organizations and for distinct so-
cial causes, apprehend common good and politics with the same cognitive 
lenses. Despite being mobilized for particular social problems (defense of 
migrants, autochthonous peoples’ rights, and environmental protection) and 
although they act on confrontational or consensual political issues, moral 
voicing activists rely on socially shared cognitions toward common good 
and politics. Regardless of the social problems they choose to address and 
of the degree of social conflict surrounding the issue, evolving in the same 
commitment community provides activists with similar cultural resources 
for framing an understanding of common good and politics. Second, we 
examined whether activists engaged in the same organization, but with dis-
tinct levels of commitment, rely on shared views of common good and pol-
itics. And we found no substantial variation in the way active and passive 
members apprehend common good and politics.
Activists possess a specific mind, which differs from that of the whole 
population. They rely on different cultural resources when they evolve in 
distinct commitment communities; and participants involved in the same 
commitment community share similar understandings. What do these 
findings mean? First, they prove the assumption that activists rely on specific 
cognitions to act. They require socially shared cognitions to perform and sus-
tain joint action. Second, the findings underscore that individuals engaged in 
a specific commitment community synchronize their minds. Evolving in a 
community and practicing the cultural scripts circulating in these social sites 
shape their mind and synchronize their views, and this, in turn, enables them 
to perform joint action.
Showing that activists rely on specific meanings is only one part of the story 
of underscoring the role of the mind and its synchronization with others in 
the process of participation and sustained commitment. The second part 
relies on how those broad understandings of common good and politics set 
activists’ intentionality. Based on a systematic analysis of activists’ narratives, 
we showed that four cognitive paths bind activists’ understandings of 
common good and politics. As shown in Figure 7.1, one cognitive path links 
activists’ understandings of common good to their perception of otherness, 
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cognitive path bridges the activists’ view and concern for common good 
that allows them to commit to a specific social issue over another. A third 
path connects activists’ perception of common good with their cognitive 
construction of responsibility that orients their action either politically or 
socially. Finally, the last cognitive path binds activists’ understandings of pol-
itics to their state relatedness and concern for politics; both orient activists 
toward specific forms of action. We found the same four cognitive paths in 
the narratives of moral voicing, Christian aid, and workers’ voicing activists. 
Yet, as the understandings of common good and politics differ from one 
commitment community to another, intentionality is inevitably plural.
The universalist understanding of common good advocated by moral voi-
cing activists enables them to build the cognitive component pertaining to 
otherness. Accordingly, human beings hold a central place and are under-
stood beyond their social anchorage. Moral voicing activists act for others 
regardless of social difference. Second, their perception of common good 
allows them to construct a broad concern for common good. This cognitive 
component orients their action toward multiple social issues with the aim of 
bringing about a global change in society. Third, grasping common good as 
a matter of social justice provides moral voicing activists with the cognitive 
component whereby collective actors are perceived as responsible for the vi-
olation of rights, as this is identified as a political conflict. This attribution 
of responsibility orients their action toward the political sphere. Finally, be-
cause state actors are criticized for their lack of accountability, activists de-
velop a conflictual relation toward them. In addition, it is the role of civil 
society actors to intervene in politics and therefore, citizens must be politi-
cally active and vigilant. An orientation toward contentious politics arises as 
a result of these two factors.
The perception of common good and politics sets distinct intentionalities 
for Christian aid volunteers. Like moral voicing activists, a universalist un-
derstanding of common good allows Christian aid activists to construct a 
relation to otherness in which human beings are central. This eventually sets 
their intentionality toward acting on behalf of others. In addition, this uni-
versalist frame allows Christian aid activists to build a cognitive component 
with a broad concern toward common good that orients their action on mul-
tiple social issues with the aim of bringing about a global change in society. 
Additionally, Christian aid volunteers perceive common good as a matter of 
social care, which leads to a specific construction of responsibility. Unlike 
moral voicing activists, they do not identify collective actors as accountable 
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for the promotion or deterioration of common good. This explains why they 
do not view matters in terms of political conflicts. Indeed, individuals are 
responsible for their fate and problems. This specific construction of respon-
sibility orients Christian aid activists toward the social sphere rather than the 
political one. In addition, they perceive politics as a process in which civil so-
ciety actors substitute state actors’ accountability, develop a complementary 
relation to state actors, and herald an understanding of citizens as socially 
active beings. This cognitive path orients their action toward volunteerism.
The workers’ voicing activists possess yet another intentionality. Their com-
munitarian understanding of common good provides them with the cultural 
resources necessary to construct a specific relation to otherness. Workers are 
the particular group they identify with. This narrower relation to otherness 
orients their action toward the defense of employees’ rights. Their communi-
tarian understanding of common good also leads to a limited concern for so-
cial issues, as they are primarily motivated by the collective good of workers. 
This cognitive component gears a unionist’s action toward the defense of his 
or her own collective good. Unlike Christian aid volunteers, but similarly 
to moral voicing activists, unionists see common good as a matter of social 
justice. This understanding requires the attribution of responsibility to the 
collective actors accountable for the violation of workers’ rights, viewed as 
a public political conflict. Accordingly, this cognitive component ultimately 
orients unionists’ action toward the political sphere. Finally, like moral voi-
cing activists, unionists perceive state actors as accountable for common 
good. This perception constructs a conflictual relation to the state requiring 
citizens to be politically vigilant and active, ultimately orienting them toward 
contentious action.
A major finding of our study lies in the idea that activists possess a spe-
cific mind, which sets a particular intentionality and guides their action to-
ward specific forms of commitment. As summarized in Figure 7.1, cognitive 
linkages— from broad meanings to more specific cognitive components that 
set intentionality— enable activists to perform joint actions and allow them 
to maintain this commitment over time. A first set of answers to our core 
question— why activists participate and sustain commitment in collective 
endeavors— hence relates to their minds and their synchronization with the 
other participants of their commitment community.
However, we had yet to explain why and how mind synchronization takes 
places. This is where conversations, the third pillar in our study, comes into 
play. As Tilly argued, mental constructions such as understandings, cognitive 
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components, and intentionalities do not happen “in the isolated recess of 
individual minds” (Tilly 2005, 59– 60). Ties and ongoing conversations are 
the central breeding grounds of mind construction. As shown in Chapter 6, 
activists are not merely embedded in social networks but interact with fellow 
activists. Through communicational interactions, they practice the cultural 
scripts available in their commitment communities enabling them to con-
struct socially shared cognitions fashioned in concert with others. In this 
respect, Yves was a counterfactual example in our study. This Greenpeace 
participant does not enjoy conversational interactions with fellow activists 
and consequently relies on understandings of common good and politics 
that do not overlap with those of moral voicing activists. Conversational 
interactions are hence essential to synchronizing views among participants.
Yet this synchronization process takes shape through specific relational 
mechanisms. Not all conversational opportunities allow activists to construct 
socially shared cognitions. We saw that direct communicational interactions 
are the key process by which an activist’s mind is shaped. Practicing cul-
tural scripts implies face- to- face exchanges with fellow activists. Mediated 
interactions, such as those Yves experiences, are largely insufficient to con-
struct socially shared cognitions. How, then, do passive members synchro-
nize their understandings and sustain their commitment? Our findings show 
that conversational interactions that occur in the activists’ interpersonal net-
work (friends or family members closely tied to or engaged in the same com-
mitment community) are essential for passive members who seldom enjoy 
face- to- face interactions with fellow activists. Direct interaction in their inter-
personal sphere is the channel that allows them to construct shared meanings.
Additionally, the density of direct interactions is a key relational mech-
anism for cross- committed activists. Activists committed in numerous com-
mitment communities benefit from dense face- to- face interactions in each 
commitment site, and are enriched by cognitive elements of each commu-
nity. Their understandings are thus blended. In contrast, cross- committed 
activists engaged in direct conversational interactions in only one commit-
ment site, or who face unbalanced direct interactions in the various commit-
ment communities, synchronize their understandings with the community 
they have the densest direct interactions with. Direct conversations with 
fellow activists, face- to- face communicational interactions in interper-
sonal networks, and the density of direct interactions for cross- committed 
activists are the main relational mechanisms by which the activists’ minds 
are synchronized.
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Conversations and the mind are therefore intimately linked: A cognitive- 
relational process is at work and this is the fourth pillar of our study. Once 
activists integrate a commitment community they enter into a process 
of conversational interactions:  Through talks and disputes they practice 
the cultural scripts available in this community that enable them to de-
velop socially shared meanings allowing them to perform joint action. This 
cognitive- relational process is something of a virtuous circle that reinforces 
and maintains commitment through socially shared cognitions and commu-
nicational interactions.
The mind, conversations, and the resulting cognitive- relational process 
are essential pillars of sustained commitment. These findings are impor-
tant in themselves but they also have implications for the study of social 
movements, and beyond the field. In the following sections, we emphasize 
four major implications: the necessity to bring the mind back in the study 
of social movements; to rely on an integrated perspective of social networks 
by taking their structural, instrumental, and interpretative sides into ac-
count; to further the integration of culture in our theoretical framework; and 
to acknowledge the importance of collective action in shaping democratic 
cultures.
Bringing the Mind Back In
An activist’s mind is involved in participating and sustaining commitment. 
This urges scholars to return to the mind in social movement studies and to 
grasp its implications thoroughly. Our findings underscore that the activist’s 
mind is actually much more complex than suggested by previous studies on 
activism. Neither the three core cognitions highlighted by Gamson (1992) 
nor the concept of identity and that of self- interest developed by rational 
choice theorists take the complexity of activists’ minds into account when 
attempting to explain an individual’s commitment.
Our findings stress that the injustice, identity, and agency frames developed 
by Gamson are not sufficient cognitive conditions to explain commitment, ei-
ther in contentious politics or in other forms of activism. Activists rely on a 
broader cognitive baseline to commit and to sustain participation: Perceptions 
of common good and politics are actually central, for two main reasons. First, 
activists who commit to enforce common good with specific means of action 
need to construct mental understandings of both dimensions to be able to act 
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and sustain their action. Common good and politics relate to the very aim 
and means of activism. Without meanings around both pillars of activism, 
action is unlikely to occur. Indeed, the activists studied here have all elabo-
rated understandings about common good and politics, albeit with distinct 
factures. Second, broad understandings regarding common good and politics 
enable activists to develop specific cognitive elements that set their intention-
ality. Cognitions about otherness, responsibility, concern, and state related-
ness result from participants’ understandings of these two pillars of activism, 
and those mental constructs set their intention to act specifically. Such nodes 
of meanings are bound up together and orient the activists’ action. Gamson’s 
three core cognitions do not exhaust the cognitive resources necessary for 
commitment and sustainment.
Nor does identity deplete the complex ways in which the human mind 
works. Rather, identity is a major cognitive force for mobilizing and sus-
taining commitment in collective endeavors (e.g., Della Porta 1995; Diani 
2011; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Gould 1995; Krinsky 1999; Mansbridge 
2001; McAdam 1988; Melucci 1989; Passy 1998a; Polletta 2005; Snow, 
Zurcher, and Ekland- Olson 1980; Whittier 1995). But identity is com-
posed of shared meanings, stories, and boundaries (Tilly 2005). Shared 
understandings, like those about common good and politics, relation to oth-
erness, responsibility, concern, and state relatedness are meanings that con-
cretely constitute a common identity. A plurality of meanings and cognitions 
are present behind the concept of identity. Socially shared meanings set iden-
tity by enabling activists to build inter- recognition among each other and 
delimit their group identity. Our study invites scholars to grasp meanings in 
their plurality— to substantialize what identities are— rather than remaining 
with a vague category that deprives the mind of its complexity.
Self- interest too does not cover the mental resources necessary to perform 
action. A person’s interests certainly enter into play. However, as our study 
shows, intentionality is not only driven by self- fulfillment, and this is as true 
for activists who mobilize on behalf of others as it is for participants who 
defend their own group’s interests, like unionists do. As many scholars have 
demonstrated, motivational monism fares poorly in explaining people’s ac-
tion (e.g., Batson 2011; Frey and Meier 2004; Monroe 2003; Ostrom 2000). 
Monism fails to grasp the complexity of the human mind and the various 
motivational springs that allow an individual to act. In line with other 
scholars (e.g., Sen 1990; Sorber and Wilson 1998; Passy 2013), we claim that a 
plurality of logics sets a person’s intentionality.
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The second insight of our work relates to the necessity to return to the 
mind in the study of contentious politics, and more generally of activism. 
Throughout the book we have shown that the activist’s mindscape is cru-
cial. It enables activists to make sense of their commitment, orients their 
action, and contributes to maintaining their participation. Alongside new- 
institutionalist scholars, we can argue that scrutinizing the subjective and in-
dividual levels is essential if we want to understand social process. But let us 
first settle our argument with Hechter (2000), who claims,
I have always taken the sociologist’s principal task to be that of explaining 
variations in collective action, institutions, and formal organiza-
tions, among other social outcomes. [For example,] I  seek to learn why 
revolutions occur in some places and times rather than others. . . . This is 
quite a different task from the explanation of cognition, perception, per-
sonality, and other- individual- level outcomes. At first glance, explaining 
social outcomes would appear a straightforward mandate, but any such 
impression is misleading. Ultimately, social outcomes result from individ-
uals’ relations with one another and with aspects of their environment. . . . 
Getting a better grip on . . . internal states would be an important contri-
bution, but this information alone will not enable us to account for social 
outcomes. (pp. 697– 98)
As sociologists, we should primarily devote our attention to explaining 
macro- sociological phenomena, such as revolutions and protests. To do so, 
Hechter claims that we must carefully analyze the micro- sociological level 
and pay attention to an individual’s cognitions and perceptions. As social 
scientists we cannot neglect the investigation of people’s subjectivities as well 
as how individuals make sense of others and their environment. Individuals 
and their minds are therefore a crucial nexus in social science. However, 
highlighting the importance of people’s inner world is insufficient. And 
of course, this never was our claim. Yet, bringing the mind back helps ex-
plain key social phenomena (e.g., Blumer 1969; Berger and Luckmann 1967; 
Bourdieu 1977; Cicourel 1974; Collins 2004; Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1967). 
But why— and how— do individuals and their inner states engage in social 
processes?
Individuals do not rely on a personal mind but on a social mind that reflects 
the social sites they evolve in. Their social mind is developed through the 
practice of cultural scripts available in sites they are embedded in. Our study 
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clearly shows this process to be at work: By practicing the cultural scripts cir-
culating in their respective commitment community, the activists’ cognitive 
toolkit is nourished by those cultural elements. Similarly, practicing cultural 
scripts through conversations inevitably constructs and transforms socially 
shared cognitions that circulate in a community. In turn, it constructs the so-
cial network itself (White 1992). Conversations therefore lead to a constant 
to- and- fro process between an activist’s mind and the social networks.
In this study, we focused essentially on the activist’s mind, not on how it 
engages in the construction of the social network itself. However, this mu-
tual construction between the individual’s mind and social networks is actu-
ally what underlines our entire study and explanatory proposal. Cognitions 
at the micro- sociological level definitely participate in the construction of 
commitment communities, which contribute to contentious processes and 
outcomes, as Hechter stresses when he writes of revolution. Without this to- 
and- fro process between the activist’s mind and commitment communities, 
and the bonds formed through conversational interactions, contention is un-
likely to occur. While this process is not restricted to the micro- level, it is, 
however, intimately linked with individuals’ minds.
New- institutionalist scholars underscore a similar process. For them, 
cognitions are central in explaining how people act, but above all how 
institutions are formed (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). As Zucker argues 
(1983, 25)  “institutionalization is fundamentally a cognitive process.” 
Whereas structuralists focused on social institutions and their impact on the 
level of the individual, new- institutionalists reverse the causality by claiming 
that cognitions build social institutions. Actually, new- institutionalists argue 
that cognitions and interactions enable patterns of action, which in turn de-
fine institutional settings.1 This insight constitutes a major contribution to 
the micro- foundation of social process. The macro side of social process must, 
of course, not be ruled out, but as DiMaggio and Powell emphasize: “Any 
macrosociology rests on a microsociology” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 16). 
 1 Resting upon psychological findings, new- institutionalists admit that the cognitive dimension 
of action is much more important previously thought, and action results most of the time from (au-
tomatic) cognitions that settle routines. Taken- for- granted cognitions (i.e., cultural scripts) are the 
matter from which institutions are made. Cognition is the underbelly of institutionalization; how-
ever, new- institutionalists drew on the work of interactionists to establish the links between cogni-
tion and institution stability. “Ritual games” (Goffman 1967) and “interaction ritual chains” (Collins 
1988), operating at the level of practical consciousness, are essential to understanding institutional-
ization. Ritual interactions, which mobilize both cognitions and interactions, allow individuals to 
perform encounters in institutional settings. Stability hence emerges from the patterning of these 
interactions.
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We cannot avoid scrutinizing cognitions and meanings at the micro- level if 
we wish to grasp social phenomena.2
Returning to the mind is hence essential in explaining the social process, 
whatever this might be. If we want to grasp contentious processes, as well 
as those pertaining to other forms of activism, we cannot set the individual 
aside. Nor can we silence the importance of cognition and the minds of 
individuals.
Toward an Integrated Perspective of Social Networks
To explain commitment and sustained participation, we rely on an interpre-
tative conception of social networks. Networks are not only structures, or an 
association of actors that are strategically linked together to influence other 
actors such as the state or economic actors. They are networks of meanings 
too. Networks are imbued with cultural components, like stories and 
shared cognitions, and they are constructed by those cultural components. 
Networks are “islands of meanings”: “An inter- animation of talks and ties” 
(Mische and White 1998; White 1992).
Relying on the interpretative side of social networks has allowed us to ex-
plain why, and how, ordinary people participate and sustain their action in 
collective endeavors. Other factors contribute to the sustainment of com-
mitment in contentious politics and in other forms of activism.3 As with any 
social process, various factors and dynamics enter into play to explain how 
commitment is sustained. Among those factors, the interplay between minds 
and conversations is crucial. We showed that activists could perform joint ac-
tion with peers by relying on shared cognitions concerning common good 
and politics and that those shared meanings are formed and transformed 
through conversations activists enjoy in their respective commitment com-
munities, and in their network of friends and relatives. If we do not conceive of 
 2 Whereas the first developments in the new- intuitionalist theory fall short of explaining changes, 
further work has shown that practicing cultural scripts provides less regularities than previously 
thought (e.g., Clemens and Cook 1999; Friedland and Alford 1991; Polletta 1998; Swidler 2001). This 
does not distract from the core contribution of new- institutionalists: Social phenomena rest upon 
micro- sociology.
 3 From the demand side, biographical availabilities matter. Once activists have less time at their 
disposal due to professional, domestic, or other constraints, they are more likely to leave their 
commitment aside. From the supply side, persistence in the social problem and in the mobilizing 
structures (e.g., organizations, networks) is key to sustaining commitment. When the social problem 
disappears, disengagement obviously follows.
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networks as enclaves of meanings, as social scholars we cannot figure out why 
and how people come to be committed and maintain their collective effort.
Even so, we must rememberthat networks are institutional settings and are 
also driven by strategic action. Networks form and transform through talks 
and ties; that is to say that meanings and communicational interactions con-
stitute social networks. But networks are also structural realities imbued with 
instrumental actions. We call for an integrated relational perspective that rests 
upon the structural, instrumental, and interpretative dimensions of social 
networks. Networks are ties that enable institutionalization of social struc-
ture; they are collections of interests that allow for instrumental action to be 
performed, and they constitute an enclave of meanings that enables the mu-
tual construction of cultural scripts and, ultimately, the network itself. These 
three aspects cannot be separated when we talk about social networks.
Let us take two examples to illustrate how the interpretative, structural, 
and instrumental dimensions are amalgamated and shape the social process. 
The first example pertains to the whole continuum of individual participation. 
In this study, we focused on the interpretative facet of the social network and 
showed how it contributes to sustaining mobilization in contentious politics, 
volunteering, and unionism. But the structural and instrumental dimensions 
of the network are relevant too. Activists evolve in social networks that have 
a material and organizational reality. Those organizations and communities 
interact, challenge, and build alliances with collective actors who evolve in 
the public sphere. These structural realities are constructed through activists’ 
ties and conversations, but these occur in institutional settings nonetheless. 
Those actors are also affected by instrumental action. They act strategically 
with their allies, opponents, the media, and the public. They also use in-
strumental action to engage with their members with the purpose of stabi-
lizing their commitment and bridging passive members. This is carried out 
through newspapers, leaflets, and electronic newsletters. All three facets of 
networks— the interpretative, structural, and instrumental— serve to sustain 
an activist’s participation in collective action.
These dimensions also intervene in the process of joining collective ac-
tion. Here again, when activists join a commitment community, they join a 
structural and organizational reality. Instrumental strategies are also neces-
sary to recruit new members in order to enlarge a movement’s base. Finally, 
a cognitive- relational process also occurs at this stage. Before activists ac-
tualize their potential for participation in a specific collective endeavor, 
they undertake a decision- making process by assessing several parameters 
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pertaining to the commitment itself, like the chances of the collective action 
succeeding, the risk undertaken, the utility of their involvement in bringing 
about social change, or their personal availabilities. However, talks and ties 
are part of the decision- making process. As we underscored in previous 
studies (Passy 1998a, 2001, 2003), conversational interactions that take place 
with recruiters and within interpersonal networks markedly affect the poten-
tial of a person’s joining commitment. Those social interactions help activists 
construct meanings that enable them to engage in contention (see also Kitts 
2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).
Finally, all three dimensions of the social network intervene in the exit 
process too. When the structural setting declines or is consumed by internal 
conflicts, activists tend to leave the organization. Similarly, when the organi-
zation uses loose strategies to maintain their passive and active members, the 
latter are more likely to leave. However, as we underlined in previous work, a 
cognitive- conversational process is at work too (Passy 1998a, 2005; Passy and 
Giugni 2000). When activists’ conversational interactions decrease within 
their commitment community and in their interpersonal networks, they 
progressively distance themselves from their commitment. We specifically 
want to underscore that when activists enjoy less intense conversations in 
their networks, and when their life spheres (e.g., work, family) do not overlap 
anymore with the object of their contention, the sense of their commitment 
slowly vanishes and leads to demobilization.
Alliance building is another example that illustrates how the interpreta-
tive, structural, and instrumental facets are contingent upon one another. 
Whereas in his previous work, Diani stressed the importance of the struc-
tural and instrumental facets of social networks, in Cement of Civil Society 
he clearly integrates the interpretative dimension of social networks to en-
courage alliance building among civil society actors (Diani 2015). Diani 
connects the three dimensions of networks by relying on two key analyt-
ical dimensions: resource allocation (which is the whole set of procedures 
through which decisions are taken regarding the use of organizational re-
sources) and processes by which boundaries are defined. While the first di-
mension rests upon structural and instrumental understandings of networks, 
the second enables Diani to bring the interpretative facet of networks into 
his theoretical development. Relying on boundary works that emphasize that 
boundaries are composed of identities, meanings, and stories (Lamont 1993; 
Lamont and Fournier 1992; Tilly 2005), he considers how ideational elements 
help build coalitions among civil society organizations. Alongside structure 
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and strategy, Diani acknowledges the crucial role of culture in the process of 
alliance building. As he underlines: “Culture shapes how traits and relations 
combine in specific settings” (p. 195). Diani hence shows how modes of co-
ordination occur and transform in Bristol and Glasgow. Structure, strategy, 
and culture are intimately tied together and aptly intervene in the process of 
alliance building.
An individual’s participation and the alliances collective actors build are 
two straightforward examples that show that an integrated relational per-
spective which rests upon the structural, instrumental, and interpretative 
dimensions of social networks is essential to explaining social processes 
that rely on networks. To move toward an integrated relational perspec-
tive is what we advocate. For many decades, scholars relied on a structural 
or instrumental understanding of social networks. In the mid- nineties, the 
cultural turn in sociology led meaning- making to be considered as a pow-
erful dimension of social life (Alexander, Jacobs, and Smith 2012), and this 
turn highly contributed to thinking about networks in a distinct manner. It 
allowed scholars to grasp the interpretative dimension of social interactions, 
and with his seminal work, White (1992) was a key author in conceiving 
of networks as meaningful realities. Since then, the three dimensions of 
networks have been studied separately, and in a somewhat competitive 
manner. Actually, all three help us understand what networks really are: insti-
tutional settings imbued with strategies, which form and transform through 
talks and ties. This integrated perspective on social networks not only impact 
how we think and grasp networks in the social movement studies or in the 
research domain of activism, but also beyond these fields.
Integrating Culture in Social Movements Studies
Meanings hold a central place in this study. Following Jasper, we see “culture 
as meanings that are shared by individuals, along with the words, artworks, 
rituals, and other things perceived as embodying those meanings” (2014, 
24). We consider that culture is not an objective reality that occurs outside of 
people’s heads; it is inside individuals even if meanings are shaped and trig-
gered by interactions with the outside (Cerulo 2002; DiMaggio and Markus 
2010; Swidler 1986). Our findings and the cognitive- relational model we de-
velop have implications for how we apprehend culture as a social process in 
the study of social movements.
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For decades, social movement scholars treated culture as an “analytical 
noise” (Polletta 2004a, 162). Culture was a residual category at first, but when 
it was taken into consideration, it was conceived as an objective structure 
impacting contentious processes from the outside by shaping individual and 
collective behaviors (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). This conception was inti-
mately tied to the Parsonian functionalism of culture (Alexander, Jacobs, and 
Smith 2012; Alexander and Smith 2010) and was unsuitable for explaining 
the complex dynamics of culture. Many social movement scholars try to 
challenge this conception and argue that culture is not a free- floating and in-
dependent process (Polletta 2004a, 2008). Culture is actually constitutive of 
interests and sets the terms of strategic action.
To turn culture “from outside in” constituted a major challenge for so-
cial movements scholars (Polletta 2004a),4 and we review some of these 
challenges now: First, scholars had to acknowledge that collective actors are 
strategic and self- interested actors and had to forego dualities such as objec-
tivity and subjectivity, or interest and identity. Second, scholars had to dis-
tance themselves from Geertzian or Parsonian understandings of culture, 
where culture is viewed as a constraining component of social life, leaving no 
room for actors’ freedom and undermining actors’ strategic use of culture. 
Finally, scholars had to show the substantial role of culture in social processes 
and highlight how social processes are empirically imbued with culture.
Those challenges have been met by several scholars who bring consider-
able insights to refine our understanding of contentious dynamics (Meyer, 
Whittier, and Robnett 2002; Polletta 2008). Unsurprisingly, a major av-
enue of thought emerged alongside the new institutionalist theory. Culture 
configures the institutional rules of the game and institutional schemes. 
These then shape how institutions operate and are reproduced through ac-
tors’ routines. Drawing on this theoretical account, scholars show how cul-
ture operates in contentious politics: designing organizational patterns (e.g., 
Clemens 1997; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Reger 2002); channeling 
activists’ claim- making (e.g., Barker and Lavalette 2002; Koopmans et  al. 
2005); altering institutional reproduction (e.g., Armstrong and Bernstein 
2008; Sewell 1992); transforming cultural schemes (e.g., Naples 2002; 
M. Young 2007); or even generating new institutional practices and schemas 
(Davis 2005).
 4 It is also the main theoretical challenge in the current sociology of culture (e.g., Mohr and White 
2008; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Swidler 1986, 2001).
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A second key path arose from Swidler’s work, which showed that cul-
ture has to be conceived as a strategy (Swidler 1986, 2001). Individual and 
collective actors strategically use culture to perform action that necessarily 
requires some degree of agency. Opting for this heuristic path, social move-
ment scholars underscore that collective actors address certain political 
demands rather than others (Whittier 2001), constructed in the course of 
protest specific claims by mobilizing specific cultural elements (Polletta 
2006). They also indicate that cultural expressions enter into an activist’s own 
tactical calculation (Groves 2001). They show that activists use culture prac-
tically and creatively. Those studies, drawing either on new institutionalism 
or Swidler accounts, emphasize the substantial role of culture in contentious 
politics but stress that culture is part of contentious dynamics.
As insightful these studies can be, they nevertheless tend to overlook 
people’s minds. Polletta rightly argues that culture is not only in people’s heads 
(Polletta 2004b). The above- mentioned studies aptly point out that culture is 
part of strategizing, organizing, institutionalizing, and interacting with other 
players. Yet those studies focus mainly on the interplay between the meso- 
and the macro- sociological level. Most of them omit the activist’s mind. Yet, 
as we have underscored, individuals’ cognitive toolkit is an important piece 
to explain contentious processes. Those cultural resources participate in 
the contentious game: They set people’s intentionality and orient their ac-
tion; they enable people, through talks and ties, to practice cultural scripts 
available in their social community; they modify and generate new cultural 
scripts; and finally, they allow the institutionalization of the social network in 
which activists are committed.
Activists’ cognitive toolkit plays an important role in explaining conten-
tious processes, and it cannot be cropped out from the understanding of 
contentious dynamics and other social processes as well. This implies that 
social movement scholars should aim to better integrate culture into their 
theoretical frameworks, specifically by binding the macro- and meso- 
sociological levels with that of the individuals. As we have shown here, and 
as new institutionalists highlight, individuals’ cognitive toolkit is an impor-
tant piece to explain social processes. As social movement scholars and as 
sociologists, we cannot set aside the individual’s cultural resources available 
in his or her cognitive toolkit. However, cultural processes occurring at the 
individual level are intimately bound to institutions. As stressed above, talk 
and ties shape activists’ minds but also form and transform networks (com-
mitment communities). Individuals are not independent of their social sites; 
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both levels work together. In addition, we know with new institutionalist ac-
counts that we cannot grasp social phenomena without taking into account 
meanings at the individual level. Macro- sociological explanation rests upon 
a micro- sociology where cognitions are central. New institutionalist scholars 
provide substantial forays into features of the micro- foundation of the so-
cial process. Social movement scholars should ground contentious processes 
more in micro- dynamics and should integrate the micro- foundations of so-
cial processes in their theoretical and empirical accounts.
Grasping culture from inside results in better theories of mobilization, as 
Polletta (2008) rightly pointed out. But meaning— that is culture— is also in 
people’s minds, enabling and constraining action, creating and modifying 
cultural scripts, and crafting and transforming institutions. Our future task 
is to incorporate culture in social movement studies by taking into account 
cultural dynamics occurring at the level of individuals, which are bound to 
the macro- and meso- sociological levels.
Democracies in Mind
One illustration of how culture can be incorporated into social movement 
studies was our query concerning activists’ ideals of citizenship. We em-
ployed the term citizenship not to describe rules for nationality acquisi-
tion (Koopmans et al. 2005; Marshall 1950) but to show how an individual 
conceives his or her role as a citizen within a democratic regime (Dalton 
2008; Schudson 1998). Close to our results, scholars who have looked at 
understandings of citizenship have found that multiple forms of citizenship 
exist within a country. Dalton (2008), for example, differentiates between 
a “duty- based” and an “engaged” conception of citizenship. The former 
emphasizes voting and social order and the latter active participation in vol-
untary groups and solidarity. In a similar vein, Mouffe (1992, 4) distinguishes 
between a liberal citizen who is a bearer of rights and a radical democratic 
citizen as “somebody who acts as a citizen, who conceives of herself as a par-
ticipant in a collective undertaking.” Although these analytical categories 
come close to the democratic cultures found in the commitment communi-
ties studied here, our work shows that democratic cultures are more diverse 
than these two- dimensional schemes would have us believe.
As we have shown, not all activists are strong citizens. Different demo-
cratic cultures (and certainly undemocratic ones too) are imagined and lived 
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in our societies and thereby enter the public sphere through collective ac-
tion. Certainly, a vague and generic democratic culture exists on the national 
level and shapes a general idea of citizenship. As shown in Chapter 1, direct 
democratic institutions invite citizens in Switzerland to discuss and partic-
ipate in politics at least four times a year. However, the analysis of activists’ 
perceptions of citizenship enabled us to temper an overly structuralistic 
notion of culture. There is not one homogeneous but multiple democratic 
cultures lived and experienced concurrently in different commitment com-
munities. Individuals practice different cultural scripts because they are 
inscribed in particular sites. Thereby, cultures shape minds and minds simul-
taneously shape cultures.
In this study, we wanted to know whether all activists are strong citizens 
and, following our theoretical argument, whether they contribute to a real-
ization of a strong democracy as described by Benjamin Barber (1984). We 
found different conceptions of citizenship across the three commitment 
communities: Activists have particular democratic cultures in mind and con-
sequently, different types of democratic regimes are promulgated through 
the actions of these communities. Moral voicing activists are strong citizens, 
they are concerned by a broad range of common goods and stress the im-
portance of being politically vigilant and active in participatory politics. We 
found another understanding of citizenship within the Christian aid com-
munity, which we labeled as social citizens. While these members are also 
concerned by a broad range of common good, they associate political activity 
primarily with voting and are skeptical of contentious politics. Finally, the 
third conception of citizenship is that of workers’ rights activists, who stress 
the importance of political vigilance and protest activity, but they restrict this 
idea to the defense of their own group. Accordingly, we labeled them as re-
sistant citizens concerned by politics but not by common good.
In addition to showing that different democratic cultures exist within 
these communities, the investigation of activists’ understandings of citizen-
ship is also important because these cultures contribute to (de- )democratiza-
tion processes. Meaningful interactions within commitment communities 
contribute to the construction and transformation of collective frames— 
for instance ideals of citizenship— which in turn effects collective action. 
Collective action, then, is an animating element of democracies. While “pop-
ular struggle affects whether and how democratization comes to pass” (Tilly 
2007, xi), other forms of collective action effect (de- )democratization as well. 
The civil ideals of the three communities under scrutiny here clearly favor 
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a specific democratic regime. However, it is perfectly imaginable that other 
communities, not studied here, produce the reverse effect and contribute to 
de- democratization.
We were inspired by Barber (1984), who argued that strong citizens are re-
quired for a realization of a strong democracy; other proponents of a partic-
ipatory theory of democracy support this thesis as well (Macpherson 1977; 
Pateman 1970). In a similar vein, proponents of other types of democratic 
regimes argue that political participation is only required to elect decision 
makers. In this view, political apathy is required for the stability of a demo-
cratic regime because the majority of the population holds anti- democratic 
values (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Dahl 1956; Sartori 1962). 
Other commentators have shown that understandings of citizenship have a 
systematic effect on political activities (Bengtsson and Christensen 2014) and 
that robust democracies require politically tolerant citizens, who have incor-
porated a civic culture and interpersonal trust and who participate in politics 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Sullivan and Transue 1999). We are not in a po-
sition to directly assess the link between the form and intensity of political 
participation and the stability of a democratic regime. Yet we observe that 
different ideas of citizenship, disseminated by different commitment com-
munities, exist within one democratic regime.
In other words, our study has shown that understandings of citizenship 
are one outcome of the practice of meaningful interactions, the practice and 
transformation of cultural scripts, and sustained participation. Cognitive 
and relational processes are thus crucial to understanding the relationship 
between associations and democracies because different associations pro-
duce different democratic cultures. The comparison of three commitment 
communities demonstrates that we are confronted with as many ideas of 
how a “good citizen” (Schudson 1998) should act. Consequently, particular 
and radically different democratic cultures are disseminated within a country. 
In that sense, strong citizens tend to incorporate a strong or participatory 
(Macpherson 1977; Pateman 1970) democratic culture with an emphasis on 
conflict and inclusion; social citizens prefer a representative one (Dahl 1956; 
Sartori 1962; Schumpeter 1942) with citizens electing elites who do politics 
for them; and citizens with a communitarian democratic culture (Etzioni 
1993) tend toward contentious participation. Thus, the analysis of activists’ 
understanding of citizenship enables us to show how commitment com-
munities contribute to ongoing processes of (de- )democratization (Tilly 
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2007)  by creating spaces where (un- )democratic cultures are constantly 
constructed and modified.
Further Research
We have sought to provide four key contributions in this book. First, we 
bring the mind back in the study of social movements. Contrary to the 
narrow view of the activist’s mind scholars have focused on, we opted for 
a broader conception of the mind, which we view as a key player in the 
game of activism. Indeed, it enables individuals to act and to perform 
joint action thanks to shared meanings fashioned in concert with others. 
A second contribution is linked to our conceptualization of social networks, 
apprehended in light of White’s notion of “islands of meanings.” We under-
score that the interpretative side of networks (along with its structural and 
strategic counterparts) has a forceful impact on the action activists carry 
out. Networks are imbued with cultural components that shape the activist’s 
mind. Through talks and ties, activists practice the cultural scripts available 
in their commitment community, with consequences for their thoughts and 
ultimately their actions. Communicational interactions are therefore also 
crucial to activism as they have an obvious bearing on commitment and 
the sustainment of participation. Seeing networks in their cultural dimen-
sion enables us to bring culture back into our heuristic model, forming our 
third contribution to the literature. We show that culture enters the activist’s 
mind through conversational interactions with his or her peers, thereby 
having a direct effect on the commitment process and the sustainment of 
participation. Culture does not exist outside social processes, as several 
social movements scholars have claimed (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; 
Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Mische 2007; Polletta 
2004b); however, noting this does not suggest that culture is not part of 
people’s minds. Quite the contrary: We saw that culture enters people’s heads 
and clearly shapes commitment processes. Finally, the last contribution of 
our study is to stress that various conceptions of democratic cultures exist in 
activists’ minds. Activists possess a specific democratic culture depending 
on the commitment communities they evolve in. They accordingly develop 
distinct ideals of political citizenship. And through the performance of col-
lective action, these conceptions are disseminated through society.
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Further research is of course necessary to deepen our contributions. More 
work is needed to enlarge our knowledge of the human mind, of meaningful 
social networks, of the importance of culture in contentious dynamics, and 
of the various conceptions of democratic culture people construct. However, 
bringing a broad notion of mind back to the study of social movements was 
the central aspect of our research study. We therefore wish to conclude by 
proposing avenues for future research centered on this element, particularly 
when it comes to the investigation of activists’ cognitions.
We relied on a static research design in this study. This meant we investi-
gated activists in action and collected data at one point in time. This design 
was appropriate to the examination of how activists’ minds are synchro-
nized and helped highlight the impact of meaningful interactions. To fur-
ther our knowledge, we should now adopt longitudinal research designs. 
Social scientists know that learning is a lifelong process:  People develop 
understandings and practices that they modify throughout their lives. We are 
more prone to change than previous research on socialization has suggested 
(Sigel 1995), which reflects the idea of a plasticity of the human mind, now 
confirmed by various disciplines, the neurosciences most notably. To study 
these cognitive changes, scholars must opt for longitudinal research designs 
that take change and time into consideration.
Longitudinal studies would allow scholars to develop four key issues. A be-
fore/ after research design makes it possible to know whether an individual’s 
mind is modified, or transformed, once he or she joins a collective endeavor. 
Does the mind change once individuals engage in a commitment commu-
nity (and to what extent)? Does change necessarily happen after commit-
ment, suggesting that cognitive resources were hence essential to enrollment? 
And do new members already possess minds largely synchronized with 
the community they join? Answering this question matters. As underlined 
in Chapter 1, we are still confronted with ambiguous findings on the topic. 
Most scholars stress that cognitions are key to joining activism:  People 
with a potential for political participation, defined by their values and so-
cial anchorages, are far more prone to joining specific contentious sites 
than others without this potential for mobilization. Scholars who hold this 
view argue that the mind conditions human behavior. Most rely on a static 
conception of the mind, whereby values are conceived as core beliefs that 
are unlikely to be altered over the course of a person’s life. Munson’s work 
(2009) revealed distinctly different findings. Indeed, he showed that before 
joining pro- life contention, some activists were already well synchronized 
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with the movement’s views, while others were not. Some of the activists he 
studied were ambivalent on abortion and pro- choice positions. Once they 
joined pro- life groups, they underwent a socializing process that led them 
to align their views, or even to convert their pro- choice understandings into 
pro- life ones. Synchronization hence occurred progressively with fellow 
activists. Munson shows how malleable and susceptible to change the mind 
is. And his work is close to recent studies on the socialization process men-
tioned above. Munson also stressed that various patterns of mental change 
took place once activists joined a commitment community: Some changed 
their minds; other did not.
Our study has also highlighted various patterns of mental change. Even 
though we cannot validate those findings— they require retrospective data 
and therefore lead to problems of causality— we saw that some activists 
changed their understandings of common good and politics slightly, while 
others radically altered their views. Adriana, Lisa, Yan, Mathieu, and André 
are good examples of minor changes, or no changes whatsoever. Before 
joining the moral voicing, Christian aid, or workers’ voicing community, 
they evolved in interpersonal networks either sensitized to the issues or in-
cluding relations already committed to these causes. Conversations in their 
interpersonal network had provided them with specific understandings of 
common good and politics, so that joining activism did not drastically alter 
their cultural toolkit. By contrast, for activists like Eva or Christine, views 
about common good and politics underwent substantial change. Like many 
unionists, Eva joined the workers’ voicing community after she experienced 
problems in the workplace. Before she came to Unia, her interpersonal net-
work was not particularly attuned to unions. According to Eva, her entrance 
into the unionist community significantly shaped her views about poli-
tics and common good. Christine benefited from a similar mental change, 
having joined Caritas with no prior experience in activism and with an inter-
personal network only weakly tied to the Christian aid community. During 
our long conversation with Christine, she emphasized how her views on 
common good and politics were shaped by her repeated conversations with 
other Caritas volunteers.
Relying on a longitudinal research design would also enable scholars to 
underscore whether certain necessary cognitions are required for a person to 
join activism in specific commitment communities. Gamson stated that in-
justice, agency, and identity frames are necessary cognitive components for 
a person to take part in contentious politics (Fireman and Gamson 1979; 
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Gamson 1992). But he leaves many questions unanswered. Are those frames 
necessary for all individuals to join contentious activities? Does variation 
exist among individuals who join protest groups? Are broader cognitions, 
like those highlighted in this study, required to joining activism too? Must 
activists construct certain synchronized views pertaining to the aim and 
means of the commitment community, or are those views developed only 
once participation has begun? The question of indispensable cognitions re-
mains an open one in the research on social movements.
Longitudinal research designs are also relevant for examining what occurs 
during commitment and for understanding whether the activist’s mind 
changes once the person is committed, and to what extent. We could then ex-
amine the time span needed for synchronization to occur. Take Pierrette, 
for example. She joined Greenpeace and therefore the moral voicing com-
munity a mere three months before we interviewed her: In her case, syn-
chronization occurred rapidly. However, we can readily imagine that not all 
synchronizations follow this pattern. The question remains tightly linked 
to the matter of agency, creating two interrelated questions. First, how do 
activists make sense of the cultural scripts that circulate in their commitment 
site? More precisely, how do they merge those scripts with their personal cog-
nitive resources? Second, how do they transform the cultural scripts avail-
able in their community through conversation with peers? These theoretical 
questions can only be answered with longitudinal data.
Finally, a before/ after research design is required to encompass the question 
of mental resistance. Mental resistance occurs when activists join a commit-
ment community but do not experience mind synchronization. They reject 
the cognitive elements that conflict with their own cultural toolkits. Two dis-
tinct examples surfaced in our study. The first relates to activists who join a 
commitment community but do not sustain their commitment. Adriana is 
a case in point. She was already a moral voicing contender when she joined 
the Christian aid community and had been involved for more than a year in 
an association that sought to stamp out chronic poverty. However, she gave 
up this commitment although she remains convinced that supporting the 
poor is necessary. Adriana dissolved her commitment because her views did 
not mesh with the cultural scripts that circulated in the community. Adriana 
perceives poverty as a fundamental injustice, whereas the Christian aid com-
munity holds fast to the idea that poverty is a matter of personal failure. Her 
views on the nature of common good were hence quite different from those 
promulgated by the community. The same holds for her relation to politics. 
For Adriana, commitment involves political resistance, whereas Christian 
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aid volunteers view commitment as a substitute for state action. Edwige’s case 
is similar. She was committed to Caritas and was involved in the moral voi-
cing community for less than a year. As she relates: “They were too politicized 
for me; everything was a political fight, that’s ridiculous. Then, everything 
was an injustice! They really exaggerated. . . . It was too much for me, so I left.” 
The lack of fit between their own cognitive world and that of their commu-
nity did not allow synchronization to occur: They rejected the incorporation 
of cognitive elements that failed to resonate with their cultural toolkit.
The second situation of mental resistance pertains to activists who par-
ticipate in a commitment community but sustain their participation 
without sharing common understandings with their peers. Yves’s case— 
as a Greenpeace activist engaged for fifteen years— is relevant here. While 
we can explain why he is not synchronized with his commitment site, the 
reason behind his sustained commitment remains elusive. Yves maintains 
his commitment despite lacking socially shared meanings. The most prob-
able hypothesis relates to the nature of his commitment. In Switzerland, 
environmental contention is highly consensual:  Both public opinion and 
state actors are inclined to develop public policies to curtail environmental 
damage (see Chapter 2). Activists who mobilize on consensual issues, like 
Yves, can engage in activism without developing socially shared cognitions 
with their commitment community. Both cases call for more work on mental 
resistance and invite us to consider how mental synchronization relates 
to levels of political challenge. For example, among pro- migrant activists 
interviewed— and migrants’ rights is a highly confrontational political issue 
in Switzerland— all were synchronized with their fellow activists and their 
commitment community. The cognitions behind these varied configurations 
require further study.
Investigating what mental changes occur following commitment can 
enhance our understanding as to the biographical impact of activism and 
help us comprehend socialization processes (Passy and Monsch 2018). How 
and to what extent does joining a commitment community socialize indi-
viduals? The question is key to understanding the contentious process: How 
does protest alter people’s mindsets and ultimately their behavior? Little has 
been said on the topic and what we have is beset by problems of causality, due 
to the lack of a longitudinal research design (Giugni 20014, 2013; McAdam 
1999). A before/ after research design would avoid issues of causality and pro-
vide robust findings. Further study of mental changes would also highlight 
how activists use their own agency to synchronize their minds and trans-
form the cultural scripts circulating within their commitment communities, 
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thereby providing insights into socialization processes during action (Passy 
and Monsch 2018). Light would then be shed on the manner in which indi-
viduals make use of what Levi- Strauss called “bricolage”: how individuals 
manage their cognitive resources— those acquired from practicing cultural 
scripts from social sites they recently joined and their previous stock of 
knowledge— to perform action.
A second avenue of further research would be to attain a better under-
standing of the human mind. Scholars should face the complexity of the 
human mind with the aim of providing more accurate understandings of 
the mental processes that affect action. Work has shown that cognitions 
and emotions are intimately intertwined (e.g., Barrett, Dunbar, and Lycett 
2002; Kahneman 2011; Nussbaum 2001). Yet too often cognitions and 
emotions are analyzed separately in the study of social movements. Several 
researchers have shown that emotions play a significant role in contentious 
dynamics (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 1998, for a review see 
2011). However, we know of this interplay more from a theoretical than an 
empirical angle. Jasper stressed that emotions shape ideas, construct iden-
tities, elaborate cognitions, and motivate and promote action (Jasper 1997, 
2014). Other scholars emphasized that emotions amplify and accelerate in-
dividual processes (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). We have here 
seen that cognitions are emotionally laden and probably help set activists’ 
intentionalities. However, studies so far only intimate what requires empir-
ical spelling out. We therefore enjoin social movement scholars to analyze 
how emotions relate to action in more detail, and thinking and feeling pro-
cesses should be incorporated into the study of social movements with more 
attentiveness. Interdisciplinary exchanges between studies on cognition and 
emotion will certainly improve our understanding of contentious processes.
We began this book with the ambitious aim of transcending the narrow 
view of activists’ minds that recurs in social movement studies. But the qual-
itative experience of the world, as Searle (2004) stated, is only one piece in 
the puzzle of commitment and sustained participation. Conversations are 
another important component. We underscored the interplay between the 
mind and conversations so as to examine how activists make sense of one 
reality and are able to produce another one through commitment. We hope 
this inquiry will continue and lead to a broadened interest in the relevance of 




Table A.1 provides additional information on organizations whose members are part of 
the study (see also Chapter 1, Section “Comparing Commitment Communities”). Most 
of the information is drawn from their respective websites. As such, it complements the 
information given in the section titled “Comparing Commitment Communities,” in 
Chapter 1. For the number of members and the annual income, we refer to the year 2009, 
when our research began.
A.2 Interview Guideline
The guideline served as a preparation for each interview. As described in the method-
ological part of Chapter 1— “Studying Activists’ Minds”— the interviews, especially the 
first part, were open conversations and did not impose questions or suggest answers. The 
guideline was thus mostly useful in assessing the first interview in order to prepare the 
second one, that is, to elaborate on life periods and understandings barely touched on 
during the first interview.
I. Guideline for the First Interview
Introduction
 1. Presentation of the interview
 1.1. To understand interviewee’s commitment and especially his or her commit-
ment for others
 2. Procedure of the interview (in two parts)
 2.1. First interview: to understand interviewee and his or her life history better
 2.2. Second interview: to discuss topics that emerged during the first interview
 3. Regarding the interview itself
 3.1. Open discussion: Interviewer says, “You can tell me whatever you want and 
whatever you think is important when it comes to your commitment and 
experiences”
 3.2. Interview is strictly anonymous
 3.3. Interview is recorded to facilitate the analysis
 3.3.1. Asking permission to record the interview
 3.4. Thank the participant for collaboration
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Table A.1 Main Features of Organizations
Solidarity across 
Borders (SAB)
Foundation SAB is a national organization founded in 2000 after the merger 
of two organizations committed to the defense of migrants’ 
rights: BODS (Movement for an open, democratic and solidary 
Switzerland) and AKS (Asylum Coordination Switzerland).
Organization units One unit in Bern, Switzerland. SAB is considered an umbrella 
org. of the national movement for the defense of migrants’ 
rights. Many, often small and mostly urban, networks have tight 
links with this organization.
Action domains Asylum; Sans- Papiers (undocumented migrants); Schengen– 
Europe; Migration
Annual income 180,000 Swiss Francs (2009: 189,000, 2016: 179,000)
Membership 3,193 members (82% passive members; 18% active members)
Website sosf.ch
Greenpeace (GP)
Foundation GP is an international organization. In 1971, a small team of 
activists set sail from Vancouver, Canada, to bear witness to US 
nuclear testing at Amchitka, a tiny island off the Western coast 
of Alaska. A Swiss Greenpeace branch has existed since 1984. 
The branch’s first spectacular action took place in 1986 when a 
group of activists chained themselves to trees in Crans- Montana, 
Switzerland, to protest a plan to cut down a huge swath of trees 
for a World Cup ski event.
Organization units The national main office is located in Zurich; 12 regional groups 
are situated in the other urban regions.
Action domains Nuclear energy; chemical contamination; gene technology; 
climate; biodiversity
Annual income 25,000,000 CHF (2009: 23,200,000, 2016: 24,900,000 CHF)
Membership 166,927 members (99.7% passive members; 0.3% active 
members)
Website greenpeace.ch
Society for Threatened Peoples (STP)
Foundation STP is an international organization, established in 1970, 
emerging from the “Action Help to Biafra” which began in 
Hamburg, Germany. The movement denounced the genocide 
in Biafra during the summer of 1968. Since 1989, a branch of 
the STP has existed in Switzerland. The first actions of STP 
Switzerland concerned the peoples of Tibet, the Penan in 
Malaysia, the Yanomami in Brazil, the Papua in Indonesia, and 
the Yenish in Switzerland.
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Organization units One unit in Bern, Switzerland.
Action domains Human rights; collective rights for minorities; self- determination 
for indigenous people
Annual income 2,000,000 CHF (2009: 1,800,000 CHF, 2016: 2,080,000 CHF)
Membership 11,868 members (99.9% passive members; 0.1% active members)
Website gfbv.ch
Caritas Geneva
Foundation Caritas is an international organization, founded in 1897 in 
Cologne, Germany, by the theologian Lorenz Werthmann. 
The purpose was to avoid the fragmentation of Catholic social 
assistance efforts. Caritas Switzerland was founded four years 
later. Caritas Geneva has existed since 1942 with the aim of 
helping victims of war and of those who have suffered a violation 
of their human rights.
Organization units 6 sub- units in Geneva, 16 regional Caritas units in Switzerland.
Action domains Help the poor and the elderly on a local level, providing social 
and legal support, emergency relief, or youth integration, and 
assisting in the integration of migrants.
Annual income 1,500,000 CHF (2009: na, 2016: 1,500,000 CHF)
Membership 8,461 members (91% passive members; 9% active members)
Website caritasge.ch
Unia
Foundation Unia is a national organization founded in 2004 as a result of 
the merger between the union of engineers and watchmakers 
(SMUV), the union of construction and industrial workers 
(GBI), and the union of transport and foodstuff workers (VHTL).
Organization units 14 regional units and about 110 sub- units in Switzerland.
Action domains Negotiation of collective labor agreements; rights of employees; 
social security; provision of individual help; training and 
guidance for members






 1. Parents and early childhood
 1.1. Social context, origin, and composition of family
 1.1.1. Country of origin
 1.1.2. Profession of parents
 1.1.3. Material and socio- economic conditions
 1.1.4. Type of family: large, compound, single parent, etc.
 1.2. Ideological, religious, and identity context of the family
 1.2.1. Religion
 1.2.2. Politics
 1.2.3. Important values of the family
 1.2.4. Dominant identity
 1.2.5. Understanding of humanity
 1.2.6. Associative commitment
 1.3. Ambiance in the family
 1.3.1. Type of family: liberal, authoritarian
 1.3.2. Openness to others (closeness of the nuclear family)
 1.3.3. Conflicts: values, lifestyles, political or other commitments
 1.4. Influence: Commitment
 1.4.1. Family context plays a role in person’s commitment choices?
 2. Youth
 2.1. Social and relational context
 2.1.1. School/ university: success, failure
 2.1.2. Type of activities: music, sport, travels
 2.1.3. Networks: church, sports, etc.
 2.1.4. Friends
 2.2. Important events
 2.2.1. Individuals who were particularly important for interviewee in this pe-
riod (family or other)
 2.2.2. Events that were particularly important in this period (individual or 
historic event)
 2.3. Subjective world
 2.3.1. Understanding of the world/ society: injustices, revolts, etc.
 2.3.2. Political, religious, social beliefs
 2.3.3. Dominant identity
 2.3.4. Understanding of humanity
 2.3.5. Idealized individuals
 2.3.6. Lectures
 2.3.7. Perception of the future
 2.3.8. Memory of this period of person’s life: easy, hard
 2.4. Influence: commitment
 2.4.1. Youth and its role in defining commitment choices
 3. Adult life
 3.1. Social context
 3.1.1. Profession (changes, employment course)
 3.1.2. Material and socio- economic conditions
 3.1.3. Travels, living abroad
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 3.2. Relation and affective context
 3.2.1. Friends (type, milieu, commitment)
 3.2.2. Partner (type, milieu, commitment)
 3.2.3. Children
 3.2.4. Networks: church, sports, etc.
 3.3. Ideological, religious, and identity context
 3.3.1. Understanding of the world: changes and intensification
 3.3.2. Important values, beliefs
 3.3.3. Religion (commitment, practices, beliefs)
 3.3.4. Politics (political orientation, political and social sensitiveness)
 3.3.5. Dominant identities: Interviewer asks, What defines you today? (evolu-
tion and intensification, new and abandoned identities)
 3.3.6. Vision and understanding of humanity/ society
 3.3.7. Development of an interest for political/ civic commitment
 4. Political and civic commitment
 4.1. First political and civic commitment
 4.1.1. At what moment (age, life period)
 4.1.2. Political issues
 4.1.3. Which organization/ network (type)
 4.1.4. Person’s activity within this organization/ network (intensity)
 4.1.5. Motivation for this commitment (Why this one?)
 4.1.6. Meaning of this commitment (What does it represent in your life?)
 4.1.7. Incentives (opportunities, networks, friends, media, etc.)
 4.1.8. Influence of networks/ friends on person’s motivations
 4.1.9. Evident commitment, natural (link with your life, beliefs, interests, or 
coincidence)
 4.2. Course of interviewee’s political and civic commitments
 4.2.1. Other commitments
 4.2.2. Issues
 4.2.3. Organization/ networks
 4.2.4. New center of interests/ preoccupations (changing political beliefs/ polit-
ical events)
 4.2.5. Motivation for this commitment (Why this one?)
 4.2.6. Meaning of this commitment (What does it represent?)
 4.2.7. Incentives (opportunities, networks, friends, media, etc.)
 4.2.8. Influence of networks/ friends on person’s motivations
 4.2.9. Evident commitment, natural (link with person’s life, beliefs, interests or 
coincidence)
 4.2.10. Panorama of interviewee’s commitments (motivations, incentives, links 
between commitments)
 4.3. Motivation for political commitment
 4.3.1. Motivation that brought him or her to commit (political life in general)
 4.3.2. What pushes you to act (beliefs, necessity to act for a better society, etc.)
 4.3.3. Let others commit (commitment is costly)
 4.4. Politics, civil society, and the role of citizens
 4.4.1. Perception of political authorities (state, government, democracy / (de)
legitimization)
 4.4.2. Perception of civil society ((de)legitimization, necessity, collective 
action)
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 4.4.3. Perception of a citizen’s role (active, vigilant or passive, only voting, so-
cial responsibility)
 4.4.4. Construction of these perceptions (friends, networks, events, family)
 4.4.5. Common good (defend, promote, protect, etc.)
 4.4.6. Motivation to maintain commitment (beliefs, friends, networks, events)
 4.4.7. Efficacy of this commitment for social change (collective and individual 
efficacy)
 5. Commitment to organization X (SAB; STP; GP; Caritas, Unia)
 5.1. Action
 5.1.1. Since when
 5.1.2. Choice of this organization/ group:  issues, action repertoire, identity, 
members, coincidence, friends, etc.)
 5.1.3. What they have done: intensity
 5.2. Meaning of this action/ commitment
 5.2.1. Importance of this commitment: central to the person’s life?
 5.2.2. What does it represent to you? Are you attached to it?
 5.2.3. If important: Why is it an injustice? Why is responsibility important? 
How do you identify? etc.
 5.2.4. If important: How did you become a member?
 5.2.5. Definition of commitment
 5.3. Motivations and cognitions: Why?
 5.3.1. Motivations that have brought person to this commitment
 5.3.2. Evident or natural commitment
 5.4. Relation to others
 5.4.1. Identification with the group for which interviewee is committed
 5.4.2. Identification process (family, events, networks, friends, etc.)
 5.4.3. Conception of humanity (common faith, shared humanity?)
 5.4.4. Interdependence between individuals
 5.4.5. Identification with other people in difficult situations
 5.5. Relational context
 5.5.1. Incentives for commitment: opportunities, networks, friends, media, etc.
 5.5.2. Commitment process: How did you start? Networks, trust, etc.
 5.5.3. Influence of networks/ friends on person’s motivations
 5.5.4. Motivation to maintain the commitment (beliefs, friends/ networks, 
events)
 5.6. Efficacy
 5.6.1. Collective efficacy: Did something change due to political action?
 5.6.2. Individual efficacy:  Did something change due to person’s personal 
actions?
 5.6.3. Is efficacy important for commitment?
 5.6.4. Individual benefits of commitment
 5.6.4.1. If yes: before or after commitment started?
 6. End of the first interview
 6.1. Points to add
 6.2. Comments on the interview
 6.3. Other stuff
 6.4. Thank you
 6.5. Schedule second interview
APPENDIX 307
II. Guideline for the second interview
In- depth interview
 1. Organizational context
 1.1. Choice and perceptions of organization X
 1.1.1. Why this organization? Issues, action repertoire, identities, members, 
friends, etc.— networks
 1.1.2. Most important issues/ themes for you, why?
 1.1.3. Ideological and political orientation of the organization
 1.1.4. Action repertoire
 1.1.5. Importance of commitment (in your life: central, peripheral)
 1.2. Members of the organization
 1.2.1. Knowledge of members
 1.2.2. Identification with them (to feel close; aspects of identification)
 1.2.3. Frequency of interaction with members
 1.2.4. Important people (and why are they important?)
 1.2.5. Importance of these people for your life: central, peripheral
 1.3. Multi- commitment for the issue
 1.3.1. One or plural commitments for this issue
 1.3.2. Coherence between commitments
 1.4. Collective efficacy
 1.4.1. Changes accomplished: Which one, the most important, meaning ap-
plied to these changes?
 1.4.2. Role of this organization for the issue
 1.4.3. Role of all organizations committed on this issue for general cause
 1.4.4. If not efficient: Why maintain commitment?
 2. Social and interpersonal networks
 2.1. Social networks, multi- commitment (political and civic)
 2.1.1. Types of commitment (order of importance: centrality, identity)
 2.1.2. Links between these commitments (coherence or coincidence)
 2.1.3. Links of these commitments with the commitment to SAB, STP, GP, 
Caritas or Unia
 2.1.4. Intensity of commitment (very or superficially committed)
 2.1.5. Motivation/ meaning of these commitments
 2.2. Informal networks
 2.2.1. Friends: close to the cause defended by SAB, STP, GP, Caritas or Unia
 2.2.2. Family (origin): close to the cause defended by SAB, STP, GP, Caritas 
or Unia
 2.2.3. Partner/ children: close to the cause defended by SAB, STP, GP, Caritas 
or Unia
 2.2.4. Influence of friends/ family for their commitment to SAB, STP, GP, 
Caritas or Unia
 2.3. Influential encounters
 2.3.1. Influential encounters in person’s life: commitment, issue
 2.3.2. Who is this influential person (friend, trust, etc.), what does he/ she 
represent?
 2.3.3. Meaning of this influence in interviewee’s view
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 3. Cognitions— Relation to others
 3.1. Identification with the group helped/ defense of their rights
 3.1.1. Perception of the group
 3.1.2. Identification with the group: commonalities, belonging to the 
same world
 3.1.3. What differentiates them from the interviewee: belonging to 
different worlds
 3.1.4. Identification with other people in difficult situations  
(who, why, similarities, differences)
 3.2. Process and influences
 3.2.1. How did you develop this identification? (construction, always existed)
 3.2.2. Influence of family/ children (individuals, values)
 3.2.3. Influenced of friends (individuals, values)
 3.2.4. Influenced of lived experiences
 3.3. Dilemma to commit without identification
 3.3.1. Difficult to commit without identification?
 3.3.2. How to overcome these difficulties?
 4. Self- extension
 4.1. Interviewee’s relation to others, to differences: different vs. shared world, shared 
humanity, shared faith or not?)
 4.2. Feeling of belonging to the world or to groups (frontiers, which ones?)
 4.3. Perception of the human being (humanism, empathy)
 4.4. Identities, self- definition, and order of identities
 4.5. Process and influences
 4.5.1. How did you develop this perception (construction, always existed)?
 4.5.2. Influence of the family/ children (individuals, values)
 4.5.3. Influence of your friends (individuals, values)
 4.5.4. Influence of lived experiences
 5. Common good
 5.1. Existence and importance of common good, i.e., goods we all share, for ex-
ample: education, health care, food
 5.2. Examples of the interviewee and order of these
 5.3. Interdependence between citizens/ individuals
 5.4. Interviewee’s interdependence with others
 5.5. Process and influences
 5.5.1. How did you develop this perception (construction, always existed)?
 5.5.2. Influence of the family/ children (individuals, values)
 5.5.3. Influence of friends (individuals, values)
 5.5.4. Influence of lived experiences
 6. Relation to the issue: injustice frame
 6.1. Importance of the issue in your life (central, peripheral)
 6.2. Meaning of this commitment to the cause (meaning in your life, what does it 
represent?)
 6.3. Identification with the issue (what concerns you?)
 6.4. Process and influences
 6.4.1. How did you develop this perception (construction, always existed)?
 6.4.2. Influence of the family/ children (individuals, values)
 6.4.3. Influence of friends (individuals, values)
 6.4.4. Influence of lived experiences
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 7. Relation to the politics
 7.1. Delegitimization of state actors (cause)
 7.1.1. Evaluation of state actors concerning the cause
 7.1.2. State considered as a political enemy (we/ them)
 7.1.3. Other actors considered as enemies (we/ them)
 7.1.4. Perspectives (future)
 7.2. Legitimization of civil society actors (issue)
 7.2.1. Evaluation of the action of the organizations concerning the issue
 7.2.2. Organizations considered as political allies
 7.2.3. Other organizations/ actors considered as political enemies
 7.2.4. Perspectives (future)
 7.2.5. Feeling of being a minority
 7.3. Process and influences
 7.3.1. How did you develop this perception (construction, always existed)?
 7.3.2. Influence of family/ children (individuals, values)
 7.3.3. Influence of friends (individuals, values)
 7.3.4. Influence of lived experiences
 7.4. Delegitimization in general
 7.4.1. Other issues where state actors are enemies
 7.4.2. Performances/ evaluation of Swiss democracy
 7.4.3. Action by organizations/ civil society necessary for democracy
 7.4.4. Examples in Switzerland and abroad
 7.5. Efficacy of commitment
 7.5.1. Contribution of organization to bring about changes: in general and for 
the cause
 7.5.2. Your contribution to bring about changes: in general and for the cause
 7.6. The role of citizens
 7.6.1. Definition (active, vigilant, critical, etc. . . .)
 7.6.2. Importance of this role (as described by the interviewee)
 7.6.3. Identification/ attachment to the role
 7.6.4. Identification with other citizens (belonging to the same community)
 8. Ideological, religious, and identitarian contexts
 8.1. Open question: What are the values that you would like to transmit to your 
children (order of importance)?
 8.2. Individual values: “life guide”
 8.2.1. Values that guide you in your life
 8.2.2. Individual responsibility of your acts
 8.2.3. Responsibility for others
 8.2.4. Confidence in others/ other individuals
 8.2.5. Solidarity between individuals
 8.2.6. Individualism
 8.2.7. Religion
 8.3. Social values: “collective life guide”
 8.3.1. Values that guide your collective life
 8.3.2. Respect of cultural diversity
 8.3.3. Equality
 8.3.4. Liberty of others (emancipation)
 8.3.5. Trust in other groups (to which you do not belong)
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 8.3.10.  Political tolerance: anarchism, extreme right, etc.
 9. End of conversation
 9.1. Points to add
 9.2. Comments on the interview
 9.3. Other stuff
 9.4. Thank you
 9.5. To get the recording of the interview or the transcript
A.3  Codebook
The following codebook is connected to the interview guideline (Appendix A.2). Once 
the interviews were transcribed, we used it to code the interviews as described in the sec-
tion “Studying Activists’ Minds” in Chapter 1.
 1. About the social movement organization (SMO) (SAB, STP, GP, Caritas, Unia)
 1.1. Choice: Why this organization?
 1.2. Actions:  What did they do?/ Since when?/ Variation since the start of the 
commitment
 1.3. Importance/ meaning of this action
 1.4. Reason for commitment/ support
 1.5. Interactions with members/ important individuals
 1.9. Other matters related to the SMO
 2. Meanings: Relation to others
 2.1. Self- extension/ shared humanity/ identification with others
 2.2. Identification with the helped group (migrants, poor people, minorities, etc.)
 2.3. Interest in/ discovery of the other: holidays, going abroad, curiosity, exchange 
with others
 2.9. Other stuff related to the relation to others
 3. Meanings: relation to politics
 3.1. How does interviewee perceive political authorities regarding the cause?
 3.2. How does interviewee perceive political authorities in general?
 3.3. How does interviewee perceive civil society actors regarding the cause/ collec-
tive efficacy?
 3.4. How does interviewee perceive civil society actors in general/ collective 
efficacy?
 3.5. Individual efficacy
 3.9. Other matters related to the relation to politics
 4. Meanings: relation to society
 4.1. Interconnectedness/ links between members of a society
 4.2. Importance of common good
 4.3. Role of the citizen
 4.9. Other matters concerning the relation to society
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 5. Meanings: Relation to cause
 5.1. Injustice frame
 5.2. Identification with the issue
 5.9. Other matters concerning the relation to issue
 6. Parents and early childhood
 6.1. Social origin father/ mother
 6.2. Siblings (sister/ brother)
 6.3. Ideological context, identities, norms, political vision, comprehension
 6.4. Civic, political. and religious commitment of father/ mother
 6.5. Importance of the family for interviewee’s commitment
 6.6. Role model: father, mother, other member of the family, others
 6.7. Other matters related to parents and early childhood
 7. Youth
 7.1. Education/ army
 7.2. Formal networks (civic, political, and religious commitment)
 7.2.1. Civic, political, and religious commitment
 7.2.2. Coherence between commitments, links; meaning of these 
commitments
 7.2.3. Why?/ motivations
 7.2.4. Reasons behind commitment
 7.2.5. Other formal networks (leisure, culture, etc.)
 7.2.6. Other matters related to formal networks
 7.3. Informal networks
 7.3.1. Friends/ acquaintances close to the issue of commitment/ commitment 
in general
 7.3.2. Family (sisters/ brothers)
 7.3.3. Influential encounters
 7.4. Important events
 7.4.1. Sociopolitical, historical, etc.
 7.4.2. Lived experience
 7.5. Subjective world/ meanings
 7.5.1. Beliefs, values, identities, norms, lectures
 7.5.2. Aspirations, wishes, desires, what interviewee wants to become in 
the future
 7.5.3. Interest for commitment
 7.6. Other matters related to youth
 8. Adult life / current life
 8.1. Profession/ education
 8.2. Social and material conditions
 8.3. Formal networks (civic, political, and religious commitment)
 8.3.1. Civic, political, and religious commitment
 8.3.2. Coherence between commitments, links; meaning of these 
commitments
 8.3.3. Why?/ motivations
 8.3.4. Reasons behind commitment
 8.3.5. Other formal networks (leisure, culture, etc.)
 8.3.6. Other matters related to formal networks
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 8.4. Informal networks
 8.4.1. Friends/ acquaintances close to the issue of commitment/ commitment 
in general
 8.4.2. Family (sisters/ brothers)
 8.4.3. interviewee’s nuclear family: partners, children
 8.4.4. Influential encounters
 8.5. Important events
 8.5.1. Sociopolitical, historical, etc.
 8.5.2. Lived experience
 8.6. Subjective world/ meanings
 8.6.1. Beliefs, values, identities, norms, lectures
 8.6.2. Aspirations, wishes, desires, what interviewee wants to become in 
the future
 8.6.3. Interest in commitment
 8.7. Other matters related to adult/ current life
 9. New elements/ dimensions
A.4  Interviewees
The following table complements Table 1.1 in Chapter 1. It provides an overview of all 
the interviews conducted in this research. In bold are the cases included as empirical evi-
dence. However, all the cases contributed to the assessment of our arguments.
Table A.2 List of All Interviewees and Their Characteristics
Name Gender Age Profession Commitment 
intensity
Solidarity across Borders
Adriana Woman 63 Housewife Active
Simone Woman 65 Housewife Active
Lisa Woman 34 Political work for a peace 
NGO
Active
Colette Woman 62 Retired laboratory assistant Passive
Wilhelm Man 87 Retired theologian Passive
Yan Man 45 Nurse Passive
Paul Man 70 Journalist Active
Richard Man 30 Doctoral student in film 
studies
Active
Pasqualine Woman 34 Daycare for young women Active
Bernard Man 67 High school teacher Passive
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Name Gender Age Profession Commitment 
intensity
Greenpeace
Margot Woman 72 Professor of social 
assistance
Active
Nathan Man 27 Computer scientist Active
Pierrette Woman 18 Apprentice in a jeweler’s 
store
Active
Evelyne Woman 41 University teacher Passive
Maria Woman 22 Telephone saleswoman Passive
Yves Man 38 Unemployed Passive
Derick Man 45 Banker Active
François Man 69 Retired co- director of a 
multinational
Passive
Society for Threatened Peoples
Catherine Woman 69 Social scientist, politician Active
Bianca Woman 31 Geologist Active
Walter Man 65 Head of project development 
cooperation
Active
René Man 54 Head of project Zoo Active
Barbara Woman 70 Retired arts and crafts 
college teacher
Passive
Laura Woman 33 Graduate in international 
relations
Passive
Cyril Man 17 High school student Passive
Lukas Man 27 BA student in film studies Passive
Caritas
Christine Woman 73 Retired tailor Active
Elisabeth Woman 80 Retired secretary Active
Mathieu Man 75 Retired engineer Active
Jérémie Man 88 Retired engineer Passive
Edwige Woman 82 Retired librarian Passive
Emmanuelle Woman 58 Librarian Passive
Jacques Man 38 Computer scientist Active
Jean- Paul Man 51 Financial analyst Passive
Unia
Eva Woman 44 Clothes- saleswoman Active
Joao Man 50 Balm manufacturer Active
Nuno Man 60 Mason, taxi driver Active
Tiago Man 33 Foreman Passive
André Man 31 Mechanic Passive
Sarah Woman 53 Secretary Passive
Note: Age of interviewees during interview, i.e., 2009 and 2010. Analyzed interviews in bold.
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A.5 Quotes in the Empirical Chapters
This table demonstrates that we used activists’ excerpts in a balanced way throughout 
 chapters 4 and 5 in order to support our arguments with empirical evidence. Each column 
represents the number of quotes we used per case in each chapter. For example, Simone 
(SAB) is cited five times in Chapter 4 and four times in Chapter 5, resulting in a total of 
nine quotes in both chapters. The label “main case” refers to the case we selected to intro-
duce a particular cognitive dimension. There are two cases for each organization: one for 
participants’ understanding of common good (Chapter 4) and another for their under-
standing of politics (Chapter 5). “Special case” refers to activists who have another percep-
tion of one or both dimensions studied here. We highlight them in each chapter.
Table A.3 Number of Quotes per Case in Chapters 4 and 5
Activists Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Total
Solidarity across Borders
Adriana Main case 5 Main case + 5
Simone 5 4 9
Lisa 5 Main case Main case + 5
Colette 3 5 8
Wilhelm 3 3 6
Yan 5 4 9
(21) (21) (42)
Greenpeace
Margot 6 Main case Main case + 6
Nathan Main case 7 Main case + 7
Pierrette 5 6 11
Evelyne 5 6 11
Maria 5 2 7
Yves Special case Special case — 
(21) (21) (42)
Caritas
Christine 7 Main case Main case + 7
Elisabeth Special case Special case — 
Mathieu Main case 7 Main case + 7
Jérémie Special case Special case — 
Edwige 7 7 14
Emmanuelle 7 7 14
(21) (21) (42)
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Activists Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Total
Unia
Eva 5 6 11
Joao Main case 5 Main case +5
Nuno 4 Main case Main case +4
Tiago 4 5 9
André 5 2 7
Sarah 3 3 6
(21) (21) (42)
A.6 Representativeness of Survey Data
Table A.6 shows the data we used to judge the representativeness of the survey data. As 
mentioned in Chapter  1, in the section “Studying Activists’ Minds,” we are restricted 
to four (three for SAB and Caritas, two for Unia) indicators. For each organization, we 
mention the distribution within the population (pop.), the distribution in our sample 
(sample) as well the difference between the two. Based on gender and age, we have repre-
sentative samples for SAB, Greenpeace, Caritas, and Unia. However, within the sample of 
STP, young activists (between eighteen and twenty- four years old) are underrepresented. 
Stratifications in our sample led to large differences for commitment intensity and lan-
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